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Resumé/Summary	
 
 This thesis is about the rule of law in global governance and the role of legal 
expertise. It is about how contested concepts, vague wordings and political promises combine with 
international legal expertise to shape political and social realities in the making of global order(s). 
To this end, the aim of the thesis is to problematize and scrutinize the meaning and doings of the 
rule of law as a key concept in present-day international law and politics. Drawing on the case of 
internationally administered rule of law reforms in post-conflict Kosovo, the main problem I 
address in the thesis is – given the ambiguity of the very meaning of the concept – how, why and 
when is the meaning of the rule of law ‘fixed’, stabilized and made knowable to serve as a source 
of justification for the authority of international experts in ruling the domestic legal and what are 
the political implications thereof? To address this problem, I adopt a practice-oriented, multi-sited 
ethnographic approach to reconstruct the different and often conflicting meanings that are 
inscribed into the concept of the rule of law by various international actors, in particular 
international lawyers, engaged in rule of law reforms in the period from the establishment of the 
UN administration in 1999 until today where an European Union (EU) rule of law mission 
exercises extensive powers within the legal field in Kosovo. The main argument of the thesis is 
that the practical meaning of the rule of law in global governance is constituted through struggles 
over drawing the boundary between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ in the quest towards constructing and 
enacting law’s relative autonomy versus what is narrated and thus assessed as being social, 
political and moral influences. This plays out in the often mundane, everyday practices and 
ordinary language of international actors who are formally identified, authorized and justified to 
possess the professional knowledge – the particular expertise – that is required to solve the 
‘problem’ of the rule of law and thus to translate it into what it should be in practice. Importantly, 
the separation and relationship between law and politics is not naturally given in practice and can 
therefore not be taken for granted. The boundary between the two realms is narrated and enacted 
differently by different actors for a particular purpose, in a given time and place. Indeed, 
inscribing meanings into the rule of law follows from enacting and inscribing a particular meaning 
into the boundary between law and politics. In sum, the construction of knowledge and meaning 
around the ‘rule of law’ unfolds in struggles over discursively fixing, momentarily stabilizing and 
thereby inscribing meaning into this boundary, which in turn would authorize a particular group of 
actors and their attending solutions to the problem over other actors and their solutions. The 
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construction of knowledge and meaning around the ‘rule of law’, I will demonstrate in this thesis, 
is a result of how politics of translation play out in everyday practices of global governance. 
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Forord	
 
 Afhandlingen omhandler retsstatsprincippets rolle i global governance i dag. I nyere 
tid har retsstatsprincippet udviklet sig fra at være et udelukkende nationalt anliggende, som 
karakteriserede  moderne vestlige staters forfatningsmæssige strukturer og interne magtfordeling, 
til at udgøre et centralt og universelt politisk og juridisk princip for det indbyrdes forhold mellem 
ret og politik i global governance. Dette har blandt andet medført at internationale aktører, såsom 
FN, EU, og individuelle stater, har interveneret og er blevet tildelt vidtrækkende magtbeføjelser i 
postkonflikt- og såkaldt fejlslagne stater med det formål at ’promovere’ og opbygge en retsstat. 
Ikke desto mindre har retsstatsprincippets indtræden i globale og internationale fora medført, at 
dets mening fortolkes grundliggende forskelligt i praksis blandt aktører, der repræsenterer 
forskellige institutioner, professioner og former for viden. På baggrund af denne problemstilling er 
afhandlingens primære forskningsspørgsmål: Hvordan, hvornår og hvorfor – givet dets 
flertydighed– er retsstatsprincippets mening stabiliseret, ’fikseret’ og dermed konkretiseret med 
det formål at udgøre et normativt grundlag for internationale aktørers udøvelse af magt inden for 
et lands retslige processer? Og hvilke politiske konsekvenser følger deraf? Afhandlingen bygger 
på en begrebsanalytisk, etnografisk undersøgelse af hvordan retsstatsprincippet er blevet fortolket 
og dermed oversat af internationale aktører i Kosovo i perioden fra etableringen af en FN-
administration i 1999 til i dag, hvor den Europæiske Unions (EU) retsstatsmission, EULEX, 
udøver omfattende beføjelser inden for det retslige område i Kosovo. På baggrund af denne 
undersøgelse demonstrerer afhandlingen at retsstatsprincippets praktiske mening dannes i og 
igennem de konflikter der udfolder sig blandt internationale aktører omkring hvordan og hvor 
grænsen mellem ’ret’ og ’politik’ skal drages og hvilken mening, der skal indskrives i denne 
grænse. Afhandlingen argumenterer for at som følge af disse konflikter er retsstatsprincippets 
mening i global governance i konstant forandring og optager dermed forskellige meninger i tid og 
sted.  
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PROLOGUE	
Why	the	Rule	of	Law?		
 
 Something strange is happening to the idea we call the ‘rule of law’, the taken-for-
granted idea in Western thought that politics should be bound by law. Before I turn to the central 
question the thesis will address, I herewith outline three instances - three initial clues - that allude 
to this strangeness and will set the scene for what this thesis is about. 
 
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina,	1995	
 
 On December 14, 1995, the parties in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
signed the Dayton Peace Agreement. Not only did the war come to an end with their signatures. 
But in the very same moment, a new constitution in BiH entered into force. In fact, the 
constitution was an annex to the peace agreement and had been drafted primarily by American 
lawyers from the United States (US) State Department in a conference room in the US Air Force 
base in Dayton, Ohio (Bose 2002, 61). As stated by the first High Representative for BiH, Carl 
Bildt: ‘No-one thought it wise to submit the constitution to any sort of parliamentary or other 
similar proceeding. It was to be a constitution by international decree’ (Bildt, quoted in Chandler 
2006, 33). Almost two decades after the end of the war, the international attempt to establish a 
stable, constitutional state proves to have been a failure: the ethnic lines that constituted the source 
of the conflict in the 1990s were effectively institutionalized in the constitution’s recognition of 
three ‘constituent peoples’1, which has resulted in political allegiance being based on ethnicity. 
The political system comprised of two semi-autonomous entities2 has entailed permanent political 
turmoil, and a (re-)interpretation of the prerogatives of the ‘international community’ quickly 
turned the post-conflict state into an international protectorate ruled by international, executive 
decrees.3 Still, ‘[o]n paper, Dayton was a good agreement’, according to Richard Holbrooke 
                                                
1 The three constituents are Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats 
2 The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, respectively 
3 Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) established and thus provided the legal basis 
for the High Representative (HR) of BiH and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to 
oversee ‘the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement’ (‘The General 
Framework Agreement’, DPA, Annex 10, Art. 2.1.). Due to stalemates in Bosnian politics, the 
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(1998, 335), US negotiator in the peace talks in BiH, ‘[as] it ended the war and established a 
single, multi-ethnic country’ (ibid.). 
	
Kosovo,	1999	
 
 The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) are preparing NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo and Serbia, which was to be executed without a United Nations (UN) 
Security Council mandate. The intervention would therefore be illegal according to international 
law. When Robert Cook, then British Foreign Secretary, told the US Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright, that his legal advisors could not find a legal justification for the intervention without a 
Security Council mandate, Albright allegedly responded: ‘Get new lawyers!’ (Rubin 2000). The 
rule of law, however, had been invoked as a ‘right’ to protect in the event of NATO’s intervention 
in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. In a press statement issued a month into the bombing campaign 
NATO declared that ‘[t]he crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for 
which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law’4. A 
couple of months after the end of NATO’s intervention in June 1999 an international commission 
was established to address the question: ‘If international law no longer provides acceptable 
guidelines in such a situation [like Kosovo], what are the alternatives?’ (IICK 2000, 164). Noting 
that the interpretation of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention was ‘situated in a grey 
zone of ambiguity between an extension of international law and a proposal for an international 
moral consensus’ (ibid.), the commission infamously concluded that NATO’s intervention was 
‘illegal, yet legitimate’ (ibid., 186). 
                                                                                                                                                          
role of the HR became increasingly interventionist, in particular after the establishment of the so-
called ‘Bonn powers’ in 1997, which resulted from an expansionist re-interpretation of the Annex 
10 on the HR. From then on, the HR was authorized to unilaterally impose legalization and 
administrative acts to carry out his functions. In fact, all the important laws (eg. related to the 
judicial system, citizenship and national symbols) were adopted as executive, unilateral decrees by 
the HR. Moreover, the HR was authorized with the Bonn powers to dismiss local politicians and 
other officials (including presidents and prime ministers) who were accused of obstructing the 
proper implementation of the DPA. The HR adopted 757 decisions in the period from 1998 to 
2005, among which 119 concerned the removal from office of local officials and 286 the 
imposition or amendments of laws. See Woelk (2012), at 119  
4 NATO Press Release, ’Statement on Kosovo’ (’Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 23rd and 24th 
April 1999 (S-1(99)62) 
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 What is more, NATO’s intervention resulted in the establishment of a UN 
protectorate (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK) in June 1999 
that would govern Kosovo for the next almost nine years. Though the UN Secretary-General had 
declared that the executive head of UNMIK, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG), would serve as ‘the guarantor of the rule of law’ in post-conflict Kosovo5, the first 
regulation passed by the SRSG himself, which had the force of law in the country, provided that 
all executive, legislative and judicial powers would be vested in and ultimately exercised by one 
person, the SRSG.6 In fact, the same powers were granted the executive of the UN administration 
of East Timor following the referendum on independence from Indonesia in August 1999. In an 
unpublished note entitled ‘How Not to Run a Country’ the first SRSG in East Timor, Sergio 
Vieira de Mello, reflected on his experience as the ultimate executive authority in the country: 
‘The UN Administrator is nominated by the Secretary-General with little or no consultation with 
those who are to be administered. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter […] the Administrator is 
authorized to impose directives and policies as well as to use force more or less at will. There is no 
separation of the legislative or judicial from the executive authority. There are no positive models 
on how to exercise such broad powers […] The question remains open how the UN can exercise 
fair governance with absolute powers in societies recovering from war and oppression’ (Vieira de 
Mello, quoted in Beauvais 2000, 1101; emphasis added).   
 
Iraq,	2003	
 
 Fast forward to 2003. George W. Bush appoints former Ambassador, Paul Bremer, 
to serve as the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in occupied Iraq. 
Bremer would be in charge of ‘democratizing’ the post-conflict country by, among other means, 
replacing the Ba’ath regime’s rule by decree with the rule of law. In a speech on Iraq’s interim 
constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law, Bremer noted that ‘Iraqis know what happens 
when personality and position outweigh the law […] without the rule of law the government 
would become the country’s most powerful criminal’7. Ironically, as Iraq’s chief executive 
                                                
5 United Nations Security Council Report (S-1999-779), at 9 
6 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 
7 ‘Public Services Announcement’ by L. Paul Bremer on the Transitional Administrative Law and 
the Rule of Law. Available online: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-
iraq/democracy/PSAs/Rule_Law.html  
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authority in which all the country’s executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested, Bremer 
was authorized to rule by decree.8 A new arbitrary system was put in place as a result, in which the 
CPA, the military and foreign contractors would be outside the jurisdiction of Iraqi laws, 
according to an executive order passed by Bremer himself.9 ‘Exceptions’, according to Michael 
Ignatieff, human rights scholar and member of the commission that reviewed the legality of 
NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict, ‘do not destroy the rule [of law] but save it, provided 
that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort’ (2004, xiv). 
 
The	Rule	of	Law	–	One	Thing,	and	Many...	
 
 These three examples of post-conflict interventions tell us something about the 
ubiquity of the rule of law. And the failure of the rule of law. The past twenty years have 
witnessed a rapid rise in rule of law promotion (Belton 2005; Carothers 2006; Carothers 1998), 
which has been accompanied by a new interventionism justified in the name of humanitarian 
values (Chesterman 2001; Orford 2003) and the ceaseless broadening of international law’s scope. 
This development has been referred to as ‘the rule of law revival’ (Carothers 1998), a ‘fetishism of 
law’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006), the ‘conflation of law with the good’ (Kennedy 2004, 31), 
and the rapid ‘legalization of world politics’ (Abbott et al. 2000). Accordingly, the concept of the 
rule of law has moved to the center of global governance, where it has become both a key concept 
in a humanity-centered discourse of politics and a legal concept concerned with the lawfulness of 
international practices and the authority of international law. In a resolution adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 2012, the UN member states declared that ‘[w]e agree that our collective 
response to the challenges and opportunities arising from the many complex political, social and 
economic transformations before us must be guided by the rule of law, as it is the foundation of 
friendly and equitable relations between States and the basis on which just and fair societies are 
                                                
8 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01 
9 Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), ’Status of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, MNF – Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq’, CPA/ORD/27 June 2004/17, 
Section 2 para. 1 on ’Iraqi Legal Process’: ’Unless provided otherwise herein, the MNF, the CPA, 
Foreign Liaison Missions, their Personnel, property, funds and assets, and all International 
Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi legal process’. Also in the case of Kosovo, UNMIK and 
NATO’s forces in Kosovo (KFOR) would be immune from legal process. 
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built’10. The concept has, as such, come to constitute a nexus between law and politics in the 
international realm. ‘We see a revival of the Grotian moment’, Teitel (2011) notes, ‘in a discourse 
of international affairs that is increasingly preoccupied by the legality – not just the political bona 
fides – of global engagements’ (217).  
 However, the post-Cold War enthusiasm for the rule of law and the beginning of a 
renewed interventionism justified by reference to humanitarian and liberal values have resulted in 
some ambiguous enactments of its meaning in practice – to which the external interventions in 
BiH, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq testify. In the case of BiH, a constitutional state under the rule 
of law was understood as a tool to put an end to the war. As such, the rule of law was replaced by 
a rule of US lawyers and diplomats, and the source of the constitution was not the will of a local 
constituent people but an internationally brokered peace agreement. In the case of Kosovo, the 
rule of law was used as an important reason and justification for NATO’s use of force. However, 
not only was the intervention illegal, but once the international administration of the newly 
‘deliberated’ country was in place, the general idea that the rule of law resides in the separation of 
powers was quickly discounted. Finally, in the case of Iraq, the rule of law had been defined by 
Bremer as the desired end-state of a political community where no rulers would be above the law 
(echoing the Aristotelian conception of the rule of law as nomos basileus, where politicians are 
merely guardians of and servants to the law). Yet, what was delivered on this promise came to be 
a political and legal situation where external actors were placed outside the jurisdiction of Iraqi 
courts, based on a decree by the country’s ultimate executive authority in that period, which 
effectively undermined the alleged supreme authority of law’s rule.  
 The rule of law has become a post-Cold War metanarrative in global governance. A 
narrative to which politicians, generals, diplomats, activists and lawyers alike seem to subscribe. 
Yet, a narrative – as the above initial clues tell us – that adopts different meanings once we turn to 
what people are actually doing with the ‘rule of law’. The rule of law, it seems, has become an 
essentially contested concept. As stressed in passing in a UN guidebook on how to ‘implement’ 
the rule of law in peacebuilding processes, ‘[t]he rule of law is a principle of governance. It is also 
a fundamental aspect of peacebuilding and related efforts to build effective and credible criminal 
justice institutions. Although the term “rule of law” is widely used and often linked to State-
                                                
10 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Declaration 
of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels (67th session, November 30, 2012) A/RES/67/1 
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building [sic] efforts, there is no single agreed-upon definition’11. These three instances of the role 
and rule of law in a post-intervention setting beg the question of what ‘rule of law’ international 
actors talk about when they talk about the rule of law? The ambiguity and seemingly elusiveness 
of the rule of law have led some commentators to suggest that it has become ‘meaningless’ to 
concern oneself with the ‘rule of law’ due to its ‘ideological abuse and general over-use’ (Shklar 
1998, 21); that the rule of law has become ‘a slogan’ (Raz 1979, 213), an ‘exceedingly elusive 
notion’ (Tamanaha 2004, 3), and ‘a much celebrated, historic ideal, the precise meaning of which 
can be less clear today than ever before’ (Fallon 1997, 1). Maybe, as Shklar (1998, 21) concludes, 
we should just discard or neglect the concept all together. This hollow ringing, empty vessel of a 
buzzword. And yet, the widespread and seemingly unchallenged reference to the ‘rule of law’ in 
everyday global politico-legal discourses, but also in academic studies within the disciplines of 
International Relations (IR) and International Law (IL), suggests that the concept continues to 
enjoy a surprisingly high degree of normative currency, resilience, and power. 
 
Research	Question	
 
 This raises a number of questions. Why is it that the rule of law has become a core 
concept in global governance given that its very meaning appears as ambiguous and contested in 
practice? What work does the rule of law do in the world? Or rather – what world is being made 
real and actualized based on the meanings that are inscribed into the rule of law? What practices, 
forms of knowledge and subject positions are made, authorized and justified in its name and 
through the seemingly widespread belief in its virtues? In reconstructing the epistemic and social 
roots of the rule of law’s practical meanings in the case of internationally administered rule of law 
reforms in post-conflict Kosovo (1999-2015), the overall research question this thesis will address 
is the following:  
 
How is the meaning of the rule of law made knowable in practice? 
	
	
                                                
11 The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators Implementation Guide and Project Tools (2011) 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf; at v 
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Chapter	1	
INTRODUCTION	
 
'To conclude that international law must adjust to political reality [...] is 
to miss the point, since international law is part of political reality and 
serves as an institutional means of developing and rejecting a general 
consensus on the nature of international reality'12 
 
 ‘Although it is easy to think of international affairs as a rolling sea of 
politics over which we have managed to throw but a thin net of legal 
rules, in truth the situation today is more the reverse. There is law at 
every turn – and only the most marginal opportunities for engaged 
political contestation’13 
 
Problem	and	Purposes	
 
 This thesis is about the rule of law in global governance and the role of legal 
expertise. It is about how contested concepts, vague wordings and political promises combine with 
international legal expertise to shape political and social realities in the making of global order(s). 
To this end, the aim of the thesis is to problematize and scrutinize the meaning and doings of the 
rule of law as a key concept in present-day international law and politics. Drawing on the case of 
internationally administered rule of law reforms in post-conflict Kosovo, the main problem I 
address in the thesis is – given the ambiguity of the very meaning of the concept – how, why and 
when is the meaning of the rule of law ‘fixed’, stabilized and made knowable to serve as a source 
of justification for the authority of international experts in ruling the domestic legal and what are 
the political implications thereof? To address this problem, I adopt a practice-oriented, multi-sited 
ethnographic approach to reconstruct the different and often conflicting meanings that are 
                                                
12 William D. Coplin (1965) International Law and Assumptions about the State System. World 
Politics 17 (4): 615-634, at 633 
13 David Kennedy (2006a) Of War and Law (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press), at 
25 
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inscribed into the concept of the rule of law by various international actors, in particular 
international lawyers, engaged in rule of law reforms in the period from the establishment of the 
UN administration in 1999 until today where an European Union (EU) rule of law mission 
exercises extensive powers within the legal field in Kosovo. As such, the thesis does not depart 
from a rereading of the rule of law’s (Western) historical narratives, from its origins in Greek and 
Roman thought (‘rule of law, not men’, ‘law is king’, ‘law is reason’), through its medieval roots 
(‘law is divine’, ‘law is universal’), and towards its upshot in liberalism during the Enlightenment 
(‘where law ends, tyranny begins’). Neither do I intend to advance any specific, a priori 
understanding of what the rule of law is. What I am interested in is how international actors 
produce knowledge about and inscribe meanings into the ‘rule of law’ within a policy paradigm of 
post-intervention humanitarian governance. 
 The purpose of the thesis is threefold. First, I want to show how, why and when a 
certain issue – here the ‘rule of law’ – gets turned into a ‘problem’ to which only the ‘international 
community’ has the ‘solution’. To this end, I reconstruct how a semantic field was constructed 
around the rule of law in UN and EU intervention discourses and what professional knowledge 
and subject positions were identified and enacted as a result. Whilst the so-called ‘international 
community’ is not a homogenous construct but consists of a variety of multi- and bilateral actors 
drawing on different forms of knowledge and often conflicting agendas, the purpose is, second, to 
understand the various ways in which the meaning of seemingly shared norms and concepts of 
international law and politics gets momentarily fixed and stabilized in practice. Drawing on a 
mobile and multi-sited ethnography, I follow the ‘rule of law’ between and within different sites 
and situations to reconstruct how its meaning(s) is made knowable and enacted by various vested 
actors through ‘promoting the rule of law’. This relates to the third purpose of the thesis, which is 
to introduce translation as an analytical lens to foreground the mutual constitution of semantic 
fields and social orders and the constitutive role of boundary-drawing in processes of knowledge 
production and the making of meaning. To this end, I approach the sayings and doings of 
international experts as a practice of translation: a boundary-drawing practice that simultaneously 
keeps separate and connects semantic and social fields in its promise to create connectivity and 
continuity out of what is the basic condition of translation, that is, the presence of disconnectivity 
and discontinuity. 
 The main argument of the thesis is that the practical meaning of the rule of law in 
global governance is constituted through struggles over drawing the boundary between ‘law’ and 
‘politics’ in the quest towards constructing and enacting law’s relative autonomy versus what is 
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narrated and thus assessed as being social, political and moral influences. This plays out in the 
often mundane, everyday practices and ordinary language of international actors who are formally 
identified, authorized and justified to possess the professional knowledge – the particular expertise 
– that is required to solve the ‘problem’ of the rule of law and thus to translate it into what it 
should be in practice. Importantly, the separation and relationship between law and politics is not 
naturally given in practice and can therefore not be taken for granted. The boundary between the 
two realms is narrated and enacted differently by different actors for a particular purpose, in a 
given time and place. Indeed, inscribing meanings into the rule of law follows from enacting and 
inscribing a particular meaning into the boundary between law and politics. In sum, the 
construction of knowledge and meaning around the ‘rule of law’ unfolds in struggles over 
discursively fixing, momentarily stabilizing and thereby inscribing meaning into this boundary, 
which in turn would authorize a particular group of actors and their attending solutions to the 
problem over other actors and their solutions. The ‘rule of law’, in other words, becomes a ‘thing 
of boundaries’ (Abbott 1995). The construction of knowledge and meaning around the ‘rule of 
law’, I will demonstrate in this thesis, is a result of how politics of translation play out in everyday 
practices of global governance.14   
  
Theory	and	Methods	
 
 To make this argument, I adopt a reconstructive and what I term a translationalist 
approach to the case study, which suggests that the meaning of a concept cannot be extracted from 
what the concept refers to in a ‘world out there’ but has to be assembled – reconstructed - from 
how it is used in practice and what it does in terms of constituting social orders and subject 
positions, particular representations of the world and forms of knowledge in a given context. 
Accordingly, this implies paying special attention to who is authorized to define what the meaning 
of a concept is and what politics is involved in so doing. To this end, I use a multi-sited 
ethnographic approach to the case study that foregrounds the different institutional sites, forms of 
knowledge and language games in and through which the meaning of the rule of law is enacted 
                                                
14 I use the term ’global governance’ instead of ’international relations’, for instance, to suggest 
that the focus is not on inter-state relations but encompasses a variety of actors, such as 
International Organizations (IOs), regional organizations, NGOs, and individual states, etc. In the 
thesis I often refer to actors external to the domestic context as ’international actors’, which also 
refer to NGOs, for instance 
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through various and often contradictory practices of drawing the boundary between law and 
politics.  
 The empirical material of the thesis draws on fieldwork conducted in the period from 
August 2011 to April 2015 in both Kosovo (eight months in total) and Brussels (four months in 
total) and 113 interviews with, primarily, international judges and prosecutors, international legal 
advisors and other international actors within the following institutions: UNMIK, the European 
Commission (EC) in Brussels and in the EC office in Kosovo, the headquarters of EULEX in 
Kosovo and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) mission to Kosovo, the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), and bilateral donor organizations, in particular, and the USAID. During my 
fieldwork in Kosovo I conducted participant observations in courts following war crimes cases 
adjudicated by panels of a majority of international judges, in the working groups on amending the 
criminal code and the constitution of Kosovo, and I participated in some of the outreach activities 
of EULEX in informing about the its role and the rule of law in schools in Kosovo. My empirical 
data also includes reports, press releases and other documents produced by these various 
institutions.    
 What informed my choice of sites and the way in which I conducted the interviews 
was the idea of the rule of law as a ‘transverse line’. In geometry, a transversal is a line that passes 
through and connects two parallel lines. In this capacity, a transverse line is performative of new 
angles and geometric shapes. But it is also used by the mathematician to judge whether two lines 
are in fact parallel and thereby outbalance one another, which the angles the transverse line creates 
can disclose. The concept of the ‘rule of law’ is what bounds disperse sites, international actors 
and professions together in the context of internationally administered rule of law reforms in post-
conflict Kosovo. Following the rule of law from one point of departure at the outset of my 
fieldwork led me through different institutional sites, texts and events in time and place, where the 
practical meaning of the rule of law would take new and different shapes. The two parallel lines 
symbolize how the meaning of the rule of law is embedded and enacted in practices of drawing the 
boundary between law and politics. The meaning of the rule of law in Western liberal thinking 
builds on the idea of the separation between law and politics. The system of checks and balances 
is in place when the transversal shows that the two lines are in parallel, which would result in a 
neat and ideal conception of the rule of law that fits liberal thinking about this concept.  
 But, as the painting of Kandinsky shows us, a transverse line can cut through a 
landscape that is much messier. In the office of the international judge in the regional court in 
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Mitrovica, for instance, the boundary between what would pertain to being law and what would be 
ruled out as being outside of law’s rule had a different meaning than in the EULEX Office of the 
Head of Mission back in Pristina, where law should rule insofar it would not challenge the fragile 
political stability in the country. The meaning of the rule of law within these two institutional sites 
was translated fundamentally differently, as a result, but each meaning served to justify the 
professional role of the actor within the domestic legal of Kosovo. For this reason, whereas the 
rule of law transgresses the boundary between law and politics, the enactments of this boundary 
and the meaning there is thereby inscribed into it would continuously be contested and changed in 
practice, which would result in the performance of different practical meanings of the rule of law. 
The performativity of the rule of law means that its discursive construction attempts to create a 
particular reality that it envisions (Austin 1962). During interviews I therefore never asked ‘what 
is the rule of law?’. The trivial response might have been that it is about the separation of powers 
and of law and politics. I wanted my interviewees to tell stories and anecdotes from their everyday 
life on mission and from their work in offices in Brussels; stories about their past experiences with 
similar missions, about the early days when UNMIK entered the country or about their own first 
introduction to Kosovo and expat life. It is from these various accounts that I reconstruct how 
different translations of the rule of law are being made and enacted from different partial 
perspectives and situated knowledges (Haraway 1988).    
 To address the main question of the thesis and develop the argument outlined above, 
I engage with a variety of different disciplines and literatures. The theoretical framework of the 
thesis combines insights from critical approaches to the politics of international law and the role of 
legal experts in global governance with the broad church of translation studies and, in particular, 
cultural studies, post-colonial and sociological approaches to translation. Drawing on literature 
and insights from both IR and IL on the politics of international law, I propose an interdisciplinary 
approach to my case study, which is facilitated by conceptualizing international law as a practice 
of arguing informed by particular forms of knowledge and modes of reasoning that combined 
construct international law as a relatively autonomous social field distinguished from other social 
or functional field (Koskenniemi 2005; 2009a, Kratochwil 1989; 2004; Rajkovic, Aalberts and 
Gammeltoft-Hansen 2016; Venzke 2012). To conceptualize law as a practice of arguing that is 
bounded by the limits that are set by particular language games entails a move to boundaries and 
the role of actors – international experts – who through their practices constitute the field of 
international law. To this end, I draw on literature in IR and IL that addresses the dynamic and 
changing boundaries underpinning international law (see, among others contributions, Amoore 
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2013; de Goede and de Graaf 2013; Kessler 2008; Teitel 2011) and the discursive and social 
boundaries that are enacted to separate legality from non- or alegality (Johns 2013; Lindahl 2013; 
Liste 2008) as well as the politics of expertise in international law (de Goede and Sullivan 2013; 
Kennedy 2004; 2005; 2006a; 2016; Koskenniemi 2007b; Kessler and Werner 2013; Leander and 
Aalberts 2013; Riles 2000; 2011; Sullivan 2014; Werner 2014).  
 Common for this literature is its resistance to an orthodox or ‘enlightened’ (Simma 
and Paulus 1999) positivist picture of international law-making where international law is 
confined to a body of rules that regulate inter-state relations and its resistance to conceptualizing 
the power of legality in global governance as deriving from international legal rules’ ‘clarity’ and 
‘precision’ (Abbott et al. 2000). To the contrary, this literature on which the thesis draws 
addresses the semantic indeterminacy of international law that results from its ever expanding 
scope, the introduction of new words and vocabularies as well as international law being 
performative of a ‘continual making and remaking of global political possibilities’ (Johns 2013, 1) 
and of shaping social and political realities and possible futures. For these reasons, a common 
thread in this literature, which distinguishes it from positivist and formalist approaches to 
international law, is the recognition that international law is a contingent and performative practice 
through which the indeterminacy and uncertainty of international legal rules and norms are tackled 
and twisted in and through the doings and sayings of not only state officials but, in particular, 
international lawyers and other actors who increasingly partake in the making and interpretation of 
international law. Yet, it has been noted, there is still a need to address ‘the role of international 
lawyers in the construction (and deconstruction) of international law’ (Werner 2010, 307), which 
remains ‘drastically understudied’ (Kennedy 2009, 53).  
 These insights inform my turn to translation. I combine the literature on the politics 
of international law outlined above with translation studies and, in particular, cultural studies 
(Sakai 1997; 2009; Solomon 2014), post-colonial (Bhabha 1994; Niranjana 1992; Tymoczko 
2010) and sociological (Callon 1980; 1986, 1995; Latour 1987, 2005) approaches to translation. 
Doing so I develop an analytical framework centered on translation, which foregrounds the mutual 
constitution of semantic fields and social orders and the performativity of boundaries in the 
production of knowledge and meaning. This framework is based on my approach to translation as 
a privileged practice in global governance that in the face of semantic indeterminacy momentarily 
fixes and stabilizes meaning. I conceptualize translation as a boundary-drawing practice that 
simultaneously keeps separate and connects different social and semantic fields in time and space, 
which it then purports to bridge. The gap between these fields does not consciously exist prior to 
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the practice of translation but is rendered fixed, determinate, and knowable in translation and 
becomes thereby its effect. As such, translation is a temporal, disruptive event that creates a 
discontinuity that it then purports to overcome in creating continuity.  
 Why is a translationalist approach useful for my research question and main 
argument? It offers a venue into understanding the practices in and around narrating and enacting 
a gap between law and politics that are then imagined as two juxtaposed and bounded fields, 
which would authorize the international expert – the international judge or the Head of Mission, 
for instance – to intervene and impose her solution to what has been identified as a problem in a 
given context, at a given time. Depending on who is authorized to act in a given moment due to a 
particular way in which meaning is inscribed into the boundary between law and politics, either 
‘politics’ would be what is the problem and to tame politics would be the solution in safeguarding 
the relative autonomy of law. Or ‘law’ is identified as the problem and to instrumentalize law for a 
certain political purpose would be the solution. Similar to how translation depends on 
transforming what is foreign and thus othered into familiar and commensurate terms to serve a 
certain purpose (constituting meaning in a new context for a certain audience), the politics of 
translation in constructing the practical meaning of the rule of law depends on othering either law 
or politics in order to then domesticate one of the two into fitting a particular purpose, whilst 
excluding alternative translations. My move to translation as an analytical lens and as a practice of 
constructing meaning and knowledge foregrounds how meaning is momentarily rendered fixed 
and stabilized in global governance and, importantly, the agency involved in so doing.  
   
Case	and	Choices	
 
 The case of Kosovo is chosen as rule of law promotion became intrinsically linked 
with humanitarian interventionism and the expanding (however contested) scope of international 
law following the end of the Cold War. Three main dimensions of the case of Kosovo supports 
this choice. First, the intervention in Kosovo and the establishment of UNMIK constitute a pivotal 
moment in the relationship between law and politics in global governance, reflected in the 
infamous conclusion that NATO’s intervention was illegal but legitimate. Kosovo came to be a 
symbol for a renewed activism on the part of the Security Council and the ‘international 
community’ and for a ‘new moral internationalism’ (Koskenniemi 2003). Among some IR 
scholars this was termed a ‘turn towards legitimacy language’ (Hurd 2007) and within IL Franck 
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had shortly after the end of the Cold War observed ‘an emerging right to democratic governance’ 
(1992) which would later provide the backdrop for turning the rule of law into a problem to which 
international actors had the right expertise and solutions. International interventions in post-
conflict and so-called ‘failed’ states and the subsequent executive and legal administration over 
territories by international actors (eg. in the case of BiH, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq) seemed, in 
the words of Orford (2003), ‘to rehearse colonial fantasies about the need for benevolent tutelage 
of uncivilized people who were as yet unable to govern themselves’ (11). Among both IR and IL 
scholars, post-Cold War humanitarian interventions and peacebuilding missions – of which the 
case of Kosovo is a prime example - have often and critically been referred to as the revitalization 
of colonial trusteeship (Wilde 2008), a modern-day ‘mission civilisatrice’ (Paris 2002, 638) which 
results in ‘benevolent autocracy’ (Chesterman 2004, 126).   
 Furthermore, and closely related to the first point, post-intervention Kosovo 
constitutes the most ambitious state-building project in which the UN and the EU, respectively, 
have engaged to date. From 1999 until 2008, Kosovo was under a UN protectorate, and in 2008, 
the day prior to the adoption in Kosovo’s Assembly of the unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI), the EU launched its largest mission in the albeit short history of its civilian crisis 
management policy, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). A host of different rule of 
law projects has been executed in Kosovo by external actors for the purpose of rebuilding the 
post-war state: transitional constitutions, internationalized criminal tribunals (the so-called hybrid 
courts, which was the first time in the history of international law such courts were established in a 
domestic context15), international prosecution of ‘serious crimes’ (eg. corruption and war crimes), 
drafting of criminal codes and other laws, training of police, and the reconstruction of the judicial 
system to enhance the ‘access to justice’. The state-building project has been backed by an 
immense and rather fragmented (in terms of expertise and mandates) field of bi- and multilateral 
donors. In fact, Kosovo is the country that has received by far the largest flow of aid, in per capita, 
ever disbursed to a post-war or developing country. The immense involvement of international 
actors in (re)constructing the legal in post-conflict Kosovo would turn the country into a 
‘laboratory’ for exercising different rule of law reforms. In fact, new laws were drafted and 
                                                
15 Soon after the UN also established hybrid courts in East Timor. Hybrid or ’mixed’ courts 
(sometimes also referred to as ’consular courts’) were also established in colonized or semi-
colonial countries by the colonial power and laws applied in these courts would by a mix of local 
laws and the laws of the colonized power. In Ethopia, for instance, there was a British-sponsored 
mixed court after the end of the Second World War (Feyissa 2016) 
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enacted by international actors in such a speedy manner that five years into UNMIK’s mandate 
Kosovo’s Ombudsperson rebuked what he called a ‘legal chaos’16. 
 Finally, the case of Kosovo differs from other similar cases of post-intervention 
statebuilding by international actors. The status issue of Kosovo was and has never been solved. 
The mandate of UNMIK provided that the mission would respect Serbia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, whilst Kosovo would enjoy ‘substantial authority’ – a term that was never 
clarified and has created a lot of uncertainty as to the functional scope of the UN’s role and the 
future status issue of Kosovo. In 2008, following various but failed attempts to replace the 
mandate of UNMIK with a new UN Security Council resolution that would pave the way for 
Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo unilaterally declared itself independent and adopted its own 
constitution a few months later. However, as UNMIK’s mandate is open-ended, and no consensus 
has been reached insofar in the UN Security Council on Kosovo’s status, the UN is still de jure the 
ultimate executive authority in Kosovo. As a result, two legal realities define and co-exist today in 
the legal field of Kosovo: one based on the constitution adopted by Kosovo’s Assembly following 
the UDI and the other based on international law, that is, the mandate of UNMIK, Resolution 
1244, from which regulations adopted by the executive of UNMIK, the SRSG, in the period from 
1999 to 2008 would still derive their legal force in post-UDI Kosovo, according to international 
law17.  
 These three dimensions combined makes Kosovo a case in point to identify how and 
the extent to which this post-Cold War turn to ethics and a ‘language of legitimacy’ is materialized 
in practices of rule of law promotion ‘on the ground’. The extended period stretching over more 
than fifteen years of international presence in the legal field in Kosovo (which does not seem to 
end any time soon) as well as the broad range of international actors involved in legal and judicial 
reforms offer a fertile ground for reconstructing how the practical meaning of the rule of law in 
global governance is constructed in a given case in and through ‘everyday’ practices of 
international actors. The oddity of this case – Kosovo’s contested statehood and the presence of 
what I called two legal realities – also allows to unravel how the meaning of the rule of law is 
constructed in and between these realities, which entails the question as to whose law should rule, 
when and why.  
                                                
16 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Fourth Annual Report (2003-2004), published July 12, 
2004, 1-96, at 8 
17 According to the 2010 ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s UDI, there are no applicable 
prohibition of declarations of interdependence in international law and the UDI did therefore not 
breach international law 
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 Two main analytical choices limit my field of inquiry, which relate to the actors on 
which I am focusing and the historical context of the case. First, by adopting an ethnographic 
approach of ‘studying up’ my case is limited to how international actors – experts – construct 
meaning on the rule of law that is transformed into various legal and judicial policies imposed in 
the domestic context in Kosovo. Doing so, my interviews and participant observations were 
carried out among international actors, for instance, within the offices of the EU rule of law 
mission and offices of international judges in regional courts, and the documents I draw on are 
reports, press releases and other texts drafted and issued by international actors. One of the reasons 
for so doing – and therefore for not interviewing local actors and mapping different conceptions of 
the rule of law among these actors in a historical and contemporary context – is to scrutinize how 
international actors narrate a certain context, the ‘local context’, in which they subsequently 
empower themselves to intervene in.  
 Another and related reason – which became clear to me shortly within the first part 
of my fieldwork – is that struggles over how to define and make the rule of law in the case of 
Kosovo did not take place between international and local actors but between international actors 
situated in different institutional sites (for instance, the US Embassy, the European Commission 
and the Office of the Head of Mission of EULEX). The legal and judicial policies of international 
actors were in no significant degree contested among local political and judicial actors – which is 
surprising in itself. Indeed, as I will show in the thesis, this harks back to how international actors 
have constructed the local context, constituted the rule of law as a problem and lifted themselves 
into powerful positions due to which there has since the establishment of UNMIK been very 
limited space for local political and legal actors to contest and challenge the practices of the 
‘international community’. I therefore chose to focus solely on international actors and why – and 
how – this situation emerged and became ‘normal’.  
 This last point relates to my second choice in limiting the field of inquiry, which 
regards the historical context of the case. I do not explicitly place the international administration 
of Kosovo in a historical context comparing the case with past instances of international 
transitional administrations (ITAs) (see Stahn 2010 and Wilde 2008 for in-depth studies of the 
historical development of ITAs up to present-day international administrations and peacebuilding 
missions) or imperial, colonial practices (where the transfer of Western legal institutions to the 
colonized was an important means in the colonial enterprise; see Humphreys 2010; 2012, who 
compares contemporary rule of law promotion in different functional fields with past colonial 
practices). This choice is primarily informed by the page limits of this thesis, to be sure. Past 
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practices and developments do play an important role in both how international law is enacted 
towards so-called ‘failed states’ (Anghie 2005). It is also by turning to past practices that the 
universal aspirations and belief in progress attached to liberal thought and ideas can be critically 
assessed as these ideas were developed relatively with the expansion of the British Empire (Mehta 
1999)18.  
 However, this choice of not engaging in any comparative analysis of historical 
equivalents to my case does allow for addressing another interesting question, which is whether or 
how this ‘legitimacy language’ that emerged up through the 1990s, reflected in discourses on the 
rule of law and other ‘humanitarian values’, becomes a problem in practice for international actors 
involved in state-building through rule of law reforms. By this I mean that when international 
actors turn the rule of law into an important problem to which they have the solution, do they – 
maybe unintentionally – turn this problem against themselves, too? Do they assess their own 
practices according to the meaning they attached to the rule of law? ‘The rule of law vocabulary is 
itself’, Humphreys (2010) points out, ‘adopted in part precisely to highlight discontinuities (some 
very real, others rather more aspirational) with the colonial past’ (110). Indeed, by discarding the 
historical context and thereby also the analogy to the ‘civilizing mission’ and the ‘colonial 
trusteeship’, the assumption that such a self-awareness and reflection is absent among 
international actors is challenged and can be, in turn, reconstructed from how international actors 
deal with this ‘turn to ethics’ in everyday practices.     
  
Claims	and	Contributions	
  
 One may think that enough has already been said and written about the rule of law in 
global governance. To be sure, the ‘rule of law revival’ (Carothers 1998) has resulted in a 
burgeoning literature that has addressed the various international and transnational policies of 
‘promoting the rule of law’ (Kleinfeld-Belton 2005; Carothers 2006; Carothers 1998; Craig 1997; 
Grenfell 2013; Humphreys 2010; Hurwitz and Huang 2008; Kennedy 2006a; Magen 2004; 
                                                
18 ‘The liberal association with the British Empire was extended and deep’, according to Mehta 
(2009, 4): ‘Historically, the fact that most British political theorists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries were deeply involved with the empire in their writings and often in its 
administration is seldom given any significance or even mentioned in the framing of this 
intellectual traditions. As a consequence of this neglect, it is often overlooked that, for instance, 
the overwhelming majority of Edmund Burke’s published writings deal with the British Empire, 
be it in India, America, or Ireland’ (ibid., 5-6) 
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Morlino and Palombella 2011; Palombella and Walker 2009; Stromseth et al. 2006; Trubek and 
Santos 2006; Zürn et al. 2014; see also Heupel (2012) for a review of rule of law promotion and 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Teitel (2000) for the role of the rule of law in transitional 
justice). Since 2009, even a journal has been dedicated entirely to the study of the rule of law, 
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. A common thread that runs through a large part of this 
literature is the ambiguity of the meaning of the rule of law and the recognition that the concept 
has been turned into a field of immense inter- and transnational activity. The ‘rule of law’ looks 
‘like the proverbial blind man’s elephant’, Kleinfeld-Belton (2005) observes, ‘a trunk to one 
person, a tail to another’ (5-6). The concept is ‘theatrical’, according to Humphreys (2010), a 
reflection of a certain international Zeitgeist. Rule of law has become an ‘industry’ (Peerenboom 
2009, 9), a ‘big business’ (Trubek 2006, 82) and an ‘enterprise’ (Faundez 2005, 567) populated by 
‘rule of law doctors’ (Garth and Dezalay 2005, 1). To address its ambiguity, some scholars have 
resorted to empirically ‘measuring’ the very effectiveness of the rule of law according to its 
‘supply’ side (‘donors’) and ‘demand’ side (‘recipients’) (Zürn et al. 2014, 3-4; see also Jensen 
and Heller 2003; Møller and Skaaning 2014), which to a certain extent reflects the way in which 
IOs, NGOs and semi-private organizations approach the rule of law through indices and rankings, 
eg. the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators for Rule of Law and the American Bar 
Association’s World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. Other scholars have concerned themselves 
with defining the ‘rule of law’, which has resulted in some consensus that one can distinguish 
between a ‘thin’ and procedural conception and a ‘thick’ and substantive conception of the rule of 
law (Kleinfeld-Belton 2005; Tamanaha 2004; Møller and Skaaning 2014; Peerenboom 2002). The 
uptake of the rule of law from its domestic context to dispersed fora of international and global 
governance has furthermore led some commentators to suggest that those IOs that assume the 
most authority and activity in promoting the rule of law are also the most likely to internalize rule 
of law principles in their own governing structures (Gemkow and Zürn 2014). The rule of law’s 
liberating and progressive effects have in particular been stressed by American IR and IL scholars 
(Abbott et al. 2000; Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006; Slaughter 2004) who observe the emergence of 
a ‘formal global legal system’ underpinned by a ‘community of courts’ where rule of law 
principles are shared and enforced by legal actors to ensure a more just world order of liberal 
states (Slaughter 1995; 2003; 2004). In response to the question ‘why constitutionalize?’ Franck 
(2009) stressed that there is a valid reason to insist on this ‘constitutionalization paradigm’ in 
global governance as it ‘contains elements of checks and balances intended to operate 
autonomously to prevent abuses of power‘ (xii). Politics is effectively bound by law. 
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 This thesis takes a different tack. In turning to how the meaning of the rule of law is 
translated through different and dispersed practices of international humanitarian governance, the 
thesis shows that the rule of law constrains but also enables politics simultaneously. There are 
both rule of law and non-rule of law, legalities and illegalities, that exist at the same time, vying 
with each other, and made possible by the same condition, that is, the Janus-faced nature of law as 
both enabling and constraining particular practices. The same condition, in other words, makes the 
rule of law both possible and impossible, which presents us with a paradox. The three instances 
outlined in the prelude to this chapter demonstrate this point. It is by reconstructing the condition 
of possibility of this paradox that we can identify how the practical meaning(s) of the rule of law 
is momentarily fixed and made knowable in a given context. This relates to the main argument of 
the thesis. The presence of the rule of law and the non-rule of law, legalities and illegalities 
follows from practices of simultaneously enacting and collapsing the boundary between law and 
politics, the meaning of which depends on partial perspectives in contingent contexts that have to 
be reconstructed from practice.   
 Retrieving lesser-known stories from the field of ‘rule of law promotion’ serves to 
redress a rather positivist and positive account of the doings and diffusion of the rule of law in 
global governance. I deal with those lesser-known stories in showing that they in their aggregate 
render the ‘international’ much more heterogeneous and pluralistic, antagonistic and at times 
epistemically violent. Doing so, the thesis locates rule of law promotion in practices of 
international law that follow from its expanding scope, indeterminacy, growing hybridity and thus 
contested boundaries. It investigates how international law is used for political ends in promoting 
the rule of law and the roles its agents – international legal advisors, judges and prosecutors – play 
in this field of rule of law promotion. Insights from the field and the focus on the role of 
international law in promoting the rule of law, I believe, remains understudied and in need to be 
addressed to provide a more critical perspective on the doings of the rule of law and legal 
expertise in contemporary global governance. By reconstructing how the meaning of the rule of 
law is (re)made and enacted in practice in the case of internationally administered rule of law 
reforms in post-conflict Kosovo, the thesis sets out to uncover the ‘dark sides’ of rule of law 
promotion today. To that end, the thesis advances three broad claims. Combined, the three claims 
shift the analytical lens away from taken-for-granted boundaries between law and politics, the 
technical and the political and what is ‘normal’ and what is the exception towards how these 
boundaries are imagined, narrated and enacted in multiple and often contradictory practices that in 
 30 
their aggregate perform particular desired political and social realities in the making of global 
order(s).  
 First, the thesis demonstrates why the use of a constitutional language in global 
governance has resulted in a growing fragmentation of international legal expertise in showing 
how the emergence of the rule of law in UN and EU discourses on post-conflict intervention was 
complemented by the identification of relevant expertise that would be embedded in different and 
dispersed institutional sites within these two organizations. This claim addresses two 
contemporary ways of narrating the ‘international legal’. It has recently been observed that we are 
witnessing a ‘constitutional turn’ in international law (Dunoff 2009, 178) where the UN Charter, 
for instance, constitutes a system of constitutional norms to which the ‘international community’ 
is committed (Fassbender 1998; 2009). These common constitutional norms, it is argued, can 
‘provide a framework that allows for the constructive engagement of different sites of authority 
with one another’ (Kumm 2009, 272). ‘There is no deep conceptual difference between national 
and international constitutionalism’, Kumm (2009, 323) claims. International institutions, such as 
the EU and the World Trade Organization (WTO), ‘display features that make them constitutional 
in a significant sense’ (Stone Sweet 2009, 644). The rule of law, in turn, has become part and 
parcel of a shared cosmopolitan and thus universal value-system that underpins the international 
community, stabilizes expectations and thereby renders inter-regime conflicts in the international 
realm less likely (de Wet 2006). The entrance of the rule of law into the realm of global 
governance means that politics can effectively be tamed by law, which results in a more equal and 
just world order. The counter-narrative to international law’s constitutionalization is its 
fragmentation. International law defers to politics due its growing functional differentiation 
reflected in, among other developments, the proliferation of treaty regimes and international courts 
and tribunals that has resulted in forum-shopping and overlapping jurisdictions (Koskenniemi and 
Leino 2002). With the broadening of the scope of international law and the rise of international 
institutions, the ‘international legal’ is carved up into different sub-legal areas and forms of 
expertise that function relatively autonomously from one another (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 
2004; ILC 2006; Teubner 2012). Contra the constitutionalist and cosmopolitan reading of how 
international law has developed in the event of globalization, the International Law Commission’s 
famous report on the fragmentation of international law stressed that ‘[i]t is a well-known paradox 
of globalization that while is has led to increasing uniformization of social life around the world, it 
has also lead to its increasing fragmentation – that is, to the emergence of specialized and 
relatively autonomous spheres of social action and structure’ (ILC 2006, 11). In consequence, the 
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unity of international law is challenged and ‘[t]he result is conflicts between rules or rule-systems, 
deviating institutional practices and, possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law’ (ibid.). 
My first claim challenges the idea that the constitutionalization and fragmentation of international 
law, respectively, are two opposing and contradictory processes that follow from the ever-
expanding scope of international law. These two processes, I demonstrate in the thesis, are not 
mutually contradictory but rather mutually constitutive and can therefore not be thought 
independently of each other (for a few exceptions that recognize the intrinsic link between the 
constitutionalization and fragmentation of international law, see Klabbers 2004; Werner 2001). In 
the context of rule of law promotion in post-intervention in Kosovo, the emergence of a discourse 
on the rule of law and humanitarian values in global governance materialized into the 
fragmentation of legal and non-legal expertise across multiple institutional sites that were 
nevertheless held together by common policies and institutional settings, which resulted in 
political struggles over how to translate the practical meaning of the rule of law in concrete cases 
among vested actors. The thesis thus contributes to explore the relationship between international 
law’s constitutionalization and its fragmentation in demonstrating that they combined render legal 
and political boundaries within global governance constantly contested and subject to change.  
 My second claim is that the resort to seemingly technical and apolitical forms of 
expertise does not limit the range of political and legal solutions to a particular problem or case. 
Quite the contrary, international experts in the case of Kosovo continuously reinterpreted their 
mandates and their executive and legal roles to serve particular political ends and to construct 
certain contexts in which they were authorized and justified to intervene. To support this claim the 
thesis shows how various translations of the rule of law would authorize different international 
experts to intervene in the domestic legal in Kosovo, which had not only important distributional 
implications for the structure of power and the allocation of rights in post-intervention Kosovo, 
but also resulted in the authority over the legal being dispersed across multiple international 
institutional sites, which led to protracted political struggles among international actors over who 
had the final say? This claim challenges the presumed neutrality of expertise in global governance. 
IR scholars have traditionally approached the role of experts and expertise in international and 
global governance as one of neutrality, impartiality and justified by reference to the relevant, 
competent professional knowledge these experts possess. Expertise understood as ‘specialized 
knowledge’ is essential in the way in which IOs function independently of states, Barnett and 
Finnemore (2004) argue. It follows from their specialized knowledge and bureaucratic structures 
that ‘IOs carry out their missions by means that are mostly rational, technocratic, impartial, and 
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non-violent’ as opposed to government officials or lobbyists (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 5). 
Experts ‘are not in the business of controlling societies; what they control is international 
problems’, Adler and Haas (1992, 371) assert. For these reasons, experts are called upon in 
particular in times of crisis and great uncertainty. Experts of transnational advocacy networks, 
according to Keck and Sikkink (2004), are ‘most prevalent in issue areas characterized by high 
value content and informational uncertainty’ (2). This approach to expertise in international and 
global governance has often stressed the shared specialized knowledge, norms and beliefs in what 
pertains to a ‘right’ solution as what bind a community of professionals together (Adler 2005; 
Adler and Pouliot 2011; Haas 1990; 1999; Haas and Adler 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
Slaughter 2004; Ruggie 1975). A ‘community of practice’, according to Adler (2005), is defined 
by the profession and the expertise that it represents. First and foremost, ‘communities of practice 
are intersubjective social structures within which meaning is fixed, learning takes place, and 
practices evolve’ which create internal ‘collective understandings’ (Adler 2005, 16). In sum, in the 
face of uncertainty these professional communities are better suited to solve crises than, for 
instance, government officials. This distinction between the functional expert and the politician 
lies at the core of Ernst B. Haas’ functional approach to expertise: ‘The distinction between 
“politicians” (concerned with doctrine and ideology) and “technicians” or “experts” (concerned 
with doing practical tasks) is implicit or explicit in most Functional [sic] writing’ (Haas 1964, 9). 
‘Experts’, in Haas’ (1964) view, included ‘physicists, epidemiologists, meteorologists, 
agronomists, management specialists, and lawyers’ (455; emphasis added): ‘’Like Saint-Simon 
and Lenin, the Functionalist [sic] would hold that the human condition will improve only when 
“the government of men” is replaced by “the administration of things” (ibid., 9). Indeed, this last 
comment by Haas is quite telling as to how the rule of law in Kosovo was translated by 
international experts into an ‘administration of things’ – the thing being the ‘rule of law’ as 
opposed to a ‘rule of men’. By reconstructing the political struggles among international experts 
within the bounds of international administration and pointing to the distributional consequences 
thereof in post-intervention Kosovo, the thesis contributes to recent literature within IR and IL that 
have stressed the contingency and political character of professional knowledge and – inspired by 
Foucault – how expertise is not a form of knowledge that informs politics but is a forceful form of 
governing (see, among others, Amoore 2013; de Goede 2012; Fougner 2008; Leander and van 
Munster 2007). These more recent approaches have shifted the analytical lens from communities 
of experts within which knowledge is stable, shared and commonly agreed to and can lead to more 
just and progressive solutions towards how professional and political knowledge and truth claims 
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are an effect of practices – often heterogeneous practices – that are present at the same time within 
particular situations and contexts and which at times are epistemically violent in cementing power 
structures and marginalizing actors.  
 My third claim is that the practical meaning of the rule of law is rendered knowable 
and enacted by actors in and through drawing and inscribing meaning into the boundary between 
‘law’ and ‘politics’. However, this boundary adopts different meanings in time and across various 
sites of authority, why the meaning of the rule of law only gets momentarily fixed and stabilized 
and different translations of its meaning would exist at the same time. Therefore, though the rule 
of law has effectively found its way into the agendas of IOs and other inter- and transnational fora 
where it has become a ‘norm’ insofar that it refers to an envisioned state of affairs that is not yet in 
place, its meaning is essentially contested and ambiguous. Its normative meaning – ie. how the 
rule of law should be – is constantly constructed, contested and changed in practice. The meaning 
of the rule of law as a ‘norm’ can therefore not be once and for all fixed within these international 
fora (as argued by Barnett and Finnemore 2004) nor be easily trickled down from an IO to a 
domestic context through a ‘norm life cycle’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) or a ‘spiral model’ 
(Risse and Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2011). Opting for a positivist methodology, these norm models 
assume that norms function in an already given social reality and norms are analytically located 
external to and independent of social interaction. For these reasons, these widely cited norm 
explanations in this strand of IR scholarship are ill-equipped in explaining how normative 
meanings are constructed, why the meaning and function of a given concept, norm or rule can 
both be performed differently and is performative of the context in which it is enacted. My claim 
contributes to insights from within critical constructivist approaches to norms, which stress the 
counterfactual validity of norms (ie. exceptions are constitutive of a norm’s meaning) in global 
governance (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Weber 1994) and the inherent contested nature of 
fundamental norms, such as the rule of law (Park and Vetterlein 2010; Wiener 2008). Building on 
these insights, I suggest that turning to translation offers a venue into reconstructing how the 
meaning of essentially contested norms, rules and concepts – such as the rule of law  - is 
momentarily fixed, rendered determinate and thus made in practice in the face of indeterminacy 
and uncertainty.  
 To this end, post-intervention rule of law reforms by international actors in Kosovo 
provides an important case to apply this translationalist approach to the politics of international 
law. The variety of the international experts involved is reflected in the multiplicity of expert 
vocabularies present in this field of rule of law promotion. To reconstruct the various practical 
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meanings inscribed into the rule of law in the event of internationally administered rule of law 
reforms in post-intervention Kosovo, I show how practices of translation evolved around 
temporarily enacting and inscribing meaning into the boundary between law and politics that 
would subsequently authorize particular actors – translators – to intervene in order to render their 
particular meaning of the rule of law authoritarian and thereby fixed and determinate. In so doing, 
different expert vocabularies were constituted and juxtaposed each other, which would result in 
not only one but multiple translations of what the rule of law should be in practice would be 
present at the same time. Translating the rule of law, moreover, was done by both domesticating 
its meaning to suit the dominant policies, forms of knowledge and logics of representation of the 
actors that were authorized to impose their translation.   
  
An	Outline	of	the	Argument		
 
 The thesis falls in two parts. The first part is entitled Translation: The Laws of 
Language and introduces the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis. This part 
consists of three chapters. In the first chapter I introduce my approach to international law. By 
developing an approach to international law which centers on law being a practice of arguing that 
exhibits a degree of indeterminacy and uncertainty, I suggest turning to translation as a privileged 
practice of rendering meaning fixed and stabilized. This is the purpose of the second chapter in 
which I discuss translation as an analytical lens and a practice. In the third chapter I introduce my 
methodological approach and the methods on which I draw. The second part of the thesis, which is 
entitled Translating: The Languages of Law, is also structured around three chapters and an 
‘interlude’ provides a pre-introduction to each chapter. The three interludes are entitled ‘fields’, 
‘boundaries’ and ‘practices’, respectively. In each interlude I describe a situation from the 
‘everyday’ life of promoting the rule of law among international actors in Kosovo. In fact, each 
interlude begins with where the story of the chapter it introduces ends. The interludes thus serve to 
set the scene for each chapter that move backwards through reconstructing the conceptual history 
and contingency of the rule of law that have created the situations described in the interludes. In 
this part of the thesis, I first reconstruct how a semantic field around the ‘rule of law’ was 
constructed through EU and UN intervention discourses and what expertise was identified as a 
result. In a second turn, I move ‘to the field’ and follow the concept of the rule of law in and 
through different institutional sites, situations and practices related to rule of law promotion in 
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Kosovo. In a third move, I turn to one of these sites, that is, the inside of an international rule of 
law mission and reconstruct how fundamentally different translations of the rule of law’s practical 
meaning were enacted and struggling with each other. In what follows, I outline how the main 
argument of the thesis develops through these chapters. 
 
Translation:	The	Laws	of	Language	
 
 The chapter that follows this introduction (Notes on Interdisciplinarity: A 
Farewell to Arms) departs from the current debate in IR and IL on interdisciplinarity, which has 
lent little promise to the possibility of bridging the disciplinary divide. However, the current 
impasse that has been constructed by some important interventions in this debate by both IR and 
IL scholars is partly due to the ways in which the two disciplines have developed co-constitutively 
and thus relatively to one another. Both disciplines share the same interest in the ‘international’, its 
structures and subjects, and their disciplinary histories have, for this reason, been closely linked. 
But their relationship to one another has traditionally – albeit with a few exceptions – been one 
characterized by a division of labor where law has been assigned to international lawyers and 
politics to IR scholars. In the current interdisciplinarity debate, this has led to different and 
contradictory conceptions of what international law is and how it should be studied, which have 
evolved around drawing and thereby inscribing meaning into the boundary between ‘law’ and 
‘politics’. However, I suggest that a viable way out of the impasse is to be found in a 
reconstructive and practice-oriented approach to what international law ‘is’ that collapses the 
assumed boundary between law and politics and – ironically - departs from the work of two of the 
most fervent critics of interdisciplinarity, that is, Koskenniemi and Kratochwil. I take the anxiety 
voiced by international lawyers over how to guard the ‘relative autonomy’ of not only their 
discipline but of international law, more generally, to ‘productive use’ by conceptualizing 
international law as the practice of constructing a relatively autonomous ‘field’ where a certain 
way of reasoning distinguishes it from other social or functional fields as well as the self-image of 
international lawyers and their identification with their profession. The ‘relative autonomy’ of law, 
that is, the practice of distinguishing law from other normative and regulative practices and 
discourses is constructed by lawyers – and non-lawyers – through what they say and do about and 
with the law. The way in which language is used in practice is thus constitutive for what law ‘is’. 
This practice-oriented approach to law shifts the analytical lens away from international law as a 
body of rules that regulate inter-state relations towards international law as a contingent practice 
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that is performative of shaping social and politics realities. It also shifts the analytical lens from 
how international law and expertise is applied to an already given object and an already given and 
defined context towards how defining a problem authorizes a particular expertise and constructs a 
certain context in which the international expert is authorized and justified to intervene.   
 To understand how the uncertainty and semantic indeterminacy that follow from 
international law’s growing hybridity, Janus-faced nature and ever-expanding functional scope are 
countered by its agents, I propose to turn to the role and politics of translation in constructing and 
stabilizing meaning. In Chapter 3 (The Politics of Translation and Its Conditions of Possibility) 
I develop a framework centered on translation, which foregrounds the mutual constitution of 
semantic fields and social orders and the performativity of boundaries in the production of 
knowledge and meaning. Drawing on the so-called ‘cultural turn’ in translation studies as well as 
sociological and post-colonial approaches to translation, I identify three conditions of the politics 
of translation. The first condition is the indeterminacy of translation. I draw on Quine’s problem 
of ‘gavagai’ and his argument that because reference is inscrutable and the denotative content of 
what is being translated cannot be defined and ‘fixed’ once and for all, a translator always has to 
rely on the connotative relations that are present in the setting in which she finds herself. No one 
translation but always multiple translations are possible. The second condition is the contingency 
of translation. Whereas meaning would always be indeterminate, the translator has the capacity to 
momentarily fix and stabilize meaning in a given context for a particular purpose through, in 
particular, the translation technique of ‘domesticating’ by which the meaning produced by the 
translator reflects her values and norms or those present in the target context. The translator does 
therefore not merely stand between two contexts – cultures, for instance – but plays an active role 
in constructing meaning about the context and creating representations about its culture. The third 
condition is the performativity of translation. Translation is a boundary-drawing practice that 
simultaneously keeps separate and connects social and semantic fields in time and space, which it 
then purports to bridge. The gap between these social and semantic fields does not consciously 
exist prior to the practice of translation but is rendered fixed, determinate and knowable in 
translation and becomes as a result of the practice of translating. As such, translation is a temporal, 
disruptive event that creates a discontinuity that it then purports to overcome in creating 
continuity. These three conditions identify the practice of translation with the ‘political’: how is 
meaning fixed and stabilized and by whom? What spatiotemporal orders are made real through 
this fixation of meaning? Who has the authority to do so? And how are different languages made 
bounded, commensurate and juxtaposed vis-à-vis one another, as a result? Focusing on practices 
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of translation thus gives more attention to the ways in which language – expert vocabularies and 
vernaculars – are used in practice, as opposed to approach experts as being preprogrammed within 
their respective functional field and thereby automatically identifying themselves with and 
applying a given vocabulary. A translationalist approach, I will show in the analytical part of the 
thesis, can address the question as to how meaning is momentarily rendered fixed and stabilized to 
serve as the source and justification for the intervention of particular experts.  
 In Chapter 3 (Following the Rule of Law: On Methodology and Methods) I 
develop a reconstructive approach to doing case study and conceptual analysis that departs from 
the assumption that the meaning of a concept – here the rule of law - cannot be defined prior to the 
inquiry but has to be reconstructed from its enactment in and through contingent practices. To this 
end I draw on multi-sited ethnography that is informed by ‘following the concept’ in and through 
various sites, situations and texts. I outline my approach to interviewing that is based on a 
narrative as opposed to a structured approach, which foregrounds the active participation of the 
interviewer and the importance of place. In a last part I provide an overview of my research 
design, which follows the three steps identified by the titles of the interludes: fields, boundaries 
and practices. Doing so, I outline the data used for each step and provide an overview of the 
interviews conducted during fieldwork.  
 
Translating:	The	Languages	of	Law	 	
 
 The first interlude is entitled fields and is an excerpt of field notes I took as an 
observer to the final round of drafting Kosovo’s constitution during two days outside of Pristina in 
December 2011. The most pressing issue in the negotiations had been postponed to this very final 
round, that is, the prerogatives of the President and the question that if the President would not be 
able to assume her or his powers who would have the final say to impose a state of emergency. 
Sixteen people would be present in this final round of negotiations out of which almost half of 
them were international lawyers. The head of the working group on the constitutional reform, a 
politician from one of the main parties in Kosovo, was residing at the end of the roundtable next to 
his main advisor in the negotiations, a US constitutional judge from the district court in 
Minnesota. 
 This interlude introduces Chapter 5 (Fluid Fields: Imagining the Rule of Law, 
Inventing Expertise) on the emergence of a semantic and professional field around promoting the 
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rule of law in UN and the EU intervention discourses. Here, intervention discourses relate to the 
role the UN and EU assign themselves in intervening in a domestic context after conflict or in a 
so-called ‘failed’ state. The chapter falls in three parts. In the first part, I outline past practices of 
rule of law promotion in the context of European colonial rule and in relation to the emergence of 
a law and development movement from the mid-20th century up through its uptake in development 
policies in the context of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s. In a second and third turn, I 
reconstruct the semantic fields constructed around the rule of law by following its discursive 
trajectory through UN and EU intervention statements and how the expertise of international 
actors was identified along this trajectory. In these discourses, the rule of law was primarily 
approached as a policy issue, why the boundary between law and politics was not a concern in 
formulating policies to further its promotion in post-conflict states.  
 The second interlude is entitled boundaries. In some of my interviews with 
international judges they would refer to a review by Kosovo’s Constitutional Court that had been 
done in March 2011 on the legality of a decision, which had been adopted by a panel of three 
international judges in Kosovo. The review had been done before I went to Kosovo the first time. 
But its reference puzzled me. The review provides an insight into the co-existence of two legal 
orders – a domestic and an international – and how, why and when they clash. But it tells much 
more than that. It tells something about the role of different legal and non-legal actors in Kosovo, 
their struggle for authority and the power to define. And how the boundary between law and 
politics is enacted in constructing law’s relative autonomy against what is ruled out as being social 
and political influences.  
 This interlude serves as an introduction to Chapter 6 (Grey Zones: Enacting 
Boundaries, Empowering Experts) in which I reconstruct how the meaning of the rule of law 
was made through the politics of translation that unfolded in practices of (re)drawing and 
overcoming the boundary between ‘law’ and ‘politics’. Doing so, I identify how the rule of law 
and the non-rule of law, legalities and illegalities, came to exist at the same time within the 
bureaucratic bounds of international administration over legal and judicial fields in post-
intervention Kosovo. In three steps, I show how a boundary between law and politics was enacted 
through invoking the narrative of a legal vacuum reigning in an unruly domestic present and how 
the international executive became the embodiment of the rule of law in this context. This resulted 
in the empowerment of a host of international organizations and international lawyers to construct 
the rule of law in Kosovo, which resulted in legal expertise being dispersed across multiple sites of 
authority. I show, in a third step, how this mutual relationship between constitutionalism and 
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fragmentation has been reproduced after Kosovo’s declared its independence, where the past 
practices of UN administration are being duplicated in and through practices of international 
donors engaged in what I term law-making unbounded.  
 I call the third interlude practices. It is an excerpt of field notes I took whilst 
observing a panel of a majority of international judges deployed by the EU’s rule of law mission, 
EULEX, adjudicating in a war crime case prosecuted by an international prosecutor. The panel 
took place in the cinema of Pristina where the judges were placed on the scene in front of the red 
curtain and the defendants in the cozy cinema seats. The panel reflects one situation of the 
everyday life of international rule of law promotion and how the rule of law and the role of 
international lawyers are contested from different perspectives – even from within EULEX’s own 
administration.  
 I use this interlude to introduce the seventh and final chapter (“Village Justice”: 
Translating the Rule of Law by Taming Its Meanings) in which I reconstruct the practices of 
translating the rule of law within three different ‘realities’ witin an international rule of law 
mission. Doing so, I show how the ‘planners’ who were authorized to set up the mission translated 
the rule of law into a ‘technicality’ which reflected their professional backgrounds, lack of 
knowledge about the local context, and recourse to tools and measures to quantify and assess the 
performance of the rule of law. In another reality constructed around the ‘politicians’ within the 
mission, the meaning of the rule of law would be translated fundamentally differently. Here, the 
rule of law would mean ‘political stability’ and ‘no touch cases’ involving local policians in 
Kosovo’s government would result from this translation. Yet, a third translation of the rule of law 
would enact its meaning as being ‘legality’. This translation was done by the ‘practitioners’ – the 
international judges and prosecutors – within the mission. In each reality, the meaning of the rule 
of law was tamed and trimmed through translating it into a particular version that would justify the 
position and claims to expertise by each group of actors. These three translations would vie with 
each other within the mission and combined had important implicatons for the doings of the EU’s 
rule of law mission and its exercise of executive powers within the judiciary in post-conflict 
Kosovo.  
In the conclusion I summarize the findings of the thesis. To this end, I first address 
the question raised in the thesis’ title: has the rule of law become a rule of lawyers? I relate my 
answer to this question to the findings that followed from addressing the main research question of 
the thesis. In a concluding note, I briefly outline future research questions and inquiries that follow 
from the findings of the thesis.  
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Chapter	2	
NOTES	ON	INTERDISCIPLINARITY:	A	FAREWELL	TO	ARMS	
 
Introduction:	Turfs	and	Troubles	
 
‘No topic has been the subject of more confusion in contemporary 
thought about international problems than the relationship between law 
and politics’19 
 
‘[I]nterdisciplinarity is somehow a little bit like virginity – a state that 
many, if not all of us, appreciate, but which we do not maintain’20 
 
 Why interdisciplinarity? The current debate on interdisciplinarity among IR and IL 
scholars might also lead us to ask: what interdisciplinarity? In this chapter I will provide a few 
notes on the politics of bridging the disciplinary boundary between IR and IL and its implications 
for how to study the role and rule of law in global governance, that is, the possibility of 
interdisciplinarity.  To be sure, the current debate on interdisciplinarity does not lend much 
promise for interdisciplinary work. According to Kratochwil, who himself was one of the first IR 
scholars to bring international law into the field of IR after decades of its absence due to the 
dominant position of realist theorizing: ‘Even if we all participate in a way in the “making” of the 
social world, we never can begin entirely de novo as we are always situated and part of a tradition 
with its discourses and sedimented institutions. The result of adopting a strategy of engagement is 
that most researchers are likely to continue with what s/he is doing and sprinkle their allegedly 
“inter-disciplinary” narrative with some of the agreed upon terms’ (Kratochwil 2010, 313).  
 From the lawyers’ camp, the sentence has been equally harsh and unpromising. 
Whereas Kratochwil invoked the metaphor of virginity, Klabbers (2009) turned to the world of 
music to make the same point: ‘[T]he two disciplines have as much in common as the 
                                                
19 Edward Hallett Carr (1939/1964) The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row), at 170 
20 Friedrich Kratochwil (2014a) The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and 
Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press), at 29 
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musicologist studying Mozart’s string quartets, and the gentleman at the ticket-counter trying to 
sell tickets to next month’s performance of Die Zauberflote’ (120). International lawyers, 
according to Klabbers (2005), should ‘jealously guard the relative autonomy of their discipline’ 
(36). To be sure, Klabber’s colleague in the Faculty of Law at the University of Helsinki, Martti 
Koskenniemi, has been as hostile towards the various ‘calls’ for interdisciplinary research 
encompassing the disciplines of IR and IL. Calling international lawyers to arms, he advanced 
what he termed a ‘counterdisciplinary’ move to counter the contemporary calls and the various 
attempts of interdisciplinarity that had preceded them, which he found more as a ‘conquest’ than 
cooperation (Koskenniemi 2011, 16). Instead of conquest, Kratochwil has referred to the same 
efforts as being of ‘colonization’ which ‘amount to little more than the ‘recasting’ of some well-
known problem in the new language or methodology’ (Kratochwil 2000, 35). The attempts to 
merge the conceptual apparatus on which the two disciplines are drawing would always fail, 
according to the critics, ‘because the fields are organized around different objectives and speak to 
different audiences’ (Hafner-Burton et al. 2012, 48). 
 The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I reconstruct how the two disciplines 
have developed co-constitutively and thus relatively to one another. Both disciplines share the 
same interest in the ‘international’, its structures and subjects, and their disciplinary histories have, 
for this reason, been closely linked. But their relationship to one another has traditionally – albeit 
with a few exceptions – been one characterized by a division of labor where law has been assigned 
to the international lawyers and politics to IR scholars. This division of labor reverberates through 
interventions and positions taken in the recent debate on interdisciplinarity in which the traditional 
fault lines between the two disciplines since the establishment of IR as a discipline in 1919 still 
resurface. In the debate, this has led to different and contradictory conceptions of what 
international law is and how it should be studied. I want to suggest that the debate on 
interdisciplinarity has been mired in practices of constructing the ‘other’ discipline based on 
narrow conceptions of what the other discipline ‘is’ as well as conflicting and irreconcilable 
conceptions of law. This has resulted in the ‘genuine dialogue’ between IR and IL being ‘more the 
exception and talking past each other more the rule’ (Kessler 2010, 303).   
 The second purpose of the chapter is to emphasize the possibility and potentiality of 
an interdisciplinary approach. Doing so, I suggest that a viable way out of the impasse is to be 
found in a reconstructive and practice-oriented approach to what international law ‘is’, which – 
ironically - departs from the work of two of the most fervent critics of interdisciplinarity, that is 
Koskenniemi and Kratochwil. I take the anxiety voiced by international lawyers over how to guard 
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the ‘relative autonomy’ of not only their discipline but of international law, more generally, to 
‘productive use’. Indeed, the position of Klabbers and Koskenniemi in the debate on 
interdisciplinarity, I believe, is not necessarily a genuine hostility towards engaging with other 
disciplines (Koskenniemi’s work, for instance, spans the disciplines of history, philosophy and 
sociology). But tells us more about international law as a relatively autonomous practical ‘field’ 
where a certain way of reasoning distinguishes it form other social or functional fields (Bourdieu 
1987) as well as the self-image of international lawyers and their identification with their 
profession (Orford 1998). The ‘relative autonomy’ of law, that is, the practice of distinguishing 
law from other normative and regulative practices and discourses is constructed by what lawyers – 
and non-lawyers – say and do about and with the law. The ways in which language is used, 
according to both Koskenniemi and Kratochwil, are thus constitutive for what law ‘is’.  
 The chapter falls in two parts. In the first part of this chapter, I outline the historical 
‘co-constitution’ of the two disciplines, which has resulted in momentarily rapprochements and 
alliances but, for the most part, insulation and mutual exclusion. In this short chapter I cannot do 
justice to the depth of the disciplinary histories of both IR and IL but only foreground key debates 
and publications that define the parallel trajectories of the two disciplines. Following this outline, I 
turn to three more recent interventions in the debate on interdisciplinarity, which have enacted 
particular and narrow conceptions of what the other discipline is – and what international law is 
(or should be). In the second part of the chapter, I review the work of Kratochwil and 
Koskenniemi who have both emphasized that law is a practice of arguing. This is my claim to the 
possibility and potentiality of interdisciplinarity. To conceptualize law as a practice of arguing that 
is bounded by the limits that are set by particular language games entails a move to boundaries and 
the role of actors – international experts – who constitute the field of international law. In the 
second section of this part, I review how the boundaries of law have recently been addressed by 
both critical IR and IL scholars, who share an interest in uncovering the dynamics and politics of 
international law, its changing territorial, functional and temporal boundaries, and the dark sides 
of supposed universalities and virtues, such as the notion of progress and humanitarianism. In a 
second turn, I look at how the role of experts and expertise has been addressed by these scholars, 
too. Doing so I follow the more recent intervention in the debate on the role of legal expertise, 
which suggests that the reflexivity of expertise and the reality in which it is enacted has to be 
recognized and analytically addressed. To this end, I will in the chapter that follows on The 
Politics of Translation and Its Conditions of Possibility develop a framework centered on 
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translation, which foregrounds the mutual constitution of semantic fields and social orders and the 
performativity of boundaries in the production of knowledge and meaning.  
 
The	Interdisciplinarity	Debate	and	the	Problem	of	Law	
 
Making	Disciplinary	Boundaries	
 
 ‘[I]deas of interdisciplinarity and transdiciplinarity imply a variety of boundary 
transgressions’ (Barry et al. 2008, 21). Indeed, since its establishment as a discipline IR has been 
in a rather complicated relationship with its neighboring discipline, IL, and boundary 
transgressions have been scarce and often the exception. Though the main concern of both 
disciplines has always been and remains the structures, rules and subjects of the ‘international’, 
each discipline has predominantly focused on either politics or law in their attempts to appropriate 
the ‘international’ to fit their own turf building agenda. As infamously stressed by Morgenthau 
(1985, 13): ‘[T]he political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere [and] thinks in 
terms of interest defined as power […] the lawyer, of conformity of action with legal rules’ (13). 
This disciplinary distinction dates back to the establishment of the first chair of international 
politics in 1919 at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. The purpose of the chair was stated to 
prevent another great war and, at that time, the two disciplines (of which IL is the oldest) 
overlapped in their beliefs that the rule of law and international institutions could replace war and 
power politics (Dunoff and Pollack 2013, 5).  
 However, the ‘idealism’ of the interwar scholarship was soon rejected by many 
political scientists following the failure of replacing war with the rule of law (Dunoff and Pollack 
2013, 5), which resulted in an increased scientific outlook of the discipline of IR and a move away 
from normative thinking, to which the behavioralist turn later in US academia testified. The 
marginalization or almost total absence of international law in IR followed the first debate of the 
so-called ‘great debates’ that have shaped the boundaries of the field – or even provided the 
narrative (together with its ‘turns’21) based on which it can be claimed that IR indeed is a 
                                                
21 For example: the so-called linguistic (Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989), historiographical (Bell 
2001), practice (Pouliot 2008) and reflexive (Guzzini 2000; Hamati-Ataya 2011) ‘turns’. To be 
sure, these authors would not refer to their own intervention as a ‘turn’ but their interventions have 
often been referred to by others as signaling a ‘new’ turn in IR theorizing  
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discipline.22 This ‘first debate’ – dubbed the idealist-realist debate – was initiated in the late 1930s 
at a time where idealism had been the ‘normal mode of enquiry’ (Wilson 1998, 1) in the interwar 
years. The debate was triggered by, among other events, the failure of the League and Munich, 
but, importantly, also by the publication of Carr’s (1939) The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 in 
which the scholar had described idealism as being ‘bankrupt’, a ‘hollow and intolerable sham’ 
(Wilson 1998, 1) and ousted an attack – also in later writings – against ‘legalism’ (dos Reis 2015, 
12). In fact, three years prior to its publication Carr had become the Woodrow Wilson Professor of 
International Politics in Aberystwyth. His harsh criticism of idealism and the rule of law might 
have followed from his own project of shaping the new discipline of international relations 
independently from international law and its scholars. At the same time, many international legal 
scholars would following the Second World War focus on solving technical legal problems and 
thus do away with abstract theorizing (Werner 2010, 305). From then on, the disciplines of IR and 
IL would develop separately and became increasingly defined vis-à-vis one another. In 
consequence, international law was largely discredited in IR, whereas legal scholars would 
emphasize law’s independence from politics. 
 Indeed, it is not entirely true that the dialogue between IR and IL was completely 
absent. There were individual scholars whose work cannot be confined to either one of the two 
disciplines. Dos Reis (2015) points us to Quincy Wright and his extended work (which includes 
99 articles in The American Journal of International Law (AJIL)). Wright is mostly known for his 
importance in shaping the field of IR but at the same time he was the editor of AJIL and had 
served as president of both the International Political Science Association and the American 
Society of International Law. His approach to both international law and politics would be defined 
by the same project – to make both disciplines and thus their ‘objects’ more scientific. To this end, 
                                                
22  Indeed, these ‘paradigmatic confrontations’ (Herborth 2012, 239) that have discursively 
structured the historicity of IR as a discipline and its processes of knowledge production have been 
deemed useless for the enterprise of IR for, in particular, two reasons. Firstly, reference to grand 
debates in delimitating the field of IR and its epistemic practices is flawed as it is based on a myth, 
understood as ‘highly simplified narratives ascribing fixed and coherent meanings to selected 
events, people and places’ (Bell 2009, 5). The grand debates, Bell argues, are myopic to the 
heterogeneity of the field in its pursuit of a progressivist narrative to justify certain mainstream 
theoretical (political realism) and methodological (neo-positivism) perspectives (2009, 6). 
Secondly, the debates tend to revitalize the ‘semantics of ontology’ (Herborth 2012, 249) reflected 
in practices of adjudicating, i.e. what would be the right way of describing ‘the world’, which in 
turn enacts a hierarchical perspective on knowledge and knowing, locates ‘traditional science’ 
outside the social construction of reality and is entrenched in the continuous separation between 
ontology and epistemology, which needs to be overcome (ibid., 251). 
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however, IL should get closer to the social sciences ‘not merely by utilizing their data, but also by 
employing their methods and philosophy’ (Wright, quoted in dos Reis 2015, 7).  
 The same attempt to ‘scientificize’ international law and politics shaped another 
boundary-transgressing move. The emergence of the New Haven School, also known as the 
policy- or process-oriented school, at Yale University after the end of the Second World War and 
the extended writings of McDougal and Lasswell, a legal scholar and a political scientist, 
respectively, up through the 1950s and 1960s, was an important attempt to foster a genuine 
interdisciplinary research agenda. McDougal and Lasswell had been unsatisfied with the positivist 
view of law that dominated much work within IL and the realist view espoused by, in particular, 
Morgenthau. In his infamous attack on the discipline of IL in AJIL – an attack which Koskenniemi 
(2001) has referred to as his ‘legal swan song’ (459) – Morgenthau (1940) wrote that ‘[i]t is a 
strange paradox that the lay public has observed much more skeptical and realistic, therefore 
scientific, attitude toward international law than the science of international law itself’ (260). 
Morgenthau’s skepticism – and realism – was partly directed towards taking ‘context’ into 
account, a concern that was picked up by the New Haven School scholars who intended to identify 
all the steps and stages in the process of law-making, its different – also non-state – actors and the 
ways in which law was received in its social context. However, their scientific, ‘objective’ (which 
they hoped for) approach to international law did not get entirely rid of the idealism that scholars 
within IR and political science would claim was limiting the ability of IL scholars to embrace law 
in its (political) context. To promote ‘human dignity’, according to the New Haven School, was 
the greater purpose international law should serve (see Reisman et al. 2007). 
 The New Haven School approach to international law was colored by the second 
‘grand debate’ within IR, which unfolded between ‘traditionalism’ and ‘behavorialism’ (also 
referred to as scientism). As is clear by now, the behavorialists won and the project of turning IR 
into a ‘science’ took off. The so-called ‘science question’ came to occupy the center stage in the 
discipline’s ‘turf building exercise’ (dos Reis 2015, 3) and IR became primarily a discipline 
shaped by US political science scholars. Indeed, this science question would be an important 
yardstick in shaping the disciplinary development of IR: ‘All three ‘great debates’, as the origin 
myths of the field are usually called, have turned around the status of knowledge. In all three, the 
camp that has been able to play the card of science over its contenders has been able to win the 
debates’ (van der Ree 2013, 29). For the New Haven scholars the behavorialist turn was evident in 
their (actually quite positivist) approach to law. Indeed, law had a normative foundation outside of 
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law – human dignity – but their main aim was to develop a scientific, systematic and therefore 
testable approach to international law.    
 Whilst the science question would occupy many scholars within IR, Kratochwil 
(2000) and dos Reis (2015) point out that, at the same time, among legal scholars there were also 
important attempts to turn law into a science by developing objective and ‘pure’ theories of law – 
most evident in the work of Hans Kelsen (who had been the supervisor of Morgenthau’s 
dissertation) in that period. Kratochwil (2000) refers to these developments within the two 
disciplines as ‘a strange symbiosis of realism and legalism’ (37). Legalism and anti-legalism, 
respectively, came to define the disciplines of IL and IR, their mutual division of labor and their 
particular disciplinary identity, which centered on the exclusion of the ‘other’ (law was excluded 
in realist accounts of the international, and politics was increasingly discarded among many legal 
scholars) (dos Reis 2015, 12). And yet, the two disciplines – its mainstream voices – shared a 
fundamental concern in turning their respective discipline into a science. Indeed, it was only with 
the end of the Cold War that legal scholars and political scientists began to approach each other’s 
disciplines after four decades of insularity and mutual exclusion.  
   
Disciplining	and	Domesticating?	
 
 During the last couple of decades, the observation that international politics has 
become increasingly governed by legal rules has resulted in various ‘calls’ for bridging the 
disciplinary gaps between IR and IL. Indeed, these calls and the corresponding replies have 
painted a rather pessimistic picture of interdisciplinarity. In this section, I will look closer at three 
interventions that I believe have been instrumental for the debate. The first intervention is the 
special issue of International Organization on ‘Legalization and World Politics’ (the Legalization 
issue), which was authored jointly by IR and IL scholars and perceived as a pivotal publication in 
establishing a joint IR/IL research agenda.23 The second intervention is the response of Finnemore 
and Toope in the same journal a year after the publication of the Legalization issue24, and the third 
intervention is Koskenniemi’s call for a so-called counterdisciplinarity published in the journal 
                                                
23 Kenneth W. Abbott et al. (2000) The Concept of Legalization. International Organization 54 
(3): 401-419 
24 Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope (2001) Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of 
Law and Politics. International Organization 55 (3): 743-758 
 49 
International Relations in 2011.25 I will pay special attention to how each intervention narrates 
‘law’, on the one hand, and the ‘other’ discipline, on the other hand. Doing so, my argument is that 
the impasse that seems to result from their respective interventions as to whether 
interdisciplinarity can be done is constructed due to their conflicting assumptions of what law is 
and their narrow view on what the other discipline can therefore offer.  
 I will focus on the contribution in the special issue on legalization in which the 
concept of ‘legalization’ was defined for the purpose of ‘creat[ing] common ground for political 
scientists and lawyers’ (Abbott et al. 2000, 402). Indeed, three of the scholars involved in this 
endeavor – Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter26 - had already 
called for bridging the disciplinary gap a few years earlier. The first of these calls was launched 
more than two decades ago with a piece by Abbott (1989) entitled ‘Modern International Relations 
Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’. In this article from 1989, Abbott denounced ‘the 
estrangement between IL and the most closely related social science discipline, international 
relations (“IR”)’ (Abbott 1989, 337). The aim of the article was to introduce legal scholars to 
rationalism and neoliberal regime theory, which was how Abbott identified IR as a discipline, and 
to transform international legal scholars from ‘formalists’ to ‘functionalists’. Abbott also stressed 
that IR scholars could use IL as an ‘immense reservoir of information about legal rules [or as] the 
raw material for the growth and application of [their] theory’ (Abbott 1989, 339-340). Abbott’s 
call for interdisciplinarity was followed up by Slaughter (1993) a few years later. Slaughter, who 
was advocating for a ‘dual agenda’ (Slaughter Burley 1993), argued that ‘[i]nternational law and 
international politics cohabit the same conceptual space’ (Slaughter 1995, 503) and ‘[t]he 
prospects for genuine interdisciplinary collaboration, to the benefit of both disciplines, have never 
been better’ (Slaughter Burley 1993, 238). 
 Both Abbott and Slaughter’s proposals on how to foster a joint IR/IL research 
agenda have been criticized for favoring one side of the divide, that is, IR, and, in particular, 
neoliberal IR theory (Dunoff and Pollack 2013, 26). In A Prospectus Abbott had stressed that IR 
was indeed useful for international legal scholars who in the theories and methods of the IR 
discipline could find a way to leave the ‘narrow positivism’ that he believed defined their 
discipline. To be sure, the exchange suggested by Abbott between the two disciplines was one in 
which legal scholars could provide the empirics and ‘practical’ knowledge and IR scholars could 
                                                
25  Martti Koskenniemi (2011) Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in 
Counterdisciplinarity. International Relations 26 (1): 3-34 
26 The other co-authors were Andrew Moravcsik and Duncan Snidal 
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bring in their theoretical insights and conceptual apparatus. Slaughter (1993) would suggest the 
same trade-off between the two disciplines: ‘[I]nternational lawyers seeking to build on insights 
from international relations theory will discover a new conceptual apparatus with which to analyze 
both old and new areas of law’ (228). These positions, indeed, resemble Wright’s claim that IL 
should become more like a social science by employing its methods. Following Abbott and 
Slaughter, Keohane took up the interdisciplinary challenge in an article from 1997 in which he 
described how the rule of international law was understood through an ‘instrumentalist optic’ and 
a ‘normative optic’ by IR and IL scholars, respectively, which could turn into a ‘productive 
synthesis’ between the two disciplines as they were both concerned with the question of 
compliance (informed by either state interests – to which the instrumentalist optic would apply – 
or legitimacy – to which the normative optic of legal scholars would apply). However, the 
productive synthesis could only be achieved, according to Keohane, in the development of clear 
and objective indicators for empirical testing – echoing the New Haven School’s interest in 
providing a systematic, testable approach to international law. 
 These views from within the rational choice and neoliberal institutionalist branch of 
IR would shape the efforts in the Legalization issue to foster a genuine interdisciplinary research 
agenda. In the introductory piece in the Legalization issue it was emphasized that given the ‘move 
to law’ (Goldstein et al. 2000, 386) in international affairs it was necessary to develop a 
framework that was ‘able to unite perspectives developed by political scientists and international 
legal scholars and engage in a genuinely collaborative venture’ (ibid., 387). In this context, the 
concept of legalization was introduced as a term to bridge the cleavage between the two 
disciplines and to guide empirical work on this ‘move to law’. ‘Legalization’, according to its 
authors, is ‘a particular form of institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, 
precision and delegation’ (Abbott et al. 2000, 401). In the ‘absence of centralized coercion’ in the 
international realm, the authors identified these three ‘variables’ by which the degree of the 
legalization of international politics – the extent to which international politics is bound by legal 
rules and institutions – could be identified, measured and empirically tested. ‘Obligation’ meant 
‘that states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules of commitments’ 
(ibid., 401). ‘Delegation’ referred to ‘the extent to which states and other actors delegate authority 
to designated third parties […] to implement agreements’ (ibid., 415). Subscribing to a positivist 
epistemology, the Legalization authors argued that ‘precision’ indicates the extent to which ‘rules 
unambiguously define the conduct they require’ (ibid.) and ‘narrows the scope for reasonable 
interpretation’ as ‘clarity is essential to the force of law’ (ibid., 412-143). In sum, the three 
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variables reflected an understanding of the rule of law as being determined by clearly defined 
norms and dependent on the presence of third parties, such as courts. Indeed, the emphasis on 
courts and thus the idea of ‘checks and balances’ indicates the influence of US thinking on the rule 
of law among the Legalization scholars. The international legal realm, as a result, was construed 
as a ‘realm of formal, enforceable contract’ (Reus-Smit 2004, 40).  
 The turn to the three variables resulted from the authors strive for conceptual 
consistency, which would ease theorizing among legal and non-legal scholars alike. Though the 
scholars did emphasize that legalization can come in different degrees – from ‘hard legalization’ 
to ‘soft legalization’, where the European Union (EU) and its acquis communitaire would be an 
example of ‘ideal type’ hard legalization (Abbott et al. 2000, 405)  - they recognized, however 
only in passing, that there might be considerable differences between theory and practice: ‘[T]he 
degree of obligation, precision, or delegation in formal institutions can be obscured in practice by 
political pressure, informal norms, and other factors’ (ibid., 402). Politics, effectively, could 
influence law but was mostly a matter of the realm of practice and thus not an important 
component in the scientific, positivist and formalistic view of law espoused by the scholars. Also, 
this testifies to their distinction between law and politics, which hinges on their liberal and 
positivist conception of law. In making the distinction between ‘hard’ legalization, on the one 
hand, and ‘soft’ legalization, on the other hand, the authors noted that ‘[i]t would be inappropriate 
to equate the right-hand endpoints [hard legalization] with “law” and the left-hand endpoints [soft 
legalization] with “politics”, for politics continues (albeit in different forms) even when there is 
law’ (Abbott et al. 2000, 404; emphasis added). ‘[M]ost of the time’, it was noted by way of 
conclusion, ‘legal and political considerations combine to influence behavior’ (ibid., 419). This 
perception, according to Kratochwil (2000), follows from the (mis)perception that ‘[l]aw and 
politics are not one continuum in the realm of praxis, but radically different domains that must be 
kept separate’ (39) – a perception which also underpinned the turn to legalism and anti-legalism, 
respectively, among IL and IR scholars, as outlined in the previous section. 
 Despite the stated aim of ‘creat[ing] a common ground for political scientists and 
lawyers by moving away from a narrow view of law as requiring enforcement by a coercive 
sovereign’ (Abbott et al. 2000, 402), the understanding of law among the authors was quite 
narrow. Indeed, the main concern seemed to have been how to explain compliance with 
international law – a concern which has reverberated among scholars ever since the establishment 
of international law as field of research and writings. But more importantly, their intervention 
clearly demonstrated their disciplinary roots. Hart was effectively referred to when the scholars 
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outlined their approach to law: ‘We acknowledge a particular debt to H.L.A Hart’s The Concept of 
Law’ (Abbott et al. 2000, 403). And ‘[p]recision’, the authors argued, ‘is an important 
characteristic in many theories of law. It is essential to a rationalist view of law as a coordinating 
device’ (ibid., 413). It was not explicitly clarified in the beginning of the contribution (only by a 
brief reference to the influence of Hart) why ‘precision’ should be a defining characteristic of law. 
However, a bit further in the piece, the following justification was given: ‘[P]recision increases the 
legitimacy of rules and thus their normative “compliance pull”. Lon L. Fuller, like other liberals, 
emphasizes the social and moral virtues of certainty and predictability for individual actors. In 
each case, clarity is essential to the force of law’ (ibid., 413).  
 The influence of positivist and rationalist IR theories was evident in this 
intervention, too. In explaining why states would accept and comply with rules that are not legally 
obligatory the authors referred to the principal-agent model and the prisoners’ dilemma: ‘[S]tates 
often delegate discretionary authority’ to international organizations, such as ‘the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank’, ‘to administer coordination standards, which actors have 
incentives to follow provided they expect others to do so’ (Abbott et al. 2000, 407). Where 
legalization was ‘low’ on all three variables – or rather where there was no legalization at all – ‘we 
approach the ideal type of anarchy prominent in international relations theory’ (ibid.). Here, the 
authors emphasize that rules can never be completely absent in a situation of ‘international 
anarchy’ and turns to Hedley Bull and his thesis on the ‘anarchical society’ (1977) to make this 
point – implicitly invoking the perception of the international resting on a state-based system.  
 Due to these issues, Finnemore and Toope – both constructivist IR scholars – wrote a 
response to the Legalization issue the following year. The irony was not hard to discern when the 
two authors noted that the ‘authors of “Legalization and World Politics” […] have done an 
excellent job connecting one branch of thinking about international law (rooted in the legal theory 
of H.L.A Hart) to one branch of thinking about international politics (neoliberal institutionalism)’ 
(Finnemore and Toope 2001, 743). Sympathetic to the idea of establishing a research agenda that 
would bridge the disciplinary divide between IL and IR, the two scholars suggested a ‘richer view’ 
on law and politics. International law is not only a matter of whether or the extent to which states 
comply. But rather – or essentially - a matter of legitimacy. If we want to explain obligation, for 
instance, then we first have to look at whether these rules are legitimate in the first place, 
Finnemore and Toope argued.  
 The Legalization issue had adopted a too liberal, formal and positivist view of the 
rule of international law, it was claimed in the response. This view, Finnemore and Toope noted, 
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perceived law as a ‘product’ of interstate bargaining and the Legalization authors – so the critique 
went – were more concerned with the ‘form’ of law, than with ‘what legitimates law’ (Finnemore 
and Toope 2001, 750; emphasis added). Implicitly addressing the same ‘why comply?’ question, 
Finnemore and Toope argued that the rule of law in the international realm should be approached 
as a process rather than a product and the study of legalization should place law in its broader 
social context. As asserted by Finnemore and Toope, ‘[u]nder a broader view of law, the 
legalization of politics encompasses more than just the largely technical and formal criteria of 
obligation, precision, and delegation. It encompasses features and effects of legitimacy, including 
the need for congruence between law and underlying social practice’ (Finnemore and Toope 2001, 
744). 
 Interestingly, the two authors contested the Legalization scholars for being too 
Western biased in their conception of law: ‘Theirs is an overwhelmingly liberal and positivist 
view of law. It is also limited to the bureaucratic formalism described by Weber and so is very 
“Western” in a narrow sense’ (Finnemore and Toope 2001, 745)27 and suggested that ‘legal 
bureaucratization’ would have been a more accurate term for what Abbott et al. called 
‘legalization’. The underlying normative baseline that law should be rational - according to this 
response - was implicitly evoking Weberian ideas of the (high degree of) rationality of European 
law as opposed to legal systems of other ‘civilizations’. Indeed, Weber’s notion of law did rely to 
a considerable degree on the importance of obligation to explain why rules are obeyed. But his 
conception of law also follows another dimension, that is, legitimacy. Law’s formal rationality, 
according to Weber, cannot be distinguished from its legitimacy. Law derives its authority from 
coercion and power from its legitimacy, in the Weberian conception of law. If so, law would loose 
its normative power and therefore its coercive functionality (Weber 1978; see also Trubek (1972) 
for a discussion on Weber’s notion of law). Legality and legitimacy are therefore mutually 
constitutive and cannot be separated, according to Weber. My point here is that Finnemore and 
Toope – whilst criticizing the Legalization scholars for being too ‘Western’ in implicitly evoking 
Weber’s idea of the formal rationality in which legality is embedded - actually came to the same 
conception of legality in foregrounding its constitutive other, that is, legitimacy.  
                                                
27 ’We are not implying that Western law, positivism, and liberalism are uninteresting theoretical 
frameworks, but an analysis of the role of law in world politics that is entirely constrained by these 
three optics [obligation, precision, and delegation], attending primarily to formal institutions, is at 
best partial’ (Finnemore and Toope 2001, 745) 
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 What is more, whilst Finnemore and Toope’s intervention in the interdisciplinarity 
debate was important in terms of redressing the projection of IR as being only about 
neoliberalism, rationality and the role of states, their emphasis on legitimacy does not further the 
research agenda much. To be sure, at the time of their intervention in the interdisciplinarity debate, 
the relationship between legality and legitimacy could not have been more contested. Following 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo during the spring 1999 the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo (IICK) had reached the infamous conclusion that the intervention was 
‘illegal but legitimate’ and thereby contested the extent to which the power of legality derives 
from its legitimacy (which Franck (1990) had argued it did in The Power of Legitimacy Among 
Nations). In recognizing that the intervention had been executed on ‘shaky legal grounds’ (IICK 
2000, 166), the Commission emphasized that its own ‘interpretation is situated in a grey zone of 
ambiguity between an extension of international law and a proposal for an international moral 
consensus. In essence, this grey zone goes beyond strict ideas of legality to incorporate more 
flexible views of legitimacy’ (IICK 2000, 164; emphasis in original). Legality (as a formal idea of 
legal validity) and legitimacy (a natural law-like morality) was effectively divorced, which is 
reflected in the work that has lately been invested in ‘legitimacy’ within IR (see, for instance, 
Hurd 2007).  
 Ten years after these interventions, Koskenniemi (2011) offered his perspective on 
the debate on interdisciplinarity. Indeed, his perspective was a rather pessimistic one, to say the 
least, and did not leave much hope for future exchange and alliances across the disciplinary divide. 
In his piece ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations: A Essay in Counterdisciplinarity’ he 
directed his critique towards the use of theory and methods from IR to analyze international law. 
Doing so, he constructed IR as a discipline populated by US behavioralist and realist scholars. In 
identifying three moments or ‘efforts to reform international law into a science’ (Koskenniemi 
2011, 3) – the behavioral turn in US political science in the 1960s, the concern with regimes and 
constructivism in the late 1980s and the ‘turn to law and economics, rational choice and game 
theory’ (ibid., 16) – the conclusion was that ‘’[c]ooperation always sounded more like conquest’ 
(ibid.). As to the constructivist turn and its engagement with law – for instance, the work of 
Kratochwil (1989) and Onuf (1989) – Koskenniemi (2011) noted that ‘very little cooperation 
followed. Most lawyers failed to see the point of translating law into the vocabulary of political 
science of which they would no longer be the native speakers’ (16). To be sure, the attempts by 
US scholars in formulating an interdisciplinary research agenda had been highly biased in favoring 
the IR side over IL, the latter being reduced to merely a channel of empirical material on which IR 
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scholars could draw. Interdisciplinarity is about power and hegemony, Klabbers (2009) deplored: 
'Interdisciplinary scholarship is, more often than not, about imposing the vocabulary, methods 
theories and idiosyncrasies of discipline A on discipline B. Interdisciplinarity, in a word, is about 
power, and when it comes to links between international legal scholarship and international 
relations scholarship the balance tilts strongly in favour of the latter’ (120).  
 The main tenet of Koskenniemi’s counterdisciplinary move was that most 
interdisciplinary approaches were ‘blind’ to the ‘point law’ (Koskenniemi 2011, 17). The realist 
IR scholars might have viewed IL scholars being all prone to idealism and ‘naïve utopianism’, 
according to Koskenniemi, and therefore felt the need to place law in its political context. 
However, though teleology still enjoys a certain ‘persistence’ among international lawyers, 
international lawyers are aware that ‘[t]eleology has not fared well as a ground for institutional 
reform. Proposed universals have turned out to be representative of particular interests’ 
(Koskenniemi 2011, 9). However, IR scholars – according to Koskenniemi (2011) – miss the point 
of law which is that law ‘is based on facts and interests’ at the same time as it ‘possesses ‘relative 
autonomy’ from any momentary fact or interest, that it is not pure immanence, a passive product 
of power’ (ibid., 12: emphasis in original). This is the ‘mystery of legal obligation’ (ibid.), which 
cannot be explained by recourse to rational, behavioralist ‘scientific’ models. In making this 
argument, Koskenniemi referred to his earlier work in identifying the structure of legal 
argumentation as oscillating between apology and utopia resulting in international law being 
essentially indeterminate (Koskenniemi 1989). Moreover, Koskenniemi (2011) stressed that there 
are important differences between the ‘profession’ of the IR scholar and the one of the legal 
scholar. IR scholars are mostly concerned with ‘demonstrable [and] empirical truths’, whereas 
international lawyers are concerned with practical judgment and the normative ends to which the 
rule of law serves (19):  
 
‘For Cassesse and countless other international lawyers, the field in which we have 
made our professional careers is more than just another technical discipline. It 
possesses and inbuilt moral direction to make human rights, justice and peace 
universal. To ‘do’ international law is to operate with a teleology that points from 
humankind’s separation to unity […] Whatever differences may exist between 
international lawyers, we tend to be united in our understanding that legal modernity is 
moving towards what an influential Latin American jurist labeled in 2005 a new jus 
gentium uniting individuals (and not states) across the globe […] It seems impossible, 
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or at least very difficult, to do international law without some such teleology, some 
sense that one is working not only to coordinate the activities of states but for the good 
of humanity itself’ (Koskenniemi 2011, 4; emphasis added)  
 
 Koskenniemi’s call for counterdisciplinarity has to be read in the context of the 
various calls of US neoliberal, rational choice scholars, as outlined above. The ‘conquest’ and 
colonization that he ascribed to these calls are not far off as they did indeed suggest, as noted 
above, that IR scholars had the ‘right’ theory and methods that could be applied to the empirics 
offered by scholars within the discipline of IL. His counterdisciplinary move also has to be read 
together with his call for a ‘culture of formalism’ (also referred to as ‘constitutionalism as 
mindset’ (Koskenniemi 2007a)) which indeed emphasizes ‘culture’ more than ‘formalism’ in 
defining it as ‘a culture of resistance to power, a social practice of accountability, openness, and 
equality whose status cannot be reduced to the political positions of any one of the parties whose 
claims are treated within it’ (Koskenniemi 2004, 500). Here, what Koskenniemi is aiming at is to 
place international lawyers not in a political project but within an ethical concern internal to the 
legal profession (cf. the above quote) to ensure the ‘relative autonomy’ of international law. 
However, the turn to concepts such as ‘legitimacy’, for instance, constitutes for Koskenniemi 
(2009b) an attempt by IR scholars to impose a ‘managerial vocabulary’ (406) on international law 
which results in ‘[t[he vocabularies of ‘consent’, ‘validity’ or ‘dispute settlement’ [being] replaced 
by the social science vocabularies of ‘explaining’ behaviour and attaining ‘compliance’’ (410) and 
a move from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, from ‘formal institutions’ to ‘regimes’, and from 
‘responsibility’ to compliance’ (411).  
 Disciplining is domesticating and power produces knowledge, as Foucault argued 
What I wanted to demonstrate in this part of the chapter is that the processes of drawing (and 
redrawing) the disciplinary boundaries between IR and IL have, by and large, evolved around 
appropriating the ‘international’ to fit the prevailing research agendas within each discipline, 
which has resulted in the exclusion of the ‘other’ – either the insights from the other discipline or 
law and politics as objects of study in IL and IR, respectively – in what seems as a mutual division 
of labor. The three interventions in the interdisciplinary debate demonstrated the extent to which 
earlier practices of disciplinary boundary-drawing reverberate throughout the (attempted) dialogue 
between the two disciplines today. Disciplining – negotiating what methods and objects of study, 
for instance, are deemed ‘appropriate’ whilst ruling out ‘undisciplinary’ methods and objects – 
took the shape of domesticating the ‘other’. By domesticating the other, I suggest that in justifying 
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why interdisciplinarity could work or not and thereby advancing one’s own ‘project’, the scholars 
of the other field was either reduced to positivists (in the Legalization issue) or realists (in 
Koskenniemi’s account). Indeed, the fact that Koskenniemi’s attack was only directed towards IR 
and not other social sciences, for instance, sociology where work of prominent scholars on law has 
been taken up by both IR and IL scholars (eg. Teubner’s (2012) work on international law which 
is influenced by Luhmann’s (2004) approach to law as a social system), demonstrates that the ‘turf 
building exercise’ was only directed against IL’s constitutive ‘other’ (see also Aalberts and 
Venzke 2015).  
 Domesticating also played out in the attempt to conceptualize ‘law’ in a particular 
way that would fit each intervention and their broader research agendas. In the Legalization issue 
a formalist and positivist conception of law was espoused to fit the rational and neoliberal 
institutionalist concern with explaining state behavior and compliance in a ‘scientific’ manner and 
to ensure conceptual consistency so the concept of legalization deductively could be applied to 
empirics. In Finnemore and Toope’s intervention ‘law’ was translated into ‘legitimacy’, which 
would work with their constructivist account on international relations but which also exhibited 
their own Western (Weberian) bias and preoccupation with the same question as the Legalization 
scholars: why do states comply? And in Koskenniemi’s quite critical call for counterdisciplinarity, 
which in opposition to the two other interventions would completely close off any attempt to 
transgress the disciplinary divide, it was noted that IR scholars in general get the ‘point of law’ 
wrong and should therefore leave law altogether with the legal scholars. Law is indeterminate, a 
site for political contestation, as legal argumentation will always unfold between the two 
contradicting and therefore irreconcilable poles of factuality and normativity. Law is therefore 
neither about state behavior and politics nor about legitimacy, but about the making, enactment 
and defense of its relative autonomy, which is a matter of practices of arguing.    
Law	as	Practice:	A	Viable	Way	Out	
 
The	Language(s)	of	Law	
 
 In this section and the following I want to suggest that there is a viable way out of 
the impasse the current interdisciplinarity debate seems to have constructed, and this way out – 
ironically enough – starts with the scholarship of Kratochwil and Koskenniemi. And the year of 
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1989. This year Kratochwil published Rules, Norms and Decisions28, Nicholas Onuf published 
World of Our Making29 and Koskenniemi published From Apology to Utopia30. Kratochwil and 
Onuf’s publications marked the reintegration of international law into IR, which had been long 
dominated by political realists and a general disinterest in international legal issues. In the 
introductory chapter to Rules, Norms, and Decisions Kratochwil stressed that ‘we understand the 
international arena largely negatively, i.e., in terms of the “lack” of binding legal norms, of central 
institutions, of a sovereign will, etc. As inappropriate as this “domestic analogy” may be for 
understanding international relations, the conceptual links between order, law, and special 
institutions remain largely unexamined’ (Kratochwil 1989, 2; emphasis in original).  
 The three publications would differ (though not considerably) in their various topics: 
Kratocwhil was concerned with the role of norms in international relations and his book became ‘a 
manifesto of constructivism in the study of world politics’ (Klabbers 2015, 1195). Following the 
same lines, Onuf31 also introduced constructivism in IR and focused his work on explaining how 
formal as well as informal rules perform the reality that they describe. The structure of the world 
is therefore ever changing, Onuf argued, according to the way in which rules are performed and 
work in a given context, at a given moment. Both Kratochwil and Onuf were influenced by the 
‘linguistic turn’ in Western philosophy (beginning with the ordinary language philosophy of 
Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]) and Austin (1962), among others, which has also inspired post-
structuralist scholars, such as Derrida, Foucault and Butler). Koskenniemi, in turn, was concerned 
with unpacking the structure of legal argumentation. Two years prior to these publications, David 
                                                
28 Friedrich Kratochwil (1989) Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (New York: Cambridge 
University Press) 
29  Nicholas G. Onuf (1989) World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations (Columbia, SC: Greenwood Press) 
30 Martti Koskenniemi (2005) From Apology to Utopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
(reissue with a new epilogue) 
31 Indeed, Onuf (2014) does not seem to have been as hostile towards bridging the gap between IR 
and IL. In a speech given at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights at 
the University of Helsinki in April 2014, he emphasizes that he himself has indeed been ‘at the 
boundaries’ throughout his academic life: ‘As some of you may know, I have made the field of 
International Relations my home for many decades. I was, however, well-trained in international 
law, having served as Robert Tucker’s assistant when he revised Kelsen’s Principles of 
International Law (1965), studied briefly with Myres McDougal, and worked extensively with 
Richard Falk. I taught international law and international institutions until I left full-time teaching 
in 2006, at that time assembling much of my published work in a book entitled International 
Legal Theory: Essays and Engagements, 1966-2006 (2008)’. 
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Kennedy (1987) had published International Legal Structures and, much like, Koskenniemi he 
was also concerned with the rhetorical structures of international law and made the claim that 
international law is basically rhetoric. Common for the four scholars was the emphasis on the role 
of language as what bounds social practices and thereby constitutes social orders as well as their 
conceptualization of international law as being indeterminate and contingent. The ‘why comply?’ 
question was of less importance. The importance in the view of these scholars was to understand 
how semantic and social orders, respectively, constitute one another in constructing law as a 
distinct social space. In this section of the chapter, I will trace this argument through the writings 
of Koskenniemi and Kratochwil. 
 I begin with Koskenniemi. Throughout his work he has emphasized the politics of 
international law, first within a more structuralist account of international law and its semantic 
structures and later by turning to the different actors and expertise involved in the making of 
international law faced with international law’s inherent indeterminacy. In his magnum opus, 
From Apology to Utopia (1989/2005a), he stressed ‘the determining power of the law as a 
conceptual scheme which controls our perception of the facts of international society’ 
(Koskenniemi 2005a, 524) – thus coming close to Onuf’s argument that rules are performative in 
constituting the reality they envision. The constitutive role of language in filling law with meaning 
is emphasized in Apology: ‘The most obvious conceptual scheme which controls perception is 
language’ (525), Koskenniemi argued, which means that ‘[c]ontrary to the common-sensical view, 
language does not reflect the world but interprets it, carves it up, makes sense of the amorphous 
mass of things and events in its. In this sense, facts are constructed as they are perceived though 
[sic] language’ (ibid.; emphasis added). Language usage is thus an important means in sense-
making. In Apology Koskenniemi made this point in deconstructing the rhetorical structure of 
international law which is shaped by its oscillation – ‘constant movement’ - between two opposing 
concerns, that is, apology, on the one hand, where law merely serves as a legitimation of power 
politics and state interests, and utopia, on the other hand, where international law becomes ‘a bag 
of dreams inextricable from the preferences of the dreamer’ (Koskenniemi 2011, 12). International 
law will therefore never be stable or determinate but constantly negotiated in terms of its factuality 
and normativity. International law, in sum, is both particular and universal, at the same time. For 
this reason, Koskenniemi concludes elsewhere that ‘international law is an argumentative practice 
in which political claims are defended and attacked’ (Koskenniemi 2011, 3; emphasis added). 
Koskenniemi followed the same line of inquiry when he undertook a historical study of 
international law in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2004) in which he addressed the puzzle as to 
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why and how the European founders of international law in the 19th century were both 
cosmopolitan and highly nationalist, at the same time. Indeed, his interest in seemingly 
irreconcilable differences – in uncertainty, ambivalence and indeterminacy - is also manifest in his 
writing on international law’s practitioners who mediate between ’commitment’ (’cosmopolitan 
enthusiasm’) and ’cynicism’ (’the constraints of diplomatic routine’) (Koskenniemi 1999a). In this 
piece published in 1999 and entitled ‘Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline of a Theory of 
International Law as Practice’ Koskenniemi (1999a) surveys the professions and practice of 
international law – the judge, the advisor, the activist and the academic – and concludes that 
’[i]nternational law is what international lawyers do and how they think’ (523). In the same vein, 
Koskenniemi stressed in The Gentle Civilizers of Nations that ’[i]t may be too much to say that 
international law is only what international lawyers do and think. But at least it is that […] Like 
any social phenomenon, international law is a complex set of practices and ideas, as well as 
interpretations of those practices and ideas’ (Koskenniemi 2004, 7). 
 International law is a ‘site for political contestation’ (Koskenniemi 2011, 21), as a 
result. In his writings that followed Apology Koskenniemi focused in particular on how the 
politics of international law unfolds between functional legal regimes and their particular expert 
vocabularies. In his publication The Politics of International Law – 20 Years After (and in the 
epilogue to the 2005 publication of Apology) Koskenniemi brought more agency into the structural 
account of the argumentative structure of international law that he had put forward in Apology.32 
In the meantime, the International Law Commission had published its report on international law’s 
fragmentation that had been finalized by Koskenniemi (ILC 2006). In The Politics of International 
Law – 20 Years After Koskenniemi summarized its conclusion as follows: ‘Through specialisation 
– that is to say, through the creation of special regimes of knowledge and expertise in areas such 
as ‘trade law’, ‘human rights law’, ‘environment law’, ‘security law’, ‘international criminal law’, 
                                                
32 Kratochwil (2014a) notes this change in Koskenniemi’s work as follows (after having raised his 
dissatisfaction with what he calls the ’endless rounds of deconstruction’): ’[O]ne has to wonder 
whether Martti Koskenniemi’s original post-modern deconstruction of the international legal 
discourse, encountering thereby a seemingly endless spiral of arguments that meander between 
apology and utopia, does not result from his conceptual framework. If you start out with 
conceptual tools that distinguish clearly between the ”is” and the ”ought” that are rooted in the 
tradition of ”theory” – after all Kant still wanted to reform metaphysics so that philosophy could 
become a ”science” – then what we are seeing is exactly what this distinction lets us see, because 
everything else is left out. But we know – and Wittgenstein took great pains to make us aware of it 
– that this is not what we are after when we act or argue. It is therefore perhaps not accidental that 
Koskenniemi more recently emphasized the elements of a practice of legal arguing that modifies 
(or clarifies) considerably his earlier indeterminacy argument’ (61; emphasis in original) 
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‘European law’, and so on – the world of legal practice is being sliced up in institutional projects 
that cater for special audiences with special interests and special ethos’ (Koskenniemi 2009a, 9). 
International law as a site of contestation was reflected in the different expert vocabularies of the 
various functional regimes, which would struggle with each other to define a particular case, its 
problems and solutions in their own language. ‘What is being put forward as significant and what 
gets pushed into darkness’, Koskenniemi (2009a) notes, ‘is determined by the choice of the 
language through which the matter is looked at, and which provides the basis for the application of 
a particular kind of law and legal expertise’ (11). ‘Words are politics’, Koskenniemi (2009b) 
argued in another article published the same year, and ‘[t]echnical expressions such as 
‘regulation’, ‘compliance’, ‘governance’ and so on hark back to new political and legal 
sensitivities and priorities, lifting new experts into positions of authority’ (411). International law 
is not only semantically indeterminate but also – and for that reason – highly contingent, 
ambivalent and essentially a practice of arguing. 
 Indeed, this argument has also defined Kratochwil’s approach to international law. In 
Rules, Norms, and Decisions Kratochwil argued that legal reasoning is just a form of practical 
reasoning: ’[T]he legal mode of reasoning with rules and norms can best be understood as a 
specialized case of practical reasoning often expounded in treaties on ”rhetoric”’ (Kratochwil 
1989, 39). By arguing that the meaning of rules and norms derive intersubjectively and from the 
way they are used in practice, that is, their meaning in use (Kratochwil draws extensively on the 
work of Wittgenstein), it was stressed that ’the legal character of rules and norms can be 
established when we are able to show that these norms are used in a distinct fashion in making 
decisions and in communicating the basis for those choices to a wider audience’ (Kratochwil 
1989, 42; emphasis in original). In other words – those of Kratochwil (2009a) – ‘what makes rules 
“legal” is their principled use in application […] what the law is remains often unclear’ (58; 
emphasis in original). Finally, the meaning of legal rules and norms is fundamentally 
indeterminate as actors – by their practices – can change and remake ’the normative structures by 
which they are able to act, share meanings, communicate intentions [and therefore] one of the 
most important sources of change […] is the practice of actors themselves and its concomitant 
process of interstitial law-making in the international arena’ (Kratochwil 1989, 61; emphasis in 
original). Due to this indeterminacy, ‘decisions must be buttressed by arguments and these 
arguments are guided and constrained by a “style” or rhetoric’ (Kratochwil 2009a, 59).  
 The role of practices in constituting the meanings of concepts, rules and norms has 
also been stated elsewhere in Kratochwil’s work, with explicit reference to the ‘rule of law’: 
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[I]nspite of its lack of a stable reference, the term [the ‘rule of law’] plays a decisive role in the 
realm of praxis where we try to work out our legal and political problems. Its meaning therefore 
consists in its use and in the connections it established to other concepts within a semantic field, 
and in the way in which certain actions and practices are thereby authorised or prohibited’ 
(Kratohwil 2009b, 172-173; emphasis in original). In Kratochwil’s latest publication entitled The 
Status of Law in World Society (2014a) he provides an impressive account of his practice-oriented 
approach to international law. Whereas his project in Rules, Norms and, Decisions was to outline a 
constructivist approach to the study of international relations and to finally bring international law 
back into IR, in the Status of Law his project is to provide a ‘diagnosis’ of international law (a 
quite dreary one, to be sure) by reconstructing the role of the legal in international relations (see 
Grasten 2015). Here, he shares many insights – and concerns - with David Kennedy (2016; 2009; 
2005) in pointing out that ‘for better or for worse, “law” and its “lawyers” have arrived as part of 
the professional class that manages our affairs […] law now provides in large part the vocabulary 
for contemporary politics’ (Kratochwil 2014a, 1) to the extent that ‘”law” might have become part 
of the problem rather than the solution’ (2). Again, Kratochwil (2014a) emphasizes that law is an 
argumentative practice, and - taking cues from Wittgenstein – he argues that the ways in which 
concepts are used, as opposed to their reference, are constitutive of their very meaning and the 
way in which certain professional practices are authorized and justified to manage global affairs: 
‘[T]he language game of “law” seems to require that there exists a group of authorized persons 
deciding what the law “is”’ (66).  
 Both Koskenniemi and Kratochwil’s writings are much broader and deeper than the 
examples I have just given and, to be sure, I have not given justice to this depth. However, the 
point I want to make is that the ways in which they both approach law share important similarities 
and thus a fertile ground for engaging in interdisciplinary work. Their work demonstrates that 
interdisciplinarity can be done among scholars who share the same epistemological concerns. Both 
Koskenniemi and Kratochwil, for instance, reject the belief that language refers to an always 
already given reality in emphasizing its performative power in making – and continuously 
remaking - the reality it describes. As rightly argued by Aalberts (2013), ‘the question whether 
interdisciplinary collaboration is productive and worth exploring cannot be settled in the abstract, 
but depends in the first place on the specificities of our puzzlements and/or the question we want 
to answer’ (508; see also Kratochwil 2014b). Both Koskenniemi and Kratowchwil argue that 
international law is essentially a practice – a practice of arguing, negotiating and struggling, which 
result in international law being a site of political contestation and antagonism. The meaning of 
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concepts, norms and rules thus derives from what is being said and done by actors, who have been 
authorized to do so. This shifts the focus from how legal norms and rules are obeyed and complied 
with towards how order is constructed and enacted to constitute law as a distinct social space that 
depends on the contingency of legal argumentation and how the boundaries between legality and 
non-legality are subsequently (re)drawn. For that reason, both Koskenniemi and Kratochwil argue 
that this social, discursive construction of the relative autonomy of law is what distinguishes law 
from other modes of practical reasoning. But, importantly, constructing law’s autonomy is done in 
practice as a result of different language games that authorize particular professional groups to 
‘speak’ and endow certain arguments with ‘legal validity’. As argued by Venzke (2012), ‘[legal] 
[t]exts cannot talk – they are talked about. They passively submit to the need for interpretation and 
gaining meaning in their use […] For the language of international law this means not to look at 
the sources of the law but at its practice in search of what the law is’ (1). This calls for a 
reconstructive, practice-oriented approach where conceptual consistency is replaced by the 
recognition of the contingency of concepts and the different language games in which they are 
embedded. It also calls for an approach to reconstruct what legal professionals do and say in terms 
of foregrounding struggles over whose law should rule, why, when and how (see Grasten 2016). 
What is more, the politics of law in both Koskenniemi and Kratochwil’s approach evolves around 
differences and distinctions. Boundaries and distinctions, according to both scholars, are what 
structure sense-making and the production of knowledge; for instance, functional and hence 
professional boundaries that underpin the fragmentation of international law. This means that ‘not 
everything goes’ as ‘[i]nterpretations have to live up to the standards of legal argument and need 
to find acceptance within a relevant community in order to succeed’ (Venzke 2012, 2).  
 In the next section, I make a brief turn to boundaries, distinctions and the role of 
expertise. But, first, I want to outline the way in which I approach law in the analytical part of this 
thesis. My approach follows Kratochwil and Koskenniemi’s conceptualizations as just outlined: 
Law is a practice and the meaning of concepts, rules and norms are embedded in different 
language games, which justify and authorize certain practices and vested actors, whilst 
marginalizing or silencing other practices, actors and thereby alternative courses of action. The 
relative autonomy of law is constituted by practices of drawing, enacting and thereby constantly 
reinscribing meaning into the boundary between what pertains to ‘law’ and what is 
(inter)subjectively ruled out as its ‘other’, that is, unduly social, political and moral influences. I 
understand ‘practice’ as a contingent, relational, patterned and performative action (see Adler and 
Pouliot 2011) and as a creative act of signifying in which narratives, symbols and metaphors, etc., 
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are produced to make something known.33 Practice, in turn, is discursive ‘both in the sense that 
some practices involve speech acts […], and in the sense that practice cannot be thought ‘outside 
of’ discourse’ (Neumann 2002, 628). In being contingent, a practice is conditioned on underlying 
social conventions in a given context. And it is performative in not only presenting something but 
also being productive of the reality it signifies or describes. It is an enactment in the sense that 
‘when people act, they bring events and structures into existence and set them in motion’ (Weick 
1988, 306). Enactments, in other words, ‘don’t just present something that has already been made, 
but always have powerful productive consequences. They (help to) make realities in-here and out-
there’ (Law 2004, 56). A last note on practice. I use ‘practice’ throughout the thesis with two 
different, albeit closely related, meanings. For the most part, I refer to ‘practice’ as outlined above, 
which shares the ways in which Bourdieu’s theory of practice and Wittgenstein’s language games 
approach ‘practice’. However, I also often refer to ‘practice’ (as ‘in practice’ as opposed to 
abstractions and ideal theorizing) in the way Aristotle, for instance, approached practice more 
generically as ‘praxis’ in its relationship to theorizing; it is the entire realm of action and doing.  
 
The	Role	of	Boundaries	and	Experts	in	International	Law	
 
 In this final section, I turn to the role of boundaries, distinctions and experts in the 
making of the ‘international legal’, which has recently been of concern among critical IR and IL 
scholars. These scholars have either addressed the changing nature of traditional boundaries 
defining international law, the pertinence of boundaries and binaries in reproducing asymmetrical 
power structures embedded in the making and enactment of international law or the boundary and 
distinction between legality and a- or non-legality. Indeed, the dynamic and changing boundaries 
in and of international law have empowered new legal as well as non-legal actors in partaking in 
the making and interpretation of international law, which address my initial question as to why 
interdisciplinarity? As noted by Aalberts and Venzke (2015): ‘To understand the power of law, 
academics are well advised to reorient their attention from a dominant focus on the courtroom to 
the ‘situation room’ or cabinet war rooms, where strategy and legality are part of the same 
discursive struggle to justify politics through playing with the rules by the rules’ (16). In what 
                                                
33 According to Doty (1997), ’[p]ractice contains a signifying element, i.e. in order to have any 
meaning at all a practice must signify something. Practices are generally embedded in discourse(s) 
which enable particular meaning(s) to be signified’ (377; emphasis in original) 
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follows I will survey different ‘moves’ to the boundaries by critical IR and IL scholars and the 
recent concern with the role of expertise in international law. 
 How and why traditional, taken-for-granted boundaries of international law in terms 
of territoriality, functionality and temporality are changing and the ways in which these changes 
impact on legal argumentation have recently been of interest in both IR and IL. With the 
emergence of humanitarian interventions and the norm of RtoP, the referent object of international 
law is not only states and its foundational institution of sovereignty but now also ranges from the 
individual to the more diffuse notion of humanity. International law is undergoing a ‘paradigm 
shift’, Teitel (2011) observes, where ‘[t]he normative foundations of the international legal order 
have shifted from an emphasis on state security – that is, security as defined by borders, statehood, 
territory, and so on – to a focus on human security; the security of persons and peoples’ (4). 
International law has become ‘humanity’s law’ (Teitel 2011), as a result. This change in 
international law is reflected in the use of terms, such as, legitimacy, responsibility and justice – 
and the rule of law, as I show in the thesis - as opposed to order and national interests. Whilst 
sovereignty and international law understood as regulating the relations between independent 
states are still important to international law, the boundaries between the ‘international’ and the 
‘domestic’ are getting increasingly blurred with the emergence, for instance, of the notion of 
universal jurisdiction. Indeed, this change in the subjectivity of international law was also 
reflected in UNMIK’s mandate that ‘recognized’ the sovereignty of Serbia whilst emphasizing 
that Kosovo should enjoy ‘substantial autonomy’, which challenged the boundary between what 
would pertain to ‘sovereignty’ as the administration’s normative foundation rested on ensuring the 
rights of the ‘people of Kosovo’. The functional scope of international law has equally changed 
and widened, too. This has resulted in the boundaries between different legal regimes (for 
instance, between environmental law and trade law – the case here often referred to being the 
MOX case), between different jurisdictions (eg. the infamous Kadi case) or between the public 
and the private (eg. the emergence of private security companies in providing public security in 
post-conflict societies; see Leander 2005a; 2005b) being more and more contested. In the case of 
post-intervention Kosovo, the functional scope of UNMIK reached into all spheres of society and 
resulting from the continuous reinterpretation of international law, that is, the Security Council 
Resolution 1244, the SRSG extended his and UNMIK’s legal powers, for instance, to administer 
the wholesale privatization of Kosovo’s socially owned enterprises (Grasten and Uberti 2015). 
 Finally, in the context of the war on terror, the emergence of a new ‘logic of 
precaution’ (Aradau and van Munster 2007; see also Amoore 2008) and the ‘politics of 
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preemption’ (de Goede 2008a; 2008b) it has been argued that the temporality of law has changed 
from not only sanctioning past practices and being concerned with interpreting existing legal 
sources but also to prevent possible future practices to occur, enacting a ‘forward-lookingly’ logic 
of potentiality: ‘The orientation to the future in relation to ancillary and preparatory criminal acts 
is less one of prediction and more one of potentiality: possible future violence and potential end 
stages of ancillary acts are mobilized in trial proceedings or through the media in ways that are not 
strictly predictive and probabilistic, but that incorporate “a logic of radical uncertainty in legal 
reasoning” (de Goede and de Graaf 2013, 316; emphasis in original). The practice of extrajudicial 
killings and terror listing reflects this change in law’s temporality from norms to addressing 
uncertainty through the identification of risk. This ‘logic of radical uncertainty in legal reasoning’, 
according to Kessler and Werner (2008), ‘leads to a stronger emphasis on possible future events in 
comparison to past and present circumstances’ (290). International law, in consequence, is 
increasingly made and interpreted in this ‘continual making and remaking of global political 
possibilities’ (Johns 2013, 1; see also Kessler 2008). To give an example: law’s changing 
temporality in the emphasis on a possible future was reflected in the interpretation of UNMIK’s 
mandate, Resolution 1244, and thereby the enactment of international law, which was exercised 
according to what future events and potential crises the international administration could face in 
its governance of Kosovo. What is more, this changing temporality of international law and 
politics following the emergence of new security measures has also blurred the functional 
boundaries between the fields of economy and security and ‘emerging alliances between the 
commercial economic embracing of risk and the preemptive mode of risk in state security’ have 
been observed (Amoore 2013) to which the freezing of the assets of listed potential terrorists 
testify.   
 Boundaries and distinctions – in particular in the shape of binaries and dichotomies - 
have been at the center of, in particular, work by Third World Approach to International Law 
(TWAIL) scholars and scholars of feminist jurisprudence, who are both concerned with the 
structured inequality that is inherent in international law, international law’s continuous 
production of its ‘others’ (see, for instance, Orford 2006), and in the way in which its conceptual 
apparatus works in binaries, which both structure the conditions of the making of international law 
as well as its content. Distinctions, such as civilized/uncivilized, core/periphery and 
developed/undeveloped, are constitutive of the architecture of international law, according to 
TWAIL scholars, and the epistemic and normative roots of these binaries are planted in European 
colonial rule:   
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‘International lawyers over the centuries maintained this basic dichotomy between the 
civilized and the uncivilized, even while refining and elaborating their understanding 
of each of these terms. Having established this dichotomy, furthermore, jurists 
continually developed techniques for overcoming it by formulating legal doctrines 
directed towards civilizing the uncivilized world. I use the term ‘dynamic of 
difference’ to denote, broadly, the endless process of creating a gap between two 
cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and civilized and the other as ‘particular’ and 
uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to normalize the 
aberrant society […] The dynamic is self-sustaining and indeed […] endless; each act 
of arrival reveals further horizons, each act of bridging further differences that 
international law must seek to overcome’ (Anghie 2005, 4) 
 
 One side of the distinction and the set of values that is represented by this side is thus 
capable of projecting itself as the ‘universal’ towards the other side being, then, the ‘particular’. 
Along the same line, feminist legal theory, which problematizes international law as being ‘both 
built on and operat[ing] to reinforce gendered and sexed assumptions’ (Charlesworth and Chinkin 
2000, 18), approaches international law as essentially a boundary-making process – not only in 
demarcating territorial, jurisdictional and legal boundaries but also between genders (ibid., 20). To 
reveal the hidden meanings of international law – what is being othered and silenced – feminist 
legal scholars have often turned to the method of deconstruction to identify the hierarchy that is 
enacted in international legal structures and practices between the two opposites of a binary, such 
as objective/subjective, logic/emotion, mind/body, activity/passivity, order/anarchy, 
public/private, international/domestic – with the first side of the binary signifying male values and 
symbols, which is stressed and marked and thus superior to its attendant ‘other’ side, which 
signifies female values and symbols (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000; see also Charlesworth 
1999). Orford (1999), for example, has demonstrated how these binaries were enacted in 
intervention discourses in the 1990s to project Western powers as ‘knights in white armour’ and 
the population of the state to be intervened in as the helpless, feminized character of the heroic tale 
who is in need (‘need of intervention’) to be saved.   
 Finally, the importance of boundaries in appropriating the ‘legal’ and its dynamic (as 
opposed to statist) and ever-changing nature and meanings has recently been addressed by Lindahl 
(2013) and Johns (2013) who both approach the making of the international legal as processes of 
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inclusion and exclusion. ‘No legal order is imaginable that does not close itself into an inside vis-
à-vis an outside’, according to Lindahl (2013, 4), who is concerned with unpacking the 
boundaries, limits and fault lines that lie at the core of the very nature of legal ordering and which 
are being reconfigured in the event of globalization. Boundaries, according to Lindahl, are what 
delimitate legal order and thereby ‘how a concrete legal collective draws the limit between legal 
(dis)order and the unordered’ (158). Importantly, the unordered is a relational concept through 
and through’ (Lindahl 2013; 94; emphasis in original). Boundary-drawing becomes therefore an 
important means in sense- and knowledge-making to the extent that it ‘establishes what [a legal 
collective] deems to be important and relevant, partitioning it from what is unimportant and 
irrelevant’ (Lindahl 2013, 95). Doing so, boundary-drawing is performative of what Lindahl terms 
‘a-legality’ and the politics of law is therefore one of including and excluding. In Lindahl’s 
structural account of (international) law, law and its constituent power ‘order[] space by 
differentiating and interconnecting behavior in specific normative articulations of past, present and 
future (Lindahl 2013, 19-20). Johns (2013) has also recently turned the analytical lens towards 
boundary-drawing as a process of meaning-making in international law but brings in more agency 
than Lindahl’s account in reconstructing the ‘practices of reference, spatialisation and 
temporalisation through which international lawyers convey a sense of what may be opposed to 
international legal ‘compliance’’ (Johns 2013, 23; emphasis added). 
 By reconstructing practices of boundary-drawing and applying a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach (a ‘quasi-ethnography’, as Johns terms it) to the making of the ‘international legal’, 
Johns (2013) traces how ‘non-law’ – ‘unruly law’ – is made through practices of international 
lawyers themselves: ‘International lawyers make law as they go about their daily work, but they 
also make non-law’ (Johns 2013). ‘Non-law’34, according to Johns (2013), is what ‘stands 
opposed to or outside the reach of legal norms’ (1) but it is also constitutive of the scope and the 
content of international law as well as the responsibility international lawyers assume when 
making law (25). However, this distinction between law and non-law is not once and for all given 
but constituted in and through the practices of lawyers. What is more, it follows that the 
relationship between legality and non-legality is one of ‘the[ir] mutually constitutive nature or 
the[ir] inseparability’ (Johns 2013, 144). The relationship between law and its ‘outside is therefore 
                                                
34 Or ’non-legality’ which, according to Johns, can be divided into five forms of legality: extra-
legality, illegality, pre- and post-legality, supra-legality and infra-legality. Illegality, for instance, 
means that something is forbidden or suppressed by international whereas extra-legality refers to 
something being outside the realm of international law and therefore not necessarily illegal.  
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in a constant negotiation with one another as ‘legal professionals (and other experts seeking or 
purporting to govern conduct on a global scale by lawful means) continually articulate, for and 
through international law, a jurisdiction bounded, as the case may be, by one or more before(s) 
and after(s), below(s) and above(s), against(s) and/or despite(s)’ (Johns 2013, 8). Extra-legality, in 
Johns’ account, is a legal creation. Johns draws on the case of Guantánamo Bay (which has been 
characterized as ‘an example of ‘the rule of law [having been] suspended’ (Gathii 2003, 368)) to 
argue that law does not recede but constructs the conditions of possibility of its own suspension 
(for instance, the conferral of legal powers to the executive). The detention camps are ‘above all 
works of legal representation and classification [and] spaces where law and liberal proceduralism 
speak and operate in excess’ (Johns 2005, 614; emphasis in original). Seemingly legal vacuums, as 
a result, are produced and structured by legal practices. In terms of security practices, such as the 
suspension of visa waivers, Amoore (2008) has made the same point: ‘It is not the case that ‘law 
recedes’ as risk advances, but rather that law itself authorizes a specific and particular mode of 
risk management’ (850). Moreover, ‘[i]llegality’, Johns points out, ‘is less a matter of neglect than 
a matter of preoccupation for international legal work. The classification of some action or 
condition as illegal is patently a quite deliberate outcome of legal imagination and endeavour’ 
(Johns 2013, 11). By emphasizing the contingency of law and legal ordering, Johns thus opens up 
for disclosing the politics of boundary-drawing in the making of international law where what is 
invoked as either ‘law’ or ‘non-law’ (and thereby the distinction between the two) is dependent on 
who or what fixes meaning, in what context and for what particular purpose.   
 The observation of the dynamic and changing boundaries in and of international law 
as well as its semantic indeterminacy and hence need of interpretation has spurred a recent and 
increasing interest in scrutinizing who are granted authority to make and interpret law and with 
what distributional consequences (see, for instance, Leander and Aalberts 2013; Werner 2014). 
The ever-growing scope of international law has led commentators to suggest that politics is 
primarily being ruled by lawyers and framed in a legal terminology in the ‘expertisation’ of 
international law (Leander and Aalberts 2013). As a result, ‘the politics of law in the 
neoinstitutionalist era has largely been the politics of politics denied’ (Kennedy 2006b, 163). 
However, the example of Albright telling Cook to ‘get new lawyers’ who could find a legal 
justification for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo demonstrates that legal expertise in itself is 
getting politicized. Whilst political actors rely increasingly on legal expertise, it has therefore also 
been observed that the operation of international law is also more and more exercised by non-legal 
actors (Kennedy 2016; 2004) who, as Aalberts and Venzke (2015) pointed out, play with the rules 
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by the rules and thereby also engage in legal argumentation. This politics of expertise has been 
central to Koskenniemi’s later work, as noted above, where his argument is that the expanding 
scope of international law has opened the door for other forms of expertise coming from outside 
the fields of international law to partake in legal decision-making. ‘[T]he law defers to the politics 
of expertise’, he argues, ‘for what might be ‘reasonable’ for an environmental expert is not what is 
‘reasonable’ to a chemical manufacturer; what is ‘optimal’ to [a] development engineer is not 
what is optimal to the representative of an indigenous population; what is ‘proportionate’ to a 
humanitarian specialist is not necessarily what is proportionate to a military expert’ (Koskenniemi 
2007b, 10).  
 The role of legal expertise has in particular been of concern to the work of Kennedy 
(2004; 2005; 2006a; 2016), which has been centered on uncovering ‘the politics of the invisible 
college’ of international experts (Kennedy 2001) and what he calls the ‘background’ of 
international law where experts reside, as opposed to the foreground where sovereigns and 
legislators are cast as lawmakers (Kennedy 2005). International lawyers, according to Kennedy, 
are not neutral, apolitical actors but ‘people with projects’ (Kennedy 2009; see also Kessler and 
Werner 2013; Orford 1998). Against the backdrop of the emergence of what Teitel terms a 
‘humanity’s law’, his project is to disclose the ‘dark sides’ of international law’s virtue and how 
the language of law is used for different political ends, such as a legitimizing tool in warfare or in 
distributing powers within a paradigm of humanitarianism. However, ‘[a]lthough international law 
is traditionally understood as less easily separable from “politics”’, Orford (1998) notes, 
‘international lawyers do not understand their own practices as political, in the sense of involving 
an exercise of power’ (15-16). Nevertheless, ‘[t]hese experts – often lawyers – make decisions that 
affect the wealth, status, and power of other people’ (Kennedy 2005, 6). As argued by Kessler and 
Werner (2013), ‘[f]aced with uncertainty as to the law’s precise scope and meaning, they [experts] 
construct legal interpretations and inject them with a legitimacy claim based on their expertise’ 
(794). This legitimacy claim, however, is rather ambiguous as it is based on the recognition that 
the expert acts impersonally and therefore does not let his personal preferences influence the 
claims he is making, on the one hand, and the recognition that the specific position, knowledge 
and skills of that one person is what authorize him to make claims, on the other hand (Kessler and 
Werner 2013, 802).  
 Indeed, the emphasis on the role of experts in the making of international law is not 
entirely new. The New Haven School scholars were concerned with this issue but would approach 
the international lawyer as a neutral, impartial actor, as opposed to the politician and the activist. 
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What is new, however, is the emphasis on the legal expert’s partiality and political role and hence 
the politics of legal expertise, that is, the recognition that because international law in the context 
of its functional and temporal expansion is essentially inderminate and uncertain, the politics of 
expertise does not only take place between different forms of expertise, legal expertise being one 
of them, but also within the field of international law itself and between different legal 
vocabularies (between international humanitarian law and human rights, for instance) (Leander 
and Aalberts 2013). The ‘politics of expertise’ to which law is ‘deferring’’, in other words, is not 
‘merely external’ (Leander and Aalberts 2013, 784) but unfolds in processes of co-constitution 
within the social space of international law where legal expertise and its object constitute one 
another (ibid.). To define a problem is instrumental for what legal expertise would be authorized 
and performative of the reality in which the lawyer intervenes and subsequently reinterpret the 
object and its meaning over time (Leander and Aalberts 2013, 788; see also De Goede and 
Sullivan 2013 and other contributions in the same special issue on legal expertise). This calls for a 
more reflexive and reconstructive approach to the politics of international law, which foregrounds 
the indeterminacy, contingency and performativity of international law as a practice of arguing 
and a field of expertise.   
 In this second part of the chapter, I argued that a viable way out of what I termed the 
impasse constructed by the co-constitutive history of the disciplines of IR and IL and recent 
interventions in the debate on interdisciplinarity was to adopt a reconstructive, practice-oriented 
approach to law that foregrounds the constitutive role of language and professional practices. This 
conception of law situates the analytical vantage point at boundaries and entails the questions how, 
where and, importantly, why boundaries and distinctions are made and enacted to construct law’s 
relative autonomy within new political contexts (eg. the war on terror) and, importantly, by 
whom? This shifts the focus away from the question of why comply and the assumption that 
international law derives its legality and legitimacy from its semantically precise rules (ie. the 
Legalization scholars) towards how order is (re)constructed and meaning is fixed in the face of 
semantic indeterminacy and the uncertainty as to the ever-changing scope and function of 
international law. To this end, critical IR and legal scholars have highlighted the performativity of 
boundaries in carving up the international legal into different territorial or functional fields for 
particular legal and political purposes as well as agency of legal as well as non-legal experts in this 
process of inclusion and exclusion in distinguishing between what pertains to ‘legality’ and what 
is ruled out as its (relative and constitutive) other.  
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Conclusion:	Anxiety	and	Autonomy	
 
 By way of conclusion, I want to make a few points. My first point might be a bit 
trivial but it relates to yet another rather critical comment on interdisciplinarity by Kratochwil 
(2010), who notes that ‘interdisciplinary work will require considerable knowledge in at least two 
fields and a capacity to ‘translate’’ (313). After having written and rewritten this chapter, which 
was supposed to only provide ‘a few notes’ on interdisciplinarity, its length made me wonder 
whether I should find a more adequate title. However, I decided to stay with ‘notes’ – and this is 
where the anxiety surfaces – as I feel I am only hinting at the waste amount of literature, ideas and 
positions which define the disciplines of IR and IL, their common and yet not so common 
disciplinary histories, and other attempts, too, at bridging the disciplinary divide both in a 
historical and contemporary context. However, by opting for ‘notes’ I wanted to underline 
‘anxiety’ – not only my own but, in particular, the one voiced by some lawyers in the debate on 
interdisciplinarity, which reflects the practices and concern with constructing the relative 
autonomy of international law as a discipline and also, more generally, international law as a 
distinct social field of practice. Here, I approach a field as a ‘constantly evolving, dynamic 
terrain[] of struggles and change’  (Leander 2009, 5) that exists in a context and therefore is only 
relatively autonomous from other fields, which results in its boundaries being constantly contested 
and challenged.  
 This anxiety led me to approach international law as the social and discursive 
construction of what pertains to the rule of law and what is ruled out as it other. This approach 
departs from the work of Koskenniemi and Kratowchil and their argument that law is a practice of 
arguing, which I suggested provides a fertile ground for doing interdisciplinary research on 
international law by brushing of the positivist and formalist conception of law espoused by some 
IR and IL scholars. Indeed, doing interdisciplinarity work is more a question of methodological 
and metatheoretical concerns and ‘puzzlement’. What finding oneself at the boundaries also can 
lead to is a ‘fresh’ perspective on how certain practices unfold, concepts are made or orders 
enacted, which in practice do not confine themselves to disciplinary demarcations and which 
cannot always be appropriated to fit already established, take-for-granted concepts and methods. 
This is my claim to the possibility and potentiality of interdisciplinarity and to a farewell to arms.   
 In the chapter that follows on The Politics of Translation and Its Conditions of 
Possibility I build on these insights that semantic fields and social orders a mutually constitutive in 
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constructing the relative autonomy of international law as a social field distinct from other social 
and functional fields. To this end, I conceptualize translation as a boundary-drawing process that 
simultaneously keep separate and connect semantic and social fields in creating certain 
representations of the world, a culture or a group of people. Doing so, the purpose of the next 
chapter is to use translation as an insight into how languages are made bounded, rendered unified 
and thus juxtaposed one another. Opting for translation as an analytical lens and a practice of 
boundary-drawing allows for reconstructing how the meaning of legal norms, rules and concepts – 
such as the rule of law – are temporarily fixed and rendered determinate in practice in the face of 
the semantic indeterminacy and uncertainty of international law.    
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Chapter	3	
THE	POLITICS	OF	TRANSLATION	AND	ITS	CONDITIONS	OF	POSSIBILITY	
 
‘This story of Babel recounts, among other things, the origin of the 
confusion of tongues, the irreducible multiplicity of idioms, the 
necessary and impossible task of translation, its necessity as 
impossibility’35  
 
‘In every possible sense, translation is necessary but impossible’36  
 
Introduction:	Law,	Language	and	Translation		
 
 Politics of translation are ubiquitous in today’s global society. Whether we look at 
how policy is transformed into practice, how seemingly stable concepts adopt different meanings 
across space and through time, or, to give an example, how warfare is increasingly turned into 
‘lawfare’ (Dunlap, 2008; Kennedy 2006a) and the displacement of the social by the technical (e.g. 
drones), meaning construction today unfolds through multiple mediums and across different and 
dispersed social spaces, which are underpinned by different logics of representation, ways of 
knowing and, importantly, languages. In practical terms, translation is inevitably necessitated 
today by the spread of seemingly stable but in practice essentially contested ‘universal’ norms and 
concepts across the world and by the gradual heterogeneity of global space. The 
constitutionalization of international law (Fassbender 2009; Peters 2006; Stone Sweet 2009) and 
the increase in transgovernmental regulation and what has been termed global administrative law 
(Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 2005) have resulted in the emergence of fundamental, 
constitutional norms, such as the rule of law, within the ‘legal international’. Yet, when such 
                                                
35  Jacques Derrida (1985) Des Tours de Babel. In Joseph F. Graham (ed.) Difference in 
Translation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) (pp. 165-207), at 171 
36 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2007) Translation as Culture. In Paul St-Pierre and Prafulla C. Kar 
(eds.) In Translation – Reflections, Refractions, Transformations (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company) (pp. 263-276), at 263 
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norms cross state borders and move outside of their (‘modern nation-state’) context, there is a lack 
of conceptual fit and their meanings become contested, as a result (Wiener 2008, 13). They need 
to be translated. The counter-narrative to international law’s constitutionalization is its 
fragmentation: The international legal, it is argued, is increasingly carved up into different 
functional fields and the same ‘problem’ is addressed in different, often competing expert 
vocabularies and vernaculars (eg. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004; Koskenniemi 2009a; 
International Law Commission 2006). The same ‘problem’, in other words, is translated 
differently. Following these observations, it has been noted that the transfer of concepts and 
policies (such as human rights, for instance) between functional and semantic fields creates 
‘translation problems’ (Koskenniemi 1999) when ‘helpers, experts and activists […] translate 
those normative “visions” into actual practice’ (Kratochwil 2014a, 21; emphasis added). It is the 
expert, the lawyer, who works in the background of sovereigns and legislators, Kennedy (2005) 
argues, ‘who translates political decisions back into facts on the ground’ (9).  
 However, whereas the use of the term ‘translation’ in the context of increasing 
transfers of knowledge and meaning on a global scale as well as the emergence of new mediums 
shaping global governance and policies seems fairly uncontested, it remains to be seen what 
politics is involved in processes of translating policy into practice and in the constitution of shared 
meaning within and between different spatiotemporal orders. What are the translation problems? 
Who are the translators? What particular purposes does a certain translation serve? What are the 
conditions that shape the politics of translation? My own personal observation is that ‘translation’ 
is increasingly articulated and mobilized in more critically inclined writings within the disciplines 
of IR and IL, but its very meaning, the processes and practices that it refers to, its context (when 
does translation take place?) and the politics that underpins it, are often left unaddressed and 
therefore rarely spelled out in any greater details. Translation is often treated as a broad and poorly 
defined category.  
 Building on the previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to develop an 
analytical framework centered on ‘translation’ as not only a product resulting from the process of 
translating an ‘original’ into a target (con)text but, in particular, as a highly ambivalent and 
politically chartered practice by which meaning is reproduced and thus made anew in the face of 
semantic indeterminacy, yet in the pursuit of a certain project. Doing so, I also want to suggest 
that translation can be used as an analytical lens that foregrounds the mutual constitution of 
semantic fields and social orders and the constitutive role of boundaries in processes of knowledge 
production and meaning making. My turn to ‘translation’ is therefore inspired and informed by the 
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reconstructive, practice-oriented approach to international law, which I outlined in the previous 
chapter. Before I outline what I mean by translation, I want to unpack what I mean by its 
ambivalence. The ambivalence of the practice of translating is manifest in its dual performance of 
disunity and unity, foreignness and familiarity, ‘source’ and ‘target’. The constitutional power of 
translation (which is neglected if translation is merely understood as an interlinguistic transfer of 
meaning without change) comes into play in its enactment of a gap between two – subsequently 
juxtaposed - linguistic and cultural entities that it, at the same time, purports to bridge and efface 
in rendering familiar what appears as foreign. This ambivalence – or duality – of translation refers 
to what Derrida and Spivak (above quotes) addressed as the (im)possibility of translating.  
 The ambivalence of translation derives not only from this complex, somehow 
contradictory, relationship between disunity (between space and across time) and unity, but also 
from the problem of reference – or, more accurate, the lack of reference – due to which semantic 
indeterminacy will always be a problem the translator will face in practice. For this reason, one 
translation is never possible but only multiple translations, why the politics of translation plays out 
in the conscious and contested process of authorizing and justifying one particular translation, 
whilst marginalizing or denying alternative translations. Given this essential ambivalence and 
contestedness but practical importance of translation in global governance, how does translation 
construct, contest and change the meaning of concepts, such as the ‘rule of law’? This is the 
question I will address in this chapter.  
 Here, I will briefly pause to outline what I mean by ‘translation’ (which I will return 
to again in the following part by way of an example). To this end, I will first outline how 
translation has traditionally been conceptualized in order to suggest a conception of translation 
that approaches translation as a highly contingent, boundary-drawing practice. In Western 
conceptualizations of translation, translation traditionally denotes a process of transfer. In 
translation studies the concept is often referred to as ‘etymologically, a “carrying across” or 
“bringing across”: the Latin translation derives from transferre (trans, “across” + ferre, “to carry” 
or “to bring”)’ (Kasparek 1983, 83; emphasis in original). Notions – or norms - such as 
equivalence and symmetry, which designate a source-oriented approach to translating, have 
traditionally been instructive of how to approach translation among translation scholars. In one of 
the very first attempts to formulate a theory of translation, Étienne Dolet’s (1509-46) La Manière 
de Bien Traduire d’une Langue en Autre (1540), five criteria for a so-called ‘good translation’ 
were listed, which emphasized the importance of the source text. Two of the criteria were the 
following: ‘(1) The translator must fully understand the sense and meaning of the original author, 
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although he is at liberty to clarify obscurities; (2) The translator should have a perfect knowledge 
of both SL [source text] and TL [target text]’ (Dolet 1540, quoted in Bassnett 2002, 61). However, 
in his influential book from 1980 entitled In Search of a Theory of Translation, which anticipated 
a ‘cultural turn’ in translation studies (on the cultural turn, see Bassnett 1998), translation scholar, 
Gideon Toury, called for a more flexible conception of translation as any ‘translational 
phenomena’37 ‘regarded as a translation from the intrinsic point of view of the target system’ 
(1980, 73). According to Toury, making the target system the object of study was a natural move 
given that translation is necessitated by a particular need in the target context.  
 This marked shift from the source to the target – what Malmkjær (2005) has dubbed 
the ‘target text turn’ - would free many translation scholars from the straightjacket of the original 
text and the norms of equivalence and symmetry that focusing on the original text would imply. 
This would allow translation scholars to observe more diffuse and complex translation practices 
and thereby to move beyond a purely linguistic view on translation. Importantly, the agency of the 
translator was foregrounded and made ‘visible’ (Venuti 1995) in the face of semantic uncertainty 
and the problem of what was increasingly recognized as the absence of universal meanings and 
hence of a shared referent that would stand outside all languages as a tertium comparationis in a 
‘world out there’. As stressed by Tymoczko (2010), whose work has been centered in particular on 
translation in a post-colonial context, ‘the transfer metaphor implicit in Western 
conceptualizations of translation undermines the self-reflexivity and empowerment of translators, 
encouraging a sort of amnesia about ideology in translation processes that facilitates the 
unexamined ascendancy of the values of the dominant powers within a culture and throughout the 
globalizing world’ (7). The broadening of the scope of translation studies also blurred the 
disciplinary boundaries between this scholarly field and, in particular, sociology and post-colonial 
studies, where the text has not been the prime focus among scholars but rather a more abstract 
conception of translation as a (often epistemically violent) practice in and through which 
singularity is created out of – or despite of - heterogeneity and difference.  
 It is from these later currents – briefly outlined and to which I will return throughout 
the chapter – that I approach translation: Translation is a boundary-drawing practice that 
simultaneously keeps separate and connects social and semantic fields in its promise to create 
connectivity and continuity out of what is its basic condition, that is, the presence of 
                                                
37 Toury refers in In Search of a Theory of Translation to ’translational phenomena’ as ’entire 
texts or their constituents, corpora bigger than one text, or, finally, phenomena which have no 
direct textual realization’ (1980, 7; emphasis added) 
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disconnectivity and discontinuity. Doing so, the practice of translating enacts boundaries, which in 
turn are overcome by rendering linguistic or non-linguistic differences ‘fixed’, determinate and 
knowable. In the face of semantic indeterminacy, translation is what momentarily fixes and 
stabilizes meaning. Translation therefore means more than transfer as it also produces meaning 
and thereby new semantic fields, subject positions, ways of knowing and representations. Also, it 
is different from interpretation insofar as interpretation means the reception and understanding of 
meaning. In other words, ‘[t]ranslation has a more active sense of re-writing, re-production: it may 
be predicated on interpretation and understanding, but it is also more than that’ (Freeman 2009, 
435). It is constitutive of new meaning within a new social field – its target (con)text - but also 
render meaning – sometimes new meaning – to what is being translated (the ‘original’). Adopting 
this conception of translation, my aim is to foreground the sociology and performativity of 
translation. 
 This chapter falls in four parts. In the first part I reconstruct the conditions that 
constitute the paradox that Derrida and Spivak are concerned with when they refer to the 
(im)possibility of translation. Doing so, I argue that these conditions are exactly what constitute 
the conditions of possibility for the politics of translation. The politics of translation, I will 
demonstrate in the three parts that follow, is conditioned on the indeterminacy, contingency and 
performativity of the practice of translating. In the next part of this chapter I will also provide an 
example of translation to demonstrate how my conception works as both an analytical lens and a 
practice that can be observed. In the remainder of this introduction, I give an overview of how 
translation has been approached within different disciplines in order to identify how these 
conceptions relate to my concept of translation as not solely a practice of boundary-transgressing 
but, first and foremost, of boundary-drawing. 
 Indeed, the notion of translation has been used in a broad variety of disciplines and 
sub-disciplines outside of the field of traditional translation studies, most notably in Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) (Callon 1986, 1995; Latour 1987, 2005) and its offspring Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) (Law 1997), also referred to as the sociology of translation inspired by the 
work of Serres on translation (1982). But also in: anthropology (Rubel and Rosman 2003), 
comparative law (Glanert 2014a, 2014b, 2011; Glanert and LeGrand 2013; LeGrand 2014, 2005), 
management and organizational studies (Czarniawska and Sevón 1996; Yanow 2004), security 
studies (de Goede and Sullivan 2016; Stritzel 2011), post-colonial studies (Bhabha 1994; 
Niranjana 1992), cultural studies (Sakai 1997), and, to a lesser extent and more recently, in IR 
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where the approach to translation is mainly inspired by ANT (Acuto and Curtis 201338; Barry 
2013; Best and Walters 2013; Brake and Katzenstein 2013; Büger 2015; Büger and Bethke 2014; 
Nexon and Pouliot 2013) and International Political Economy (de Goede 2003). And many more 
references could be added. 
 Often the meaning of translation differs in these different disciplinary usages of the 
term, though there are important overlaps. In STS and ANT translation adopts two but closely 
related meanings. Translation is the process of transforming different modalities and practices into 
singularities. Translation, as such, ‘involves creating convergences and homologies by relating 
things that were previously different’ (Callon 1980, 211). Translations, according to Law (2004), 
‘help co-ordination of multiples’ (60). Translation is therefore essential to the notion of network in 
ANT. The other conception is translation as encompassing processes of problematization and the 
empowering of a few actors to represent the rest. Translation, it follows, is an exercise of power: 
‘By translation we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and 
violence thanks for which an actor or force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself, authority to 
speak or act on behalf of another actor or force’ (Callon and Latour 1981, 279).  
 Translation from a post-colonial perspective also adopts two meanings that both 
relate to what is observed as the implicit asymmetries between cultures in the colonial and post-
colonial context. Post-colonial translation studies build on the observation of a ‘close relationship 
between colonization and translation’ (Bassnett and Trivedi 1999, 5). And it has been noted that 
‘[n]othing comes closer to the central activity and political dynamic of postcolonialism than the 
concept of translation’ (Young 2003, 138). One is metaphoric in which translation symbolizes the 
colonial mindset instrumental to processes of turning indigenous cultures into ‘translations’ or 
reproductions of the original, the culture of the colonizer and the ‘Western modern state’. In this 
perspective, indigenous cultures were translated into colonized cultures (‘copies’), and local 
people were translated from being subjects to objects. The other conception of translation is 
translation as an enactment that is premised on the colonial ordering of culture and languages, 
where the ‘local’ language and culture would be inferior to the colonizers’ language and culture. 
In the context of 19th century colonialism, translation was an important generator of knowledge on 
Europe’s ‘Other’ (Hui 1998, 201). Translations of texts and the choice of translation materials, 
which would create the desired image of the barbarian Other or the mysterious Orient, became 
                                                
38 Though in this edited volume, which aims at bringing ANT into the field of IR, ’translation’ is 
not explicitly of concern but rather ’assemblage’ (agencement) – which among ANT scholars are 
also at times referred to as ’translation’ 
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important means in representing Orientalism (Said 1978) through which populations where 
‘interpellated’ into colonial subjects (Niranjana 1992) and a collective singular, that is, the 
colonized, ‘the locals’, the ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’.  
 Both ANT and post-colonial approaches to translation share the recognition that 
translation does not take place in a neutral setting nor is informed by norms for a ‘good 
translation’, such as, equivalence and symmetry. Translation is a manipulative act where the 
Orientalist or the scientist, for instance, translates for a particular purpose, which becomes 
reflected in the meaning that is constructed in the process of translating. Therefore they also share 
the conception of translation as domestication understood as turning another element – knowledge, 
group of people, a culture – into a desired element from the perspective of the translator, which 
would fit the translator’s project and set of values and leave the values and cultural specificities of 
the ‘original’’s culture out. Translation is fundamentally a violent epistemic act. However, the two 
approaches adopt different starting points. The ANT scholar is concerned with how translation 
serves as a means by a particular group of people to – throughout different, accumulative steps 
(Callon’s (1986) study of translation as domestication in the case of the scallops in the St. Brieux 
Bay is a good example) – constitute asymmetric power structures, which might not have been in 
place prior to the intervention of the translator. The post-colonial starting point is the presence of 
asymmetric power structures that the translator – the Orientalist – bolsters and reinforces in and 
through his work.  
 In comparative law, translation has been a concern within this field for a long time. 
Already in 1951, US comparative legal scholar, Ferdinand F. Stone, noted that the ‘translation of 
basic legal works’ was an ‘indispensable first step’ in comparing laws (Hendry 2014, 87). 
Translation among comparative law scholars seems to have followed the traditional approach to 
translation that defined earlier work in the disciplinary field of translation studies. As noted by 
LeGrand: ‘The task of comparatists-at-law is to measure the gap or the écart between laws, not 
unlike the way in which literary translators constantly seek to apprehend the distance between 
languages’ (2005, 41; emphasis in original). The reference to (functional) ‘equivalence’ echoes the 
traditional conception of translation that defined translation studies until a more broad and flexible 
conception of translation saw the day with the ‘cultural turn’ (Bassnett 1998). For instance, in their 
oft-cited book An Introduction to Comparative Law Zweigert and Kötz stressed that ‘[t]he basic 
methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality’ (1998, 31). ‘[T]he process 
of translation within the traditional comparative approach is harnessed to the task of ascertaining 
functional equivalence’ (Hendry 2014, 89).  
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 However, more recent work by, in particular, Glanert and LeGrand have approached 
translation as not solely an issue of linguistic differences but also of culture. Translation is 
therefore not only about transfer but also (or rather) about transformation (Hendry (2014) places 
this approach to translation in the distinction between comparative law as the ‘traditional’ process 
of comparison, on the one hand, and comparative legal studies as a post-positivist approach being 
more concerned and ‘sensitive’ to context, on the other hand). The issue at stake in terms of 
translating within comparative legal studies is thus not only the problem of linguistic differences 
but also different legal traditions, legal histories and what LeGrand (1996) terms the legal 
mentalité. The role of the comparatist is effectively the translator, who is – like the Orientalist and 
the scientist - not neutral (neutrality being ‘fictitious’ (Frankenberg 1985)), why no ‘pure’ 
translation can be achieved. Both LeGrand and Glanert are concerned with the seemingly 
impossible task to combine the indeterminacy and contingency of language with what remains 
important to the ‘comparatist-at-law’, that is, the strive for functional equivalence when a legal 
text are transferred from one legal culture and linguistic community to another. ‘[L]aw-in-
translation’, Glanert (2014a) argues, ‘operate[s] as an assemblage: it combines a transnational 
fabric with linguistic iterations that compel the law-text to get reacquainted with the localism it 
had sought to overcome’ (261). Legal translation, as a result, oscillates between the generic and 
the singular, and the ‘glocal’ and the local (Glanert 2014a).  
 In anthropology, translation has played a prime role, too, since its inception as a 
discipline. As noted by Rubel and Rosman (2003) ‘[t]he central aim of the anthropological 
enterprise has always been to understand and comprehend a culture or cultures than one’s own. 
This inevitably involves either the translation of words, ideas and meanings from one culture to 
another, or the translation to a set of analytical concepts’ (1). Here, translation denotes, in its 
broadest sense, ‘cross-cultural understanding’ (Rubel and Rosman 2003, 1). The early 
anthropologists (the European explorers and travellers) therefore became translators, ‘who were 
the basis for the conceptions which the Others had of Europeans’ (ibid.) and, as emphasized in 
particular by post-colonial scholars, the basis for constructing the ‘Others’ themselves through 
travel writings.   
 Translation does not only define the object of study of the anthropologist but also 
every methodological step taken in the process of making claims about the object in carrying out 
an ethnography: ‘When field notes are recorded, social institutions and discourses are analyzed 
(such as kinship, residence patterns, exchange or ritual practices) and ethnographic descriptions 
are crafted, translation is present in every step’ (Hanks and Severi 2014, 2). An important 
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ethnographic contribution on international law and translation is the legal anthropologist Sally 
Engle Merry’s (2006) Human Rights and Gender Violence; Translating International Law into 
Local Justice in which she traces how state and non-state actors translate human rights norms on 
gender violence into various local contexts. In what she terms a ‘deterritorialized ethnography’ she 
places her inquiry in processes in which the local and the global are intertwined. According to 
Merry (2006), ‘[i]n order for human rights ideas to be effective […] they need to be translated into 
local terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning. They need, in other words, to 
be remade in the vernacular’ (1). In this context, ‘[t]ranslation is the process of adjusting the 
rhetoric and structure of these programs [‘developed by activists in one setting’] to local 
circumstances’ (Merry 2006, 135).  
 Indeed, the conception of translation in comparative law and legal studies come 
close to the way in which translation has been approached in translation studies. In earlier 
comparative law work, it was in particular the norms of functional equivalence and symmetry that 
were stressed in the process of transferring meaning from one legal culture and linguistic 
community to another. The scholars who would identify themselves as comparative legal studies 
scholars adopt a more flexible conception of translation that takes the context of translation and 
the visible role of the translator into account, and which resembles the work in translation studies 
that identify with the ‘cultural turn’. The conception of translation among these scholars come 
close to how translation has been approached among anthropologists as a cross-cultural, boundary-
transgressing process.  
 My own approach draws on these various conceptions of translation. It follows from 
insights within ANT and post-colonial translation studies that translation is not a neutral act, nor is 
the translator a neutral actor. Translation is epistemically violent in authorizing particular 
representations of cultures and groups of people, forms of knowledge and social orders, whilst 
marginalizing or excluding others. I therefore share their problematization of and analytical 
interest in the performativity of translation and, more generally, of language. I share their 
emphasis on the contingency of translation – which is also shared by comparative legal scholars, 
such as Glanert and LeGrand. The conception among anthropologists of translation as also 
encompassing the process of turning data gathered in the field into concepts is also important to 
this study. Not least as it highlights the epistemic violence of academic writing in itself, which for 
my own part is in English. If I had chosen to refer to the ‘rule of law’ in the ways in which it is 
articulated within other languages – ‘Etat de Droit’ or ‘Rechtsstaat’, for instance – would my data 
collection and analysis have been different? The reconstructive approach to my case study (which 
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I will outline in the next chapter on methods) partly followed from this concern as well as my 
choice of not providing any a priori definition of what the ‘rule of law’ is but to move the 
analytical lens towards how its conceptual elusiveness is dealt with and become a problem in and 
of practice. During my fieldwork and in the analytical part of this thesis I therefore focus both on 
practices of constitution-making (ie. the making of a ‘constitutional state’) and the role of courts 
(which is central to common law conceptions of a state under the rule of law).  
 However, my conception of translation – translation as a boundary-drawing practice 
– does not take the boundaries that translation purports to bridge for given, understood as being 
always already in place and being fairly uncontested. This is how translation is approached among 
legal comparative scholars and anthropologists in their concern with cross-cultural processes and 
the immediately given écart between cultures, languages and laws. In my view such an approach 
analytically ‘blindspots’ how translation in itself enacts these boundaries, which are of concern to 
comparative law and anthropology. Again, to restate my conception of translation: The practice of 
translating, in the face of semantic indeterminacy, is what momentarily fixes and stabilizes 
meaning in enacting and at the same time purporting to bridge boundaries for a particular purpose 
in a given context. Foregrounding how translation not only transgresses boundaries but also makes 
them and renders them fixed, determinate and knowable highlights the politics of translation. To 
make this point, the following part turns first to the seemingly paradox of translation, which I then 
set out to deparadoxificate in order to reconstruct its conditions of possibility, which constitute, I 
will argue, the conditions of the politics of translation and hence of the construction of meaning in 
global governance.  
  
Constituting	the	Problem,	Problematizing	the	Conditions	
 
Deparadoxificating	Translation	
 
  To address the question of how translation constructs, contests and changes the 
meaning of concepts, such as the rule of law, in global governance, I first turn to what Derrida 
(and Spivak) termed the paradox of translation, that is, a translation’s necessity as impossibility 
(its (im)possibility). This paradox, according to Derrida, presents itself in translation being a 
process of replication and differentiation, at the same time. As such, translation encompasses the 
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seemingly impossible task of creating unity out of differences, whereas differences can only exist 
as long as they refer (albeit negatively) to one another and their dissolution would therefore 
equally result in the dissolution of relations that make translation possible in the first place. For 
Derrida it is essentially the difference between words within a language on which language as a 
system of social convention relies.39 As meaning cannot be before or beyond language, according 
to Derrida, but is an effect of language, and given that each language or culture has a particular set 
of differential relations which structure meaning, translatability – understood as the transfer 
between languages of one text’s signification unchanged into another text - can never be achieved.  
 However, Derrida argues, it is what is irreducibly different (‘the irreducible 
multiplicity of idioms’) that also constitutes the possibility (as necessity) of translation. The 
boundaries of a language or culture are constituted in their differential relations to other languages 
or cultures. For this reason, translation is always possible. The problem is therefore that ‘[i]f the 
foreign is unambiguously incomprehensible, unknowable and unfamiliar, it is impossible to talk 
about translation because translation simply cannot be done. If, on the other hand, the foreign is 
comprehensible, knowable and familiar, it is unnecessary to call for translation’ (Sakai 2009, 83). 
Translation, in sum, is essentially undecidable in this oscillation between unfamiliarity and 
familiarity where its condition of impossibility is, at the same time, its condition of possibility. 
 Here, my argument is that whereas Derrida’s paradox of translation leads to an 
impasse the distinction between the unfamiliar and the familiar, which is constitutive for Derrida’s 
paradox, needs to be reconstructed from how it is made in practice. That is to say: I suggest that a 
viable way out of this (bivalent, logical) paradox is to treat its contradictions as ‘problems of 
praxis’ (Kratochwil 2014a, 262). Doing so allow us to ‘go on’ in observing translation as a 
practice that is actually done in everyday (international) life, and seemingly unproblematically in 
the transformation of, for instance, concepts into practice (and practice into theory) that structures 
social relations. To quote Ricæur (2006): ’[T]ranslation is inscribed in the long litany of ’despite 
everything’… Despite the heterogeneity of idioms, there are bilinguals, polyglots, interpreters and 
translators’ (18). Also, treating its contradictions as problems of praxis also foregrounds where 
and how meaning is made and located when problems are made and potentially overcome inter-
                                                
39 Différance as ’the movement by which language, or any code, any system of reference in 
general, becomes ’historically’ constituted as a fabric of differences’ (Derrida, ”Difference” in 
Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973) 
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subjectively in the social construction of distinctions that bound knowledge and sense-making in a 
given situation.    
 ‘Deparadoxificating’ translation means that we have to move beyond the paradox by 
reconstructing its conditions of possibility. This move shifts the focus from the paradox’s ‘dead-
end’ when approached deconstructively towards how it is produced and reproduced in and through 
practices in contingent contexts by multiple situated actors who draw on different logics and 
language games and thus enact the boundary between what is foreign (and unfamiliar) and what is 
familiar differently. This implies both the recognition that practice is contingent and takes place in 
a particular context as well as in ‘irreversible time’: ‘[S]ome dilemmas that are irresolvable in 
logic can be solved by utilizing “time” as a means of dissolving the paradox that, for example, one 
cannot be ruler and ruled at the same time, a problem that “rotation” and “the rule of law” 
dissolves in a way’ (Kratochwil 2014a, 263). To treat these contradictions as a problem of 
practice, which the translator must address, foregrounds how the distinction between the 
unfamiliar and familiar is enacted by the translator to serve a given purpose in a contingent 
context and therefore becomes a result of the practice of translation, rather than its cause. From 
this perspective, Derrida’s distinction between the translatable (the familiar) and the untranslatable 
(the unfamiliar) is the effect of – and not the precondition for – translating as a performative act. 
Reversing the order of cause and effect that underpins Derrida’s paradox, in consequence, 
discloses the indeterminacy, contingency and performativity of translation. 
 Accordingly, the boundary between what is foreign and unknown and what is 
familiar and known in translation must therefore in practice always be ambiguous and this, in turn, 
is what constitutes the possibility of politics. Depending on how and where the boundary is drawn 
and by whom is constitutive of different perspectives on the meaning of what is being translated. 
Whose claim to the ‘right’ knowledge would authorize and justify this person to act as a 
translator? Who has the authority and capacity to define what is the ‘right’ translation? How is 
meaning fixed and stabilized in translation by excluding other interpretations and translations? 
These are the practical issues that come to the fore when we abandon the paradox and move to the 
realm of praxis. This relates to the main argument of the thesis: Depending on who is authorized 
to act in a given moment due to a particular way in which meaning is inscribed into the boundary 
between law and politics, either ‘politics’ would be what is othered and assessed as the ‘problem’ 
and to tame (‘domesticate’) politics would be the solution from this partial perspective. Or ‘law’ is 
identified as the ‘problem’ and to instrumentalize law for a certain political end would be the 
solution from another yet partial perspective. Indeed, the three interventions in the 
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interdisciplinarity debate that I discussed in the previous chapter demonstrate this point. Each 
intervention narrated the ‘other’ discipline in a particular way, and thereby inscribed a particular 
meaning into the boundary between the disciplines of IR and IL, which would then render their 
intervention in the debate and, in particular, their definition of law authoritarian and justifiable – a 
definition that the ‘other’ side should describe to, too. Before I proceed to discuss the three 
conditions – indeterminacy, contingency and performativity - that underpin the politics of 
translation and constitute the conditions that made Derrida’s paradox possible, I will provide an 
example from earlier, imperial practices of translation to demonstrate what I mean by translation 
as a boundary-drawing practice and how these three conditions are inherent in how translation 
unfolds in practice. 
 
Translating	the	Qing	Legal	Code		
 
 In 1810, Sir George Staunton’s English translation of the legal code of the Qing 
Empire (1644-1912) was published.40 Staunton, who had learned Chinese as an adolescent, had 
not only a particular knowledge that would authorize him as acting as a translator but also a 
particular purpose with his translation, which was to convince his (home) audience that China did 
have a conception of ‘justice’. Four years prior to Staunton’s translation James Barrow, who had 
been Staunton’s First Secretary when he worked for the British embassy in China, had published 
Travels in China (1806) in which he set out to offer a ‘corrective’ portrait of the Chinese. This 
portrait, Barrow promised, would present the Chinese ‘not as their own moral maxims would 
represent them but as they really are’ (Barrow, quoted in Reed and Demattè 2011, 158). In 
Barrow’s for that time unflattering account of China41 the author stressed in particular its legal 
system as being ruled by arbitrariness and impartiality and China as being ‘fundamentally unjust 
both in their dealings with each other and with foreigners’ (St André 2004, 4). In his account 
Barrow had made reference to the Qing penal code, which - according to Barrow – ‘encourages 
people to indifference and cruelty toward the fortunate’ (St André 2004, 5). Now, the translation 
of Staunton, who was eager to correct this negative image of Chinese law and society more 
                                                
40 George Thomas Staunton (1810/2012) Ta Tsing Leu Lee; Being the Fundamental Laws, and a 
Selection from the Supplementary Statutes, of the Penal Code of China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press) 
41 According to Barrow, the Chinese ’sell their children into slavery’, ’practice homosexuality’ 
and ’smoke opium and gamble’ (St André 2004, 5) 
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generally among British readers, thus ‘strive[d] to present the Chinese legal code as something 
comprehensible, reasonable, and just’ (St André 2004, 5) and to demonstrate the presence of a 
particular Chinese ‘concept of justice above and beyond the law’ (ibid., 22). In his introduction, 
Staunton had stressed that ‘the Chinese are people just like us’ (St André 2004, 6). Through 
countless footnotes Staunton provided his own - positive - interpretation of the substance of the 
legal code and ‘introduc[ed] various subtle changes to the syntax and lexis that cumulatively 
served to make the laws sound more positive and universal’ (Baker 2006, 43). Indeed, Staunton’s 
translation remained the only one of its kind for the next 150 years until 1994 when a new 
translation of the Qing legal code was published.42 In the meantime, anyone interested in the Qing 
Empire and its legal system would have to rely on Staunton’s translation. In the 1994 version of 
the Qing legal code the translator dismissed Staunton’s version as being ‘essentially useless since 
it was so free as to be inaccurate’ (Jones 1994, v). However, Staunton’s translation did not fully 
succeed in correcting the image of the Chinese created by Barrow. In his influential book History 
of British India from 1817, which became important for the British civilizing mission (Knowles 
2011), James Mill (who never went to the region) relies in the part that concerns China extensively 
on Barrow’s Travels in China, whilst Staunton and his work is mentioned only once.43 
 What I want to show with this example is the extent to which translation is a 
boundary-drawing practice that is performative of constituting and authorizing particular 
representations of reality, ways of knowing and subject positions. In the way Staunton translated 
the legal code of the Qing empire he enacted a reality (the presence of a concept of justice in 
China) in which the population was represented as ‘just like us’ and the addresser of the Qing 
legal code, the Chinese emperors, as those who ‘watched over and guided the development of the 
legal code so that it continued to meet society’s evolving need for justice’ (St André 2004, 6). The 
translation was meant to correct a previous representation of that reality (Barrow’s travel 
writings), which in turn was enacted in another narrative on the empire, the one espoused by 
Jones. For that reason, not only one translation is possible, but multiple translations that would 
fundamentally differ in their representations of a given ‘reality’. The indeterminacy of translation 
in this case was reflected in the absence of any denotative content of the meaning that was 
translated – that is, what would pertain to being ‘justice’ in the Qing Empire and in its legal code – 
which then depended on the connotative relations that were made and drawn from the partial 
                                                
42 William C. Jones (1994) The Great Qing Code (New York: Oxford University Press) 
43 James Mill (1817/2010), The History of British India vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press) 
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perspective of the translator. Staunton, for instance, would write his ideas of justice, which was 
informed by his cultural background, into his translation and make subtle changes to the words in 
the code to make the laws sound ‘universal’, that is, familiar to his home audience.  
 The translation of the legal code, therefore, enacted a boundary between the (legal) 
culture of the Qing Empire and the one of the translator. The translation was not only – or at all – 
an exercise in cross-cultural boundary-transgressing, but rather an enactment of the boundary 
between two cultures, which then came pitted against each other. The example demonstrates that 
the identification of an ‘original’ – of the ‘other’ - is only possible and performed in translation in 
which ‘the incommensurability as difference’ (Sakai 1997, 14) is negotiated and worked out by 
the translator. In other words, the boundary between the two cultures (one foreign, the other 
familiar) was not knowable and fixed prior to the intervention of the translator. Though I am 
primarily focusing on translation as a practice in the thesis, this example also shows how 
translation is also a product that serves the social function or purpose of its enactment. Staunton’s 
purpose was quite evident: to correct the image of the Qing Empire’s legal culture and to 
demonstrate that there was indeed a particular Chinese conception of justice, which was different 
from the one in the British Empire – but he made this conception of justice comprehensible and 
thus familiar to the British audience. What is more, the example is also telling as to the extent a 
translation as a product – textual (eg. a piece of literature) or non-textual (an image, form, 
assemblage etc.) – exhibits a certain degree of permanence (eg. Staunton’s translation was the 
only one of its kind for 184 years).  
  
The	Indeterminacy	Of	Translation	
 
Quine	and	the	Problem	of	Gavagai		
	 	
 Staunton’s translation leads me to the first condition of the politics of translation I 
will address: its indeterminacy. I first turn to Quine’s ‘problem of gavagai’ and the indeterminacy 
of translation, which I relate to Wittgenstein’s conception of language-games and meaning-in-use. 
Common for Quine and Wittgenstein is the understanding that the meaning of a word (or sentence, 
text, etc.) does not derive from its ‘essence’ nor simply the object to which it refers in a ‘world out 
there’ but depends on the way in which it is used in practice in given context and situation and 
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hence the language games in which it is embedded. The practice of translating and the 
construction of meaning, for this reason, depend on the connotative relations in which the 
translation takes place, due to its lack of denotative content (that is, a lack of a referent). However, 
to understand Quine’s problem of gavagai, we first have to reconstruct what he was 
problematizing. To this end, I briefly review the ‘commonsensical’ conception of translation, 
which constitutes one part of his problem. 
 The issue of meaning – or the conveying of meaning – has always been central to 
translation. Indeed, it is the very question where to locate meaning that has triggered the various 
twists and turns translation studies have taken since they saw the day. Here, the contested 
relationship between translation and meaning comes to the fore: One in which transmission and 
location stand in an uneasy, somehow contradictory, relationship with one another. The 
understanding of translation as conveying meaning in its promise of creating equivalence and 
symmetry, that is, sameness in meaning across disparate and seemingly incompatible semantic 
fields underpins the commonsensical understanding of translation. A brief search for common and 
popular definitions of ‘translation’ results in the following. Translation is ‘[t]he restatement of the 
forms of one language in another: the chief means of exchanging information between different 
language communities’, according to the Oxford Companion to the English Language (McArthur 
2013, published online). Le Petit Robert, the French monolingual dictionary, defines ‘traduction’ 
(n.) as ‘[t]exte ou ouvrage donnant dans une autre langue l’équivalent du texte original qu’on a 
traduit’ and ‘traduire’ as ‘[f]aire que ce qui était énoncé dans une langue naturelle le soit dans une 
autre, en tendant à l’équivalence sémantique et expressive des deux énoncés’. Finally, Wikipedia’s 
entry on ‘translation’ begins with the following definition: ‘Translation is the communication of 
the meaning of a source-language text by means of an equivalent target language text’44. As 
Catford noted already 50 years ago (critical himself of conceptualizing translation as a means to 
create sameness in meaning45): ‘It is generally agreed that meaning is important in translation […] 
Indeed translation has often been defined with reference to meaning; a translation is said to ‘have 
the same meaning’ as the original’ (Catford 1965, 35; emphasis in original).  
                                                
44  ’Translation’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Translation#cite_note-1 (accessed 18 December 
2015). The source of the quote is stated to be ’The Oxford Companion to the English Language, 
Namit Bhatia, ed., 1992, pp. 1,051–54’. However, this reference does not exist. I have added the 
citation to this part due to broad use of Wikipedia as a source of information and this definition of 
translation might therefore be relatively common.  
45 ’An SL [source language] text has an SL meaning and a TL [target language] text has a TL 
meaning’ (Catford 1965, 35) 
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 The idea of equivalence builds on the assumption that translators can convey a 
message, or the same stable meaning, from the source language/text to the target language/text. 
The message and its determinate meaning exists prior to the act of translating and thus remains 
invariant throughout the process. Translation, in turn, is secondary to the message, as opposed to 
the message and its meaning being a product of the translation. This follows from the assumption 
that the two languages – the source and the target language - are naturally equivalent in the sense 
that they both refer to the same reality, referent or function, which is external to all languages, and 
to which they can all refer (cf. the popular definitions given by Le Petit Robert and Wikipedia). 
This paradigm of equivalence has been criticized for being ‘an illusion of symmetry between 
languages which hardly exists beyond the level of vague approximations and which distorts the 
basic problems of translation’ (Snell-Hornby 1988, 22). 
 It was this assumption – that translation was merely a means to convey the same 
meaning unproblematically – that Quine addressed and challenged. In his book Word and Object 
(1960) Quine used the example of the word ‘gavagai’ which has now become famous to 
problematize the indeterminacy of translation. What was of concern to Quine was translation as 
the process of rendering a sentence from one language to another. As this process is not 
determinate, an array of possible translations will always exist. It is therefore not the case that 
translation is impossible but that no one (singular) translation is possible as translation is always 
already multiply possible. The original, in other words, ‘is the site of many different semantic 
possibilities that are fixed only provisionally in any one translation, on the basis of varying 
cultural assumptions and interpretative choices, in specific social situation, in different historical 
periods’ (Venuti 1995, 18; emphasis added). 
 To demonstrate this indeterminacy of translation, Quine turned to the field translator, 
an anthropologist, who faced with a culture unknown to him tried to understand the language of 
the natives (Quine referred to this thought experiment as ‘radical translation’ as the field translator 
has no prior knowledge of the language). In this context, a native speaker points at a rabbit and 
utters ‘gavagai’. Just like Staunton, to translate this utterance the anthropologist can only rely on 
the setting in which the event unfolds and where he finds himself. Here, Quine points to two 
indeterminacies of translation. One is what he terms the inscrutability of reference. The translator 
has to decide whether this utterance means ‘rabbit’, ‘undetached rabbit parts’, or ‘rabbit stages’ 
(Quine 1960, 32). Reference between a word and an object, Quine argues, is therefore inscrutable. 
Once a word is translated into a new word it enters into contact with other words and new 
associations and meanings. No one translation is therefore determinate or definitive. 
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 The other indeterminacy is closely linked to the one just described. Translation is 
also indeterminate as a result of what Quine terms holophrastic indeterminacy. A given sentence 
can be translated in multiple ways into another sentence and there is therefore no right method for 
translating and no proof neither for what pertains to being a ‘good translation’. Quine essentially 
questioned synonymy and equivalence as generally agreed norms structuring the process of 
translating. Again, it is a matter of reference but here (though Quine is not explicit on this point) 
of self-referentiality where a word or sentence refers to itself which problematizes translation. 
Consider, for instance, the translation of the sentence ‘the first word of this very sentence has three 
letters’ into its French ‘equivalent’ ‘le premier mot de cette phrase a trois lettres’, where semantic 
equivalence might be strived for but is functionally lost between the two sentences. This is the 
semantic indeterminacy and uncertainty the translator would always face in practice and to which 
I will return in the following part of this chapter on the contingency of translation.  
 
Wittgenstein	and	Language-Games	
 
 These instances of the indeterminacy of translations necessitate us to shift the focus 
from what a word (such as a concept), sentence or entire text denotes towards the connotative 
relations in which they are embedded. There are many affinities between Quine’s conception of 
indeterminacy and the later work of Wittgenstein (1953) where he argued that the meaning of 
words and concepts derive from their usage. Both Quine and Wittgenstein rejected the idea of the 
transparency of reference and therefore that meaning of words, sentences or text can be extracted 
and identified from a stable, given and singular reference in a ‘world out there’ (a tertium 
comparationis, as it is referred to in translation studies). In his earlier work (Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus) Wittgenstein (1922) had approached language as merely a means to describe an 
already given and independent reality: ‘The propositions show the logical form of reality’ 
(Wittgensteain 2014, §4.121; emphasis in original) and ‘[t]o give the essence of proposition means 
to give the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world’ (ibid., §5.4711). Yet, he 
noted in this early development of his ordinary language philosophy that ‘[t]he limits of my 
language mean the limits of my world’ (ibid., §5.6; emphasis added). The conditions that 
language imposes on sense-making would be developed in a more pragmatist way in his later 
work. In Philosophical Investigations (1953), which was published posthumously, Wittgenstein 
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outlined his language game theory, which was concerned with the pragmatic aspects of language, 
that is, language’s ordinary usage.  
 Language use is a kind of action, according to Wittgenstein, through which reality is 
enacted. Language can therefore not only show us the world, label it and describe it (why our 
sense of the world would be bounded by our language), but also perform it. In approaching 
language as a kind of play, Wittgenstein introduced the notion of ‘language games’ through which 
social reality is constructed by shared rules generated through language. Language as 
correspondence, which Wittgenstein had argued for in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was 
abandoned as it failed to explain how language sometimes would be used with no – or at least an 
ambiguous - referent object. The meaning of a word would therefore be relative to the context in 
which it was used or to the ways in which a language was applied and would therefore be 
contingent on practice: ‘For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the 
word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ 
(Wittgenstein 2009, §43; emphasis in original). Accordingly, sense- and world-making is bound 
by language, and language is what ‘provides the boundaries of ‘social’ processes’ (Kessler 2007, 
263). 
 Both Quine and Wittgenstein rejected the idea of the transparency of reference and 
therefore that the meaning of words, sentences or text can be extracted from what they denote. 
Drawing on the example of the translator, Quine went a bit further in problematizing the role 
between this conception of language and translation and stressed that meaning cannot be conveyed 
through translation but a translation and therefore the transfer and transformation of meaning is 
always dependent on its context and the connotative relations embedded in this context. For this 
reason, in order to grasp the meaning of the connotative relations – the semantic and social fields 
in which a concept, for instance, is embedded – we have to reconstruct it from practice and life-
worlds. The usage of a language, in other words, refers to ‘the fact that the speaking of language is 
part of an activity, or of a form of life’ (Wittgenstein 2009, §23; emphasis in original). 
Wittgenstein used the example of rule-following where we can only know what a rule means by 
observing in a given case ‘what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”’ (Wittgenstein 
2009, §201; emphasis added).  
 This relates to the main argument of the thesis that the meaning of the rule of law in 
global governance is constituted through struggles over drawing the boundary through practices 
and in a given context between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ in the quest towards constructing and enacting 
law’s relative autonomy and status versus what is narrated as being its ‘other’. These struggles are 
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contingent and depend on vested actors and their particular modes of arguing. Following Quine 
and Wittgenstein, it therefore entails a reconstructive, practice-oriented approach to law, as 
outlined in the previous chapter, and, as emphasized in this part of the chapter, a recognition that 
meaning cannot be conveyed unproblematically and unchanged between different ‘life-worlds’ but 
has to be assembled from partial perspectives and situated knowledges (Haraway 1988).  
 
The	Contingency	of	Translation	
 
The	Role	of	the	Translator:	Between	Invisibility	and	Visibility	
  
 This last point leads me to the second condition of the politics of translation, that is, 
contingency. The purpose of this section is to address the question as to how the indeterminacy of 
translation – the fact that there are always-already multiple translations available – is addressed in 
practice and how meaning is thereby rendered determinate and fixed. How is one translation 
chosen over another and how is this choice justified? To this end, I turn to the agency involved in 
translation, the role of the translator and the means and strategies the translator draw on. In 
traditional theories on translation, the translator has been perceived as ‘a member of one 
community who helps mediate communicational exchange with members of another community’ 
(Solomon 2014, 77), that is, as someone who is simply ‘standing “between” in the transfer 
process’ (Tymoczko 2010, 7). This understanding of the role – or rather absence – of the translator 
narrates translation as a symmetrical exchange between two languages and the translator as 
’neutral, above history and ideology’ (Tymoczko 2010, 7). Importantly, in this view, ‘the 
translator can even be seen as an alienated figure […] an alienation that can be passed off as the 
“objectivity” of a professional’ (ibid.). This conception of the role of the translator is present in 
Ricæur’s understanding of translation in his Sur la Traduction:  
 
‘Two partners are in effect placed in a relation by the act of translation, the stranger – a 
term covering the work, the author, his language – and the reader of the translated 
work. And, between the two, the translator who transmits, passes on the entire 
message from one idiom into the other. The ordeal in question resides in this 
uncomfortable situation of the mediator’ (Ricæur 2004, 8-9; emphasis added). 
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 However, this conception of the role of translator completely discards her agency 
and responsibility. Indeed, the example of Quine’s field translator demonstrates that the translator 
faced with the fundamental problem of semantic indeterminacy had the possibility of choosing 
between different possible translations and would have to rely on his reading of the context in 
which he was translating. Staunton’s example is telling, too. It is also telling of how the role of 
expertise and professional knowledge in global governance today is couched in neutral and 
‘objective’ terms and how the international expert is often being narrated as being simply a 
mediator without any political agency, which resemble how translation studies have traditionally 
approached the translator, as noted above. The construction of the expert’s – the translator’s – 
neutrality has been of concern to scholars who identify with the ‘cultural turn’ in translations 
studies. It was Venuti (1995), in particular, who addressed the fictitious invisibility of the 
translator in his influential book, The Translator’s Invisibility, which came to shape the field of 
translation studies considerably. Venuti argued that the alleged invisibility of the translator and the 
illusionary appearance of a translation being not a translation but the ‘original’ is a conscious act 
of the translator herself and therefore discloses her agency and active role in the construction of 
meaning and particular representations. The greater the appearance of fluency, the more is the 
translator hidden and rendered invisible. The illusion of fluency and transparency, Venuti (1995) 
argues, ‘conceals the numerous conditions under which a translation is made, starting with the 
translator’s crucial intervention in the foreign text’ (1-2), or, in the case of the international expert, 
in a foreign context.  
 Rendering the translator invisible, which is a manipulative act, can also be 
epistemically violent in discarding her political role in constructing certain desired representations 
of cultures. In Constructing Cultures (1998) translation scholars, Bassnett and Lefevere, argued 
that translators increasingly play an important role in an increasing globalized world in 
constructing (representations of) cultures and the importance of the process of doing so should 
therefore not be neglected. Translators are ‘among the chief mediators between cultures’ 
(Tymoczko 2009, 184). The process of choosing a text over others and of using particular 
techniques of translating as well as the specialized knowledge, agenda and dominant values and 
beliefs behind a particular translation had to be identified (Bassnett and Lefevere 1998, 10). The 
intimate relationship between knowledge and power, in other words, had to be recognized. As 
argued by Foucault (1995 [1975]): ‘There is no power relation without the correlative constitutive 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations’ (27).  
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 Thereby, not only the agency but also the responsibility and accountability of the 
translator should be disclosed and recognized. For instance, the choice of texts that were translated 
within a colonial context was often guided by the purpose of reifying orientalist images of the 
colonized as either the ‘barbarian’ Other or the ‘mysterious’ and ‘magical’ Orient (see, for 
instance, Robinson (1997) for a review of various translated texts in the colonial period). What is 
more, and related to the issue of accountability, the translator can also be identified as the very 
author of the ‘original’ that is being translated in a given context. To give an example, the 
Japanese translator of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses was stabbed to death in 1991, which 
shows how the identity of the author and the one of the translator can become one and hence a 
substitute for one another among a certain audience. In fact, the fate of Étienne Dolet, who I 
mentioned in the introduction, is another example that points to the visibility and political role of 
the translator. In 1546 Dolet was tortured and burned after having been accused of heresy due to 
his translation of one of Platon’s texts. 
 The political role of the translator has been of particular concern among post-
colonial scholars. During the colonial period in India, for instance, Niranjana (1992) points out 
that translators and their ‘reinforce(d) hegemonic versions of the colonial, help[ed] them to 
acquire the status of what Edward Said calls representations or objects without a history’ (176). 
The ‘problematic of translation’, Niranjana (1992) argues, thus ‘becomes a significant site for 
raising questions of representation, power, and historicity’ (1). Translation has also been addressed 
by post-colonial translation scholars as not solely a means through which the Orientalist could 
channel desired representations of the colonized to his ‘home audience’. But also as a means of 
resistance or redirection of colonial and postcolonial powers by either retranslations of texts that 
had been translated during European imperialism or by using hybridized versions of language in 
new translations (for instance, a mix of French and Arabic in the francophone North Africa) 
(Niranjana 1992; Robinson 1997). This last point leads to the second section of this part of the 
chapter, that is, the means and strategies on which translators draw.  
  
The	Techniques	of	the	Translator:	Between	Domesticating	and	Foreignizing	
 
 What techniques does the translator use when rendering meaning fixed and 
stabilized? The German philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher’s distinction in 1813 between 
translations as either foreignizing or domesticating the original text has shaped practical 
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approaches to translation and debates within translation studies ever since. There are only two 
methods of translation, Schleiermacher argued, ‘[e]ither the translator leaves the author in peace, 
as much as possible, and moves the reader towards him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much 
as possible, and moves the author towards him’ (Schleiermacher, quoted in Lefevere 1977, 74). In 
the original text, Schleiermacher referred to domesticating as verdeutschend, meaning 
‘Germaninizing’ (Pym 2010, 31). Domesticating, in other words, refers to ‘an ethnocentric 
reduction of the foreign text to target-language cultural values’ (Venuti 1995, 20). Erasing the 
visibility of the translator and creating an illusion of fluency and transparency are thus the result of 
using domestication as a method in translation. Foreignizing, to the contrary, implies that some 
significant cultural traces of the original ‘foreign’ text would be retained in the translation.   
 Domesticating as a key method through which the translator fixes and determinates 
meaning has been addressed in particular by ANT and post-colonial scholars. Among ANT 
scholars, domestication in relation to translation is a process that not only implies symbolic and 
epistemic violence, as argued by post-colonial scholars, but also persuasion. The most famous and 
illustrative example of how domestication is used as a means in translation from an ANT 
perspective is Callon’s (1986) study of how a science of scallops emerged through a protracted 
process of domesticating. To this end, he outlined ‘four moments of translation’, that is, 
problematization, interessement, enrolment and mobilization, through which marine biologists 
(interested in developing a strategy for the declining population of scallops in St. Brieuc Bay) 
influenced the social actors involved and translated the ‘problem’ into their own language which 
in turn authorized them to intervene, whilst silencing other actors. This was done through these 
moments of translation during which the researchers would impose their own definition of the 
situation on others and thereby bolster their authority and problem-solving solutions. Here, 
translation is both pivotal in forming a network encompassing the various human and non-human 
actants involved, but also in being an ‘act[] of persuasion and violence’ (Callon and Latour 1981, 
279).  
 In the St. Brieuc Bay, by identifying a ‘problem’ the researchers imposed their 
definition of the situation and the solution of the problem on the implied actors and thereby made 
themselves indispensable as problem-solvers. In imposing themselves as the ones holding the 
solution to the problem they had defined themselves, the researchers locked-in the other actors 
into certain roles. The definition of the problem, however, is not sufficient enough in terms of 
‘persuading’ the other actors into supporting the problem definition and its subsequent solutions. 
The second moment of translation, what Callon refers to as interessement, is when ‘the group of 
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actions by which an entity (here the three researchers) attempts to impose and stabilize the identity 
of the other actors it defines through its problematization’ (Callon 1986, 207). This is done 
through different devices and ‘a series of trials of strength’ (ibid.). The process is not determinate 
as the actors involved might contest this interessement or ally themselves with other actors with 
whom their identity would be defined in another manner. These two moments of translation thus 
bear similarities with the way in which post-colonial scholars approach translation as a strategy of 
domination, imposition and epistemic as well as subjective containment. It is only if the second 
moment of translation turns out being successful that the third moment, enrolement, will incur. 
This is the moment where the structure created by the researchers become cemented. Enrolement 
accompanies interessement in its engagement with multilateral negotiations in and through which 
the identities of the actors involved are determined. The roles as such are attributed and accepted 
through this moment of translation and can be done through various means, such as, physical 
violence, seduction, and consent without discussion.  
 The final moment is the mobilization of allies. This moment harks back to the 
question of how the few gets to represent the rest. ‘Who speaks in the name of whom? Who 
represents whom?’, Callon asks. The question is crucial for the success of the translation process 
in which – in the case of the scallops in St. Brieuc Bay – the representation of ‘what is true for a 
few [scallops] is true for the whole of the population’ (Callon 1986, 211) has become authoritative 
and spokespersons (the three researchers) have been appointed to speak now of a ‘fact’ and act in 
its name. As spokespersons, the researchers have translated what the (human as well as non-
human) actors they represent would ‘say’ into their own language. Gradually throughout the four 
moments of translation, the number of possible representative interlocutors has been reduced so 
that it is now a group of few who speaks on behalf of all actors involved in the project in the bay. 
What we can conclude from Callon’s four moments is that translation is a process of displacement 
and substitution where the substitution has been achieved by silencing the other.  
 This argument has also been made among post-colonial scholars. Translators during 
the colonial period often ‘domesticated’ foreign texts to make them suit Western values and 
appear as seemingly transparent and natural representations of the non-Western culture. 
Translations were as such important ‘strategies of containment’ (Niranjana 1992, 3), which were 
performative of fixing colonized cultures and stereotypes. The indeterminacy of translation in 
relation to the multiple versions of a given translated text (or culture, in this context) was thus 
addressed by the concern of conformity with dominant (colonial) norms. As a strategy of 
containment, translation became a heuristic for concealing difference and alterity in its 
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dissemination of knowledge. As argued by Bhabha (1994): ‘The subjects of the [colonial] 
discourse are constructed within an apparatus of power which contains […] an ‘other’ knowledge 
– a knowledge that is arrested and fetishistic and circulates through colonial discourse as that 
limited form of otherness that I have called stereotype’ (Bhabha 1994, 77-78; emphasis added). It 
has also been argued that the predominant translation of texts today into English results in 
intellectual colonization and cultural hegemony, which reinforces the idea of and distinction 
between a dominant and dominated societies (see, for instance, Bielsa 2014; Venuti 1995).   
 However, some postcolonial scholars have suggested a third technique – or rather 
outcome of translation – which finds itself in between domesticating and foreignizing, that is, 
hybridizing. This is inspired by Bhabha’s (1994) approach to translation that evolves around key 
notions such as ‘in-between’ and ‘hybridity’. First, a ‘hybrid text’ among postcolonial translation 
scholars is understood as a ‘one written by the ex-colonised in the language of the ex-coloniser 
(such as the Nigerian or Indian writing in English or the North African writing in French’), thus 
creating a ‘new language’ and occupying a space ‘in between’’ (Snell-Hornby 2000, 16). In 
Bhabha’s (1994) cultural approach to translation, meaning translation is not approached as a inter-
lingual phenomenon or practice but as a ‘culture’, hybridity means that translation is not a 
movement from a source to a target but is located within a third space beyond both the source and 
the target where conflict arise from cultural difference and processes of creolization. To illustrate 
this point, Bhabha (1994, 224) refers to the migrant culture as a translation. Hybridizing, however, 
seems to me as adopting the same meaning as foreignizing insofar as a foreignizing method means 
‘an ethnodeviant pressure [as opposed to an ethnocentric reduction] on those values [the cultural 
values of the target language] to register the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text, 
sending the reader abroad’ (Venuti 1995, 20; emphasis added).        
 Finally, this qualification of the dialectical nature of translation in both overcoming 
and cementing differences shifts the focus towards the ways in which boundaries are constitutive 
of making something present, known and thus translatable, whilst silencing alternative 
translations. Boundary-drawing become a mode of sense-making for the very practice of 
translating as the meaning of what is translated can only be constituted based on the distinction 
between what has now become subject to familiar terms, and what is familiar can only be 
conceptualized according to what is foreign. ‘The aim of translation’, in other words, ‘is to bring 
back a cultural other as the same, the recognizable, even the familiar; and this aim always risks a 
wholesale domestication of the foreign text, often in highly self-conscious projects, where 
translation serves an appropriation of foreign cultures for domestic agendas, cultural, economic, 
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political’ (Venuti 1995, 18). This last remark on boundaries leads me to the third and final 
condition of the politics of translation, that is, performativity. 
    
The	Performativity	of	Translation	
 
Translation	as	a	Temporal	Event	
 
 Any translation involves a temporal aspect, either in bringing a past text into the 
present or in making the ‘afterlife’ (or survival) of a text – which was of concern to Walter 
Benjamin - possible in the future. The temporal ordering that a translation performs thus consists 
in its creation of continuity out of discontinuity. In other words, it connects in time what has 
already been written, said and done with a new group of actors or a new particular context. In his 
famous essay from 1923, The Task of the Translator, Benjamin described a translation as being 
part of the ‘afterlife’ (Überleben) of a text and thereby being a text in its own right (as opposed to 
simply a ‘copy’ of an original). ‘For a translation comes later than the original, and since the 
important works of world literature never find their chosen translators at the time of their origin, 
their translation marks their stage of continued life’ (Benjamin 1923/1969, 71). Critical of fidelity 
and equivalence as norms in translating, Benjamin noted that in continuing an original’s life 
translation would always imply transformation as the meaning of words changes over time, which 
confirms that translation is indeterminate and contingent in serving the social function of its 
enactment in a specific time and place.  
 For Benjamin, when a translation ‘marks the stage’ of an original’s continued life it 
achieves a certain stability as it ‘transplants the original into a more definitive linguistic realm 
since it can no longer be displaced by a secondary rendering’ (Benjamin 1923/1969, 75), which 
means that a translation is ultimately untranslatable. However, as I argued in the part on the 
indeterminacy of translation, translation is always indeterminate and can therefore only 
momentarily fix and stabilize meaning, through, for instance domestication. One translation, in 
other words, is always upon for contestation despite its permanence (eg. the example of the 
translation of the Qing legal code), and would always be translatable, as a result. The use of 
retranslation as a mode of resistance in post-colonial societies was, for instance, directed towards 
the translations that had been done of ‘local’ texts by the Orientalist in the context of colonialism.  
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 There is another temporal aspect of translation, which I have already addressed when 
discussing Derrida’s paradox of translation. Translation is a temporal event insofar that it is the 
practice of translation that enacts the gap between two seemingly bounded and juxtaposed 
languages, which would not exist if it were not for the work of the translator. The gap authorizes 
the translator – the expert - to intervene in a certain context and thus serves as the normative 
foundation for her authority and the claims she is making. The temporal ordering that results from 
translating resides therefore both in fixing a relationship between past, present and future, as noted 
above, but also in identifying and thereby constructing an ‘original’ as an outcome of translating. 
As a temporal, disruptive event translation creates a discontinuity that it then purports to overcome 
in creating continuity. This is done, for instance, in identifying a ‘problem’ as a disruptive event in 
a given context (Callon’s study of the scallops is a good example) and thereby constructing its past 
roots and its future solutions. The problematization becomes then an act of temporal ordering. 
Accordingly, this temporal event refers to the retrospective referentiality that is translation by 
which I mean that the gap the translator is supposed to transgress is the effect rather than the cause 
of the practice of translating. In the words of Sakai (1997): 
 
‘[T]he work of translation is a practice by which the initial discontinuity between the 
addresser and the addressee is made continuous and recognizable. In this respect, 
translation is just like other social practices that render the points of discontinuity in 
social formation continuous. Only retrospectively and after translation, therefore, can 
we recognize the initial incommensurability as a gap, crevice, or border between fully 
constituted entities, spheres, or domains. But, when represented as a gap, crevice or 
border, it is no longer incommensurate. […] What makes it possible to represent the 
initial difference as an already determined difference between one language unity and 
another is the work of translation itself’ (Sakai 1997, 14; emphasis added).  
 
Translation	and	Spatial	Ordering	
 
 Creating a gap, juxtaposing languages and enacting the idea of linguistic and cultural 
unity do not only relate to translation as a temporal event that creates the context in which the 
translator intervenes. Translation is also performative of conceptions of a global, spatial order. 
Translation as a boundary-drawing practice constructs knowledge and meaning about ‘borders’ 
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and becomes a practice of bordering the global world and framing it as being carved up into 
bounded, unified languages that overlap with the territorial borders of Western modern nation-
states. The popular, ‘commonsensical’ conception of translation where translation merely transfers 
meaning between two equivalent and natural languages and the conception of translation in early 
translation studies, which builds on norms of equivalence and symmetry and the role of the 
translator as one ‘in-between’, result from a particular identification of language that emerged in 
the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century in Europe (Sakai 2014; Solomon 2014). For 
this reason, it has been argued that translation exhibits a Western bias in assuming that the idea of 
monolingualism is what defines a ‘normal’ culture (Tymoczko 2010, 7). Tymoczko (2007) points 
out that in India, for example, translation adopts two meanings in Indian/Sanskrit: rupantar 
meaning ‘change in form’ and anuvad meaning ‘speaking after’ or ‘following’, which both reject 
the idea of fidelity to the original (Tymoczko 2010, 68).  
 However, the Western conception of translation, it is argued (Sakai 2008; Solomon 
2014; Tymoczko 2010), follows from the replacement of the multilinguality of empires by the 
supposed (or enforced) unity of a national language and the modern articulation of the innate link 
between language, territory and nationality. Accordingly, translation ‘serves to reify national 
sovereignty’ (Sakai 2006, 86) in positioning cultural and linguistic entities against each other, 
separated by cartographically demarcated boundaries. The traditional and popular conception of 
translation as the transfer of meaning between two natural and equivalent languages and the 
translator as being neutral ‘also enable[] the representation of ethnic and national subjects, and in 
spite of the presence of the translator who is always in between, translation, no longer as 
difference or repetition but as representation [as opposed to a contingent practice], is made to 
discriminatorily posit one language unity against another (and one “cultural” unity against 
another)’ (Sakai 2008, 54). The idea of the unity of a language, in turn, is created in the practice of 
translating to regulate the translator’s usage of language and, more generally, ‘to systematically 
organize knowledge about languages in a modern, scientific manner’ (ibid., 37; emphasis added). 
 Translation, accordingly, is not merely a process of transfer between commensurate 
differences but a practice that both constitutes and structures differentiation in and of the world. 
Chakrabarty (2009) problematized this role of translation in Provincializing Europe in which he 
stressed that ‘what translation produces out of seeming ‘incommensurabilities’ is neither an 
absence of relationship between dominant and dominating forms of knowledge nor equivalents 
that successfully mediate between differences, but precisely the partly opaque relationship we call 
‘difference’ (17). This relates to what Anghie identifies as the ‘dynamic of difference’, which 
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plays out in the enactment of a gap between two cultures according to the distinction between the 
civilized and the uncivilized that then justifies and authorizes a hegemonic move to bridge that 
gap.  
 In sum, the externality of one langue unit – or a social unit – to another is a product 
of the very process of translation, which therefore produces the ‘fictive representation of the 
symmetrical relation between linguistic [and social] unities’ (Solomon 2014, 77). The isolation 
and commensuration of linguistic and social units, in other words, is not naturally given but only 
enacted in the practice of translation in which they are exchanged. This does not only disclose the 
performativity of translation and the power of the translator but also a certain way to organize 
knowledge in and of the world. The fictive representation of symmetry is a version of translation 
that abides to the logic of equivalence and ‘conforms to the design of the modern international 
world’ (Mezzadra and Sakai 2014, para. 10). 
  
Conclusion:	The	Indeterminacy,	Contingency	and	Performativity	of	Translating	
 
 To conclude I will begin with the questions I raised in the beginning of the chapter: 
What are the translation problems? Who are the translators? What particular purpose does a 
translation serve? And what are the conditions that shape the politics of translation? To address 
these questions, I first turned to Derrida’s paradox of translation. Because languages are 
irreducible different to transfer the same meaning and significations from one language to another 
can never be done. But exactly because languages are irreducible different, there would always be 
a need for translation. Translation, according to this paradox, is both possible and impossible and 
that at the same time. But, due to the practical importance of translation in everyday ‘global life’, I 
then suggested we should go beyond this paradox, which would imply three moves: Its conditions 
of possibility had to be reconstructed, which would imply approaching the paradox as a problem 
of practice that dissolves itself, too, when we reverse the order of cause and effect, meaning that 
was is recognized as being foreign, ‘other’ and unknowable is a product of translation and not 
solely its precondition. The first condition is the indeterminacy of translation. To demonstrate that 
the (im)possibility of translation is a problem of practice and therefore cannot be addressed 
deconstructively I turned to the realm of practice and Quine’s example of the field translator and 
his problem of ‘gavagai’. Quine showed that because reference is inscrutable and the denotative 
content of what is being translated cannot be defined and ‘fixed’ once and for all, the translator 
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has to rely on the connotative relations that are present in the setting in which she finds herself. No 
one translation but always multiple translations are possible. The meaning that is supposedly 
transferred and conveyed through a translation becomes a product of translation. The inscrutability 
of reference and the importance of connotative relations led me to the work of Wittgenstein and 
his notion of language game. The meaning of words depends on how language is used in a given 
context (by the translator, for instance) and the given rules of how to use language that are present 
in that context. This answers the question as to what are the translation problems. 
 This led me to the second condition of the possibility of the paradox of translation, 
that is, the contingency of translation. First, the translator is an expert who is authorized to 
intervene in a given context based on her expertise and the identification of a problem and a need 
in the target context that she can solve due to her specific expertise (eg. Staunton’s language skills 
authorized him to translate the Qing legal code). The translator does therefore not merely stand 
between two contexts – cultures, for instance – but plays an active role in constructing meaning 
about the context and creating representations about its culture. The neutrality of the translator’s 
role and the illusion of a translation’s fluency and transparency is a conscious act by the translator 
that covers over her agency and accountability in constructing meaning and knowledge. This 
continuous act is instrumental in the use of domestication as a technique in translating through 
which the translator fixes and stabilizes the meaning that is produced in translation to suit her 
values and norms or those present in the target context and thereby erasing a translation’s ‘foreign’ 
elements. Semantic indeterminacy is thereby addressed and tamed by momentarily stabilizing and 
fixing meaning for a particular purpose. This answers the questions: Who are the translators? 
What particular purpose does a translation serve? 
 Finally, the translator’s intervention and claim to expertise is also authorized and 
justified following the fixation of spatiotemporal orders of which translation is performative. This 
leads back to my conception of translation: Translation is a boundary-drawing practice that 
simultaneously keeps separate and connects social and semantic fields in time and space, which it 
then purports to bridge. The gap between these social and semantic fields does not consciously 
exist prior to the practice of translation but is rendered fixed, determinate, and knowable in the 
practice of translation and becomes a result of the practice of translating. As such, translation is a 
temporal, disruptive event that creates a discontinuity that it then purports to overcome in creating 
continuity. By enacting the idea of social and linguistic unity, translation is also a means to 
construct knowledge about the ‘inter-national’ and to frame the world as carved up into 
demarcated borders. 
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 These three conditions – the indeterminacy, contingency and performativity of 
translation – identify the practice of translation with the ‘political’: how is meaning fixed and 
stabilized and by whom? What spatiotemporal orders are made real through this fixation of 
meaning? Who has the authority to do so? And how are different languages made bounded, 
commensurate and juxtaposed vis-à-vis one another, as a result? What a translationalist approach 
can offer is to foreground how different expert vocabularies emerge and become bounded in 
practice and how a specific context, its subject and objects are discursively constructed in this 
process. Focusing on practices of translation thus gives more attention to the ways in which 
language – expert vocabularies and vernaculars – are used in practice, as opposed to approach 
experts as being preprogrammed within their respective functional field and thereby automatically 
identifying themselves with and applying a given vocabulary. A translationalist approach, I will 
show in the analytical part of the thesis, can address the question as to how, in the face of semantic 
indeterminacy, meaning is momentarily rendered fixed and stabilized to serve as the source and 
justification for the intervention of particular experts. In the following chapter on Following the 
Rule of Law: On Methodology and Methods I outline my approach to reconstructing the practical 
meaning of the rule of law and what methods and data I draw on in so doing.  
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Chapter	4 
FOLLOWING	THE	RULE	OF	LAW:	ON	METHODOLOGY	AND	METHODS	
 
 
‘I noticed, too, the relationship between naming and being, because I 
realized upon my return to the hotel that in town I had seen only that 
which I was able to name: for example, I remembered the acacia tree, 
but not the tree standing next to it, whose name I did not know. I 
understood, in short, that the more words I knew, the richer, fuller, and 
more variegated would be the world that opened before me, and which I 
could capture’46 
 
‘No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the 
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there 
is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the 
context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a 
system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live’47 
 
Introduction:	Law,	Language	and	the	Logic	of	Reconstruction	
 
 How to study the politics of translation in global governance? By what methods can 
we map the messy landscape of the various meanings of the rule of law? We have to follow the 
concept, I suggest in this chapter. This implies three moves in terms of the methods applied. The 
first move is what I refer to a reconstructive approach to case study analysis, where the 
contingency of conceptual meaning is of interest to the analysis, as opposed to identifying the 
meaning of a key concept prior to the inquiry and thereby ‘fixing’ its meaning once and for all. 
Insisting on conceptual contingency at the expense of conceptual consistency is informed by the 
limits of language and how knowledge- and sense-making is bounded, as a result. This is 
                                                
46 Ryszard Kapuściński (2008) Travels with Herodotus. London (London: Penguin Books), at 22 
47 Robert Cover (1983) Foreword: Nomos and Narrative. Harvard Law Review 97: 4-68, at 4-5 
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illustrated by the first quote that introduces this chapter. Knowing no Hindi and only little English, 
Ryszard Kapuściński, a Polish correspondent, describes how he during his first meeting with India 
in 1955 only remembered what he could name and therefore make sense of.  
 This leads to the second move, which is the use of ethnography as a privileged 
method to reconstruct how a concept is filled with life and meaning in everyday practices. Here I 
suggest moving away from a single location in order to follow how a concept travels in and 
between different social sites that are of relevance to the case. For this reason, it is the concept that 
identifies these places and lay out the trajectories of its own study and not a single, bounded site 
that defines how and what dimensions of the concept should be addressed. In brief, we have to 
follow the concept. This implies a multi-sited and thus more mobile ethnography that builds on the 
analytical importance of the ‘particular’ and of recognizing conceptual contingency and the 
constitutive role of practices that transgress institutional and geographic boundaries. It 
foregrounds what Haraway terms a partial perspective that is embedded in situated knowledges: 
‘[A]ll eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual systems, building on 
translations and specific ways of seeing, that is, ways of life’ (Haraway 1988, 584).  
 By doing away with the possibility – or necessity – of objectivity and the ‘vision 
from nowhere’ (Haraway 1988, 581), reconstructing the partial perspectives held by actors 
relevant to the case shifts the analytical lens away from correspondence to the subjective and to 
embodied experiences. Indeed, as noted by Koselleck, ‘in practice, it is not possible to maintain a 
boundary between narration and description’ (105). This is related to my third and final move, 
which is a narrative approach to conducting interviews, where the rigid procedures of the 
structured interview is abandoned to make the interviewee tell stories that are significant to her 
experience in order to reconstruct the interviewee’s perspective and the knowledge on which she 
draws. These stories – and this relates to Cover’s quote – are performative of the reality in which 
the actor – the interviewee – finds herself.  
 The chapter is structured around three parts. In the first part, I first outline what I 
mean by adopting a reconstructive position in doing a qualitative case study. To this end, I 
distinguish between reconstruction and subsumption as two distinct logics of inquiry in social 
science. I then turn to the implications for doing conceptual analysis that follow from the recent 
concern with reflexive scholarship within IR and the analytical importance of a concept’s 
contingency and performativity. In a final part, I relate the methodological position that I take in 
the thesis and the emphasis on doing conceptual analysis that foregrounds the contingency and 
performativity of concepts with doing case study analysis. I argue that the two main approaches to 
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case study analysis grouped under the heading of a post-positivist and a constructionist approach, 
respectively, are too limited and suggest a third approach, that is, a reconstructive approach that 
departs from the constant dialogue between the conceptual framework, the field of research and 
the empirical findings as well as the active and subjective role of the researcher. In the second 
part, I show how multi-sited ethnography and the narrative interview are useful methods for a 
reconstructive approach to case study analysis. In the final part of the chapter, I outline the 
research design of the chapter that is constructed around four steps to my field of research, I 
provide an overview of the data I draw on and an outline of how the data is used in the three 
analytical chapters of the thesis.    
  
Case	Study:	A	Reconstructive	Approach	
 
The	Logic	of	Reconstruction	
 
 To develop what I term a reconstructive approach to a case study analysis, I will 
begin with identifying the distinction between subsumption and reconstruction as two logics of 
inquiry. A logic of subsumption departs from the identification of pre-established concepts and 
categories that in turn are applied ‘onto the world’. ‘Concepts are about ontology’, according to 
Goertz (2006): ‘To develop a concept is more than providing a definition: it is deciding what is 
important about an entity’ (27; emphasis in original). A logic of reconstruction, on the other hand, 
departs from the assumption that the meaning as well as relevance of a particular set of concepts 
and categories cannot be established prior to the process of inquiry but result from the inquiry 
itself. In brief, conceptual consistency – as espoused by the logic of subsumption – is substituted 
by conceptual contingency (see Herborth 2012, 2011; Herborth and Kessler 2014) and a concept-
driven as opposed to a theory-driven approach to data collection and analysis (see Friedrichs and 
Kratochwil 2009).  
 Adopting a logic of subsumption to research is premised upon an assumption that 
there is an always already given ‘world out there’ that can be observed from an Archimedean 
point and thereby mapped out and defined through a pre-established and pre–defined set of 
concepts and categories. Law has referred to this assumption as the ‘externalization’ of reality, 
which implies four dimensions: independence, anteriority, definiteness, and singularity (Law 
2004, 24-25). Independence refers to the understanding of an external reality as being independent 
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of our perception of it, whereas anteriority refers to this reality existing prior to our actions 
‘waiting to be depicted’ (Law 2004, 25). That reality is definite and singular signifies that it is 
assumed as being specific, certain and stable, shared by everyone and thus the same everywhere, 
in any given time and place. These four dimensions do not derive from a simple description or 
experience of reality, according to Law, but rather from our performance of such a reality, which 
is rooted in Euro-American thought and empirical experience and which can be operationalized 
through our choice and combination of methods. ‘The practices of science make relations’, Law 
(2004) argues, ‘but as they make relations they also make realities’ (29; emphasis added). 
However, following the logic of subsumption, conceptual consistency is both strived for and also 
justified based on this assumption of an external, identifiable and singular reality.   
 Adopting a logic of reconstruction to doing research, on the contrary, implies 
embracing conceptual contingency, that is, the apprehension that concepts are developed from – as 
opposed to merely applied to – the material at hand. There is no Archimedean point, accordingly, 
from where it can be judged to what extent a certain set of concepts and categories is adequate in 
addressing a specific problem or material. A logic of reconstruction - or ‘abduction’ as Friedrichs 
and Kratochwil (drawing on Peirce (1965)) term it - therefore builds on a problem-driven, 
pragmatist approach to research (the writings of Foucault is a good example hereof), where theory 
is understood as a practice in itself and methodology becomes a ‘social theory in use’ (Herborth 
and Kessler 2014, 7), which implies that ‘the agency of researchers and their communities comes 
to the fore’ (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 711; see also Kratochwil 2007a). This reconstructive 
approach has recently been suggested in legal analysis, too: ‘[T]he study of international law 
requires attention to the movement of meaning [as international law is] inherently genealogical, 
depending as it does upon the transmission of concepts, languages and norms across time and 
space’ (Orford 2013, at 175). Legal analysis should thus embrace ‘description’ (Orford 2012) and 
what I here term a reconstructive position. Here, ‘description’ is not referred to as a theoretically 
neutral approach to the meaning of concepts (ie. how a ‘descriptive’ research approach has been 
defined within IR) but to a distinction between description versus ‘prescription’, where the latter is 
understood as the resort to ‘absolute truths’ among both conventional and critical legal scholars 
and in connection with Richard Falk’s (1970) point that international legal theorists fail ‘to 
provide adequate guidelines for evaluating particular decisions’ (7).  
 Moreover, the transmission of concepts across time and place does not follow a neat, 
causality-driven chronology. ‘[K]nowledge of the past’, Kratochwil (2006) asserts, ‘relates to 
practical choices in that ‘history’ is not simply a storehouse of fixed data, but a product of 
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memory, which in turn is deeply involved in our constructions of identity and of the political 
projects we pursue’ (5). For the same reason, ‘[i]nternational legal scholarship is necessarily 
anachronic, because the operation of modern law is not governed solely by a chronological sense 
of time in which events and texts are confined to their proper place in a historical and linear 
progression […] The past, far from being gone, is constantly being retrieved as a source of 
rationalisation of present obligation’ (Orford 2013, 175). This approach to the relationship 
between concepts and time is, in particular, reflected in the work of Skinner and Koselleck who 
both adopt an anti-essentialist and constructivist approach to conceptual history and point to the 
ambiguity and polysemy of concepts: ‘It is a general property of language that each of the 
meanings of a word reaches further than the singularity to which historical events can lay claim. 
Each word, even name, displays a linguistic potentiality beyond the individual phenomenon that it 
at a given moment characterizes or names’ (Koselleck 2004, 91). 
 To sum up, a reconstructive, concept-driven approach implies that any a priori 
definition of what a concept is cannot – or rather should not - be established regardless of or prior 
to the research process. For instance, attempting to provide a definition of what the rule of law is 
prior to my analysis would not only unnecessarily limit my field of inquiry and thereby blindspot 
different and alternative meanings. But also – and related to the first point – neglect the struggle 
and antagonism involved in defining its meaning in practice. A concept-driven approach in this 
context means that concepts occupy a prime place throughout the research process as there will 
constantly be a dialogue between the material at hand and the concepts and categories that were 
used as a venue into the field of inquiry in the first place. ‘Just like data, concepts do not speak for 
themselves. They have a history’, Guzzini (2013) remarks, and ‘[u]nderstanding their ongoing 
history is not just a means but also an end of our theoretical conversation’ (536; emphasis added). 
The meaning of concepts and categories are, for this reason, the very result of the research 
process:  
 
‘Our concepts constitute our field of research. What we observe in that field will in 
turn elucidate or modify our understanding of the concepts. Rather than accepting the 
positivist view that the operational definition of concepts should be stipulated at the 
beginning of the research process and then be held constant, it is better to allow for the 
mutual adaption of conceptual framework, field of research, and empirical findings’ 
(Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 717) 
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Reconstruction	and	Conceptual	Analysis	
 
 This emphasis on dialogue, conversation and the mutual adaption of concepts, fields 
and findings follows from the way in which IR as a (Western) discipline has been contested ‘from 
within’ since the so-called third debate was launched almost three decades ago (Lapid 1989). The 
‘debate’ was triggered by a criticism of the predominance of positivist methods in IR and the lack 
of concern among IR scholars with their own – reflexive – engagement with the construction of 
social reality. ‘The foundationalist project of epistemology has failed’, Kratochwil (2007b) 
declared, ’because it cannot account for the fact that science is an actual practice among a group 
of people who are not only deeply implicated in setting the research agenda, but in the 
construction of the very problems they investigate’ (26; emphasis added). Now, it was suggested 
in and after the ‘third debate’, we should finally do away with binary constructions that underpin 
and unnecessarily limit knowledge production, such as subject/object and facts/values, and, in 
turn, reconstruct how the relationship between knowledge and reality is intersubjectively 
constructed in the first place to disclose the conditions of (scientific) knowledge production that 
ultimately result in the making of seemingly naturally given truths and order. To this end, a more 
reflexive approach to theorizing would imply addressing the conditions and context of the 
researcher’s own knowledge production and how the theoretical, cultural and political context of 
individual engagement would affect the object of study (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 269). This 
has resulted in the identification of two different but closely related reflexive approaches (Hamati-
Ataya 2012). The first approach finds its epistemological and normative roots in critical theory 
and the Frankfurt School and perceives a reflexive epistemological stance as a means to serve 
human emancipation (Hamati-Ataya 2012, 675-676) - a belief shared among many Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars, too. In IR constructivist theorizing, the 
concern with reflexivity is reflected in the understanding of knowledge and social reality being 
mutually constitutive (Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1966]). However, this has resulted in different 
constructivist approaches to reflexivity, which evolve around the schism between what Hopf 
(1998) termed a conventional and a critical type of constructivism, respectively:  
 
‘[C]ritical theorists self-consciously recognize their own participation in the 
reproduction, constitution, and fixing of the social entities they observe. They realize 
that the actor and observer can never be separated. Conventional constructivists 
ignore this injunction, while largely adopting interpretivist understandings of the 
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connectivity of subjects with other subjects in a web of intersubjective meaning. The 
observer never becomes a subject of the same self-reflective critical inquiry’ (Hopf 
1998, 184-185; emphasis added)  
   
 The implications that follow from this increasing concern with reflexive scholarship, 
Guzzini (2013) argues, imply ‘a wider understanding of ‘conceptual analysis’ than usually 
offered’ (535) as concepts, as a result, ‘cannot be thought independently of their semantic context 
and their pragmatic use’ (ibid., 536). For this reason, conceptual analysis inevitably involves two 
‘levels of action’ (Guzzini 2000), which are the level of observation and ‘scientific knowledge’, 
on the one hand, and ‘the level of action proper’ that concerns ‘common-sense knowledge’, on the 
other hand. Yet, as stressed by Guzzini (2000), ‘[c]onstructivists must assume [both] scientific and 
common-sense knowledge to be socially produced’ and they ‘need to take seriously that if science 
is just another form of human action, both theories of knowledge and theories of action have to be 
understood in connection’ (162; emphasis added). The two levels are intertwined and thus need to 
be interpreted simultaneously.  
 Conceptual analysis is therefore performative in this interaction of social science 
with its (social) world. When engaging in a conceptual analysis, accordingly, one has to begin 
with how the concept is used and by doing so reconstruct its practical meaning(s), conceptual 
history/ies and present trajectories. Such a pragmatic conceptual analysis highlights the 
‘performative aspects’ of a concept, which implies three successive questions or analytical moves, 
that is: What does the concept mean to the actors to whom it is relevant? What does it do? And 
how has it become to mean and be able to do what it does? (Guzzini 2005, 495). Importantly, such 
an approach recognizes the intersubjectivity of language, meaning that language cannot be 
reduced to being objective and thus existing independently of its usage (as Wittgenstein and Quine 
pointed out), nor can it be reduced to being subjective (no language is private, Wittgenstein 
ascertained) as ‘it exists independently of us to the extent that language is always more than its 
individual usages and prior to them (Guzzini 2005, 498). This emphasizes the contingency of 
conceptual analysis (who has the power to define and with what effects?) and the particular 
communication involved (who is saying what and why?), but also raises the question of what is a 
‘case’? This is the question I address in the third and final section of this part of the chapter where 
I relate this perspective on doing conceptual analysis with working with a case. Doing so, I outline 
what I mean by a reconstructive approach to case study analysis. 
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A	Reconstructive	Approach	to	Case	Study	Analysis		
 
 In this section, I first describe the main approaches to what a case study is and how it 
should be done in order to position and outline what I suggest would be a richer and more 
productive approach to case study analysis. Case study – especially a single case study - as a 
method has often been used to provide a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973). As opposed to the more 
fluid notion of ‘fieldwork’, according to Stake (1995), the label ‘case study’ ‘draws attention to 
the question of what specifically can be learned from the single case’ (236). The popular, common 
definition of a ‘case study’ is often the one provided by Gerring. A case study, Gerring (2004) 
suggests, is ‘an intensive study of a single unit […] a spatially bounded phenomenon – e.g. a 
nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person – observed at a single point in time or 
over some delimited period of time’ (342). Or, as suggested by two other often-cited definitions, a 
case study ‘is defined by interest in an individual case, not by the methods of inquiry used [and] 
the object of study is a specific, unique, bounded system’ (Stake 2008, 443, 445); the ‘single most 
defining characteristic of case study research lies in delimiting the object of study: the case [which 
is] a thing, a single entity, a unit around which there are boundaries’ (Merriam 1998, 27).  
 A variety of different approaches to case study analysis can be discerned. Two 
general continuums have been distinguished according to whether the researcher either strives for 
offering a particularistic or a generalizing understanding, respectively, of the case study and its 
findings. Within the particularistic paradigm, a case study is defined as ‘the study of the 
particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important 
circumstances’ (Stake 1995, xi). In the generalist paradigm, to the contrary, a case study is defined 
as ‘the examination of an instance in action. The choice of the word ‘instance’ is significant in this 
definition, because it implies a goal of generalisation’ (MacDonald and Walker 1975, 2) and, for 
this reason, ‘one can often generalize on the basis of a single case’ (Flyvbjerg 2006, 228) (see 
Staricco (2015) for a more in-depth discussion of the promises and pitfalls of these two 
approaches).  
 Various approaches have also been classified according to being either post-
positivist or constructivist. The post-positivist approach is reflected in Yin’s (2012; 2009) 
development of case study analysis as a methodology (see also Eisenhardt 1989, Flyvbjerg 2011; 
2006). Case study analysis, according to Yin (2009) implies ‘following a rigorous methodological 
path’ (3) where ‘the goal [is] to expand and generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not 
to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)’ (15). To this end, the research design should 
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follow a deductive, ‘logical sequence’ (Yin 2009, 26), which begins with, first, the research 
question and then the propositions developed from this question, which ‘point to what you should 
study’ as ‘[o]nly if you are forced to state some propositions will you move in the right direction’ 
(ibid., 28). This leads to the unit of analysis, then the ‘logic linking the data to the propositions’ 
and, finally, the criteria for interpreting the findings (ibid., 27).  
 Stake, whose extended work on case study analysis represents the constructivist 
camp, has deplored that case study is a methodology at all: ‘[C]ase study is not a methodological 
choice but a choice about of what is being studied’ (Stake 2005, 443). A qualitative case study, 
according to Stake, draws together ‘a palette of methods’ encompassing ‘naturalistic, holistic, 
ethnographic, phenomenological, and biographic research methods’ (Stake 1995, xi-xii). This 
approach differs from Yin’s conception of a case study as a ‘rigorous methodological path’ by 
suggesting a more inductive approach in directing the attention towards how the construction of a 
case can be used to carve out the boundaries of given social phenomenon in order to make it 
accessible for empirical analysis and experience. To this end, Stake (1995) stresses that the most 
important of ‘the major conceptual responsibilities of the qualitative case researcher’ is, first and 
foremost, ‘bounding the case, conceptualizing the object of study’ in order to, secondly, ‘select[] 
phenomena, themes, or issues […] to emphasize’ (244). It follows - which I find quite daunting – 
that ‘[t]he methods of qualitative case study are largely the methods of disciplining personal and 
particularized experience’ (Stake 1995, 245). To be sure, Stake’s constructionist approach to case 
study analysis exhibits the same post-positivist epistemological stance that Hopf deplored the 
‘conventional’ constructivists for endorsing. 
 I find these two main approaches too limited in both their way of identifying the case 
and in how they strive for conceptual consistency in carrying out a case study, which probably 
derives from the struggle of ensuring at least some degree of generality based on a (single) case 
study. First, the definitions given of what a case study is in the beginning of this section describe a 
case study as a ‘spatially bounded phenomenon’ (Gerring) and that its ‘object of study is a 
specific, unique, bounded system’ (Stake). These common definitions suggest that the temporal 
elements of a case study and the boundaries they set are secondary to identifying the case study’s 
spatial boundaries, and that it is the spatial boundaries of a given phenomenon that define what is 
to be analytically addressed. This relates to the assumption that the object of study of the case 
analysis can be confined and thus appropriated within a ‘bounded system’ (though its unclear what 
Stake actually means by a bounded system). I agree with Stake that a case study is by no means a 
methodology and that the ‘case of’ question is what defines and guides this kind of analysis. But I 
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disagree that to address this question the ‘conceptual responsibility’ of the researcher is to first 
bound the case and conceptualize the object of study. This refers to my critical assessment of 
subscribing to a logic of subsumption in social inquiry.  
 Adopting a reconstructive approach to my case analysis, I make the concept of the 
rule of law my object of study and internationally administered rule of law reforms the case 
through which I can reconstruct the making of its practical meaning through time and between 
different institutional sites and practices. As what is of interest to this study is the question of how 
its meaning is made in practice by different actors, it is the concept that lays out the trajectory of 
its own analysis, which transgresses different institutional and sometimes also territorial 
boundaries. Here, I draw on Koselleck’s conception of a concept: ‘[A] concept must remain 
ambiguous in order to be a concept […] it bundles up the variety of historical experience together 
with a collection of theoretical and practical references into a relation that is given and can be 
experience only through the concept’ (Koselleck 2004, 85). A concept therefore organizes and is 
performative of experiences and sense-making, either of the past or even in its capacity to reach 
into potential futures and create expectations, according to Koselleck. But, importantly, it remains 
ambiguous and polysemic and can for that reason adopt different meanings in time and place 
according to how meaning is inscribed into it by a particular group of actors.   
 It follows that neither the boundaries of the object of study nor those of the case as 
such can be once and for all established prior to engaging with the field of research and the 
empirical findings. In other words, following a reconstructive approach, ‘what is the case’ has to 
be reconstructed from the material available. It is therefore both the constant puzzles that the 
material might confront the researcher with (a personal perspective), on the one hand, and the 
different partial perspectives of the actors relevant to the case, on the other hand, that create the 
constant dialogue between the conceptual framework, the field of research and the findings. To 
use case study as a ‘methods of disciplining personal and particularized experience’ (Stake) would 
both limit the case unnecessarily and blindspot the pluralism and politics involved in meaning- 
and sense-making. According to Haraway (1988), we should not seek ‘partiality for its own sake, 
but, rather, for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make 
possible’ (590).  
 What is more, a diachronic approach to the case study is equally important as 
opposed to only focusing on how the concept crosses spatially demarcated boundaries. This is 
where a performative and pragmatic conceptual analysis is at the center of a reconstructive 
approach to case study analysis, which begins with inquiring the different usages of a concept, 
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what that concept does in the world (for example, in creating a specific representation of reality in 
which a particular group of actors can intervene) and how the concept has become to mean and do 
what it does, that is, its conceptual history. Below, I summarize the implications following from 
the distinction between subsumption and reconstruction as two methodologies for doing case 
study analysis. In the next part, I suggest that multi-sited ethnography and narrative interviews 
constitute two useful methods for a reconstructive approach to case study analysis.  
 
 
Approaches to Case Study Analysis 
 
Logics of Inquiry Subsumption Reconstruction 
Research Question  The research question remains 
stable throughout the case study 
The research question is open and 
in dialogue with the empirical 
findings of the case study 
Defining the Case A pre-defined and -established 
concept and its propositions 
define and bound the case  
The case study is concept-driven 
and follows the trajectories that 
are laid out by the practical usage 
of the concept 
Object of Study 
 
A spatially bounded phenomenon 
or system 
A concept, group of actors, etc., 
with the capacity of transgressing 
spatial and temporal boundaries 
The Role of the Researcher 
 
An observer external to the field 
of research  
An active participant embedded 
in her field of research 
	
Studying	Through:	Doing	Multi-Sited	Ethnography	
 
Why	Multiple	Sites?	Opting	for	a	More	Mobile	Approach	to	Ethnography	
 
 To address the question of why multiple sites, I will begin by retelling how my 
initial focus on one single location turned out to be too limited to address the question of how the 
practical meaning of the rule of law was made in the case of internationally administered rule of 
law reforms in post-intervention Kosovo. As described in the introductory chapter to the thesis, 
this case was chosen due to how rule of law promotion in Kosovo is intrinsically linked with 
humanitarian interventionism, the expanding scope of international law following the end of the 
Cold War and the emergence of a legitimacy language in global governance. It therefore provides 
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a fertile empirical ground for reconstructing how the practical meaning of the rule of law in global 
governance is made in a given case by international actors. To provide a ‘thick description’ of how 
the meaning of the rule of law was made and enacted, I had initially chosen to focus exclusively 
on the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX) as a ‘bounded’ phenomenon 
that represents the case. To this end, I wanted to draw on ethnography defined as ‘the study of 
people in naturally occurring settings or “fields” by means of methods which capture their social 
meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher participating directly in the setting’ 
(Brewer 2000, 10). My object of study was therefore the actors within the mission, which was 
informed by my interest in especially organizational ethnography (Ybema et al., 2009) as a 
methods to study the ‘insides’ of an international mission and organization and in unpacking the 
everyday practices - ordinary activities - of its staff.  
 Prior to my first round of fieldwork, I had read all the documents published by the 
mission. The ‘rule of law’ – which obviously is also reflected in the mission’s name – was a 
recurrent concept in the various official texts produced by the mission. However, what meaning 
was attached to this central concept of the mission was never really specified or easily 
decipherable for an external observer when reading through these documents. To give a few 
examples. In one of the mission’s ‘program reports’ (that is, an annual report in which the 
progress of Kosovo’s institutions in the area of the rule of law is assessed by mission staff) it was 
noted that ‘what is envisaged by the EULEX Kosovo Mission Statement is a process of reform: 
moving Kosovo’s police, justice and customs from their ‘current state’ to a more ‘desirable state’. 
As in a journey, it is essential that those who work in Kosovo’s rule of law know where they are at 
the start, as well as where they want to be in the future’48. To be sure, the exit strategy of EULEX 
does not add more clarification to what this journey implies. It reads as follows: ‘[T]he mission is 
foreseen to be terminated when the Kosovo authorities have gained enough experience to 
guarantee that all members of society benefit from the rule of law’49. A year into the deployment 
of the mission, an internal EULEX memorandum was leaked to the press in Kosovo. In the 
memorandum, an international staff in the office of the Deputy Head of Mission lamented local 
actors’ lack of capacity to recognize the rule of law and charged local politicians for interfering in 
‘the independence of the Rule of Law services of Kosovo’50. According to the memorandum: 
                                                
48 EULEX Programme Report 2010 ‘Building Sustainable Change Together’, EULEX Programme 
Office, at 6 
49 EULEX Kosovo ‘Fact Sheet’ (December 2009) 
50 Ibid. 
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‘Very often, these institutions [‘the local RoL institutions in Kosovo’] are culturally and/or 
mentally not acquainted to the concept of independence of their services. EULEX certainly has a 
role here of leading by good example, thus gradually changing the culture/mentality’51. Finally, in 
EULEX’s so-called Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) it is stressed by way of introduction that 
‘[t]he Member States have a vision – a European one – of what they want Kosovo’s rule of law 
system to look like’52. Given that EULEX is a rule of law mission with important executive 
powers in the legal field in Kosovo, the puzzling part was therefore how this ‘desirable state’, the 
‘right’ mentality and the ‘European vision’ of the rule of law were translated into actual practices 
and how knowledge was produced around these vague pointers as to the mission’s mandate.   
 Following this puzzle, when I went to Kosovo for the first time in the end of August 
2011 to do fieldwork my strategy was to ‘follow the people’ within the mission of EULEX to 
reconstruct how knowledge was produced and meaning made on the rule of law within various 
functional sites (the office of the Head of Mission, the Programme Office, the offices of the 
prosecutors and in the local courts where international judges would work side by side with 
Kosovo-Albanian judges, among other sites). After having conducted a few initial interviews – 
mostly with international judges and prosecutors – I realized that my initial boundary-drawing 
exercise in terms of narrowing my field of research had excluded important aspects of how this 
knowledge production among EULEX staff was conditioned on past and parallel practices of other 
international actors. To be sure, the initial spatial boundaries I had set for the case were contested 
and did therefore not represent the case adequately. The following brief ‘tour’ through different 
sites and practices illustrates why.  
 During my initial interviews, the EULEX judges and prosecutors – mainly coming 
from EU member states with legal systems that follow the civil law tradition – would often 
complain over Kosovo’s criminal procedure code and its common law-like procedures, which they 
found contradictory and difficult to apply in practice. In fact, the code had been drafted primarily 
by US legal advisors from the US Department of Justice and its Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development (OPDAT). The US has played an important role in Kosovo since 1999. To give an 
example from ‘everyday international life’ in Kosovo: Kosovo’s police academy in the city of 
Vushtrri was funded by the US Department of Justice through their Criminal Investigative 
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) but the responsibility of its functioning had formally been 
assigned the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 
                                                
51 http://download.cabledrum.net/wikileaks_archive/file/un-kosovo-rol-2009.pdf  
52 EULEX Kosovo, ’Mission Implementation Plan (on file with author)  
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Kosovo. When UNMIK had been established in June 1999, the OSCE was mandated by the 
United Nations (UN) to be in charge of ‘democratization and institution-building’, which included 
the training of judicial staff and Kosovo’s police force. The OSCE and the Americans would 
divide the training of Kosovar police officers between them, but the cooperation between the 
OSCE and the US trainers was not very smooth, to say the least. One of my interviewees 
explained how the bone of contention had been how to train the cadets. The Americans were 
training the cadets on Tuesdays, telling them to shoot at the upper body and head area. On 
Thursdays, European police officers mandated by the OSCE would tell them to pacify by shooting 
at arms and legs. And so the training went on. During my last field trip to Kosovo in August 2013, 
OSCE’s broad mandate had been extended into also changing the road names all over Kosovo to 
ensure that more female names would be visible. This last point might seem trivial (especially 
compared to the training of the cadets) but it reflects how the mandates of international 
organizations and missions gradually change in scope following their continuously reinterpretation 
by mission staffs. My initial strategy of following one group of people within a single site was 
therefore soon abandoned for the strategy of following the ‘rule of law’ as a concept, which then 
became my object of study. In fact, I also changed my initial research question that had addressed 
how the meaning of the rule of law was contested in practice. Now, the ambiguity of its very 
meaning resulted in a much more interesting question, that is, how its meaning was being ‘fixed’, 
rendered determinate, momentarily stabilized in practice and thereby made knowable. 
 Following the concept entails a more mobile and – as the above recount shows – 
multi-sited ethnographic approach. In her influential 1972 piece, anthropologist Laura Nader 
asked: ‘What if […] anthropologists were to study the colonizers rather than the colonized, the 
culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless, the culture of affluence rather than the 
culture of poverty?’ (289). This call for ‘studying up’ (Nader 1972) was soon found suited to 
address more complex objects of study in a ‘global’ context witin a disciplinary field that had been 
preoccupied with the ‘local’ and therefore found ‘its foundations challenged by the advent of the 
‘global’, whose epistemic existence it had denied’ (Hatzimihail 417).53 The response to Nader’s 
                                                
53 A decade later, for instance, Rabinow (1986) set out to ‘anthropologize the West’ (inspired by 
the work of Foucault) by reconstructing through the use of ethnography the discourses and 
practices that underpinned and thereby made up Western knowledge systems and their 
constructions of reality. ’We need to anthropologize the West’, Rabinow claimed, ’show how 
exotic its constitution of reality has been; emphasize those domains most taken for granted as 
universal (this includes epistemology and econonomics); make them seem as historically peculiar 
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question came, in particular, with Marcus’ (1995) introduction of a ‘multi-sited ethnography’ (see 
also Falzon 2009; Feldman 2011; Stepputat 2012; Steputtat and Larsen 2015). This approach 
follows from his distinction between studying a certain social group or a tribe in a single location 
versus studying a broader topic by carrying out ethnographic research in multiple sites. The 
conventional ethnographic research design bound by a single site-approach, Marcus argued, was 
ill-equipped to grasp how – or the extent to which – meanings and identities in the event of 
globalization were not produced only in one location at a particular time, but, to the contrary, 
across different sites, at different times and in different situations. Multi-sited fieldwork, 
accordingly, would shift the analytical lens from the single site and situation towards 
‘construct[ing] the lifeworlds of variously situated subjects’ (Marcus 1985, 96). ‘Strategies of 
quite literally following connections, associations, and putative relationships are thus at the very 
heart of designing multi-sited ethnographic research’, Marcus (1995, 97) suggests.  
 Moreover, this ‘studying up’ approach to doing fieldwork has been used recently to 
unpack how complex global policies are made and enacted ‘between a multitude of actors who are 
involved in the attempt to generate, institutionalize and coordinate global policies’ (Steputtat and 
Larsen 2015, 13; see also Autesserre 2014). This is reflected in the work of Riles (2001) whose 
approach to the work and networks of international actors is to turn ‘the inside out’ by studying 
artifacts and bureaucratic practices that construct the ‘outside’ of international policy fields, that 
is, the reality that international elites and experts are addressing and in which they are intervening. 
In the following, I will first outline the different tracking strategies on which multi-sited 
ethnography can draw. Opting for ‘following the concept’, I relate this approach to Mol’s (2002) 
ethnographic study (what she terms a ‘praxiography’) of how the meaning of a given object was 
constructed differently within what she refers to as different ‘realities’, which resulted in different 
‘versions’ of that object. I therefore not only intend to ‘study up’ by reconstructing how 
international professional communities construct knowledge but also to ‘study through’ by 
reconstructing the connections and observing how the concept of the rule of law brings together 
actors, discourses and institutions, and the new kinds of relations and subjects this process creates 
(Shore 2011, 172). In a final note, I address what data is relevant for this kind of ethnography.    
 First, how to track the circulation and enactment of meaning in and through different 
social and institutional sites? Marcus (1985) outlines six different techniques (or what he refers to 
as ‘practices of construction’) according to which multi-sited ethnographies can construct and 
                                                                                                                                                          
as possible; show how their claims to truth are linked to social practices and have hence become 
effective forces in the social world (Rabinow 1986, 241) 
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follow their object of study. One technique is to ‘follow the people’, which implies staying with a 
particular group of people and map out their movements (this approach has been used, in 
particular, within migration and diaspora studies). ‘Follow the thing’ implies tracing how a certain 
material object of study – a technology, commodity or work of art, for instance – circulate through 
different contexts; an approach that is reflected in Hopkins and Wallerstein’s (1977) ‘commodity 
chain’ where a final commodity is the product of various and heterogeneous processes across 
space that link actors and activities together. ‘Follow the thing’ has also been prominent in 
Latour’s work on reconstructing the diffusion of the idea of Pasteurism (Latour 1988). A third 
strategy is to ‘follow the plot’ or the story: this implies following a compelling narrative, maybe 
one that has turned into a myth. It is a strategy that can be used to map collective memory and 
struggles over defining what would be a collective reality. Fourth, ‘following the life’ or a 
biography implies following ‘narrated individual experiences’ through different juxtaposed but 
connected social contexts and, fifth, by ‘following the conflict’ the ethnographer maps out the 
different parties to a particular conflict or case (which has been used in the anthropology of law, 
for instance). Finally, Marcus suggests to ‘follow the metaphor’: ‘When the thing traced is within 
the realm of discourse and modes of thought, then the circulation of signs, symbols, and 
metaphors guides the design of ethnography’ (Marcus 1985, 108). Doing so implies tracing and 
reconstructing ‘the social correlates and associations that are most clearly alive in language use 
and print or visual media’ (ibid.). I adopt this last tracking mechanism in the thesis and refer to it 
as ‘following the concept’ in order to map out the different meanings that are inscribed into in and 
through different sites and situations. My approach is inspired, too, by Mol’s ethnographic 
approach to the study of an ‘object’ and how it mutated in and through dispersed practices into 
multiple objects.   
 In the multi-sited ethnographic approach that Mol adopts in The Body Multiple 
(2002) the focus is not only on how her object of study travels between different institutional sites, 
but also on how its meaning is enacted fundamentally differently within these sites. To 
demonstrate this point, Mol undertook an ethnographic study (a ‘praxiography’) of the medical 
practices surrounding the disease lower-limb atherosclerosis in a Dutch hospital. Atherosclerosis, 
according to Mol, is an object that is generated in practice. Similar to the ‘rule of law’, what 
atherosclerosis is can therefore not be answered straightforwardly. Despite being a relatively 
ordinary disease, it is multiple as it means something fundamentally different to different actors at 
various sites, such as, the department of pathology, the outpatient clinic, the epidemiological 
research center, the surgeon’s consulting room, etc., which all have their own methods, logics and 
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practices. The disease, in sum, is ‘done’ differently in these various sites in the hospital and has 
therefore different meanings for the doctors, patients and researchers.   
 Mol argues that these various medical practices relating to atherosclerosis enact 
different versions of the object. Indeed, that there are different versions of an object means that 
multiple objects (which are still thought of being the ‘same’ object with a relatively stable 
meaning) are being performed at the same time. In consequence, there are different 
atheroscleroses that co-exist. Difference, therefore, ‘is no longer a matter of different perspectives 
on a single object but the enactment of different objects in the different sets of relations and 
contexts of practice’ (Law and Singleton 2005, 342). Object – or objects – does not exist in and of 
itself but is being produced and performed in different contexts that each perform their own 
reality. For this reason, each context in which (a version of) an object is enacted cannot bring to 
presence all properties of an object; properties which might be present in another context. The way 
in which an object is enacted in a given context would therefore depend upon what is 
simultaneously being absent, that is, what is othered at the same time. It follows, that ‘[a]n object 
is a presence. It is present, here and now. But, whatever the form of its presence, this also implies 
a set of absences. The present object implies realities that are necessarily absent, that cannot be 
brought to presence; that are othered. So, to put it slightly differently, an object is a pattern of 
presences and absences’ (Law and Singleton 2005, 342-343).  
 Following from Mol’s approach, turning the ‘rule of law’ into my object of study 
does not only allows me to reconstruct how different institutional sites and actors are connected 
and linked together, but also how its meaning is constructed differently in and through these 
institutional sites in practice. In the analytical part of the chapter I demonstrate that meaning 
construction around the rule of law unfolds in struggles over discursively fixing, momentarily 
stabilizing and thereby inscribing meaning into the boundary between law and politics, which in 
turn would authorize a particular group of actors and their attending solutions to a problem over 
other actors and their solutions. Similar to lower-limb atherosclerosis in Mol’s study, the practical 
meaning of the rule of law that is made ‘real’ and present in a given situation therefore depends on 
what is othered and made absent through the politics of translating. Indeed, in the context of a 
mobile and multi-sited ethnography, the meaning of translation differs from how it has 
traditionally been approach among anthropologists in the sense of merely comprehending another 
culture than one’s own (cf. Chapter 3). According to Marcus (1995), the function of translation ‘is 
enhanced since it is no longer practiced in the primary, dualistic “them-us” frame of conventional 
ethnography but requires considerably more nuancing and shading as the practice of translation 
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connects the several sites that the research explored along unexpected and even dissonant 
fractures of social location’ (100; emphasis added). 
 Finally, what data would be needed to reconstruct the mundane, everyday practices 
of international actors? In colleting and selecting my data I was inspired by other work that have 
addressed the ‘insides’ of the ‘international community’ or a particular international professional 
field. In her legal anthropology of the everyday practices within a network of different 
international and local institutions around the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women, Riles 
(2000) draws attention to the daily, bureaucratic practices within an international network of 
attending meetings and conferences, preparing newsletters, the collection of data and the writing 
of reports through which legal knowledge is assembled and the ‘outside’ of the network is 
rendered knowledgeable and thereby constructed. Similar to Riles’ ethnography of the ‘global’, 
Autesserre (2014) reconstructs the ‘everyday dimension of international interventions’ by 
mapping out the ‘routine practices’ of international actors, that is, placing international experts in 
management positions and local actors in subordinate positions, replacing international (in 
particular seconded) staff regularly, drawing on best practices, lessons learned, and other universal 
templates, holding coordination meetings and writing reports, among other recurrent and patterned 
practices. Another important focus of Autesserre is ‘narratives’, which authorize and justify 
certain practices. ‘[T]he prevailing narrative that host populations and their elites lack capacity’, 
according to Autesserre (2014), ‘legitimizes the practice of sending foreigners to help building 
peace in conflict zones and of putting these foreigners in leadership positions’ (35). To study the 
everyday life of what she calls ‘peaceland’, Autesserre draws on extended fieldwork, in-depth 
interviews, participant observations and key documents produced by international peacebuilding 
missions. In another legal ethnography, Riles (2011) draws on fieldwork among lawyers to unpack 
how the ‘technical’ of regulatory governance of collaterals in the global financial market 
encompasses a variety of agents, lawyers as well as non-lawyers, and non-human agents, such as, 
legal documents and computer programs that link dispersed institutional sites and markets 
together. The importance of legal documents as ‘artifacts’ of legal knowledge production has also 
been stressed in another study by Riles (1999) in which she unfolds the process of drafting 
documents and reports in international fora, such as the UN, to reconstruct not the political but the 
practical epistemological foundations of international law (which differ from neat scientific 
models and often from legal theories, too, she argues). 
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A	Narrative	Approach	to	Interviewing	and	the	Importance	of	Place	
 
 My own approach to reconstructing the everyday practices of international actors 
through which they construct knowledge about and enact the practical meaning of the rule of law 
draws on the various documents produced by these actors (such as reports, press releases, daily 
news updates, minutes, laws and regulations, and webpages) but in particular on narrative 
interviews. The narrative interview differs in fundamental ways from the most prevalent 
interviewing technique among political scientists, that is, the structured interview. The structured 
interview follows a set of rigid procedures, such as pre-established response categories and closed-
ended questions, asking questions without any variation, using a script to ensure how the dialogue 
should proceed, and maintaining a professional and impersonal role in the interview situation, 
which implies not expressing opinions about the subject that is of relevance to the interview 
(Marvasti 2004, 17-18).  
 The unstructured interview exhibits less rigid procedures and allows more 
interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. Here, a distinction is often made between 
the in-depth interview and the ethnographic interview, where for the latter the very physical 
setting of the interview is of particular importance. All my interviews, for instance, took place in 
the offices of my interviewees, in the restaurant where they use to have their lunch or the café 
where they would normally go for an after-work drink. When conducting interviews in the office 
of an international prosecutor, for instance, she would find an email in her computer, a particular 
paragraph in the law, or a report that had just been published by EULEX to make her point. To do 
an interview in the everyday physical setting of the interviewee thus directs attention towards the 
various artifacts that are of importance to her daily work. The interviews outside the office but in 
equally mundane physical settings for people on mission were both helpful in creating a good and 
more relaxed dialogue, why I would sometimes first conduct an interview in the interviewee’s 
office and later meet in a more ‘relaxed’ setting for follow-up questions. But also to observe the 
network between international actors as they would often attend the same restaurants and cafés, 
which moreover was helpful for me in order to establish new contacts.       
 I refer to my approach to interviewing as a narrative approach. I wanted the 
interview to be as unstructured as possible, meaning that instead of asking ‘what is the rule of 
law? How do you define it? And what does the rule of law mean to you?’, my aim was to make 
the interviewee tell stories and anecdotes from her daily work, about the other people in the 
mission or the doings of other international institutions and actors within her field of work. 
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Sometimes the same anecdote would be brought up in different interviews, which would 
emphasize its importance in constructing a common narrative about the doings of international 
rule of law actors. As my interest was also in reconstructing the role of UNMIK in rule of law 
reforms in the period from 1999 to 2008, these anecdotes and especially their frequency were used 
as a means to retell the past and, in particular, through the lens of what events actors would find 
the most important in that past. Indeed, anecdotes, stories and, to be sure, gossip are part and 
parcel of everyday ‘expat’ life, where those who have been in Kosovo during several years would 
generously share their stories with the newly arrived and with me. I therefore took a very active 
role in my interviews, sometimes addressing the gossip you would hear in the streets of Pristina 
about EULEX or the UN, for instance, to get the validity confirmed (which it often was), often 
sharing my own views or referring to personal experience doing fieldwork all over Kosovo. 
However, my active role in the interview was also informed by my own disciplinary background, 
which I will return to in the following section on perspectives and problems related to being at the 
boundaries. 
 
Being	at	the	Boundaries:	Perspectives	and	Problems		
 
 In this third and final part of the section, I discuss what problems and perspectives I 
encountered in finding myself ‘at the boundaries’. By being at the boundaries, I refer to collecting 
data between different institutional sites and between professional groups, as well as 
reconstructing the role of in particular international lawyers in rule of law reforms coming myself 
from a non-law background (nor am I an anthropologist by training, too). I will begin with the last 
boundary – the one about disciplines. Indeed, not being a lawyer by training was one of the main 
reasons that I took on an active role during interviews and often would meet my interviewees for 
follow-up questions. I did not have any prior knowledge about the legal issues at stake but learned 
through my interviewees what were the most important aspects of law in a given case, what were 
the problems in the criminal procedure code and how the different legal professions – the judge 
and the prosecutor – related to one another and to other professions, such as the forensic 
investigators and the police. Whereas my early interviews would take on a more external 
perspective on law, later they would focus more and more on the internal perspectives. The most 
important problem I faced due to my lack of training in law, I believe, was that it was of course 
time consuming to meet interviewees again for further follow-up questions that would address a 
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legal aspect that had not come to my mind during an interview. Indeed, I think my lack of 
substantive prior knowledge and therefore take-for-granted position about the legal issues became 
important to my case study as it resulted in the combination an external perspective on law that is 
concerned with how actors in a legal system behave with an internal perspective on law, that is, 
the one taking by participants within a legal system and which is concerned with how a certain 
rule should be interpreted in a given case. As noted by Werner (2010), ‘an age-old problem that 
has always plagued multidisciplinary cooperation between lawyers and non-lawyers [is] how to 
relate the internal and the external perspective on law’ (305); a problem that can be addressed by 
‘tak[ing] legal analysis beyond doctrine into concrete interpretative practices where law receives 
concrete meaning and force’ and thereby reconstruct ‘the role of borders and boundaries’ (307) 
that ‘are constituted and reconstituted in discursive practices, including legal proceedings’ (306). 
 Another problem that arises from finding oneself at disciplinary boundaries has 
recently been addressed by both IR scholars and anthropologists. The turn to practices in the 
discipline of IR (see Adler and Pouliot 2011) has resulted in the emerging use of ethnographic 
methods among IR scholars (Neumann 2005, 2002; Pouliot 2007), which has recently been 
labeled an ‘ethnographic turn’ (Vrasti 2008, 279; Lie 2013). The recourse to ethnography as a 
method by IR scholars has been criticized from within the field of anthropology (Vrasti 2008). 
According to Vrasti, the use of ethnographic methods by IR scholars has only been possible by 
‘adopting a selective, instrumental and somewhat timid understanding of what ethnography is and 
does’ (Vrasti 2008, 280). In a reply to this critique, Vrasti was criticized of applying a ‘pure’ 
notion of ethnography (Rancatore 2010, 66) and not embracing the potentiality of the so-called 
ethnographic turn in IR in providing a ‘sustained disciplinary revisitation of the relationship 
between methods and methodology as useful social science practice’ (ibid., 67; emphasis in 
original). In turn – it was suggested in this debate – the use of ethnography by IR scholars should 
be approached as a method that can ‘open up’ for different, multiple venues into empirical studies 
(Rancatore 2010, 74). Indeed, I believe that the recourse to ethnographic methods in IR – such as 
fieldwork, participant observations and narrative interviews – does not only address the call for 
recognizing the reflexivity inherent in social science research. But is also a crucial method for 
addressing the ‘global’ and its plurality and thereby getting beyond an armchair approach to global 
governance that conceives of seemingly international norms and concepts, for instance, as being 
relatively stable and determinate. To quote Koselleck: ‘Whoever believes himself capable of 
deducing his expectations in their entirety from his experience is in error’ (Koselleck 2004, 261). 
What an ethnographic approach – especially in its mobile and multi-sited variant – can offer is the 
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generation of new and more critical insights on the ‘global’ that are well grounded in empirical 
data.  
 Being at the professional boundaries would result in another kind of problem, which 
was quite telling as to the role of different professions within an international mission. All my 
interviews with international judges are recorded and I could quote them directly. It reflects the 
norms that judges attach to their profession, that is, that they are independent and cannot be made 
accountable for what they say and how they judge to any ‘above’ political level. The international 
prosecutors – finding themselves at the boundaries between their professional independence and 
the political level within the mission – were more reluctant of being recorded and quoted. Some of 
my interviews with prosecutors are recorded, for other interviews I rely on my field notes when 
referring to these interviews in the analytical part of the thesis. The higher up in the organizational 
hierarchy of EULEX, the more difficult it was to either get an interview recorded or getting access 
to the relevant actors at all.  
 Finally, the institutional boundaries also play a role. First, as EULEX is the 
international actor with the most extensive mandate in the legal field in Kosovo compared to other 
international organizations and actors, I have in the analytical part granted more importance to 
EULEX and its internal organizational structure and culture. This also relates to the fact that my 
fieldwork outside of Kosovo would only be limited to Brussels and I have for this reason not 
reconstructed the practices and policies of UN offices and programs in New York and Geneva that 
would be of relevance to UN actors present in Kosovo and who are active in rule of law reforms. 
Another institutional boundary is also temporal and relates to how I have reconstructed earlier 
practices of UNMIK, that is, partly through anecdotes and stories told by present staff with 
UNMIK or former UNMIK staff who still works in Kosovo in other institutions, partly through 
secondary literature on UNMIK, press releases, UNMIK regulations and UN reports published in 
the period from 1999 to 2008. In the following part, I will provide an overview of the research 
design of the thesis, the data I am drawing on and how it is used in each chapter in the analytical 
part.  
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Research	Design	and	Data	
 
Following	the	Rule	of	Law	in	Three	Steps	
 
 The research design of the thesis is constructed around three steps in following the 
rule of law: fields, boundaries and practices. By fields, I mean the social construction of bounded 
terrains within a context, which authorizes and justifies certain subject positions, truth claims and 
representations. Yet, as a field is embedded in a context, its boundaries are constantly contested 
and changed from within and outside the field. For that reason, I approach boundaries – and the 
practice of drawing boundaries – performative of knowledge and sense-making within a given 
field. Finally, a practice is a contingent and patterned in the sense that some regularity can be 
identified in relation to a particular practice.  
 
Fields:	
 
 Following the rule of law, the first step (cf. Chapter 5) reconstructs how a semantic 
field around the rule of law was constructed in and through international interventions discourses. 
Here, intervention discourses refer to the formulation of international policies on peacebuilding, 
post-conflict state-building and civilian crisis management. In this first step, the analytical focus is 
on the UN and the EU as they are the two main actors who have exercised important legal and 
executive powers within the legal field in post-intervention Kosovo. In order to reconstruct how 
the rule of law is used in intervention discourses I map out what expertise was identified and 
authorized to address the ‘problem’ of the rule of law in post-conflict countries through these 
discourses.  
 
Boundaries:	
 
 In a second step (cf. Chapter 6) I reconstruct how the rule of law was translated in 
the period form 1999 to 2015 within the bureaucratic bounds of UN administration and the 
emergence of a field of international donors after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration (UDI) in 2008. I 
move from the semantic fields outlined in the first step of the research design in order to, in a 
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second, step reconstruct how the meaning of the rule of law was translated from its discursive 
construction into a realm of different practices. To this end, moving to the boundaries, I first 
identify how a certain context was created within which practices of international actors over the 
domestic legal were authorized and justified. This context was enacted by drawing a boundary 
between law and politics – where the rule of law would stand in opposition to unruly political 
practices of local actors.  
 
Practices:	
 
 In a third and final step (cf. Chapter 7), I reconstruct practices within the 
organizational structures of an international rule of law mission, the EU rule of law mission in 
Kosovo (EULEX). Doing so, I map out how three different translations of the rule of law – 
technicality, political stability and legality, respectively – were constructed and enacted through 
different and dispersed practices. This last step is structured around three parts, which each evolve 
around a given context – reality – in which the three groups of actors involved in rule of law 
promotion within EULEX is embedded, that is, the ‘planners’, the ‘politicians and the 
‘practitioners’. In order to identify the particular connotative relations these groups of actors are 
drawing on and enacting, I first reconstruct the context in which they find themselves and then 
turn to how their particular translation of the rule of law is made and justified within this context.  
 
Overview	of	Data:	Interviews	and	Places	
 
 In this section, I provide an overview of the interviews that were conducted during 
my fieldwork. I have inserted the list of interviews in this section to give a sense of the social 
cartography within which the analysis of thesis is embedded. The interviews are clustered 
according to the institution in which they were conducted. A great majority of the interviews were 
conducted in Pristina among the international missions and other institutions. My interviews with 
EULEX judges were also conducted in the district courts in the four largest cities in Kosovo, that 
is, Pristina, Prizren, Peja, and Mitrovica. When I refer to geographical names in Kosovo I use the 
Albanian names (referring to ‘Kosovo’ as opposed to its Albanian name ‘Kosova’ I use the 
English name for the country). In the third and last section of this part of the chapter, I give a brief 
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overview of how different sources of data is used according to the four steps and each analytical 
chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
List	of	Interviews	
KOSOVO:	
 
EULEX	HQs	
 
EULEX Advisor Training Office, EULEX HQs   Pristina 24 January 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Political Office, EULEX HQs  Pristina 1 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Assembly of EULEX Judges, Supreme Court Pristina 2 February 2012 
 
EULEX Analyst  Situation Center, EULEX HQs  Pristina  2 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Reporting Office, EULEX HQs   Pristina 3 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Political Office, EULEX HQs  Pristina 3 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (1) Office of the Chief of Staff, EULEX HQs Pristina 7 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (2) Office of the Chief of Staff, EULEX HQs Pristina 7 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Best Practices Office, EULEX HQs Pristina 8 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Program Office, EULEX HQs  Pristina 12 February 2012 
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EULEX Advisor (1) Legislation Unit, Kosovo’s Ministry of Justice Pristina 15 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor (2) Legislation Unit, Kosovo’s Ministry of Justice Pristina 15 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (1) Kosovo Judicial Council  Pristina 17 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (2) Kosovo Judicial Council  Pristina 17 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (1) Mitrovica District Court  Mitrovica 22 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Human Resources Unit, EULEX HQs Pristina 6 May 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Property Expert, EULEX HQs  Pristina 8 May 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Anti-Corruption Expert, EULEX HQs Pristina 8 May 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Office of the Minister of Justice, MOJ Pristina 10 May 2012 
 
EULEX Head of Justice Justice Unit, EULEX HQs  Pristina 14 May 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Office of the Head of Justice, EULEX HQs Pristina 15 May 2012 
 
EULEX Press Officer (1) Public Information Office, EULEX HQs Pristina 18 April 2013 
 
EULEX Press Officer (2) Public Information Office, EULEX HQs Pristina 15 May 2013 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (2) Mitrovica District Court  Pristina 29 July 2013 
 
 
EULEX	Judges	and	Prosecutors	
 
EULEX Judge  Assembly of EULEX Judges, Supreme Court Pristina 27 January 2012 
 
EULEX Judge  Special Chamber of Kosovo’s Supreme Court Pristina 23 April 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (1) Kosovo’s Supreme Court  Pristina 24 April 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (2) Kosovo’s Supreme Court  Pristina 10 May 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (3) Kosovo’s Supreme Court  Pristina 8 May 2013 
 
EULEX Judge  Kosovo’s Court of Appeals  Pristina 6 August 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (1) Pristina District Court  Pristina 31 January 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (2) Pristina District Court  Pristina 31 January 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (3) Pristina District Court  Pristina 9 May 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (1) Prizren District Court  Prizren 6 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (2) Prizren District Court  Prizren 6 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (3) Prizren District Court  Prizren 6 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (1) Peja District Court  Peja 13 February 2012 
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EULEX Judge (2) Peja District Court  Peja 13 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (3) Peja District Court  Peja 13 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (4) Peja District Court  Peja 13 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (5) Peja District Court  Peja 24 July 2013  
 
EULEX Judge (1) Mitrovica District Court  Mitrovica 29 July 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (2) Mitrovica District Court  Mitrovica 29 July 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (1) EULEX Police Headquarters  Pristina 18 April 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (2) EULEX Police Headquarters  Pristina 9 May 2013 
 
 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (1) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 20 January 2012 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (2) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 22 January 2012 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (3) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 10 February 2012 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (4) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 10 February 2012 
 
Chief EULEX Prosecutor EULEX Police Headquarters  Pristina 7 May 2013 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (1) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 7 May 2013 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (2) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 8 May 2013 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (3) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 9 May 2013 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (4) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 24 July 2013  
 
 
European	Commission	Liaison	Office	(ECLO)	
 
EC Rule of Law Advisor EC Liaison Office  Pristina 21 February 2012 
 
EC Political Advisor EC Liaison Office, Rule of Law Unit Pristina 12 July 2012 
 
EC Rule of Law Advisor EC Liaison Office  Pristina 26 April 2013 
 
EC Legal Advisor EC Liaison Office, Rule of Law Unit Pristina 29 April 2013 
 
EC Political Advisor EC Liaison Office, Rule of Law Unit Pristina 2 May 2013 
 
Legal Advisor  Office of the EU Special Representative Pristina 2 May 2013 
 
 
UN	Institutions	
 
UNDP Legal Advisor Office of the President, Assembly of Kosovo Pristina 13 December 2011 
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Former SRSG of UNMIK Phone Interview   21 December 2012 
 
UNMIK Legal Advisor (1) UNMIK HQs   Pristina 15 April 2013 
 
UNMIK Legal Advisor (2) UNMIK HQS   Pristina 15 April 2013 
 
UN Legal Advisor UNDP Office   Pristina 25 July 2013 
 
UNMIK Legal Advisor (3) UNMIK HQs   Pristina 31 July 2013 
 
Political Advisor UN Development Coordinator’s Office Pristina 31 July 2013 
 
 
OSCE	
 
Legal Advisor   OSCE Mission, Legal System Monitoring Unit Pristina 30 July 2013 
 
Political Advisor OSCE Mission, Program Office  Pristina  3 August 2013 
	
 
DFID	
 
Deputy Program Director DFID   Pristina  19 November 2011 
	
US		
 
Program Director USAID    Pristina 17 February 2012 
 
Police Advisor  ICITAP US Embassy  Pristina 30 July 2013 
 
Program Manager  ICITAP US Embassy  Pristina 31 July 2013 
 
Legal Advisor   ICITAP US Embassy  Pristina 31 July 2013 
 
 
Kosovar	Judicial	Institutions	
 
Director  Kosovo Judicial Council Secretariat Pristina 22 November 2011 
 
Secretary-General  Kosovo’s Constitutional Court  Pristina 24 January 2012 
 
Kosovo-Albanian Prosecutor  Office of the Chief Prosecutor, Corruption Unit Pristina 10 February 2012 
 
International Legal Advisor Kosovo’s Constitutional Court  Pristina 16 February 2012 
 
Kosovo-Albanian Judge Kosovo’s Constitutional Court  Pristina 17 February 2012 
 
President of Supreme Court Kosovo’s Supreme Court  Pristina  22 February 2012 
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Members	of	Parliament	
 
Member of Parliament (1) Assembly of Kosovo  Pristina 5 December 2011 
 
Member of Parliament (2) Assembly of Kosovo  Pristina 15 December 2011 
 
Former Minister of Justice Assembly of Kosovo  Pristina 2 August 2013 
 
 
International	NGOs	
 
Director  European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI) Pristina 5 December 2011 
 
Program Assistant National Democratic Institute (NDI) Pristina 5 December 2011 
 
Program Director National Center for State Courts (NCSC) Pristina 29 July 2013 
 
 
Kosovar	NGOs	and	Other	Institutions	
 
Legal Advisor  Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Pristina 5 November 2011 
 
Legal Advisor  Effective ROL Program, Checchi Consulting Pristina 23 November 2011 
 
Researcher   FOL Lëvizja   Pristina 29 November 2011 
 
Journalist  Zëri Gazeta   Pristina 29 November 2011 
 
Director  Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI) Pristina 30 November 2011 
 
Director  COHU for Anti-Corruption  Pristina  30 November 2011 
 
Researcher (1)  Think Tank Legal Political Studies Pristina 2 December 2011 
 
Researcher (2)  Think Tank Legal Political Studies Pristina 2 December 2011 
 
Kosovo-Albanian Lawyer East West Management Institute Inc Pristina 2 December 2011 
 
President  The Union of Independent Trade Unions Pristina 29 April 2013 
 
Professor of Law University of Pristina  Pristina 23 July 2013 
 
Senior Researcher  Kosovo Center for Security Studies Pristina 29 July 2013 
 
 
BRUSSELS:	
 
European	External	Action	Service	
 
Advisor (1)  Western Balkans Unit, EEAS  Brussels 11 June 2012 
 
Advisor (2)  Western Balkans Unit, EEAS  Brussels 11 June 2012 
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EULEX Justice Expert EU External Action Service (EEAS) Brussels 21 June 2012 
 
EEAS Advisor  Crisis Management and Planning Directorate Brussels 12 June 2012 
 
Press Officer  European External Action Service Brussels  12 June 2012 
 
National Advisor PermRep to the EU, in charge of EEAS/CSDP Brussels 12 March 2014 
 
Advisor (1)  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity Brussels 13 March 2014  
 
Advisor (2)  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity Brussels 17 March 2014 
 
Advisor (3)  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity Brussels 18 March 2014 
 
Advisor (4)  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity Brussels 2 May 2014 
 
 
European	Commission,	DG	Enlargement	
 
Deputy Head (1) Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement   Brussels 13 June 2012 
 
Advisor (1)  ROL Desk, Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement Brussels 13 June 2012 
 
Advisor (2)  ROL Desk, Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement Brussels 13 June 2012 
 
Deputy Head (2) Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement   Brussels 13 March 2014 
 
Advisor (3)  ROL Desk, Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement Brussels 17 March 2014 
 
Former EULEX Legal Advisor European Commission  Brussels 27 March 2014 
 
National Advisor Kosovo’s Embassy, EC liaison  Brussels 12 March 2014 
	
Use	of	Data	in	Each	Step		
Fields:		
 
• Participant observation in the final negotiations on the amendments of Kosovo’s constitution 
• UN reports, UNGA resolutions, secondary literature on the UN and the rule of law 
• EU Summit Conclusions, secondary literature on the establishment of the EEAS 
• Interviews conducted in Brussels in the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
• Interviews conducted in Brussels in the DG Enlargement, the European Commission 
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Boundaries:	
 
• UN resolutions and UNMIK regulations 
• UN Secretary-General reports on UNMIK 
• Secondary literature on UNMIK 
• Reports on UNMIK issued by Kosovo’s Ombudsperson 
• Interviews with present and former staff of UNMIK 
• Decisions by the Constitutional Court 
• Interviews with EULEX staff in Kosovo and Brussels 
• European Commission progress reports and other reports 
• Interviews with ECLO officials in Kosovo 
• OSCE reports and interviews with OSCE mission staff in Brussels 
• Interview with representatives of US programs in Kosovo 
 
Practices:		
 
• Participant observations during case hearings 
• EULEX progress reports, program reports, press material 
• Interviews with EULEX judges and prosecutors 
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PART	THREE:	TRANSLATING	-	THE	LANGUAGES	OF	LAW	
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INTERLUDE:	FIELDS	
 
Setting:	Final	Round	of	Negotiating	the	Amendments	to	Kosovo’s	Constitution	
Parliamentary	Committee	on	Amending	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Kosovo	
16-17	December	2011,	somewhere	outside	of	Prizren	
 
[The following text is an excerpt from my field notes taken during my observation of the final 
negotiations of amending Kosovo’s constitution during two days in a hotel outside of Prizren. The 
field notes were finalized upon my return to Pristina. I have added explanatory notes in square 
brackets through the text and three notes by the end of the text to explain particular references] 
 
 “At eight in the morning Friday (December 16) outside the Assembly I met with the 
nine parliamentarian members who were participating in the last round of negotiating the final 
amendments of Kosovo’s constitution. We took a minibus to the hotel where the negotiations were 
held two hours drive south of Pristina in the mountains outside of Prizren. We were the only 
guests in the hotel. During two days the Committee on Amending the Constitution was negotiating 
the final amendments. There were two members from each of the largest parties, PDK and LDK, 
and one member from VV, AK, and KKR as well as one representative of the Serb list and one 
from the Bosniak party. Two senior legal advisors from the legislation unit in the Assembly, a 
secretary to the committee and the Secretary-General of the Constitutional Court were there, too. 
And then several international legal advisors. There were two international advisors from the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI). According to its webpage ‘NDI was created in 1983 as one 
of the four core institutes of the National Endowment for Democracy, which was established by 
[the US] Congress in that year to act as a grant-making foundation, distributing funds to private 
organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad’ and: ‘Founded as a political party 
institute, NDI maintains a loose affiliation with the U.S. Democratic Party’54. In Kosovo, its work 
is funded by the USAID. There was also a legal advisor from ECLO [the European Commission’s 
Liaison Office] and one from the ICO [the International Civilian Office that oversees Kosovo’s 
compliance with the *Ahtisaari Plan]. And a legal advisor from the International Foundation for 
                                                
54 National Democratic Institute (NDI), webpage on ’About NDI’: 
https://www.ndi.org/about_ndi?page=0,0 
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Electoral Systems (IFES). IFES is also a US-founded NGO and receives funding for its work in 
supporting and developing the CEC [Kosovo’s Central Election Commission] from the USAID, 
too. Two interpreters translated simultaneously the negotiations that were done in part English, 
part Albanian into English and Serbian. At the end of the small round table, member of parliament 
and professor in constitutional law, Arsim Bajrami, led the negotiations. On his right side, also 
sitting at the end of the table, was a US district court judge from Minnesota – Judge Tunheim – 
who I haven’t heard about before. In his bio published by the district court in Minnesota it says: 
‘Judge Tunheim has invested a significant amount of time in international rule of law 
development. His early work in Kosovo helped the United Nations to re-establish and improve the 
legal system, and ultimately, to restructure the entire judiciary. In 2007-2008 [in the context of 
preparing Kosovo’s UDI in February 2008 and the new constitution that came into effect the 
following June] he worked as the principal outside advisor to the process that developed the 
Kosovo Constitution, including training the constitutional commission, negotiating the final 
compromises and drafting provisions that established the judicial system, the constitutional court 
and the intelligence and security sectors. Judge Tunheim has also been instrumental in the 
restructuring of criminal law and procedure in Kosovo, drafting commentary to the new procedure 
code, and developing a new law that enables negotiated guilty pleas and cooperating defendants. 
He also developed the highly successful plan to recruit American judges to serve as international 
judges in Kosovo and he has helped develop cooperative agreements between American schools 
and the University of Pristina Law School’55. I found an article he wrote in 2009 on the rule of law 
and Kosovo’s constitution, which was published in the Minnesota Journal of International Law. In 
the article he describes how he was ‘helping the UN administration try to figure out how to 
quickly establish a functioning legal system from the post-crisis vacuum’ (vacuum!). He writes 
that ‘I am especially proud of the many Minnesota state court judges and prosecutors who have 
served in the legal system in Kosovo’. He also describes how he through the assistance of the 
USAID was advising the first constitution-making process in the context of the UDI. Here, it is 
interesting: ‘The first goal was to draft a document that would be broadly acceptable to the people 
of Kosovo – a document that not only “belonged” to Kosovo, but also was acceptable and 
impressive to the rest of the world. The second goal was to provide a constitution that would help 
ensure broad international acceptance of the new country and quick recognition of Kosovo’s 
                                                
55 United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Judge John R. Tunheim, ‘Biographical 
Material’; available online at: www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2871  
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independence’56. Back in the conference room in the hotel, the constitution and its provisions that 
are negotiated are projected on a white wall. During the talks, the senior legal advisors from the 
Assembly take turns in writing the different suggestions into the text of the constitution that are 
displayed to everyone on the back wall. The final amendments that were negotiated during the last 
two days were all related to the powers of the President. The committee was in particular 
discussing art. 85 that concerns the President’s citizenship. In Kosovo’s constitution, citizens of 
Kosovo are allowed to have a dual citizenship. Now, during the negotiations, the issue was quite 
contested as the majority of the parliamentarians were concerned that if the President has a dual 
citizenship, too, would she or he be fully committed to only one state, that is, the state of Kosovo? 
It was argued that the oath of the president could be changed in order to stress the loyalty of the 
President towards the state. Bajrami, the chairman of the Committee, said that they could lean on 
the opinion of the Venice Commission. Tunheim said he would have a look at the oath of the 
President the same evening. He came back next morning with a new draft of the oath in which the 
loyalty towards the state was even more pronounced. Everyone was happy. The next difficult 
article (art. 90) was the one on the replacement of the President in case of, for instance, sickness or 
kidnapping. This article foresees a temporarily replacement of power, but the difficult issue is who 
has the ultimate authority to judge that the President will not be able to assume her powers? 
Bajrami stressed that ‘some constitutional norms have to bear in mind the political and cultural 
level, meaning the reality of the political culture in Kosovo’. The discussion was especially 
centered on art. 90b on the involvement of another institution than the Assembly, such as the 
Constitutional Court, in judging when the President cannot fulfill his or her obligations. In the 
initial draft, it was noted that a medical team would have this power when the reason why the 
President could not fulfill his or her obligations was due to sickness. Several of the members of 
the Committee stressed that this could easily be abused, considering the level of corruption and 
abuse of power in Kosovo. Originally, the Constitutional Court would only have the power to 
judge whether the President was capable or not to assume powers after a certain time of her or his 
absence. Some of the negotiators said that the involvement of the Constitutional Court earlier in 
this process together with the Assembly would be in line with the example of Macedonia’s 
constitution and therefore ok. The parliamentarians who were against thought that this would 
mean that the role of Constitutional Court would be strengthened, which they didn’t think was a 
good idea at all. It was also discussed who had the power to say that the President could not fulfill 
                                                
56 Judge John R. Tunheim (2009) Rule of Law and the Kosovo Constitution. Minnesota Journal of 
International Law 18 (2): 371-379 
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her or his position after another force majeure than sickness, such as coma. The example of the 
first President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, who was kidnapped by Serbian 
forces during 24 hours in 1992, was used as an example of a force majeure. Again, the question 
would pop up: who has ultimately the final say? Moreover, it was not really clear who had the 
final word between Bajrami and Tunheim. In the evening we had dinner. I was sitting next to one 
of the NDI advisors. He had just arrived to Kosovo after having worked for the NDI in Liberia. I 
mentioned the report ‘trust me I am an international’ and its description of all the corruption 
scandals that had been among UNMIK officials, the *‘Mr 10 %’s’. He told me it had been much 
worse in Liberia with the UN mission there. I took the bus with the parliamentarians back to 
Pristina Saturday afternoon after the end of the negotiations. On the way, we stopped by a small 
tavern in the middle of nowhere in the mountains to have a coffee and a rakia. They told me 
stories from back in the 1990s where they had either themselves or their friends been political 
prisoners or worked for *Rugova.   
 
* The Ahtisaari Plan is the short term for the ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement’. It is an agreement that was formulated and adopted in 2007 to address the issue of 
Kosovo’s status after having been under UN administration since June 1999. The agreement lays 
out a range of constitutional provisions that should be adopted in Kosovo’s final constitution after 
the unilaterally declared independence (UDI) and provides for an international civilian and 
military presence following the declaration of independence – what has been referred to as a 
‘supervised independence’. An International Civil Representative (ICR) under the guidance of an 
International Steering Group (composed of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK, the US, the 
EU, and NATO) would be in charge of the civilian oversight of the implementation of the 
proposal through the support of the ICO.  
 
* The ‘Mr 10 %’s’ is a term that the media and international actors in Kosovo have granted some 
of the UNMIK administrators who overlooked the major tenders and contracts – such as Pristina 
airport and Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) – after the end of the conflict and who allegedly 
took such a percentage from these contracts. 
 
* Ibrahim Rugova was a Kosovo-Albanian politician, leader of the non-violent movement 
opposing the Serbian regime (Kosovo’s ‘Gandhi’) in the 1990s and the first President of Kosovo 
when UNMIK established a supervised Assembly, a Government and a Presidency in 2002.   
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Chapter	5 
FLUID	FIELDS:	IMAGINING	THE	RULE	OF	LAW,	INVENTING	EXPERTISE	
Introduction:	Transnationalizing	the	Rule	of	Law	
 
  My venue into reconstructing the role of the rule of law and legal expertise in global 
governance is located in a place far way from traditional sites of international law and politics, that 
is, in a hotel in the mountains two hours drive from Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. There were in 
particular three things that I noted during my observation of the final negotiations of the 
constitutional amendments. The presence of almost the same amount of external actors as 
domestic actors tells us something about how the rule of law, in general, and constitution-making, 
in particular, has become a concern to the ‘international community’. The presence of two US-
funded NGOs and a judge from the district court of Minnesota tells us even more about how rule 
of law promotion has become not only a concern to international and regional organizations but to 
a host of different actors, such as, NGOs and individual states. Furthermore, the chairman of the 
committee’s need to stress that ‘some norms have to bear in mind […] the reality of the political 
culture in Kosovo’ reveals that this is often not the case. As noted by Judge Tunheim in the paper 
he published in 2009, the primary goal in the process of drafting Kosovo’s constitution in the 
event of the UDI was to make it ‘acceptable and impressive to the rest of the world’. Finally, 
though the very wordings of an oath do not have great distributional consequences for a country’s 
population, it is still telling that the oath of Kosovo’s President today was written by a US judge 
(especially in the light of the importance Americans attach to the symbolic value of the oath of the 
US President). 
 Combined these observations reflect the extent to which the rule of law has become 
internationalized or, rather, transnationalized and how the boundary between international law and 
constitutional law in the context of rule of law promotion has become contested, as a result. In the 
context of constitution-making, it has been noted that this transnationationalization of the rule of 
law has resulted in a ‘constitutional technicity’ where ‘[t]he discourse of constitution-making now 
commonly employs the neoliberal terminology of “stakeholders”, “clients”, and “best practices”, 
suggesting that the relationship between citizens and states can benefit from a market of experts’ 
(Kendall 2013, 2). The intervention of external actors in constitution-making processes has 
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become one of ‘imposed constitutionalism’ (Chesterman 2005) and the constituent power has 
become ‘internationalized’ and granted ‘two faces’: one that is turned to the inside and one turned 
to the outside (Riegner 2010). Indeed, the external intervention in constitution-making in Kosovo 
might constitute an exception given that Kosovo was under UN administration for almost nine 
years and its statehood after its unilaterally declared independence in 2008 is still contested. Yet, 
in the period from 1989 to 2011, the UN Security Council authorized UN peace missions in 
twelve states to assist in drafting their constitutions (Sripati 2012, 93). In a 2014 UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) policy framework for constitution-making, it was noted that ‘constitutions 
are central to progress on sustainable human development’ why UNDP would have an important 
role in constitution-making, too.57 Moreover, in a ‘guidance note’ by the UN Secretary-General in 
2009, it was stressed that ‘[c]onstitution-making processes are a central aspect of democratic 
transitions, peacebuilding and state-building [and] can also play a critical prevention role’58. 
Indeed, the fact that the constitution of the BiH was an annex to the Dayton Peace Agreement 
demonstrates the extent to which a constitution has become a tool of conflict resolution and 
prevention, too. The situation in the interlude reflects where the story I will outline in this chapter 
ends. Over a relatively short period of time, international actors have turned the rule of law into a 
problem to be addressed by the ‘international community’. It is this conceptual history of the rule 
of law that is of concern to the chapter.  
 In three steps, I reconstruct how the rule of law was discursively constructed in UN 
and EU reports and statements to authorize and justify the intervention of international experts in 
rule of law reforms in post-conflict or transitional states. Doing so, I show that the recourse to a 
constitutional language in global governance has resulted in a growing fragmentation of 
international expertise being dispersed across multiple institutional sites within international 
organizations (IOs). To demonstrate this point, I follow the concept of the rule of law through UN 
and EU intervention discourses and identify the expertise that has been authorized along its 
discursive trajectory. Doing so, I map out the semantic fields constructed around the enactment of 
the rule of law. The analysis in this chapter provides the discursive context for reconstructing 
practices of translating the rule of law, which are of concern to the following two chapters of the 
                                                
57 United Nations Development Programme, ’UNDP Guidance Note on Constitution-Making 
Support’, 2014, at 3  
58 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, ’United Nations Assistance to 
Constitution-Making Processes’, April 2009, at 3  
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thesis. The interludes thus reflects a concrete situation that has resulted from the turn to the rule of 
law within IOs, such as the UN and the EU. 
 In the first part, I briefly outline past practices of external interventions in 
constructing the rule of law in a domestic context. I engage with two periods in this regard, that is, 
colonial practices of transferring Western legal institutions and rules to colonized societies and the 
emergence of a law and development movement following the end of the Second World War and 
its upshot in the 1980s in the context of the Washington consensus. In the second and third parts, I 
follow the rule of law through UN and EU intervention discourses, respectively, to identify the 
different meanings inscribed into the concept and what expertise has been identified in so doing. I 
show that the rule of law in these discourses was identified with the establishment of order, yet 
two different meanings would be inscribed into this concept. In UN discourses the rule of law was 
primarily and broadly identified as a potential for peace and thus a means for broad peacebuilding 
mandates. In EU discourses the rule of law was identified more narrowly as a matter of law 
enforcement and the role of the police and the deployment of police missions was thus stressed. 
Moreover, the construction of a semantic field around the rule of law in UN discourses served as a 
policy and conceptual framework to rationalize and theorize already existing practices, whereas its 
emergence into EU intervention discourses became constructive in creating institutions and 
expertise to promote the rule of law through EU external relations.  
  
Past	Practices	of	Promoting	the	Rule	of	Law		
 
The	Rule	of	Law’s	Colonial	Past	
 
  Indeed, to promote the rule of law ‘abroad’ is not an entirely new phenomenon. The 
export of legal norms and institutions was an important part of colonial rule and international law 
provided the basis for this ‘injection’ of Western legalism into ‘uncivilized’ and ‘primitive’ 
countries, which were perceived as legal terrae nullius. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, 
which was aimed at addressing conflicting claims among European powers over territories of the 
African continent and the resulting Berlin Act of 1885 are commonly referred to as the 
constitutive moment of the colonization of Africa by European powers (see Pakenham 1991). The 
idea of the universality of international law, Anghie (2005) argues, is closely tight to the imperial 
expansion of Western European powers in the late 19th century (see also Craven 2007; 
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Koskenniemi 2001). As a result, European international law was extended to non-European 
peoples and societies, who were assimilated into a legal system that built on European ideas and 
experience (Anghie 2005, 33). In fact, many of the legal systems that are subject to rule of law 
promotion policies today were built by colonial authorities (Humphreys 2010, 17).  
 The General Acts of Berlin and Brussels granted the colonial powers extended 
prerogatives and they therefore ‘initially viewed their competence to legislate within the colonies 
as essentially unbounded’ (Humphreys 2012, 484). Existing legal institutions – for instance the 
role of local chiefs and native courts – were refurbished to fit ideas of legality held by the colonial 
power, where law was understood as being rational and impersonal, as opposed to unruly local 
customary law. According to Frederick Lugard (1858-1945), who was a British colonial 
administrator: ‘[I]f our aim be to raise the mass of the people of Africa to higher plane of 
civilization […] there are few [matters] of greater importance than the constitution of the native 
courts […] [I]t is only by the patient training of such a court that better tribunals can be evolved 
and real progress achieved. The close supervision of such a court, and the personal education of its 
members, will involve more labour and personal effort than direct administration, but it is surely 
worth the effort [if] the native courts are to become an integral part of the machinery of 
Government’ (Lugard (1926), quoted in Humphreys 2010, 115). Indeed, as I will show in the last 
chapter of the thesis, this approach to local legal institutions bears many similarities to how 
international actors have justified their involvement in reconstructing the judicial system in 
Kosovo to enhance ‘access to justice’ and ‘promote the rule of law’.   
 Colonial interventions in the late 19th century in Africa were driven by particular 
political beliefs such as governance, humanitarianism (for instance, the abolition of slave trade), 
development and free trade that were to be achieved by legal means (Humphreys 2012, 110-118). 
Indeed, as noted by Humphreys (2010), ‘the explicit objectives of colonial legal intervention are 
remarkably consonant with those currently put forward to explain and motivate [contemporary] 
rule of law reforms’ (17). However, in the colonial context, legal transplants were used for two 
ends: as a social control and to further the civilizing mission. Indeed, ‘[t]he claim to have brought 
a civilizing law and order has been an important part of the justification of colonialism’ (Chanock 
1992, 280). Or, as Simpson notes, ‘it was part of the ideology of the Colonial Office that the 
extension of liberty and the rule of law was what the colonial system was all about’ (Simpson 
2001, 295). The import of Western law would influence all spheres of society in the colonial 
context. Martial practices, for instance, would be subject to colonial law that would criminalize 
polygamy following the conception of its uncivilized nature. But also criminal law reforms as 
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entire bodies of criminal law of Western powers were transferred across the African continent. 
Law was therefore not responsive to the social and political realities in colonized societies but to a 
high degree constitutive of these realities. The rule of law became effectively the rule through law 
and colonial territories became what Humphreys (2012) refers to as ‘laboratories of statehood’ 
(475). 
 During colonialism, the ‘dynamic of difference’ that underpinned the way in which 
colonial empires imposed their policies in colonized territories paved the way for jurists using 
positivism and formalism to enact a gap between the European civilized world and the uncivilized, 
which they then sought to bridge through devising a series of legal techniques (Anghie 2005, 37). 
Indeed, here it is important to note that the emergence of liberal thought and ideas among British 
scholars and writers coincided with the colonial project (see Mehta 1999). John Stuart Mill, for 
example, who worked for the East India Company for 35 years and whose major work was the 
History of British India (Mehta 1999, 6), wrote: ‘[N]ations which are still barbarous have not got 
beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered 
and held in subjection by foreigners’ (Mill, quoted in Chimni 2012, 300). As stated by a French 
colonial administrator, Adolphe Messimy (1869-1935): ‘We must make countries out of these 
empty spaces, we must make nations out of these agglomerations of half-civilized or barbarian 
people, we must organise new states, give them traditions, morals, a political and social 
organisation’ (Messimy, quoted in Humphreys 2010, 119). To this end, extending the rule of law 
to all spheres of society and rendering the colonized a subject of a modernizing and rational – 
Western - law became one of the goals for colonial administrations. However, with these 
administrations effectively placed beyond law’s rule.  
 
The	Rule	of	Law	and	Development	
 
 Whereas the colonial enterprise had been concerned with the ends law could serve in 
the civilizing mission, the emergence of field of rule of law promotion in the mid-20th century 
evolved around the relationship between law and economic development. Following the end of the 
Second World War, international development agencies became increasingly concerned with 
reforming legal systems (Trubek and Santos 2006, 1). This turn to law and development became 
the precursor for international development policies in the 1980s that approached law as a 
regulative framework for market activities. However, in this early variant of rule of law promotion 
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that saw the day in the beginning of the 1950s, it was law as a tool for state intervention that was 
of interest (Trubek and Santos 2006, 1-2). Contra the development policies that followed from the 
Washington consensus, the state was an important actor in a regulated market economy and thus 
in economic development through, for instance, state ownership and import-substitution 
industralization. In this emerging development field, the belief in the importance of law for 
macroeconomic reforms and control guided a small amount of legal development projects around 
the world (Trubek and Santos 2006, 2), especially in Latin America.  
 The focus of this development policy was in particular centered on the legal 
profession, which needed to be ‘modernized’ and ‘de-formalized’. A modernized legal profession 
would result in a modern state bureaucracy that could make better laws and regulations to create 
the formal structures for regulating the economy. The improvement of legal education was 
therefore identified as a policy goal. Similar to Ernst B. Haas’ (1964) conception of lawyers as 
functional, technical experts, ‘[t]he L&D movement cherished a vision of lawyers as pragmatic, 
instrumental problem-solvers who would facilitate state-led economic development’ (Trubek 
2006, 75). This instrumental and functional conception of lawyers espoused by the law and 
development movement ran parallel with the development of the New Haven School at Yale and 
its policy-oriented, pragmatic perception of international law. At the same time, research on law 
and society gained interest in academia in the beginning of the 1960s and in 1964 the Law and 
Society Association was founded. The forerunners in this early field of rule of law promotion were 
‘a small band of liberal lawyers’, who worked in development agencies and US and European law 
departments (Trubek 2006, 75). The so-called ‘law and development movement’ would have its 
heydays up through the 1950s and 1960s until the mid-1970s where legal scholars raised the 
question if the movement was facing a ‘death of a field’, especially as the educational reforms did 
not yield the expected outcomes (Merryman 1977, 460; see also Trubek and Galanter 1974).   
 Whereas law had still been at the margins of international development policies in 
the 1950s up through the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘rule of law’ came to take the center stage of the 
development agenda in the 1980s. In the context of the growth in international trade in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the globalization of domestic legal fields and the Washington Consensus, the 
relationship between the rule of law and development took on another meaning. Now, the state 
was largely absent and the rule of law was understood primarily as an instrument of the market. 
According to the World Bank: ‘[E]conomic processes underway in most of the world have 
transformed the national settings and the potential role of law. Economies are more open, foreign 
investment has become more welcome, and the state is no longer expected to be the dominant 
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actor in economic development and poverty reduction’59. Law’s rule became largely a tool for 
implementing economic theories espoused by neoliberal agents, such as the World Bank (Glinavos 
2008). Inspired by the writings of Douglass North, among other economists, on ‘new institutional 
economics’, ‘[e]conomic literature’, according to the World Bank, ‘increasingly recognizes the 
importance of the rule of law and legal systems in the promotion of market-based economic 
growth and poverty reduction’ 60 . Through rankings and indices, such as the ‘Worldwide 
Governance Indicators’, the World Bank annually reports on the ‘rule of law’ (as one among six 
governance indicators) to measure the quality of governance across the world following its belief 
in a strong correlate between the presence of the rule of law and economic development:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: The World Bank, ’Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions’, at 16 
 
 The focus on the state as a market actor and the anti-formalism of the early law and 
development movement was replaced by the belief that the rule of law should guard against the 
arbitrary interference of state actors and law was now perceived in Hayekian terms: the 
formalization of titles and contract rights were essential to development. To this end, the rule of 
law should ensure the rights of the private investor, which is why stable judicial systems also 
became a concern for rule of law promotion and reflected in the meaning inscribed into ‘good 
governance’. Whereas the law and development movement had primarily addressed legal 
education, now rule of law promotion would extent to all spheres of society and its legal system, 
                                                
59 The World Bank, Legal Vice Presidency, ’Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions’, 
January 2003, at 10 
60 Ibid., at 15 
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for instance, the administration of justice. Not only international development donors would be 
involved in rule of law reforms targeting economic development, good governance and democracy 
promotion, but also a host of public and semi-public multilateral and bilateral actors, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN, the USAID and global law firms, to name a few. 
Moreover, following its spread into various societal spheres as well as across policy agendas of 
different and dispersed international donors, its meaning became extended to not only 
encompassing economic and legal development. To give an example, according to the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘the rule of law does not mean 
merely a formal legality which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and 
enforcement of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the 
supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for 
their full expression’61. In the following section, I will turn to how the rule of law also became a 
concern for peacebuilding and conflicting prevention within the organization of the UN. 
 
The	Rule	of	Law	as	a	Potential	for	Peace	
 
The	Promise	and	Perils	of	the	Rule	of	Law	
 
 In UN discourses, the meaning inscribed into the rule of law has evolved around its 
potential for stable political order and peace, which has resulted in its uptake in practically all UN 
agencies and programs. The entry of the ‘rule of law’ into UN discourses follows the expansion of 
the UN’s role in a decolonized, post-Cold War world and the UN’s rereading of its founding 
Charter, which found expression in the UN Secretary-General’s, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, pivotal 
report in 1992 entitled ‘An Agenda for Peace’. The report was the first important statement on the 
UN’s renewed role in peacebuilding and conflict prevention and the discursive construction of the 
rule of law in subsequent UN reports and declarations would follow the connection the report 
made between rule of law and peace. In the report and a supplement issued a couple of years later 
it was emphasized that ‘[t]here is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as 
the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and 
                                                
61 Document of the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
CSCW 3, Art. 1 (2) (emphasis added) 
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security in any new and stable political order’62. Now, it was stressed, ‘international intervention 
must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national 
reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government’63. The rule of law was effectively 
narrated as the prerequisite for ‘true’ peace, political stability and, importantly, order.  
 The Agenda for Peace reflected a renewed and more encompassing understanding of 
peace and security, which contradicted the way in which the UN Charter had previously and more 
narrowly been interpreted (Gazzini 2005; Österdahl 1998). Article 2 (7) of the Charter states that 
the UN is not authorized to ‘intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State’. However, the non-intervention principle is challenged when a situation 
constitutes a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’64. According to Article 
39 of the Charter, the Security Council is authorized to ‘determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and the measures to be taken ‘to maintain or 
restore international peace and security’. Now, the emphasis given to the conditions of the 
possibility of peace – rather than merely peace as an end in itself – would justify a new and more 
interventionist role to be played by the UN and the Security Council. This new interventionism, 
according to the supplement to the Agenda for Peace, was triggered by ‘a new breed of intra-state 
conflicts’ that presented the UN ‘with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the 
early 1960s’65. 
 The Agenda for Peace was a response to the conclusions of a historical meeting in 
the Security Council where its members had discussed the Council’s role in a new security 
context. In the conclusions the Security Council agreed that ‘[t]he absence of war and military 
conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-
military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have 
                                                
62 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping (Report of the 
Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security 
Council on 31 January 1992), UN Doc A/47/277-S/24111 (17 June 1992), at para. 59 (emphasis 
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become threats to peace and security’66. For this reason, in the words of the then Secretary-
General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali: ‘U.N. operations now may involve nothing less than 
the reconstruction of an entire society and state’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 115). In a report from 2004 
by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, this new security paradigm was 
further explained: ‘Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances 
and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international 
security’67. 
 At the turn of the millennium, the rule of law had moved to the fore of UN peace-
building policies. Now, whilst the ‘rule of law’ appears nowhere in the UN Charter, it was 
mentioned 18 times in a pivotal UN report from 2000 on reforming the Organization’s 
peacekeeping activities, commonly referred to as the Brahimi report. However, the ‘rule of law’ 
did find expression in the 1970 UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in which it was noted in the 
preamble that the adoption of the declaration would contribute to ‘promoting the rule of law 
amongst nations’68. Still, it was only with the Brahimi report that the rule of law was turned into a 
real policy issue and thereby a problem to be addressed by the UN and a particular expertise to 
promote the rule of law was identified to this end. Whereas in the Agenda for Peace, it had been 
suggested that the UN’s conflict prevention policies should address the immediate roots of a 
conflict to prevent its escalation, this new review of UN peacebuilding activities would suggest a 
more long-term and structural approach to conflict prevention. The report stressed that ‘a doctrinal 
shift is required in how the Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace 
operations, as well as the need for an adequately resourced team approach to upholding the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, through judicial, penal, human rights and policing experts 
working together in a coordinated and collegial manner’69. This emphasis on the role of civilian 
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expertise would spill over in a string of subsequent UN documents – resolutions and reports – 
devoted to the rule of law. 
 The Brahimi report was published a year into the mandates of the UN’s international 
transitional administrations (ITAs) in Kosovo and East Timor, where the UN had assumed 
extended executive, legal and judicial powers. In fact, given the immense powers of the UN in 
these two countries, the report raised the question as to ‘whether the United Nations should be in 
this business at all’70. Though the report recognized that there was some ‘ambivalence’ among UN 
member states about these missions, it stressed that it was not unlikely that the UN would take up 
such an expansive executive role again in the future.71 The two missions were not described as an 
exception, but rather as the beginning of a new UN peacebuilding era. It was therefore stressed 
that the UN Secretariat – given the speedy manner in which the two ITAs had been prepared and 
the limited expertise in the DPKO in taking up such a peacebuilding activity – should begin 
identifying the right expertise for similar missions if they were to become ‘the rule rather than the 
exception’72. What is more, the problem of a seemingly ‘legal vacuum’ reigning in post-conflict 
societies was raised in the Brahimi report. ‘[T]here is a pressing issue in transitional civil 
administration that must be addressed’, it emphasized, ‘and that is the issue of the “applicable 
law”. In the two locales [Kosovo and East Timor] where United Nations operations now have law 
enforcement responsibility, local judicial and legal capacity was found to be non-existent, out of 
practice or subject to intimidation by armed elements. Moreover, in both places, the law and legal 
systems prevailing prior to the conflict were questioned or rejected by key groups considered to be 
the victims of the conflicts’73. This situation, according to the report, was hampered by – or in fact 
the result of - the ‘learning process’ among UN actors deployed in such missions, which due to 
‘[d]ifferences in language, culture, custom and experience’74 was slow and could easily take up to 
six months. ‘The United Nations currently has no answer to the question of what such an 
operation should do while its law and order team inches up such a learning curve’, the report 
deplored.75 For that reason, it was suggested that the tasks of these missions would ‘have been 
much easier’ if there was a common UN ‘justice package’ constituted by ‘an interim legal code to 
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which mission personnel could have been pre-trained’76. In Kosovo and East Timor, the report 
asserted, ‘[p]owerful local political factions can and have taken advantage of the learning period to 
set up their own parallel administrations, and crime syndicates gladly exploit whatever legal or 
enforcement vacuums they can find’77.  
 Here it has to be noted that this UN concern with the rule of law and internal 
political and legal matters of post-conflict or ‘fragile’ states developed in parallel with NATO’s 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and the emergence of the norm of a responsibility to protect 
(RtoP). A year after the Brahimi report, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
sovereignty (ICISS) was established and mandated by the Canadian government to discuss the 
implications of the ‘so-called “right of humanitarian intervention”78. The commission consisted of 
twelve members, who included Klaus Naumann, a general and chairman of NATO’s Military 
Committee during the bombing campaign in Kosovo, and several scholars79, among those Michael 
Ignatieff, who had also been a member of the Kosovo commission in 1999. Indeed, the presence 
of these two actors demonstrates the extent to which Kosovo constituted a pivotal moment in 
reformulating international law and politics. The ICISS infamously concluded that ‘sovereign 
states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass 
murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states’80, which would encompass ‘not 
only the responsibility to react, but the responsibility to prevent, and the responsibility to 
rebuild’81. Indeed, the emergence of the RtoP norm did not only testify to a new normative ground 
for international interventions, but also to how already existing practices of the UN, which had 
been developed in the 1950s, were rationalized, condensed and consolidated ‘into a coherent 
theoretical account of international authority’ (Orford 2011, 183). ‘[T]he significance of the 
responsibility to protect concept’, Orford (2011) argues, ‘lies not in its capacity to transform 
promise into practice, but rather in its capacity to transform practice into promise, or deeds into 
words’ (2). The ICISS 2001 report merely provided the discursive, normative foundations for a 
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practice of international executive rule that already existed in the early years of decolonization. 
During Dag Hammerskjöld’s tenure as UN Secretary-General, the UN had struggled – and failed - 
to justify the UN’s expanding exercise of executive power in the context of its mission in Congo 
by reference to minimalist principles of neutrality and impartiality. In fact, it seemed as 
Hammerskjöld had been quite at unease with taking on this executive role (Orford 2011, 47, 87-
90). Indeed, the unease about the UN assuming executive responsibility that had been raised by 
Hammerskjöld seems to have been brushed aside with the Brahimi report. 
 In September 2003, three years after the publication of the Brahimi report, the 
Security Council met to explicitly debate the role of the UN in promoting justice and the rule of 
law in post-conflict societies. The same year, a criminal law and judicial advisory unit had been 
set up within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which had been established in 
1992 in the context of the recommendations put forward in the Agenda for Peace. In his statement 
to the Security Council at the event of the meeting on justice and the rule of law, the Secretary-
General stressed that ‘[t]his Council has a heavy responsibility to promote justice and the rule of 
law in its efforts to maintain international peace and security. This applies both internationally and 
in rebuilding shattered societies’82. The statement was given less than a month after the UN had 
deployed a mission in Iraq to assist in rebuilding the state after the intervention. In his statement 
the Secretary-General noted that through its peacebuilding missions the UN had come to learn that 
‘the rule of law is not a luxury’83. For that reason, the UN had an important role in helping 
societies to achieve the rule of law and ‘[t]he task is not simply technically difficult. It is 
politically delicate’84. The political delicate part of this task, according to the Secretary-General, 
was to foster the political will among – not international but - local actors. Now, the engagement 
of the UN in rule of law reforms should follow ‘a comprehensive approach’ that would 
‘encompass the entire criminal justice chain – not just police, but lawyers, prosecutors, judges and 
prison officers – as well as many issues beyond the criminal justice chain’85. At that time, the UN 
had already established so-called hybrid courts in Kosovo and East Timor under the UN 
administration in which international prosecutors and judges were investigating and adjudicating 
in, in particular, war crimes cases.  
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 The following year, Secretary-General published a report on ‘the rule of law and 
transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’, which addressed the views that had been 
expressed during the meeting on the rule of law in the Security Council the previous year.86 In the 
report the Secretary-General noted that there had been ‘an increased focus by the United Nations 
on questions of transitional justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies’87. In 
the report, it was in particular stressed that ‘[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually 
exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives’ and that the UN therefore had an 
important role in ‘fill[ing] the rule of law vacuum evident in so many post-conflict countries’88, 
effectively reverberating the concern raised in the Brahimi report about the legal vacuums in 
Kosovo and East Timor. Still, it was emphasized, the role of the United Nations and the 
international community should be ‘solidarity, not substitution’ 89 . Moreover, the UN had 
undertaken an internal assessment of its expertise in rule of law promotion in 2002. One of the 
issues that were addressed had been the UN’s lack of knowledge of customary law (Benner et al. 
2011, 137). Now, the Secretary-General emphasized that due regard should not only be given to 
formal institutions but ‘must be given to indigenous and informal traditions for administering 
justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their often vital role and to do so in 
conformity with both international standards and local tradition’90.   
 Again, the lack and thereby expressed need to develop expertise within the field of 
the rule of law was stressed in the 2004 report. Following the Secretary-General’s statement that 
the UN should take on a comprehensive approach to rule of law reforms, the 2004 report lamented 
that the UN was still drawing on external expertise as the number of relevant experts within its 
own organization was ‘not adequate for the task at hand’.91 ‘To be sure, there are plenty of persons 
who are expert in the workings of their own legal system, their own legislation and their own 
language’, the report noted, ‘[s]uch expertise is, however, of limited value to our activities’92. It 
was therefore recommended that the UN should sought a – rather encompassing - mix of expertise 
that would imply not only knowledge of the UN, its norms and standards for the administration of 
justice, but also experience from a post-conflict setting and its legal framework, knowledge 
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deriving from ‘familiarity with the host-country culture, an approach that is inclusive of local 
counterparts, an ability to work in the language of the host country and familiarity with a variety 
of legal areas’93. Addressing the concern raised in the Brahimi report with the slow learning curve 
once international actors had been deployed in the field, the 2004 report recommended the set up 
of ‘a reliable international roster of individuals’ within UN auspices. Doing so, the UN could grant 
more resources to screen experts and provide them with pre-training prior to their deployment.94 
 
Constructing	a	Common	Language	
 
 At the time of the 2004 report’s publication, the UN had already been engaged in 
one way or another in rule of law reforms for a decade. The report was therefore an attempt to 
establish an overall policy framework for a variety of dispersed practices related to promoting the 
rule of law that were spread across UN agencies, programs and missions. The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR), for instance, had been mandated in 1993 to offer 
‘technical and financial assistance to national projects in reforming penal and correctional 
establishments, education and training of lawyers, judges and security forces in human rights, and 
any other sphere of activity relevant to the good functioning of the rule of law’95. In the period 
from 1994 to 2006 the UN had authorized more peacekeeping operations than it had done for the 
previous 35 years (O’Neill 2008, 93). In parallel to these operations, the UN had launched ‘field 
operations’ in El Salvador (1991), Haiti (1993) and Guatemala (1994), and a so-called UN 
Transitional Authority (UNTAC) in Cambodia from 1992 to 1993. Common for these missions 
was that they were all mandated to monitor and report on human rights. Though the ‘rule of law’ 
as a UN policy goal was not explicitly invoked in this context, these efforts soon directed the 
attention towards the judiciary, the police and other institutions related to the UN’s later concern 
with the rule of law (O’Neill 2008, 94). The Brahimi report in 2000 had therefore stressed that the 
future criminal law and judicial advisory unit within the DPKO should work closely with the 
OHCR and the UN Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC), also based in Vienna, which had been 
established in 1997 to address the issue of the rule of law and transnational crime. In 2001, a year 
after the Brahimi report, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) received a new mandate, 
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which was equally directed towards the rule of law. According to the mandate, ‘UNDP will 
leverage it trusted status as a development partner to assist […] countries [..] in the sensitive area 
of the rule of law [as] violent conflict often arises when respect for the rule of law breaks down’96. 
In its renewed mandate, the rule of law was effectively linked to the core purpose of the UNDP in 
rendering it the very precondition for sustainable development: ‘A society where the rule of law is 
absent will […] be prone to conflict and will lack the enabling environment […] for sustainable 
development and poverty eradication’97 
  Given these dispersed practices of rule of law promotion within the bureaucratic 
bounds of the UN, the purpose of the 2004 report on the rule of law was not only to provide a 
consolidated policy framework but also a common conceptual ground for UN practices. To this 
end, the report set out to specify what the rule of law ‘is’ in order to derive at a ‘common 
language’. It was emphasized under the heading ‘Articulating a common language of justice for 
the United Nations’ that ‘[c]oncepts such as “justice”, “the rule of law” and “transitional justice” 
[…] serve both to define our goals and to determine our methods. Yet, there is a multiplicity of 
definitions and understandings of such concepts, even among our closest partners in the field’98. 
For that reason, the report noted that to work together effectively in the field of promoting the rule 
of law ‘a common understanding of key concepts is essential’99. To this end, the Secretary-
General offered in the report a classic liberal definition of the ‘rule of law’: 
 
‘The “rule of law” is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers 
to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to 
ensure adherence to the principles of the supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency’100 
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 Indeed, the definition provided on the rule of law follows how the concept has 
traditionally been expressed among liberal thinkers, such as Dicey, Fallon and Hayek. For 
example, according to Dicey, British Professor of Law who provided in his book An Introduction 
to the Study of Law of the Constitution in 1888 one of the first modern attempts to define the rule 
of law, the rule of law means a government bound by law, equality before the law, and procedural 
predictably and efficient rulings (Dicey 1982 [1888]). In the report, the rule of law was further 
defined by identifying how it differed from neighboring concepts, such as, ‘justice’ and 
‘transitional justice’. Whereas the rule of law was identified as a principle of governance that 
entails specific measures to realize, justice was conceived of as an ideal in rather utilitarian terms: 
‘For the United Nations, “justice” is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and 
vindication of rights […] Justice implies regard for the rights of the accused, for the interests of 
victims and for the well-being of society at large’101. Justice, moreover, ‘is a concept rooted in all 
national cultures and traditions’102 The distinction seems to imply that the rule of law is more 
pragmatic, as opposed to an ideal, and thereby realizable through concrete measures and 
institutional policies. ‘Transitional justice’, in turn, would refer to the past in a particular context 
in ‘compris[ing] the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to 
come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses’, mechanisms that can both be judicial and 
non-judicial.103  
 At the UN World Summit in 2005, the rule of law gained an even more prominent 
place in UN policies and practices. The General Assembly identified the rule of law as one of four 
core values the organization should pursue (the three other values being development, peace and 
collective security, and the strengthening of the UN)104. Doing so, the member states ‘recognized’ 
in the resolution ‘the need for universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both 
the national and international levels’105 and ‘[s]upport[ed] the idea of establishing a rule of law 
assistance unit within the Secretariat, in accordance with existing relevant procedures […] so as to 
strengthen United Nations activities to promote the rule of law, including through technical 
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assistance and capacity-building’106. Since this summit, the General Assembly has debated the rule 
of law on an annual basis, which has resulted in several resolutions. In the first resolution passed 
by the General Assembly, its members ‘reaffirmed’ that ‘human rights, the rule of law and 
democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and 
indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations’ and that ‘the promotion of and 
respect for the rule of law at the national and international levels, as well as justice and good 
governance, should guide the activities of the United Nations and of its Member States’107. The 
‘rule of law’, it was noted, ‘is essential for the realization of sustained economic growth, 
sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the protection of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’108. Indeed, whilst the ‘rule of law’ had hardly been mentioned in 
fundamental UN documents on the role of the Organization until 1992, now it had effectively 
turned into a precondition as well as a yardstick for all UN policies. 
 The following year the Secretary-General – upon request from the General 
Assembly109 - published a report entitled ‘Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations 
support for the rule of law’110. At the time of the publication, the UN’s administration in Kosovo, 
UNMIK, was seven years into its mandate. UNMIK had taken the shape of a so-called pillar 
structure, where not only UN agencies but also the EU and the OSCE were mandated by the 
Security Council to be part of the UN administration. As the next chapter shows, the interaction of 
different international actors under the over-all authority of the UN resulted in protracted struggles 
within the mission’s own bureaucratic bounds. Now, in the 2006 report, the Secretary-General 
noted that as a result of the ‘centrality of the rule of law to the work of the Organization’ both UN 
and non-UN actors have ‘become engaged in a wide range of rule of law activities […] sometimes 
in coordination, sometimes not’. Still, again, the need for expertise and capacity within the UN 
was stressed – more than fifteen years after the Agenda for Peace and its emphasis on the intrinsic 
link between ‘true peace’ and the rule of law: ‘[T]he dedicated capacities of the Organization 
remain shallow, both at the Headquarters and in the field. The needs are particularly acute with 
regard to rule of law and transitional justice expertise in conflict and post-conflict societies, in 
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which only a small number of Headquarters staff are assigned. With limited staff and resources, 
the Organization has, inevitably, turned to non-United Nations actors for assistance. Though 
external expertise is extremely valuable, chronic outsourcing undermines any attempt at building 
and retaining institutional memory and dedicated expertise within the United Nations’111. 
 In 2007, following the report by the Secretary-General, the UN established a Rule of 
Law Coordination and Resource Group, which is supported by a Rule of Law Unit within the UN 
Secretariat and presided by the Deputy Secretary-General. It consists of the heads of the nine main 
agencies and departments of the UN: the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the DPKO, the 
Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the UNDP, among others. Its function is primarily to share 
information on and coordinate the various rule of law activities within the different agencies and 
departments of the UN. By late 2012, the UN had ‘rule of law personnel’ (judicial affairs officers, 
corrections officers and police officers) deployed in 16 peace missions 112 , over 40 UN 
departments, funds and agencies are involved in rule of law promotion today (Sriram et al. 2011, 
12) and, by the end of 2010, the UN was involved in rule of law promotion activities in more than 
100 countries (ibid., 13). Moreover, during the last decade the UN has developed various ‘tools’ to 
support and streamline its rule of law reform work. The OCHR, for instance, has since 2003 
developed so-called ‘rule-of-law tools for post-conflict states’ to ‘provide practical guidance to 
field missions and transitional administrations in critical transitional justice and rule of law-related 
areas’, such as, prosecution, truth commission, vetting, etc.113 Together with the DPKO, the 
OCHR has also developed ‘rule of law indicators’ targeting criminal justice, which build on the 
definition of the rule of law provided by the Secretary-General in the 2004 report and ‘are rooted 
in human rights and criminal justice norms and standards and can be applied to both civil and 
common law systems’.114 The indicators are used both to measure criminal justice reforms – ‘their 
capacity, performance, integrity, transparency and accountability’115 – and to effectively develop 
and guide projects related to rule of law reforms. To this end, the indicators even advise its user 
how to deal with ‘rule of law spoilers’:  
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‘These individuals may not have the power to initiate reforms, but they do have the 
power to block them and your project. Early on, you should identify potential project 
spoilers. Their names are likely to emerge in the course of your discussions with 
experts and project champions. Try to understand why they might want to block or 
delay rule of law indicators work and how they might proceed. In some instances, that 
information and a genuine offer to include them in the project […] may be able to 
assuage their fears and concerns. If your attempts to win them over are unsuccessful, 
you have to develop a strategy to mitigate their likely opposition’116    
 
 The discursive trajectory of the rule of law in UN discourses since 1992 has resulted 
in the construction of a semantic field in which the meaning inscribed into the rule of law evolves 
around notions, such as: ‘true peace’, ‘security’, ‘transparent decision-making’, ‘effective 
government’, ‘non-military sources of instability’ and ‘challenges not encountered since Congo’ 
(the Agenda for Peace); ‘respect for human rights’, ‘legal vacuums’, ‘non-existing local judicial 
and legal capacity’ and ‘UN justice packages and interim legal codes’ (the Brahimi report); 
‘justice, peace and democracy as mutually constitutive’, ‘solidarity, not substitution’, 
‘international standards and local tradition’, ‘a principle of governance’, ‘publicly promulgated 
laws’, ‘judicial independence’, ‘supremacy of law’, ‘equality before the law’, ‘legal certainty’, 
legal transparency’, and ‘the separation of powers’ (the 2004 report); and the rule of law as a 
‘universal and indivisible core value’ (first General Assembly resolution on the rule of law). At 
the same time, police, lawyers, prosecutors, judges and prison officers were identified as the new 
actors to be engaged in UN peacebuilding activities in promoting the rule of law. Two narrations 
of the rule of law stand out through the various reports and declarations on the rule of law. One is 
the belief in a rule of law vacuum reigning in what the Secretary-General referred to as ‘shattered 
societies’, a narrative that ran parallel with the identification of the UN’s legitimate role in the 
reconstructing an entire society and state, which might become the rule now rather than the 
exception (the Brahimi report). Another narration of the rule of law took on a more minimalistic 
meaning where the rule of law is a principle of governance to which concrete methods and tools 
can contribute to its implementation. 
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The	Rule	of	Law	as	Law	Enforcement	
	
Policing	the	Rule	of	Law	
 
 Compared to the UN, the rule of law has a longer and more expressed trajectory in 
EU policies as a principle of governance. In its infamous decision known as Les Verts in 1986, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) referred to the then European Community as a ‘Community 
based on the rule of law’117. Doing so, the ECJ emphasized the expressions of the ‘rule of law’ 
made in the founding treaties of the European Union. In the Amsterdam Treaty adopted in 1997, 
which amended the Treaty on the European Union (commonly referred to as the Maastricht 
Treaty), the EU member states stated that ‘the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles 
which are common for the Member States’118. What is more, the Treaty of Amsterdam laid down 
provisions that would enable the EU to sanction member states that breached the fundamental 
principles – such as the rule of law – of the Union. The rule of law has in particular found 
expression in the EU’s enlargement policy. The Copenhagen criteria, which are the ‘objective 
criteria’ the EU laid down in 1993 to assess whether a state would be eligible to gain EU 
membership stipulate that the state should have a functioning market economy but also stable 
institutions ‘guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of 
minorities’. For this reason, the Treaty of Amsterdam stated that ‘any European State which 
respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to 
become a member of the Union’119. In the framework of EU’s enlargement policy, promoting the 
rule of law in its candidate countries has become a prime goal. According to this policy, rule of 
law ‘obligations’ imply an ‘independent and impartial judiciary’, that ‘government and its officials 
and agents are accountable under the law and that political leaders and decision-makers take a 
clear stance against corruption’, and ‘the process by which laws are prepared, approved and 
enforced is transparent, efficient, and fair. Laws must be clear, publicised, stable, fair and protect 
fundamental rights’120.  
                                                
117 Case 294/83 Les Verts vs Parliament (1986) ECR 1339, para. 23 
118 Treaty of the European Union (TEU), Ex-Art. 6 (1)  
119 European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, ’Rule of Law’, webpage 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/policy-highlights/rule-of-law/index_en.htm)    
120 Ibid. 
 162 
 However, the rule of law’s trajectory in EU external relations is shorter compared to 
the UN and only took off after the turn of the millennium with the formulation of the civilian 
aspect of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). To this end, the Saint Malo 
summit between France and the UK on December 3-4, 1998, and the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
entered into force on May 1, 1999, marked a turning point in the EU’s external relations. In light 
of the conflicts that had taken place in the Balkans in the 1990s, the EU member states were 
increasingly emphasizing the need for a concerted European effort in addressing conflicts in, in 
particular, the EU’s neighborhood. At the Saint Malo summit, France and the UK therefore 
declared that the EU should have ‘the capacity for autonomous action’121. Six months later at a 
European Council meeting, the EU member states agreed to further strengthen the CSDP in order 
to prepare for the future deployment of civilian and military missions. It was especially the 
military dimensions of crisis management that would be emphasized at this early stage of 
developing the CSDP. In the period 1999-2001, the European Council established three 
institutions within the Council Secretariat in Brussels related to military operations. At the 
European Council in December 1999, the member states had also agreed on establishing a civilian 
aspect of the CSDP. Yet, the institutional development of EU’s civilian crisis management was of 
less interest to the member states as opposed to the military aspect of the CSDP. The civilian part 
of EU security policy would be conducted in the shadow of the military part. In fact, some 
member states were initially reluctant to invest in and support the constitution of institutions in 
Brussels dealing with civilian crisis management as, at that time, ‘it was an innovative policy area 
that lacked operational doctrine’ (Björkdahl 2005, 142).   
 During the Portuguese presidency in 2000, at the same time the UN had published 
the Brahimi report, the EU member states agreed on the so-called Civilian Headline Goal to guide 
the civilian aspect of the CSDP. In doing so, the European Council identified four priority areas 
for joint civilian crisis management: police, civil administration, civil protection, and the rule of 
law. Nevertheless, it was only the police aspect of civilian crisis management that would gain 
attention among EU member states at this stage of institution-building. In the Presidency 
Conclusions following a European Council meeting in June 2000 it was stressed that ‘[t]he first 
priority area, identified in the light of the crises Europe has had to face in recent times and is still 
facing now, is police’122. In addition to the Civilian Head Goal, the member states identified a 
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number of tasks to be carried out by the police as well as concrete targets in terms of deployment. 
The member states should be ready to deploy up to 5000 police officers out of which 1000 police 
officers could be deployed within 30 days.123 The police officers would be mandated to, among 
other things, train, monitor and advice local police, restore law and order, and ensure respect for 
basic human rights standards in their support to local police.124  
 In the conclusions after the French Presidency during the second semester of 2000 
the police aspect of EU civilian crisis management was again stressed. It was noted in the 
conclusions that ‘the Union’s policing activities should be integrated, as from the planning stage, 
into a coherent overall crisis management operation. This requirement means that the [Council 
Secretariat] should be provided with a permanent police expertise as soon as possible’125. 
Furthermore, in the conclusions, the member states ‘called upon’ the next presidency, together 
with the EU High Representative (HR), to ‘continue identifying the capabilities required […] and 
specify requirements for the planning and conduct of European policing operations’126. Indeed, the 
conclusions did mention the ‘rule of law’ but only as an aspect of ‘policing operations’: ‘For the 
rule of law, it has been agreed that it is now possible for the European Union to set specific targets 
in conjunction with the development of policing capabilities’127. A Police Unit was established in 
the Council Secretariat and it became part of its newly established Directorate for Civilian Crisis 
Management (DG E IX). To be sure, civilian crisis management was effectively translated into 
‘policing operations’ in the early process towards bolstering the EU’s external actions.  
 The rule of law was the following year explicitly emphasized at the European 
Council in Gothenburg where the EU Member States identified the ‘rule of law’ as one of the 
priority areas of the Union’s civilian crisis management. The member states committed ‘to 
reinforce [the EU’s] ability to strengthening the rule of law capabilities’ as one of the EU’s ‘[n]ew 
concrete targets’. Accordingly, the member states emphasized that ‘[t]he EU attaches great 
importance to the strengthening of the rule of law as a tool of both conflict prevention and crisis 
management. Experience shows that strengthening the rule of law is a pre-condition for 
consolidation of peace and security’128. But again, the priority of the police was stressed; yet for 
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the first time the European Council mentioned in passing the possibility of a rule of law mission in 
which the police could be absent: ‘While rule of law missions would usually be deployed as a 
complement to a police component, they could also be undertaken without such a component’129. 
Furthermore, in particular the development of ‘capacity’ and ‘rapid deployment’ of legal actors, 
such as judges and prosecutors, was stressed ‘primarily in order to ensure a complete and 
functioning criminal justice process in operations in which international police performs an 
executive role’130.  
 In so doing, the member states committed themselves to create ‘[a] sufficiently large 
pool’ of judges, prosecutors and other legal staff readable for international missions.131 The ‘large 
pool’ approach implied that member states would commit themselves to deploy 200 judges and 
prosecutors within 30 days for a civilian crisis management mission by 2003.132 To be sure, the 
‘large pool’ approach reflected the early identification of the rule of law as a matter primarily dealt 
with by the police, where the deployment of contingents is the norm. In terms of future missions in 
the field of rule of law, the member states noted that such missions could ‘be tasked with 
strengthening local institutions through advice, training or monitoring, or mandated to perform 
executive functions through the temporary assignment of international staff, notably when local 
institutions are absent’,133 effectively re-enacting the belief in the legal vacuum present in post-
conflict or transitional societies. Finally, the member states agreed that the EU should strengthen 
its efforts, ‘within the UN framework’, in developing an ‘interim legal framework’ (similar to the 
‘interim legal code’ and the justice package suggested in the Brahimi report) to be used ‘when the 
international community faces an institutional and normative vacuum’134.  
 
Constructing	Common	Institutions	
 
 The turn to the ‘rule of law’ in and through UN discourses had been an attempt to 
provide a ‘common language’ to rationalize already existing but dispersed practices. Enacting the 
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‘rule of law’ through EU intervention discourses would result in the establishment of new 
institutions. At the European Council at Hampton Court in October 2005 the member states were 
eager to strengthen civilian crisis management after the deployment of twelve civilian missions 
and before the two rather complicated missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo. After the Council 
meeting, the then EU HR, Javier Solana, had noted in a policy paper that ‘we are currently close to 
the limits of our capacity’135. He therefore suggested to ‘put in place more robust arrangements for 
the management and control of missions and operations, involving clearer chains of command and 
responsibility and ensuring access to planned operational facilities’136. In consequence, a Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was finally established in Brussels, eight years after its 
military counterpart, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) department, and became 
operational in August 2007. The CPCC, which was headed by a Civilian Operations Commander, 
would be responsible for the planning and conduct of all civilian missions. Civilian missions 
would finally have a unified chain of command, as the conduct of military missions had had for 
almost a decade. However, whereas EU military missions would have a separate Operation 
Headquarters (OHQ) for each mission, the CPCC would constitute the headquarters of all EU 
civilian missions.  
 With the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on December 1, 2009, the CSDP 
took a new and its most recent turn. Among other things, the external relation services of the 
European Commission and the units in charge of foreign policy within the Council Secretariat 
were transferred to the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU 
opted for one third of the units to be staffed by national seconded officials. In addition, the two 
directorates in the Council Secretariat which had dealt with the military (DG E VIII) and civilian 
(DG E IX) aspects of the CSDP, respectively, merged into the Crisis Management Planning 
Directorate (CMPD). The rationale behind this merger was to establish a single civilian-military 
structure for all the CSDP missions and operations. Still, the CPCC would remain the most 
important institution in the EEAS structure in the operation of the EU’s rule of law mission in 
Kosovo (EULEX), which had been deployed in 2008, and nine other CSDP civilian missions at 
that time. However, compared to its military equivalent, the EUMS, the CPCC was relatively 
understaffed. As of June 2012, the CPCC employs approximately 60 staff, whereas the EUMS 
employs around 200 military staff. Indeed, this reflects the early emphasis on the military aspect 
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of the CSDP. What is more, roughly 80 percent of the CMPD staff has a military background.137 
The professional background of the staff within the CPCC reflects the conception of ‘civilian’ as 
mainly being police-driven and the early division of CSDP missions into ‘military missions and 
‘police operations’.  
 Moreover, the composition of the CPCC staff also reflects the decision at the launch 
of the EEAS to staff the units with one third of national seconded officials. As a consequence, the 
staff within the CPCC is for the most part seconded by EU member states. This implies that there 
is a high turnover in staff as seconded staff would usually be on leave from their national 
institution (eg. Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the police) and only have a contract for a maximum 
of two years. Not only can it take awhile for a national secondee to get acquainted with the 
political environment in Brussels, the institutional memory within the CPCC is also rather limited. 
As noted by a staff with EULEX, ‘you are starting to get some desk officers in Brussels that have 
EU field mission experience. But up until recently that was not the case, you had mostly people 
that were ‘concours’, got the position, and then ‘ough I have to learn how to run missions and 
support missions in the field’.138  
 The albeit short discursive trajectory of the rule of law in EU intervention discourses 
since 2000 resulted in a semantic field in which the meaning inscribed into the rule of law was 
constructed around notions, such as, ‘peace and security’, ‘conflict prevention’, ‘crisis 
management’, ‘rule of law capabilities’, ‘institutional and normative vacuum’ and ‘interim legal 
framework’, but notably ‘law enforcement’, ‘rapid deployment’ and ‘pool of judges, prosecutors 
and legal staff’. New institutions in relation to EU’s external affairs were created as a result, and 
the expertise vested in these institutions would reflect how the rule of law had been discursive 
constructed as a matter of law enforcement. Indeed, a report published by EU’s Court of Auditors 
four years into EULEX’s mandate reflects the extent to which the rule of law has become an issue 
of security within the EU: ‘Strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo is generally considered a 
prerequisite for economic development. Given the international nature of organised crime, the 
strengthening of the rule of law in Kosovo is also important for the internal security of the EU’139. 
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Conclusion:	Translating	the	Rule	of	Law	
 
 My venue into reconstructing the semantic fields and the expertise identified in and 
through these fields was located in the mountains in the southern part of Kosovo. The situation 
described in the interlude reflects the extent to which promoting the rule of law in global 
governance has become a concern to a host of different international actors and how it has become 
‘normal’ to intervene in the construction of an independent state’s internal affairs and 
constitutional structures. The meaning inscribed into the rule of law thus reflects to a certain 
extent past practices of injecting rule of law into colonized societies conceived as terrae nullius 
(though in UN discourses this would be conceptualized as legal vacuums). Indeed, whereas 
external engagement in law reforms had been mainly directed towards reforming legal education 
the 1950s, in a short period of time the meaning inscribed into the rule of law would be used to 
authorize international actors, such as the UN, to engage extensively in state-building processes. 
This follows from how the rule of law has been narrated as both a problem to be addressed by the 
‘international community’ and its experts and as a question of order and stability.  
 Following the rule of law through UN and EU intervention discourses shows that the 
rule of law became a catch-all phrase that provided the normative foundation for a renewed 
activism on the part of international actors from the beginning of the 1990s and onwards. In UN 
intervention discourses, the rule of law was first mentioned shortly after the end of the Cold War 
within a renewed security context. But it was in particular at the turn of the millennium that the 
rule of law became explicitly pronounced in both UN and EU discourses as a goal towards which 
their external interventions should be directed. This follows from NATO’s humanitarian 
intervention, the establishment of UN protectorates in Kosovo and East Timor, and the publication 
of the ICISS report on the responsibility to protect, which all took place in the period form 1999-
2001. Indeed, these three instances would in fact challenge commonsensical notions of the rule of 
law in flagging a new approach to international law where legality would be contested by what 
would be assessed as being legitimate. Yet, notwithstanding – or maybe exactly for that reason - 
the rule of law would take on a more encompassing meaning in UN discourses, which from then 
on increasingly identified the rule of law as a core norm of the Organization.  
 In constructing a conceptual framework for already existing and dispersed expertise 
across UN programs, agencies and missions, the aim seems to have been to rationalize these 
practices into a coherent concept and language. In EU discourses, the rule of law took on a more 
minimalist meaning in being solely a matter of police, which was reflected in the institutional set-
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up of its external civilian mission policies – a translation of the rule of law that might follow an 
implicit division of labor between the UN and the EU in conducting post-conflict missions. The 
turn to the rule of law in these discourses thus both rationalized and performed existing and new 
social orders within these two organizations. At the same time, the meaning of the concept has 
been stretched across a variety of different functional fields and forms of expertise. This begs the 
question: how is the meaning of the rule of law made knowable and stabilized in practice? In the 
following two chapters, I follow how these two conceptualizations of the rule of law and the 
expertise identified were translated into practice. But, first, I turn to a constitutional review that 
was done in the Constitutional Court in Pristina, Kosovo, in 2011.   
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INTERLUDE:	BOUNDARIES	
 
Setting:		A	review	by	Kosovo’s	Constitutional	Court	in	March	2011	on	the	legality	of	a	decision	
adopted	by	a	panel	of	three	international	judges	in	Kosovo	
 
 In March 2011, more than three years after Kosovo’s unilaterally declared 
independence (UDI) in February 2008, Kosovo’s Constitutional Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of a judgment passed by a panel of three international judges deployed with 
EULEX. The panel of EULEX judges was an appellate panel of the Special Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of Kosovo which deals with matters related to the post-conflict privatization of 
Kosovo’s socially owned enterprises. But more importantly, the Special Chamber is a fully 
international court established by UNMIK in 2003; yet physically located within Kosovo’s 
Supreme Court. Referring in particular to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Kosovo’s Privatization Agency (PAK) asked the Constitutional Court to assess the 
constitutionality of a decision rendered by the appellate panel of the Special Chamber in a case 
where PAK was one of the parties. PAK claimed that the three international judges on the 
appellate panel had violated its right to a fair and impartial trial and the principle of equality 
before the law. According to PAK, these constitutional standards had been infringed when the 
presiding international judge, a German judge, of the appellate panel had refused to recognize the 
legality of the Law on PAK. Kosovo’s Assembly had passed the law in May 2008, only a month 
after the Assembly had adopted Kosovo’s new constitution following the UDI.140 
 Instead, the appellate panel had requested a clarification by the head of UNMIK, the 
Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG), on how to interpret the applicable law. 
As the UN Security Council resolution 1244, which established UNMIK and does not recognize 
Kosovo as an independent state, is still in place, the SRSG is today effectively the main executive 
authority in Kosovo, according to international law. The clarification by the SRSG on the 
applicable law in a concrete case, which was ‘clearly reflected’141 in the wordings of the appellate 
                                                
140 According to the Article 31(1) and Article 31(2) of the Law on PAK, the law provides that it 
’shall supersede any provisions in the Applicable Law which are inconsistent herewith [and that 
the] UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 as amended will cease to have legal effect after the Law on PAK 
enters into force’ 
141 Constitutional Review of the Decision of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of 
Kosovo, ASC-09-089, dated 4 February 2010; para. 47 
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panel’s decision, therefore contested the impartiality of the three international judges. Moreover, 
the clarification and the final decision of the appellate panel stated that the Law on PAK did not 
have the force of law, even though it had been rightfully passed by Kosovo’s Assembly, but 
should only ‘be treated as valid and binding internal rules of organization within the privatization 
process’142. According to the clarification letter by the SRSG, ‘[e]ven if PAK’s own legal 
understanding could be considered, accepting the Kosovo Assembly's legislation as a purported 
legal basis for the establishment of PAK, proves unsuccessful. The PAK legislation violates the 
very legal basis from which it purports to receive legitimacy: Annex Vii, Article 2.1 of the 
Ahtisaari proposal’143. PAK, according to the decision of the appellate panel, was therefore ‘only a 
factual entity’144 as the law regulating it should be deemed null and void. To emphasize the 
international judges’ view on the illegality of the Law on PAK, the law was referred to as ‘this 
PAK “Law” [in quotation marks]’ in the decision. 145 According to the clarification letter of the 
SRSG and the international judges on the panel only international law, ie. regulations issued by 
UNMIK in the period from 1999 to 2008, could have the force of law in Kosovo as long as 
Kosovo’s statehood was not fully recognized. 
 In its assessment the Constitutional Court noted that the international judges on the 
appellate panel did ‘not recognize and apply the laws lawfully adopted by the Assembly’146 and 
‘did not “ensure the uniform application of the law”’147 nor an ‘impartial tribunal’148. According to 
the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Special Chamber, despite the fact that it is an 
international court, is not separate from the Supreme Court but is part of Kosovo’s judiciary and 
therefore ‘under the constitutional obligation to apply laws adopted by the Kosovo Assembly’149. 
What is more, the jurisdiction of EULEX judges is regulated by a law passed by Kosovo’s 
Assembly. The Constitutional Court therefore considered it ‘inconceivable’150 that the Special 
Chamber would recognize laws passed by Kosovo’s Assembly as being invalid; a general stance 
towards Assembly laws that would effectively question the Special Chamber’s own legal status. 
PAK had in its referral – and rightly so - alleged that the Special Chamber (nor the SRSG indeed) 
                                                
142 Ibid.; para. 24 
143 Ibid.; para. 46 
144 Ibid.; para. 50 
145 Ibid.; para. 24 
146 Ibid.; para. 53 
147 Ibid.; para. 60 
148 Ibid.; para. 48 
149 Ibid.; para. 56 
150 Ibid.; para. 61 
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has the authority according to the Constitution to declare a law passed by the Assembly invalid. 
Only the Constitutional Court is entitled to do so. The Constitutional Court therefore concluded 
that ‘[i]n fact, the Special Chamber simply continues to ignore the existence of Kosovo as an 
independent State and its legislation emanating from its Assembly’151.  
 In fact, the two Kosovo-Albanian judges, who were designated by the Constitutional 
Court to review the legality of the appellate panel’s decision, invoked yet another interpretation of 
how international law should rule to emphasize the supremacy of Kosovo’s Constitution. Or, 
maybe more accurate: The very absence (which was indeed disputed152) of an international rule of 
law on this matter. The Constitutional Court referred to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 
Advisory Opinion that had been passed a year prior to this review. The UN General Assembly had 
asked the ICJ the following question: ‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law’’153. 
In the opinion, the ICJ infamously answered that the UDI ‘did not violate general international 
law’ 154  as ‘general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of 
independence. Accordingly […] the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not 
violate general international law’155. Non-prohibition, accordingly, was translated into conformity 
with an international rule of law. Therefore, reverberating the wordings of the Advisory Opinion, 
the Constitutional Court stressed that ‘the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo as an 
independent and sovereign state […] is, therefore, not contrary to Security Council Resolution 
1244 (1999) as well as international law’156.  This review by the Constitutional Court received a 
lot of attention in the media in Kosovo that lamented the non-recognition of Kosovo’s statehood 
and the position of the international judge, who had presided the appellate panel, was not extended 
                                                
151 Ibid.; para. 53 
152 In his declaration, Judge Simma of the ICJ stressed that ’[b]y reading the General Assebly’s 
question as it did, the Court denied itself the possibility to enquire into the precise status under 
international law of a declaration of independence. By contrast, by moving away from ”Lotus”, 
the Court could have explored whether international law can be deliberately neutral or silent on a 
certain issue, and whether it allows for the concept of toleration, something which breaks from the 
binary understanding of permission/prohibition and which allows for a range of non-prohibited 
options. That an act might be ”tolerated” would not necessarily mean that it is ”legal”, but rather 
that it is ”not illegal”’ (Declaration of Judge Simma, para. 9) 
153  International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010; para. I 
154 Ibid.; para. 84 
155 Ibid. 
156 Constitutional Review of the Decision of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of 
Kosovo, ASC-09-089, dated 4 February 2010; para. 54 
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after the review.157 The decision on the extension was taken by EULEX’s executive, the Head of 
Mission, due to the way in which the judge had independently administered justice. A somehow 
ironic decision given the fact that the review had centered on the issue of judicial independence 
and impartiality. 
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
157 Interview with EULEX Judge (I), Kosovo’s Supreme Court, Pristina 
 173 
Chapter	6 
GREY	ZONES:	ENACTING	BOUNDARIES,	EMPOWERING	EXPERTS	
Introduction:	Contested	Boundaries	of	the	Rule	of	Law	
 
 The review by Kosovo’s Constitutional Court in 2011 provides a more complex 
picture of the role of the rule of law and international legal expertise in global governance than the 
one constructed in and through international discourses on the rule of law, cf. Chapter 5. The 
review essentially evolved around the presence and performance of different and conflicting legal 
realities. In particular two legal realities, which enacted different and seemingly irreconcilable 
understandings of what should be law and how this law should rule. One legal reality was 
performed by recourse to international law (here: regulations adopted by the UN’s administration 
in 1999-2008, UNMIK) and constructed around the ‘rule of law’ as matter on which an 
international executive authority would ultimately have the final say, which was reflected in the 
appellate panel’s decision. The legal order was clear: international law would trump domestic 
constitutional law. In this reality, Kosovo was enacted as – not an independent state but - a 
protectorate subject to international law and the ultimate authority of an international executive. 
Yet, at the same time, another legal reality was performed in presenting the case as a matter of 
constitutional law of an independent state: Kosovo. The rule of law, in turn, was translated into the 
safeguard of fundamental norms, such as judicial independence and the supremacy of law, that is, 
the final authority of the Constitutional Court and the legality and legitimacy of Kosovo’s 
legislative branch. Similar to Quine’s problem of Gavagai, not one translation but several and 
conflicting translations of the rule of law were possible at the same time. 
 What is more, the boundary between these two realities would not be as clear-cut as 
it may seem. For one thing, the physical location of the Special Chamber reflected how these legal 
realities overlapped or – quite emblematic – would be embedded in one another. What is more, as 
was implicitly stressed by the Constitutional Court, these two legal realities would clash in the 
exercise of the international judges’ legal powers. Whereas international judges applied 
international law and reasoning, their jurisdiction was based on a law passed by Kosovo’s 
Assembly. To be sure, the international judges were the very embodiment of these two legal 
realities, situated at the boundary of two different and conflicting spatial and epistemic 
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demarcations of what should pertain to being ‘legal’ and what purpose law should ultimately 
serve.  
 Again, the situation described in the interlude constitutes the end of the story I 
outlined in this chapter. The purpose of the chapter is to reconstruct how the practical meaning of 
the rule of law, which NATO had referred to as a core value to protect in the event of its 
intervention in Kosovo, turned into various and conflicting translations of what the rule of law 
should be, that is, its normative meaning. The international engagement in fulfilling the promise 
made prior to the humanitarian intervention would result in unruly practices on the part of the 
international executive, legal chaos and political fights over whose interpretation of what law 
should rule among international donors involved in rule of law reforms after Kosovo had declared 
its independence. The chapter therefore demonstrates that the turn to law in global governance has 
not resulted in a politics denied where the seemingly technicality of the rule of law has moved rule 
of law practices into what appears as apolitical, technical fields populated by international experts. 
Rather, the political locus has moved from local and national levels within a state towards various 
sites of global governance where political struggles abound.  
 To demonstrate this point, I show how the meaning of the rule of law was 
momentarily fixed through the politics of translation that unfolded in practices of (re)drawing the 
boundary between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ within the bureaucratic bounds of international 
administration over the legal field in post-intervention Kosovo. Doing so, I reconstruct in three 
steps how the promise of bringing the rule of law to a post-conflict society was translated in a rule 
through international law over the period from 1999 until today. First, in enacting a boundary 
between law and politics through describing the domestic context as a legal and institutional 
vacuum the international executive was empowered to (re)interpret international law to the extent 
that he would become the ultimate executive, legislative and judicial authority in Kosovo. To 
bring law to the domestic context, the gap that had been enacted and thus juxtaposed between 
(international) law and (local) politics served as a legitimizing source for the intervention of a host 
of international legal actors who engaged in law-drafting and as a source for the international 
executive’s turn to extra-legal practices. In a third and final step, I demonstrate the ‘afterlife’ and 
thus pertinence of the translation of the rule of law into a rule through international law, which 
both materialized in the wordings and structure of Kosovo’s constitution that was adopted at the 
event of the UDI in 2008 and in the structure and practices of a field of international donors 
engaged in law-making.  
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A	Rule	Through	International	Law		
 
The	Indeterminacy	and	Temporality	of	International	Law	
 
 On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244158 which 
established a UN ‘Interim Transitional Administration’ (UNMIK) in Kosovo. Subscribing to the 
idea of the inalienability of sovereignty, the resolution reaffirmed Serbia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, at the same time as it - somehow paradoxically - provided for the entire 
withdrawal of Serbian security forces, which began with the deployment of NATO’s forces, 
KFOR, the day after the adoption. The text of the resolution was in accordance with Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter in ‘determining’ that the situation in Kosovo ‘continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security’159. As to the status of Kosovo, Resolution 1244 only recognized 
that the people of Kosovo would enjoy ‘substantial authority’ under the UN administration; a term 
that created a significant amount of uncertainty about Kosovo’s future status and the role and 
authority of international actors mandated by the resolution to administer Kosovo. Indeed, 
according to UNMIK officials, the first SRSG of UNMIK, Bernard Kouchner, claimed to have 
read the Resolution 1244 twice every morning, but was still not able to figure out what 
‘substantial autonomy’ actually meant (Chesterman 2004, 132). ‘Substantial authority’ would only 
mean that Kosovars would eventually exercise governing functions under the UN protectorate, 
which therefore did not recognize its statehood. State-building and statehood was effectively 
separated. Importantly, the mandate of UNMIK was open-ended and its renewal would not be 
subject to an annual vote in the Security Council, which is custom for UN peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding missions. Not only the very substance of the mandate, but also its termination was 
uncertain, as a result. For the next years to come, Kosovo would effectively be a ‘territory in 
limbo between statehood and disempowered neo-trusteeship’ (Knoll 2005, 638). It had been 
anticipated during it preparation that the mission would be phased out and terminated within three 
years after its establishment. However, it would turn out to be the ultimate authority in Kosovo for 
almost nine years until the UDI in 2008. As noted by a former staff with UNMIK:  
 
                                                
158 The resolution was passed with 14 votes as China abstained 
159 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) 
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‘[T]he short term became the long term and that created the structural problems that 
became evident later. It is like treating a patient in intensive care forever. And based 
on that you cannot make policy choices’160. 
 
 Indeed, the highly vague wording of the Resolution 1244 said little about the 
authority of local political actors in Kosovo during UN administration. Nor did the Resolution say 
much about the powers of the head of UNMIK, the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG). In turn, the SRSG was implicitly authorized to define and, subsequently, extend 
his own powers, which derived from one single source: the Resolution 1244. The powers of the 
SRSG and UNMIK were, accordingly, determined by ‘regulations’, which were issued by the 
SRSG himself and had the force of law in post-conflict Kosovo. In consequence, the SRSG was 
granted significant prerogatives, which indeed challenges the positivist understanding that 
international law derives its force from its precision and clarity. The first UNMIK regulation 
promulgated by the SRSG provided that ‘all legislative and executive authority with respect to 
Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the 
SRSG’161. Accordingly, the SRSG authorized himself to ‘appoint any person to perform functions 
in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or remove such person’162. The 
SRSGs during UNMIK’s administrative rule would from then on continuously reinterpret their 
mandate to extent their powers (similar to how the BiH had turned into a protectorate ruled by 
international, executive decrees). To be sure, it is quite telling that among Kosovo-Albanians 
today the SRSGs who have headed UNMIK are jokingly referred to as Kosovo’s ‘former 
kings’163.  
 The concentration of the executive, legislative and judicial powers in the SRSG was 
justified in the UN Secretary-General’s first report to the UN Security Council on UNMIK in 
which the SRSG was named the ‘guarantor of the rule of law’ 164 , effectively rendering 
authoritarian and ultimate the SRSG’s translation of what the rule of law should be. The legal 
authority of UNMIK’s ultimate executive, the SRSG, was moreover justified by reference to the 
                                                
160 Interview with EULEX Legal Advisor (former UNMIK staff), Property Expert, EULEX HQs, 
Pristina  
161 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 ‘On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo’ 
162 Ibid.  
163 Interview with UNDP Legal Advisor, Office of the President, Assembly of Kosovo, former 
staff with UNMIK and the OSCE mission, Pristina 
164 UN Security Council Report (S-1999-779), at 9  
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ultimate purpose law should serve in Kosovo: UNMIK’s mandate. As the ‘guarantor of the rule of 
law’, the SRSG had been authorized by the UN Secretary General to ‘change, repeal or suspend 
existing law to the extent necessary for the carrying out of his functions, or where existing laws 
[were] incompatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of the interim civil administration’165. In 
fact, the first UNMIK regulation had provided that the applicable law would be the one in place 
prior to NATO’s intervention on March 24, 1999, but only insofar these laws did not conflict with 
‘internationally recognized standards’, UNMIK’s mandate or UNMIK regulations. 166  The 
imperative of guaranteeing the rule of law had effectively been translated into a rule through 
international law by UNMIK’s executive, where international law was to be used ‘forward-
lookingly’ to implement the administration’s vast but, indeed, highly ambivalent and 
indeterminate mandate. The same approach to the rule of law was espoused more than a decade 
later in the event of the international administration of Iraq after the 2003 intervention. The first 
executive order passed by Bremer, the international executive head of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), had stipulated that ‘[u]nless suspended or replaced by the CPA or superseded by 
legislation issued by democratic institutions of Iraq, laws in force in Iraq as of April 16, 2003, 
shall continue to apply in Iraq insofar as the laws do not prevent the CPA from exercising its 
rights and fulfilling its obligations, or conflict with the present or any other Regulation or Order 
issued by the CPA’167.  
 In the case of Kosovo, it was the indeterminacy and thus imprecision of international 
law, that is, the governing source of UNMIK’s authority, the Resolution 1244, which broadened 
the scope for political maneuvering within law. However, given the vague wordings of UNMIK’s 
mandate, it was still uncertain what ends the rule of international law should ultimately serve: the 
establishment of security or the deliverance of justice? The pronouncements of the second SRSG 
of UNMIK, Bernhard Kouchner, a French socialist politician and co-founder of Médecins sans 
Frontières, were, according to two former UNMIK staff, ‘always infused with the language of 
rights, ethics and justice; Realpolitik and logistics seemed less important’ (King and Mason 2006, 
51). Moreover, though Resolution 1244 had not explicitly specified the authority of the SRSG, the 
UN Secretary-General had announced that ‘internationally recognized standards of human rights 
[would be] the basis for the exercise of [the SRSG’s] authority in Kosovo’168. Still, justice and 
                                                
165 Ibid. (emphasis added) 
166 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 
167 Section 2 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1 CPA/REG/16 MAY 2003/01 
168 Ibid., at 9 
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security would stand in an uneasy relationship with one another. In the first UN Secretary-General 
report on UNMIK the ‘urgent need to build genuine rule of law in Kosovo’169 had been described 
as being imperative for the establishment of security as ‘[o]nly a fully functioning independent 
and multi-ethnic judicial system will address the existing security concerns in Kosovo and build 
public confidence’170. However, an internal document within UNMIK had raised the concern that 
the emphasis on human rights protection would be a problem for effectively carrying out the 
mission’s mandate, and UNMIK should therefore make the choice between human rights and 
security (Marshall and Inglis 2003, 106). 
 
Enacting	a	Legal	Vacuum	by	Narrating	an	Unruly	Present	
 
 The translation of the rule of law into a rule through international law was done by 
enacting a gap between an immediate unruly present resulting from the conflict in Kosovo and its 
political past, on the one hand, and the role of the UN administration as a guarantor of the rule of 
law, on the other hand. The storied ‘rule of law vacuum’ in post-conflict countries, which was 
later stressed in pivotal UN reports on the rule of law (cf. Chapter 5), was effectively used to 
justify a rule through international law. The senior legal advisor to the first SRSG, Sergio Vieira 
de Mello, described Kosovo as an ‘empty shell’ and a ‘legal vacuum’ which ‘had been stripped of 
[its] entire administrative and executive super-structures’ (Strohmeyer 2001, 46, 63)171. The legal 
system needed to be re-created ‘from “ground zero”’ (ibid., 59) as the intervention in Kosovo ‘had 
led to the withdrawal, in their entirety, of the political and administrative cadres that had 
previously governed the territories’ (ibid., 47).172 In the same vein, the first SRSG, Vieira de 
Mello, noted that, in terms of institutions, ‘nearly everything had to be brought in’ (Vieira de 
Mello, quoted in Lemay-Hebert 2014, 140) when UNMIK entered Kosovo. The following quote 
by an EULEX judge, who has experience from working as a judge in other post-conflict contexts, 
too, demonstrates the widespread belief in the ‘legal vacuum’ that reigns in post-conflict societies:  
 
                                                
169 UN Security Council Report (S-1999-779), at 13 (emphasis added) 
170 Ibid., at 14 
171 See also interview with Hansjoerg Strohmeyer in James Traub, ‘Inventing East Timor’ (2000) 
Foreign Affairs July-August 
172 Strohmeyer referred to both Kosovo and East Timor 
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‘My view has always been, you know, we need to send them [international experts] in 
basically before the fighting stops because when the fighting stops there is only a huge 
vacuum in terms of justice, law, you know, politics, everything. And we need to have 
people in place to kind of…I mean, the damage has been done by the time we hit the 
ground six months later. But then I was told ‘well, no, basically it is too dangerous to 
send anybody in apart from military personal’, which is in some respect why often we 
find military lawyers and police officers running these missions’173  
 
 It was in this context, as Orford points out, that the local and national level was 
narrated as a source of conflict and disorder, while international law and institutions were 
conceptualized as a solution: the ‘assumption made by advocates of an expanded humanitarian 
role for the Security Council is that the principal threats to human rights, democracy, and security 
occur at the state or local level’ (Orford 1997). The enactment of an unruly present was indicative 
of how the political past of Kosovo was addressed. As had also been the case during the CPA in 
Iraq, the past administration of Kosovo was described as an instance where the rule of law had 
been absent in a society ruled by men and arbitrariness. According to the Special Assistant of the 
first SRSG of UNMIK ‘[t]he intention behind [Resolution 1244] was to replace [the past] 
administration[] which had acted contrary to the aspirations of the majority and which had 
flagrantly disregarded human rights, with [an] international administration[] which would uphold 
the rule of law, promote human rights and pave the way for some form of self-rule’ (Hochschild 
2004, 287)174. To be sure, as noted by a former staff within the Office of the Prime Minister, 
which had been set up by UNMIK in 2001: ‘The political elite [UNMIK] that came to power they 
found everything in connection to the old regime to be repressing, bad, communist […] I think 
what was lacking here was discussions with older generations as they were immediately cut off as 
communists’175.  
 However, post-conflict Kosovo was certainly not a political nor a legal void. In the 
words of the former staff within the Office of the Prime Minister: ‘Kosovo was not an UNMIK 
invention basically. It was a former province of a federation and it was quite strong in terms of 
economic, legal and all kinds of developments. So I think we should have used that and sort of 
                                                
173 Interview with EULEX Judge (I), Peja District Court, Kosovo 
174 In the article Hochschild refers to the UN protectorates in both Kosovo and East Timor, 
respectively 
175 Interview with UNDP Legal Advisor to the President of Kosovo, former staff within the Office 
of the Prime Minister and the OSCE during UNMIK, Pristina 
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have built up from that. Not start everything from scratch’176. With the adoption of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (SFRY) Constitution in 1974, Kosovo had been granted the 
status of an autonomous province, at the same time as the (then) province would remain a 
constituent part of the Republic of Serbia. The Constitution of 1974 had created a ‘semi-
confederal system’ where consensus between the political leaders of the republics and the 
provinces, too, were sought (Bellamy 2000, 106). With the status of an autonomous province, 
Kosovo therefore enjoyed some of the same rights as the other six federal republics of SFRY. The 
province was authorized to take part in meetings of the federal court on equal terms with the other 
republics. Likewise, Kosovo had a seat in the federal parliament, the presidency and the federal 
constitutional court of SFRY. The constitution granted not only the republics but also the 
autonomous provinces legislative, executive and judicial autonomy and the right to issue their own 
constitutions. This resulted in the establishment of a Presidency with nine members in the 
autonomous province of Kosovo, a Parliament, a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court and other 
judicial bodies. According to Kosovo’s own constitution from 1974, Kosovo’s Parliament was the 
highest authority in Kosovo and had the power to change its own constitution. Though Kosovo 
had the same de facto status as the other SFRY republics, the province did not enjoy the same de 
jure status. Kosovo was still a province under the Republic of Serbia but with a special status.  
         Following the spring 1989, when Milosevic was elected President of Serbia, the 
province came under direct rule from Belgrade and the political and judicial institutions of the 
province were dissolved, as a consequence. With the election of Milosevic Serbian politics 
towards Kosovo changed drastically and the conditions of the Albanians in Kosovo changed 
accordingly. When Milosevic rose to power, he revitalized the old Serbian myth about Kosovo 
being the birthplace of the Serbian nation and began to voice his aspirations for a pan-Serbia. In 
1990, Kosovo’s Parliament therefore met to vote on a declaration of Kosovo as a republic within 
the SFRY. In turn, Serbia’s response was to dissolve the Parliament and other political and 
judicial institutions. All Albanian-speaking schools were forced to close and thousands of 
Kosovo-Albanian state employees were fired based on a decree in June 1990, including almost all 
the Kosovo-Albanian judges and prosecutors. By 1993, the judiciary was almost entirely 
employed by Serbs (Beurmann 2008, 44). During the 1990s, a Kosovo-Albanian political 
community would develop informally and a parallel structure of ‘public’ institutions ensured, 
among other things, education and health care financed by taxes from Kosovo-Albanians and the 
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diaspora. In September 1991, the first semi-clandestine elections were organized and executed by 
Kosovo-Albanians and Ibrahima Rugova, a Kosovo-Albanian intellectual and the leader of the 
Kosovo-Albanian non-violent movement of the 1990s, was elected president and a Kosovo-
Albanian government in exile was established. The same year, the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) was organized, which would fight against the Serbian army when the war broke out in the 
beginning of 1998. Though these institutions had been more or less dismantled at the event of the 
war, they were quickly reestablished and became active again immediate after the war with the 
return of refugees to Kosovo (by September 1999 more than 770.000 refugees had returned to 
Kosovo177).  
 Towards the end of the war in 1999, Rugova and the government in exile would 
claim that the parallel institutions which had been established in the 1990s should be recognized 
and formally established after the war. Rugova and his supporters had established the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK)) – one of the political parties that were 
present at the final negotiations on the constitutional amendments that I described in the first 
interlude. Another politically organized group that would claim its authority to govern after the 
end of the war grow out of the KLA. Already two weeks into NATO’s bombing campaign, KLA, 
which was backed by the US, had established a so-called provisional government in exile that was 
ready to take over power when the conflict would come to an end. Indeed, the US had initially 
labeled the KLA as a ‘terrorist organization’ and backed its political rival, LDK, during the 
international negotiations leading up to NATO’s intervention. The US support would soon change 
back to the KLA instead, whilst marginalizing LDK (Sörensen 2009, 209). In May 1999, KLA 
formally founded the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK) as its 
political faction (also present during the negotiations on the constitutional amendments in 2011). 
Hashim Thaci, the commander and chief political strategist of the KLA, whose nom de guerre was 
‘The Snake’ due to his politically tactical skills, subsequently appointed former KLA members, 
who had now become members of the PDK, as heads of Kosovo’s 27 (out of 29) Albanian 
majority municipalities to run the country. During the early phase of UNMIK’s deployment, 
‘[m]en claiming to represent the KLA took possession of various public buildings, houses and 
apartments (a practice that continued through to 2005). The same men also established 
administrative and security organisations, and asserted their authority as a de facto government’ 
(King and Mason 2006, 50-51). As a former international staff with UNMIK notes: ‘I call the 
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whole process [of the KLA taking over the municipalities] ‘usurpation’’178. However, according to 
two former UNMIK staff, ‘many officials in UNMIK at the time believe that the US State 
Department had advised Kouchner not to pick a fight with Thaci’ (King and Mason 2006, 75-76). 
Though different Kosovo-Albanian political fractions would exercise and claim their right to 
power, which resulted in dispersed and fragmented political practices, the storied legal and 
institutional vacuum was not reflected in reality.  
 One of the first problem UNMIK met when it was established in June 1999 had been 
the question as to whose law should rule in post-conflict Kosovo. The first UNMIK regulation 
provided that the applicable law would be the one in place prior to NATO’s intervention on 
March 24, 1999, insofar these laws did not conflict with ‘internationally recognized standards’, 
UNMIK’s mandate or UNMIK regulations.179 Effectively, international law and even UNMIK’s 
mandate were given priority over domestic laws. Furthermore, this decision was in accordance 
with the Resolution 1244, which had ‘reaffirmed’ the Security Council’s ‘commitment’ to ‘the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of Serbia.180 Though Serbian authority in Kosovo was entirely 
replaced by a UN administration and KFOR by means of international law, the decision to 
maintain the domestic legal regime appears to have followed the reasoning that the continuation of 
existing law’s rule would restore some of Serbia’s lost sovereignty in Kosovo.   
 The decision therefore sparked major resistance from within the Kosovo-Albanian 
legal community and local politicians, who criticized the decision for being a restoration of the 
former repressive regime of Milosevic. Indeed, many laws had been changed throughout the 1990s 
during Serbia’s oppressive regime in Kosovo and UN lawyers argued therefore that discriminatory 
laws would not be applicable. Moreover, the laws applicable in 1989 (that is, before the 
instauration of the Serbian regime in Kosovo) were quite similar to the ones in force in 1999. 
Nevertheless, for the Kosovo-Albanians it was not a matter of the content of laws but the context 
in which they had been enacted. Members of the Kosovo-Albanian legal community stressed that 
the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy status within Serbia in 1989 had been in violation of 
Serbia’s constitution, which contested the legality of laws passed in the 1990s. Therefore, Kosovo-
Albanian legal actors argued that the laws applicable in Kosovo before 1989 would still be in 
force and local judges therefore refused to apply the 1990s laws in court (Rausch 2002, 15). 
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Indeed, this debate on the applicable law also demonstrates that the problem of a non-existing 
legal framework that had been addressed in the Brahimi report in 2000, which had therefore 
argued for the development of ‘an interim legal code’ by the UN, was not an issue. The issue was 
rather whose law should rule.  
 In December 1999, the SRSG then promulgated a new regulation that rendered laws 
enacted before March 22, 1989, and UNMIK regulations applicable.181 As a result, to identify the 
applicable law became an extremely complex task as it would derive from four legal sources: 
Yugoslav laws, Serbian laws, Kosovo laws and international law (ie. UNMIK regulations). Again, 
priority was given to the mission’s mandate. No law would be applicable if it was in contradiction 
with the purpose of UNMIK. In the same vein, hierarchical priority as to the domestic legal order 
was given to UNMIK regulations. According to the new regulation on the applicable law, in the 
event of a conflict between prior laws and UNMIK regulations, the latter would take precedence. 
Furthermore, the regulation provided that ‘[i]f a court of competent jurisdiction or a body or 
person required to implement a provision of the law determines that a subject matter or situation is 
not covered by the laws set out in section 1.1 […] but is covered by another law in force in 
Kosovo after 22 March 1989 which is not discriminatory […], the court, body or person shall, as 
an exception, apply that law’182.  
 In consequence, four codes related to criminal matters would be applicable in 
Kosovo at once: The Serbian Criminal Code, the FRY Criminal Procedure Code, the Yugoslav 
Criminal Code, and the Kosovo Criminal Code. Importantly, there were no subsequent provisions 
spelling out how legal actors should identify the legality of a certain legal act. In brief, it was left 
to the individual judge or prosecutor to decide on the matter of the applicable law. As noted by an 
international judge who was deployed with UNMIK from 2001 to 2003 the work was 
‘challenging’ as ‘there was not one criminal code, but three codes’ 183 . Moreover, when 
international judges were deployed by UNMIK to work in Kosovo courts, there were no induction 
courses offered on the domestic legal system and its sources.184 This was especially a problem 
among the many US judges deployed at that time by UNMIK who had no experience with a civil 
law system.185 Often cases were transferred to the Supreme Court for retrials due to procedural 
mistakes. In most cases, according to a former UNMIK judges, this ‘was due to arrogance’ in the 
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sense that judges would draw on practices from their home countries, notably the common law 
system, and ‘they simple didn’t read the procedure code which is, as I said, our bible’.186 The 
retrials would drag and create an important backlog in cases due to procedural and more or less 
simple mistakes, such as, how decisions were written.187 To be sure, the work of the judiciary 
became even more haphazard with the legal chaos UNMIK would soon create through its 
unbounded law-making practices. According to a former staff with the OSCE’s mission: ‘There 
were so many loopholes [in the law] that you cannot even understand or comprehend which 
legislation should be applied in which context. So you really had to be a big master of 
interpretation’188. The legal vacuum that the UN had deplored was reigning in what the UN 
Secretary-General had referred to as ‘shattered societies’ was in the case of UNMIK created by the 
UN administration itself.  
   
Between	Constitutionalism	and	Fragmentation	
 
Filling	Up	the	Legal	Vacuum:	Law-Making	Unbounded	
 
 Translating the rule of law into a rule through international law by enacting a 
boundary between an unruly presence that would discard past and present political structures in 
Kosovo would authorize a host of International Organizations (IOs) to govern every sphere of 
society. The Resolution 1244 had ‘authorize[d] the Secretary-General, with the assistance of 
relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence189, which would all 
derive their powers from the resolution. The international civilian presence installed with UNMIK 
applied a rather top-down, technocratic approach ‘sometimes unnecessarily reinventing the wheel 
where it could have tapped into the existing local expertise’ (Lemay-Hebert 2011, 196-197). In 
fulfilling the functions of a government the UN administration would take the shape of a so-called 
‘pillar system’. Indeed, the idea behind this organizational architecture was to strengthening the 
cooperation between IOs engaged in peacebuilding, which had been lacking in the post-conflict 
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rebuilding of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Following the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the 
activities of various IOs aimed at ‘consolidating’ the rule of law in BiH had been many but 
fragmented (INPROL 2009, 9). Now, placing the various IOs involved in civil administration 
under the same authority, that is, the SRSG, had been identified as a more effective means in 
achieving concerted international involvement. However, the coordination between the different 
pillars would soon turn out to be rather challenging as the pillars worked relatively independently 
from one another.  
 The whole society was effectively carved up into different functional spheres, such 
as, economy, health, transport, which each was governed by a particular institution. The United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) led Pillar I, which was in charge of 
humanitarian emergency immediately after the end of the conflict. The UN was given the entire 
responsibility of civil administration (police, the judiciary, budget, health, education, etc.) within 
Pillar II. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was in charge of 
Pillar III on institution-building, which would include areas such as human rights, democracy, and 
capacity-building of judicial institutions. The large OSCE mission was granted a rather broad and 
vaguely defined mandate. As recalled by a former OSCE staff in its unit for human rights: ‘There 
was actually even a joke about this abbreviation. Everybody called them the Organization for 
Sincerely Confused Europeans’190. Heading Pillar IV, the EU was in charge of economic 
reconstruction and thereby the making of a liberal market, which resulted in subsequent waves of 
privatization. Each component was led by a Deputy Special Representative from the respective 
organization, who had the overall responsibility for the activities of the component. As a 
consequence, each pillar applied their own approach to the local institutions they were building 
based on the specialization and expertise of the given organization in charge. Furthermore, each 
organization had their own bureaucratic cultures and chains of commands and all reported back to 
their respective headquarters. However, deriving from the immense powers of the head of the 
UNMIK, the SRSG would still have the final authority to ‘direct activities to ensure the coherent 
implementation of the tasks assigned to the mission’191. 
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 ‘[T]he politics of law in the neo-institutionalist era’, Kennedy (2006b, 163) notes, is 
‘largely […] the politics of politics denied’. The law-making practices within UNMIK seemed to 
subscribe to this interpretation as well as the assumption that Kosovo was a legal vacuum. The 
drafting and enactment of new laws that would extent to all spheres of Kosovo’s society became 
an important tool in exercising UNMIK’s mandate. Already a month into its deployment, UNMIK 
established a Department of Judicial Affairs (DJA).192 The DJA would be the main unit for legal 
reforms, together with the SRSG’s international lawyers within the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). 
To ensure ‘local ownership’ in the law-making process UNMIK also established a Joint Advisory 
Council on Legislative Matters (JAC) in August 1999, which consisted of 20 Kosovars (eg. law 
professors) and seven international members.193 The JAC was meant to be the prime forum for the 
legal reform work together with the UNMIK’s OLA. Yet, the formal authority of the JAC was 
never defined by UNMIK, and the joint council became gradually irrelevant as OLA started to 
bypass it in the legislative process (Marshall and Inglis 2003, 117). 
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 Consequently, the JAC soon became ‘an empty shell’ (Marshall and Inglis 2003, 
117). As recalled by a former international staff in the DJA, law-making was largely ‘purpose-
made’ to ‘ensure the success of the mission’194 and thus the implementation of UNMIK’s 
mandate. Moreover, an OSCE report from 2001 noted that ‘[i]t has been stated [by the OLA] that 
regulations of a more “interventionist” character will often not warrant review by the JAC, as their 
content will as a rule, be more of a political than of a legal nature’195. Whilst UNMIK’s role in 
reconstructing the whole legal framework of post-conflict Kosovo had been justified by the 
seemingly technical task of so doing, the statement by the OLA shows that in practice law was 
conceived of as a political means in steering the developments in the post-conflict state. It testifies 
to how the meaning of the boundary between law and politics was continuously redefined within 
the bureaucratic bounds of UN administration. Indeed, the construction of a clear distinction 
between law and politics in this context would place the DJA and in particular the SRSG’s legal 
advisors in the OLA in a favorable position over local legal actors.  
 What is more, the legal reform work undertaking by UNMIK was carried out 
without any oversight as to who was drafting the laws and how new laws would impact on 
existing laws. In fact, from 2001 to 2007, the DJA had eight different directors.196 As noted by a 
former Deputy SRSG of UNMIK, ‘UNMIK regulations drafted by jurists of another culture were 
grafted onto the Yugoslav body of laws, without much concern for coherence’ (Cady 2012, 28). 
Kosovo’s Ombudsperson at that time referred to the legal framework as a ‘Swiss cheese’197. 
Indeed, the translation of the rule of law into a rule through international law would empower 
various legal advisors – and also non-legal actors – to draft and domesticate the meaning of laws 
to suit their own background experiences and knowledge. As recalled by a former UNMIK staff 
within the DJA ‘there was no in depth discussion on the structures’198:  
 
“[M]ost of the staff of UNMIK was general affairs officers, that’s what their title was, 
very generic kind of title within the UN. So they were really not experts on institutional 
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design. The UN didn’t have any previous experience. This was the first mission, and 
they didn’t in fact make a lot of effort to bring in expertise because they could have 
when it came to institutional design. Actually they just, you know, I remember my 
colleague googled other [national institutions] and then compared them, and said ‘okay, 
this is how it would look like’”199 
 
 An advisor with the UK’s development agency, the Department for International 
Development (DFID), recalls how the agency was mandated by UNMIK to establish Kosovo’s 
civil service administration based on British common law standards:  
 
‘From 2000 to 2004 we actually helped in that time UNMIK and the PISG [the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government] to establish the administration, which 
means establishing the civil service and our support was basically setting up the basic 
system, the legislation, the procedures, the core policies, and the job descriptions. You 
know, whatever it takes, from scratch […] It was a good kind of short-term measure to 
bring some rules in place but still it clashed with other legislation. It was based on the 
British common law system and tradition […] the whole architecture of the [civil] 
administration [of Kosovo], the core of it, was basically imported […] We took on 
board all the criticism and addressed those by, for example, hiring German experts in 
public administration reforms, especially in the legislation […] But we learned one big 
lesson that if you want to deliver and support drafting legislation, first of all, you 
facilitate the process, you don’t draft the legislation and secondly you look at hiring 
from similar legal traditions. Not from the UK’200 
 
 The high turnover in international staff and the general recruitment of international 
legal advisors would impact considerably on both the law-making process but also the substance 
and coherence of laws. Law-making was often qualified by a ‘conflict of legal cultures’201 and a 
protracted learning process, which the Brahimi report had addressed, as well as a genuine lack of 
knowledge about Kosovo among the international lawyers in UNMIK’s OLA and the DJA. A 
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former staff in the DJA recalls an UNMIK regulation related to the authority of the police in 
which a ‘coastal guard’ unit for Kosovo was mentioned.202 Indeed, the closest coast to Kosovo is 
in Albania. Often, a provision in one section of a law would contradict a provision in a following 
section due to the departure of an international staff and the arrival of a new advisor who would 
continue working on the same draft law.203 In general, the recruitment process in UNMIK was not 
very effective and often corrupted as it was based on personal relations.204 Accordingly, it was not 
always the right person who was chosen for the position. A USAID manual, ‘A Practitioner’s 
Guide to Drafting Laws in Kosovo’, from 2006 concluded that ‘[c]ompeting legal regimes, 
conflicting legal mandates, a general absence of legislative direction in key policy areas, confusion 
regarding controlling authority and the lack of harmony within the overall legal structure of the 
country all undermine the rule of law’205. 
 One of the first things the DJA engaged in upon its establishment was translating all 
existing legislation in Kosovo into English. However, the translations were done very poorly, and 
the English version would often differ from the Serbian or Albanian versions of the same law.206 
This was also the case when UNMIK regulations - all drafted in English - were translated into 
Serbian and Albanian, where the meaning of the same law would differ between the law’s 
different translations. Indeed, many regulations were not even translated into Albanian or Serbian 
as the unit in charge within UNMIK only had few people employed to carry out this important part 
of the legal work. Local judges and prosecutors therefore had to apply laws written in English, 
which was a complicated task due to a widespread lack in English language skills. Furthermore, it 
was difficult to find local translators who were familiar with the judicial and thus highly technical 
vocabulary. The poor translations would only add to the plural and conflicting legal sources that 
reigned in Kosovo’s legal framework. Five years into UNMIK’s mandate, a report by Kosovo’s 
Ombudsperson rebuked the ‘legal chaos’ that prevailed as the result of international practitioners’ 
engagement in law-making. Not only did the various language versions of the same laws create a 
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great amount of legal uncertainty. Often, the UNMIK regulations were not published officially. 
According to the report, ‘the wider public is not even aware of most of the laws applicable in 
Kosovo’207. 
 Whereas many laws were drafted and passed rather hastily, some more important 
laws were underway for several years. A law organizing the court system, for instance, only 
entered into force in 2010 after the drafting had started in 2004 and required almost 50 drafts. A 
new criminal code and criminal procedure code entered into force in April 2004 after at least three 
years of drafting by a variety of international actors and almost five years into UNMIK’s mandate. 
However, the codes were received with skepticism from both local and international legal actors. 
For instance, the law drafters had drawn on various European and US legal codes that resulted in 
the criminal code and criminal procedure codes consisting of an irreconcilable blend of civil law 
and common law standards. An international judge deployed with EULEX recalls that he had to 
read the criminal procedure code ‘twice a day for two months’ when he arrived in Kosovo in order 
to understand and be able to apply it.208  
 
Who	Guards	the	Guardians?	Unruly	Practices	of	Rule	of	Law	Promotion	
 
 During UNMIK, the judiciary in Kosovo was the only independent instance that 
could outbalance the immense powers of the SRSG and, in particular, challenge the recourse to 
extra-legal practices that emerged within the executive senior level of the mission. Only a few 
months into UNMIK’s mandate, the SRSG would use his vaguely defined (as to the legal basis, 
that is, Resolution 1244) but – in practice – self-interpreted and extended powers to carry out 
executive detentions. Already in August 1999, the SRSG passed a regulation that authorized 
UNMIK to temporally detain or restrict the freedom of movement of individuals to prevent ‘[a] 
threat to public peace and order [that] may be posed by any act that jeopardizes (a) the rule of 
law’209. Again, the vague wording and imprecision of international law – here UNMIK regulation 
1999/2 – would result in the SRSG’s reinterpretation of his own powers in using the regulation to 
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exercise preventive detentions of individuals and often for an indefinite period (Stahn 2010, 693). 
Somehow ironically, the purpose of the regulation was to sanction practices that would be in 
breach with the rule of law. The result of the regulation, however, was a new possible situation 
where the international executive would place himself beyond law’s rule in carrying out executive 
detentions.  
 In 2000, the same year as UNMIK deployed international judges and prosecutors in 
Kosovo’s judicial system, the SRSG began detaining individuals himself who had been released 
by a relevant judicial authority, even in the event of cases being adjudicated by a panel with a 
majority of international judges. In one instance, an international judge had ordered the release of 
a murder suspect, who had been detained by NATO’s Forces in Kosovo, KFOR. Despite the 
alleged independence of the judge in rendering this decision, the SRSG intervened in the case and 
continued the detention. The suspect was finally released after having been held for two years in 
detention due to insufficient evidence. In fact, the SRSG’s interference in the administration of 
justice was formalized and thus legitimized by the UN’s Office of the Legal Advisor in New York, 
who provided the SRSG with a guide to follow in order to decide on carrying out an executive 
detention or not (Marshall and Inglis 2003, 113). The guide instructed the SRSG and his 
international legal advisers in UNMIK’s OLA on how to maintain an executive detention in cases 
where UNMIK would consider that ‘there was a risk of judicial impropriety and misconduct’ 
(Marshall and Inglis 2003, 113). In the end, using his self-granted legislative powers, the SRSG 
promulgated a regulation, UNMIK regulation 2001/18 (‘On the Establishment of a Detention 
Review Commission for Extra-Judicial Detentions Based on Executive Orders’), that would 
effectively legalize and thereby legitimize his interference in justice.  
 The regulation was promulgated shortly before the SRSG had detained a group of 
Kosovo-Albanians who had been acquitted by a panel of a majority of international judges due to 
insufficient evidence. Despite the fact that international judges and prosecutors had been deployed 
in Kosovo’s courts with the passing of an UNMIK regulation by the SRSG to ensure that 
‘independence and impartiality’ should reign in the field of justice, a special chamber of judges - 
an ad-hoc quasi judicial organ - outside of Kosovo’s court system, whose members were 
appointed by the SRSG himself, would review the legality of the SRSG’s executive detentions, 
according to regulation 2001/18. The executive leadership of UNMIK had justified this practice 
by reassuring that two years after then end of the war, Kosovo would still qualify as an 
‘internationally-recognized emergency’ and, according to a press release by UNMIK, 
‘international human rights standards accept the need for special measures that, in the wider 
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interests of security, and under prescribed legal conditions, allow authorities to respond to the 
finding of intelligence that are not all to be presented to the court system’ (‘UNMIK Refutes 
Allegations of Judicial Bias and Lack of Strategy’, UNMIK News, 25 June 2001, quoted in 
Buchan 2013, 170). Again, international law – here international human rights standards – was 
interpreted to serve as the normative foundation for the exercise of the executive’s powers beyond 
law’s rule. This interpretation, indeed, reflects the ‘grey zone’ that the commission on the legality 
of NATO’s intervention had concluded that international humanitarianism is embedded in; a grey 
zone constructed around an ‘ambiguity’ of international law’s extension and international moral 
consensus.   
 In addition, the SRSG interpreted his mandate to also allow for the enactment of 
case-based executive decisions, which would precede the applicable laws in place. In 2004, for 
example, the SRSG intervened in a tender process carried out by Kosovo’s Telecommunication 
Regulatory Authority (TRA) by means of an executive decision to hinder the tender to the mobile 
phone operator, Mobikos. When the municipal court in Pristina ruled that the TRA should 
continue with the tender and that it was in compliance with the applicable law, UNMIK claimed 
that the court’s decision was null and void, ‘without any legal basis and non-enforceable [since it] 
disregarded the applicable law in Kosovo as established by the Executive Decision of the SRSG’ 
(UNMIK press release, 23 March 2004, quoted in Stahn 2010, 329). As a result of UNMIK’s 
intervention, the contract between the TRA and Mobikos was not executed (Everly 2007, 28). In 
justifying UNMIK’s intervention in the decision of the court, the mission referred in an UNMIK 
press release to its founding mandate, hence international law, and the legal authority it vested in 
the SRSG: ‘In issuing the Executive Decision, the SRSG was acting under the authority vested in 
him pursuant to the UN Security Council mandate under resolution 1244. In making such a 
determination the SRSG has full authority to issue an Executive Decision which has the force of 
law and is not subject to any challenges’ (UNMIK press release, 23 March 2004, quoted in Stahn 
2010, 329)210.  
 These practices of the SRSG, which began to exhibit a regular pattern, were 
increasingly contested by the OSCE and thus from within the bureaucratic bounds of UNMIK’s 
own administration. In subsequent reports the Ombudsperson (an institution created by the 
OSCE’s mission, mandated by the Resolution 1244, and thereby implicitly by the UN and 
international law) criticized UNMIK and the SRSG for breaching fundamental rule of law 
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principles. In a report entitled ‘The Conformity of Deprivations of Liberty under ‘Executive 
Orders’ with Recognised International Standards’ addressed to UNMIK’s SRSG, the 
Ombudsperson referred to complains by ‘a number of individuals’ over the ‘lawfulness of their 
deprivations of liberty’211. ‘These individuals have complained’, the report noted, ‘about the 
alleged lack of a legal basis for their detention, the failure of any governmental authority to inform 
them fully of the grounds of their detention, the lack of procedural mechanisms through which 
they can effectively challenge their continued detention, the lack of compensation for unlawful 
detention, and other similar issues’212. In referring to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and in ‘observ[ing] that no law 
currently in force in Kosovo provides for deprivations of liberty grounded solely on the discretion 
of the SRSG’213, the Ombudsperson concluded ‘that any deprivation of liberty by Executive Order 
of the [SRSG] cannot be considered to be lawful’214. What is more, the Ombudsperson – a Polish 
human rights lawyer – advanced another interpretation of the UNMIK regulation (regulation 
1999/1) that had stipulated that all executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested in 
UNMIK and exercised by the SRSG: ‘Respect for the rule of law requires the separation of 
powers, a principle that is also reflected in […] UNMIK Regulation N. 1999/1 […] which reads, 
‘All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the 
judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the [SRSG]’ (emphasis added). Neither this 
provision, nor any other legal provision applicable in Kosovo vests judicial authority in the 
SRSG’215. Therefore, the Ombudsperson continued, ‘the [SRSG] cannot be considered to be a 
judge or other judicial officer’216.  
 Indeed, this statement by the Ombudsperson demonstrates the extent to which the 
interpretation of UNMIK’s mandate – and the translation of the rule of law into a rule through 
international law – was contested within the mission itself. Whereas UNMIK’s senior executive 
had translated the regulation into an unbounded exercise of powers that effectively collapsed the 
boundary between what would pertain to law and what would pertain to politics, yet another 
translation of the rule of law was advanced within the bureaucratic bounds of the UN mission, one 
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in which law and politics was effectively separated. According to the latter translation, the powers 
granted the mission were vested in the whole administration, its various pillars and the possibility 
for overseeing and contesting the practices of the SRSG. Moreover, in his annual reports on 
UNMIK and the rule of law, the Ombudsperson would refer to UNMIK as a ‘government’, a 
‘state’ or a ‘surrogate state’217, as opposed to a mere technical, apolitical administration, which 
had to observe fundamental rule of law principles. This was in particular stressed in the context of 
the SRSG’s adoption of UNMIK regulation 2000/47 ‘On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of 
KFOR and UNMIK and their Personnel in Kosovo’, which provided that ‘UNMIK and KFOR, 
their property, funds and assets are immune from any form of legal process’218. The civilian and 
military powers governing post-conflict Kosovo were effectively placed beyond the law. A similar 
executive order was passed by the CPA in Iraq in 2003, according to which ‘[t]he MNF, CPA and 
Foreign Liaison Missions, their Personnel, property, funds and assets, and all International 
Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi legal process’219. In continuously referring to UNMIK as 
a ‘government’ ‘state’, the Ombudsperson stressed that ‘[t]he rationale for classical grants of 
immunity, however, does not apply to the circumstances prevailing in Kosovo, where [UNMIK] in 
fact acts as a surrogate state. It follows that the underlying purpose of a grant immunity does not 
apply as there is no need for a government to be protected against itself’220  
 In fact, neither Resolution 1244 nor the ‘military technical agreement’ NATO had 
signed with Serbia the day prior to the adoption of Resolution 1244 mentioned anything about 
KFOR undertaking legal or judicial responsibilities. However, KFOR translated its mandate rather 
loosely to also being concerned with such functions. Among KFOR’s functions – according to 
NATO itself - which mainly encompassed ensuring a secure environment for the return of 
refugees, KFOR was also responsible to ensure ‘support for the establishment of civilian 
institutions, law and order, the judicial and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of 
the political, economic and social life of Kosovo’221. Immediately after the end of the conflict, at a 
time when UNMIK was struggling to establish its presence, KFOR carried out several of the 
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functions that were part of UNMIK’s Pillar II on civil administration. Doing so, KFOR granted 
itself extra-judicial powers to arrest and imprison, without judgment, any individual who was 
suspected to be a threat to peace in Kosovo. Indeed, KFOR, which had grown rather impatient 
with UNMIK, would justify these extra-judicial practices by referring to the slow establishment of 
the UN police force, CIVPOL As noted by the KFOR commander, General Klaus Reinhardt, who 
served from October 1999 to April 2000, the military ‘ran the country, not the civilian 
organizations. The military were the kings, they [made] it happen’ (Reinhardt, quoted in Lemay-
Hebert 2011, 199). As asserted by the special assistant to the first SRSG, ‘[w]ith varying levels of 
diligence and dedication, soldiers acted as police. Military judges, defence lawyers and 
prosecutors made up the judiciary and jails were established and guarded by troops. A handover of 
these functions to UNMIK […] commenced rapidly with the timeline determined more by 
KFOR’s […] desire to relinquish these functions than [UNMIK’s] readiness to take them on’ 
(Hochschild 2004, 292). 
 Moreover, KFOR criticized UNMIK for administering a legal system that was ‘ill-
equipped to address illegal activity’ (Marshall and Inglis 2003, 117). In fact, the SRSG passed 
several regulations to provide a legal basis for KFOR’s executive detentions.222 However, despite 
the issuing of UNMIK regulations to legalize KFOR practices, KFOR continued to detain 
individuals without using the law or the purpose of criminal proceedings. What is more, KFOR 
maintained a parallel system to review its own detentions during the first period of UNMIK’s 
administrative rule (Marshall and Inglis 2003, 111). Already prior to NATO’s intervention, the 
organization had voiced its views on international law and legality. When NATO’s spokesperson 
during a press conference was confronted with the possibility that the contributing states to 
NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo war (among those, the US) could be held responsible for 
breaching international humanitarian law and therefore be investigated by the ICTY, he stressed 
the importance of ‘distinguish[ing] between the theoretical and the practical’223. According to the 
spokesperson, the ICTY prosecutor, Louise Arbour, whose office had assumed formal jurisdiction 
over Kosovo in March 1998, would only start her investigations ‘because we [NATO] will allow 
her to […] If her court, as we want, is to be allowed access, it will be because of NATO. So 
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NATO is the friend of the Tribunal’. 224 The boundary drawn between the theoretical and the 
practical - the ‘real world’ – seems to have been reenacted ‘on the ground’ by KFOR actors in 
justifying their extra-legal practices.  
 Finally, the independence of the judiciary in Kosovo in countering the immense 
powers of the SRSG became effectively contested a year into UNMIK’s mandate. In the beginning 
of 2000, several violent attacks by Kosovo-Albanians against Serbs in the town of Mitrovica 
constituted a pivotal moment in the UN’s administration of Kosovo. A number of Albanians had 
been arrested for their involvement in the attacks but had been acquitted by a Kosovo-Albanian 
judge despite admissible evidence. For that reason, UNMIK became increasingly concerned that 
ethnic biases and impartiality might have become a problem in the administration of justice. The 
majority of Serbian judges and prosecutors had either during or immediately after the war fled 
Kosovo or refused to serve in the post-war judicial system for security reasons. To ensure that 
cases involving Kosovo-Serbs would be adjudicated impartially, UNMIK used this single event to 
deploy an international judge and an international prosecutor in the district court in Mitrovica. The 
same year, the presence of international judges and prosecutors would increase with the passing of 
UNMIK regulation 2000/34 in May 2000. Subsequently, there would be one international judge 
deployed in each of Kosovo’s district courts and in the Supreme Court in Pristina. However, 
UNMIK would be faced with one important problem for its administration of the justice system. 
According to regulation 2000/34, serious crimes cases had to be heard by panels of two 
professional judges and three lay judges and with a majority voting. International judges would 
therefore often be outvoted by their local counterparts. The problem of impartiality was still 
pronounced among the local prosecutors, too, who were criticized for prosecuting Serbs based on 
contested evidence, whereas cases were dropped against Albanians even in the case of admissible 
evidence.  
 For that reason, another UNMIK regulation, regulation 2000/64, was passed in 
December 2000 which granted the SRSG the authority to establish three judges panels with a 
majority of international judges (the so-called ’64 panels’). The SRSG was authorized to decide on 
the composition of panels on which at least two out of three judges would be international judges, 
who were individually assigned to the case by the SRSG, and an international judge as the 
presiding judge - also assigned individually by the SRSG. What is more, international judges and 
prosecutors were subject – as UN staff in general – to six-month renewable contracts, which could 
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both be used as an instrument to shorten the term of a critical international judge, but also placed 
international judges outside the disciplinary mechanisms that would apply to local judges in 
relation to their proper administration of justice. Regulation 2000/64 also provided that case 
selection by international prosecutors was under the ultimate control of the SRSG. When a case 
had been allocated an international prosecutor by the SRSG, it could be tried on a ’64 panel’. 
Furthermore, according to another UNMIK regulation, an international prosecutor could reopen a 
case after a local prosecutor had abandoned it.225 
 The adjudication and ultimately the voting in the mixed panels could now be fully 
controlled by UNMIK and its executive. By imposing its own definition of the problem – that is, 
the impartiality and lack of independence in the judicial system – the executive within UNMIK 
had effectively locked in the judicial actors in specific roles to ensure that the mandate of UNMIK 
in promoting the rule of law could be effectively carried out. As noted by a former UNMIK judge, 
‘the three judges panels were decided upon for more practical reasons’226. To be sure, the thorny 
issue of impartial local judges had been replaced by a system in which there was no separation of 
powers between the international executive, the SRSG, and the judicial branch. By enacting a 
boundary between law and politics to safeguard the relative autonomy of law from impartial 
practices in the administration of justice, the international executive had effectively collapsed this 
boundary to render its own translation of the rule of law – a rule through international law – 
authoritarian.  
 Indeed, this outline of the various translations of the rule of law within the bounds of 
UN administration demonstrates the extent to which enacting the practical meaning of the rule of 
law evolved around enacting the boundary between law and politics and thereby juxtaposing these 
two functional fields in order to subsequently collapse the distinction to render one translation of 
the rule of law – in this case it was in particular ‘a rule through international law‘ - authoritarian 
and thus ‘fixed’. As noted by a Kosovo-Albanian senior legal advisor to the President:  
 
‘What I mind is actually that people, the international community in Kosovo, and I’m 
not saying that Kosovo society and the institutions are completely innocent, but I think 
we have missed a huge chance to learn what democracy is from the institutions that 
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were actually installed here and mandated to develop that mindset in the country by 
drafting legislation and by the way they managed the sectors’227 
 
DONORS’	JUSTICE	
 
A	Constitution	by	International	Decree	
 
 In March 2004, the worst outbreak of violence since the end of the war in 1999 
would result in a change in the international presence in Kosovo. The riots had been partly spurred 
by a ‘fatigue’ with international administration. Five years into UNMIK’s mandate, Kosovo’s 
population had grown increasingly discontent with its administrative role and the status quo in 
terms of the prospect of full statehood. The approval of UNMIK’s administration had in a public 
poll dropped from a high of nearly 64 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent during the spring 2004 
(Lemay-Hebert 2009, 68). However, the question as to who had the ultimate responsibility for 
breaching the fragile peace was contested among international and local actors. As recalled by a 
former staff with the OSCE’s mission in Kosovo:  
 
‘I remember in 2004 with the riots that occurred in March, I was back then with the 
OSCE mission working with human rights and the rule of law, and the locals were 
blaming internationals, internationals were blaming the locals. This blame game was 
so tremendous, so… it was a dead-end. Nobody wanted to take responsibility […] 
UNMIK had built this castle on sand and it just felt, everything collapsed’228 
 
 The growing opposition in Kosovo called for a political dialogue on Kosovo’s status. 
The following year, a Contact Group was established by France, Germany, the UK, the US and 
Russia to mediate the status talks between Pristina and Belgrade. The idea that Kosovo - after 
gaining its independence - should still fall under international supervision, albeit temporary, was 
flagged for the first time in a UN report in 2005: ‘Once the future status has been determined, an 
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international presence – military and civilian – will require the resources necessary to manage the 
implementation of the settlement in a stable and orderly way’229. The negotiations on the final 
status were initiated in 2005 with the appointment of former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, as 
the UN Special UN Envoy. After seven months of status talk, which had not led to any tangible 
outcomes, Ahtisaari began drafting a plan for the final status, which was guided by a consensus 
within the Contact Group that the final settlement on Kosovo’s statehood should be compatible 
with international standards of human rights, democracy and international law, ‘conform with 
democratic values and European standards and contribute to realizing the European perspective of 
Kosovo’230.  
    The Ahtisaari Plan would take the shape of a quasi-constitutional document, which 
laid out a range of ‘constitutional provisions’231 to be implemented directly into the governing 
structures of an independent Kosovo. In so doing, the Ahtisaari Plan made permanent a range of 
provisions of an UNMIK regulation from 2001, entitled a ‘Constitutional Framework, which had 
facilitated the establishment of local provisional institutions under the authority of the SRSG. 
However, the ‘Constitutional Framework’ was only meant as a temporary framework for the 
interim UN administration and had been drafted by international lawyers in UNMIK’s OLA and 
the US embassy in Pristina. The plan did not take any stand on Kosovo’s status issue, but in an 
attached report to the Security Council, the Special Envoy declared that due to the realities on the 
ground, Kosovo could not be reintegrated into Serbia.232 In consequence, the report recommended 
an internationally ‘supervised independence’ under the auspices of an International Civilian 
Representative (ICR).  
 During the summer 2007, Russia had blocked several Security Council resolutions 
that would finally solve Kosovo’s status issue and formalize the transfer of powers from UNMIK 
to the local provisional institutions that had been established in 2001 by the UN administration 
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and over which the SRSG had the ultimate executive and legal authority. The Security Council 
therefore never endorsed the Ahtisaari Plan and Resolution 1244 would, in consequence, stay in 
force after Kosovo’s UDI, which has created the situation described in the interlude to this 
chapter. In order to secure part of the international community’s support for its declaration of 
independence, Kosovo would recognize the authority of the Ahtisaari Plan over its own 
Constitution in its process of consolidating its newly gained statehood. In the UDI, Kosovo’s 
Assembly therefore confirmed its commitment to the Ahtisaari Plan and its fundamental principles 
that reflected the content of the UNMIK regulation from 2001 on a constitutional framework: 
 
‘[T]he recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari provide Kosovo with 
a comprehensive framework for its future development and are in line with the 
highest European standards of human rights and good governance […] We shall 
implement in full those obligations [‘for Kosovo contained in the Ahtisaari Plan’] 
including through priority adoption of the legislation included in its Annex XII […] 
We shall adopt as soon as possible a Constitution that enshrines our commitment to 
respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all our citizens, particularly as 
defined by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution shall 
incorporate all relevant principles of the Ahtisaari Plan’233           
 
 With Kosovo’s endorsement of the Ahtisaari Plan an International Civilian Office 
(ICO) was established and an International Civilian Representative (ICR) was appointed by an 
‘International Steering Group’ (ISG)234. The ICR was mandated to oversee the implementation of 
the Ahtisaari Plan and had the final authority as to the interpretation of its provisions (the 
international supervision ended in September 2012). In addition, the Ahtisaari Plan provided that 
the ICR should ‘[t]ake corrective measures to remedy, as necessary, any actions taken by the 
Kosovo authorities that the ICR deems to be a breach of this Settlement, or seriously undermine 
the rule of law, or to be otherwise inconsistent with the terms or spirit of this Settlement; such 
corrective measures may include, but are not limited to, annulment of laws or decisions adopted 
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by Kosovo authorities’235. According to the Plan, corrective measures taken by the ICR would 
include ‘[…] the authority to sanction or remove from office any public official’236. The ICR 
therefore had the ultimate authority in the new state with the prerogative to annul laws lawfully 
passed by Kosovo’s Assembly which derived its powers from the newly adopted constitution or to 
remove public officials from office. The ICR was effectively placed above Kosovo’s laws. The 
international rule through law was complete as the source of the ultimate authority in Kosovo was, 
consequently, external to the new state. The legislative acts outlined in the Ahtisaari Plan’s Annex 
XII were 41 state-forming laws, which were to be adopted immediately after the UDI by Kosovo’s 
Assembly. However, the laws were passed in a way where they would not be subject to debates in 
Kosovo’s Assembly and they were all ‘filtered by the ICO’237.   
 The Ahtisaari Plan had explicitly provided that a constitutional commission should 
be established as soon the Plan was endorsed by the members of the ISG and a constitution should 
be approved by the Assembly 120 days after. In the Annex I of the Ahtisaari Plan, a range of 
‘constitutional provisions’ were laid out which should be included ‘directly’ in the final 
constitution. Since the end of the war, local political actors, in particular related to the PDK, the 
party that had been established by ex-KLA members, and the LDK, headed by Ibrahim Rugova 
who had been the de facto leader of the Kosovo-Albanians and the parallel structures in the 1990s, 
had ready-made constitutional drafts. When the process of constitution-making was initiated after 
the Ahtisaari Plan had been finalized 2007, draft constitutions were therefore presented by local 
political leaders and a constitutional convention had been planned to be constituted without any 
involvement from the international community. Yet, the organization of roundtables on the 
drafting of the constitution by, in particular, the US Embassy and the OSCE mission in Kosovo 
was an effective attempt to keep the process within the realm of the ‘international community’ 
(Weller 2009, 246).  
 In the final text of Kosovo’s Constitution as it was adopted on April 8, 2008, it was 
clear that a certain degree of ‘constitutional spill-over’ had been taking place from UNMIK’s 2001 
regulation and the Ahtisaari Plan, often word for word. Three US advisors, among those, Judge 
Tunheim, were appointed by the USAID to assist in the constitution-drafting process, which was 
‘tightly managed by the US mission in Prishtina’ (Weller 2009, 240). According to one of the 
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legal advisors, the Ahtisaari Plan was implemented directly in the constitution: ‘as a matter of fact, 
all of us, internationals and locals, agreed, after the refusal by Russia, that we would include every 
provision of the plan in the constitution […] [t]he Constitutional Commission made every effort to 
make the Constitution fully compliant with the Ahtisaari plan’238. As a consequence, the 
constitution did not emanate from a thorough constitutional deliberation but from prior quasi-
constitutional documents, which had been heavily influenced by the involvement of international 
lawyers.  
 In Kosovo’s Constitution, as it was adopted in April 2008, its article 16 provides that 
‘[t]he Constitution is the highest legal act of the Republic of Kosovo. Laws and other legal acts 
shall be in accordance with this Constitution’ (Art. 16; emphasis added). However, according to its 
article 143, the Ahtisaari Plan is the supra-superior law of Kosovo. The Constitution recognizes 
that ‘[t]he provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement dated 26 
March 2007 shall take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo’ (Art. 143.2) and 
‘[t]he Constitution, laws and other legal acts of the Republic of Kosovo shall be interpreted in 
compliance with the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’ (Art. 143.3). In 
addition, in line with the Ahtisaari Plan, the Constitution grants a significant amount of power to 
the ICR. In law drafting, the local legislator has to use the ICR’s interpretation of the Ahtisaari 
Plan, which is ultimate: ‘Notwithstanding any provision of this Constitution, the International 
Civil Representative shall, in accordance with the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement dated 26 March 2007, be the final authority on Kosovo regarding interpretation of the 
civilian aspects of the said Comprehensive Proposal. No Republic of Kosovo authority shall have 
jurisdiction to review, diminish or otherwise restrict the mandate, powers and obligations referred 
to in Article 146 and this Article’ (Art. 147; emphasis added)’. The boundary between 
international law and constitutional law, as a result, had effectively been collapsed in the ultimate 
location of international law over the constitutional law of the new state. Kosovo’s Constitution – 
similar to the Constitution of the BiH which had been an annex to the Dayton Peace Agreement 
and thus entered into force when the agreement was signed – became a constitution by 
international decree.  
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“A	Pissing	Contest”:	Making	Laws	in	Kosovo	
 
 The rule of international law mutated into a dispersed rule of international lawyers 
after the UDI in 2008. In the period from 1999 to 2008, law-making had primarily been carried out 
within the bureaucratic bounds of UNMIK, the DJA and the SRSG’s OLA. Whereas the decider of 
last resort had ultimately been the SRSG and his international legal advisors, law-drafting has after 
the UDI turned into a veritable rule of no-one and everyone to the extent that the ‘legal chaos’ that 
prevailed during UNMIK has been replicated. Moreover, following its declaration of 
independence, the adoption of national laws by Kosovo’s Assembly was understood as an 
enactment of its newly gained sovereignty. New national legislation was therefore prepared in a 
rather hasty manner without any legal review or deliberation in Kosovo’s Assembly, which has 
added to the plurality of sources and thus inconsistency within Kosovo’s legal framework. 
UNMIK regulations, in particular, were often used as a ‘template’ for new laws239 or simply 
passed with the only amendment being the title of the regulation, which would then be adopted 
word for word.240 As stressed by a Kosovo-Albanian senior legal advisor to Kosovo’s President:  
 
‘Now in my current capacity I come to see more of these laws being enacted and I have 
to say, really, they are in a tremendous [dreadful] state. But what can you do? Can you 
stop state-building completely? This is it. We have to draft now laws and enact them in 
order to rewrite them again and amend them again in a year’s time probably because 
you can have a new law that defines all the criteria and in the end it doesn’t talk about 
sanctions. It says, you know, ‘former sanctions are applicable’, which ones? I mean you 
[referring to international donors] drafted the law. How can former ones then be 
applicable? These kinds of legal nonsense, legal gaps and vacuums… It is just 
impossible’241 
 
 Today, more than seven years after Kosovo’s UDI, law-making still takes place in 
working groups which sometimes consist of up to six different international donors with mandates 
that would in most cases diverge. Consequently, local actors are often marginalized. Law-making 
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and the wordings of laws are, as a result, frequently domesticated to suit the mandates, norms and 
beliefs about the legality of the various ‘translators’, that is, international donors. For instance, 
four laws related to the justice system, which entered into force on January 1, 2013, were fully 
drafted within a working group consisting of only international legal advisors representing 
different international institutions, as it was considered that these laws were ‘too important to hand 
over to the locals’242. As noted by the legal advisor to Kosovo’s President, ‘we have a completely 
different court system now which is pretty much based on the US model’243. The complete 
absence of coordination between the different international donors has led to a great extent of 
duplication of donor projects. Lack of coordination, conflicting mandates and duplication of rule 
of law development projects have even been a problem between the European Commission’s 
Liaison Office in Kosovo (ECLO) and EULEX. According to an international lawyer working in 
EULEX, this has created a situation of ‘almost competition [within the working groups] between 
advisors from the Department of Justice from the US, USAID advisors, and ECLO who would 
bring in twinning experts only for a short period of time, and then you would have our legal 
advisors […] who are here on a permanent basis, so coordination is not perfect among these 
external advisors’244.  
 Two of the largest donors are the European Commission and the US. Yet, in a report 
by the EU’s Court of Auditors published four years after Kosovo’s independence, it was noted that 
‘[t]he EU institutions have made significant efforts to coordinate with the USA which is the 
largest bilateral donor in Kosovo. Nonetheless it remains difficult to achieve full co-ordination 
given the wide range of US actors involved in Kosovo in the rule of law field. Co-ordination is 
particularly challenging in the drafting of legislation, where the USA is very active despite 
Kosovo’s interest in adopting the EU acquis communautaire and the fact that Kosovo’s legal 
framework is based on European Continental Law’245. The prospect of a future membership of the 
European Union has led Kosovo on to the path of European integration which means the appliance 
with the EU acquis communautaire and thus new extensive reforms of the existing legal 
framework. Potential membership of the European Union has been a guiding light for the ongoing 
reforms. ‘The reason for EU’s presence in Kosovo is no longer the issue of securing its own 
backyard […] Now the issue of Kosovo is more an issue of EU integration’, according to a staff 
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with EULEX, ‘and we have to remember we are doing state-building here’246 (which indeed 
contradicts the EU’s mission mandate which derives its legal force from Resolution 1244 and 
therefore does not recognize Kosovo’s statehood). The annual progress reports of the European 
Commission has been a means to speed up the reform process, providing assessments of Kosovo’s 
preparation of EU membership in particular as to whether Kosovo’s legislation complies with the 
EU acquis and ‘European standards’ in general. In June 2012, the European Commission also 
launched the process of integrating Kosovo in the Schengen area and thus to secure Kosovo 
citizens visa-free travel. The ‘Roadmap for Visa Liberalization’ consists of 95 criteria that Kosovo 
has to fulfill, whereas several criteria aim at adopting and implementing new legislation. Both the 
annual EU progress reports and the ‘visa roadmap’ are perceived as ‘checklists’ that have to be 
complied with as soon as possible. As a consequence, a proper needs assessment and political 
deliberative processes towards lawmaking have often been left out.  
 Indeed, the EU progress reports are one of the main reasons why Kosovo’s 
Assembly has passed laws in a rather quick manner without much deliberation nor concern for 
how new laws impact on already existing laws. As a result, legal and procedural transparency and 
participation in law-making have largely been sacrificed in order to realize the ‘European agenda’ 
and, ironically, ‘European standards’ for democracy, good governance and the rule of law. The 
progress report is published in October every year. Therefore, in order to improve the 
shortcomings identified in the report the previous year (and to demonstrate ‘progress’), the 
Assembly has to pass the new laws by July. Otherwise, the adoption of new legislation would not 
be mentioned in the progress report published in October the same year. In consequence, a proper 
debate on the content of laws in the Assembly is not prioritized due to the EU’s reporting system. 
And relevant civil society actors are seldom consulted as there would be no time for dialogue. 
There is therefore a tendency to adopt laws by ‘urgent procedure’, as everything has to be finished 
by end of July. Indeed, ‘whereas urgent procedure should be the exception, it has now become the 
rule’247.  
 The majority of the European Commission’s legal projects in Kosovo have been 
implemented by TAIEX and twinning experts, who provide short-term or long-term ‘technical 
assistance’, respectively, to ‘beneficiary countries’ and who are seconded by ministries of EU 
Member States. The general trend, which has been termed the ‘parachuting syndrome’248 among 
                                                
246 Interview with EULEX Program Officer, EULEX HQs, Pristina 
247 Interview with Legal Advisor, OSCE Mission, Legal System Monitoring Unit, Pristina  
248 Interview with Kosovo-Albanian Judge, Constitutional Court, Pristina, Kosovo;  
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legal actors in Kosovo, has been that international lawyers work in Pristina for a few weeks on a 
specific legal provision according to their mandate, without any prior knowledge of the social 
environment and a comprehensive view of the whole legal framework. As was also the case 
during UNMIK, often when a provision has been changed other provisions in affected laws are not 
being changed accordingly. The focus has often been on new reforms and thus new primary 
legislation instead of ensuring secondary legislation and a proper implementation of laws. The 
inconsistencies of laws, the focus on new primary legislation and the general lack of capacity in 
Kosovo institutions as well as of a lack of a public support to new reforms have led to serious 
shortcomings in the implementation of laws. 
 
‘If you look at the whole kind of legal base, the whole legislation in Kosovo, you will 
see that it combines very different legal traditions, or different legal practices, if you 
want. And I can easily say that 99 % of the laws have been drafted by internationals 
but in the worst cases they are just copies of, you know, kind of imported copies of 
other countries’ legislation and if you look at the totality of the legislation, you can see 
why they cannot be implemented’249 
 
 The US, in particular, plays an important political and legal role in post-UDI 
Kosovo. To give an idea of the popularity of the US in Kosovo: the main road in Pristina is named 
Bill Clinton Boulevard. It intersects with George Bush Boulevard and where the two boulevards 
cross each other there is a 3.5 meters tall statue of Bill Clinton, which was unveiled in 2009. On 
Kosovo’s independence day, 17 February, US and British flags are on sale everywhere along the 
main pedestrian street in Pristina. Hardly any Kosovo flags are to be seen that day. On 
Thanksgiving Day, the whole city is couched in American flags, too. As noted by a Kosovo-
Albanian advisor within the Office of Kosovo’s President:  
 
 ‘They [the US] really want to have Kosovo as a state not ‘failed’. This is their project 
because with the heavy support of the US everything with Kosovo happened: NATO 
bombardment, independence, all of that. So they really want to see this country succeed, 
which is fine. We want that, too’250 
                                                                                                                                                          
Interview with EC Legal Advisor, EC Liaison Office, Pristina 
249 Interview with Deputy Programme Manager, DFID, Pristina 
250 Interview with UNDP Legal Advisor, Office of the President, Pristina 
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 Due to its extended involvement in law-making after the UDI, the US embassy in 
Pristina is called the country’s ‘Ministry of Justice bis’ among international staff deployed with 
EULEX251. Moreover, the now former US ambassador in the period from 2009 to 2012, 
Christopher W. Dell, was commonly referred to as the ‘real President of Kosovo’ or the ‘prime 
minister’ of Kosovo because of his interference with the internal affairs of Kosovo’s government 
and of having picked and pushed for the election of Kosovo’s current President, who is elected by 
a vote in Kosovo’s Assembly. In fact, several US diplomats who were involved in NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 have been privately engaged in the private sector in post-
intervention Kosovo by placing bids on tenders related to large infrastructure projects. When there 
was a tender on Kosovo’s largest company, the state telecommunications company, in 2012, 
Albright Capital Management owned by the former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, 
was shortlisted. Another example is Wesley Clark, the NATO Commander leading the NATO 
bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo back in 1999, is chairman for a Canadian energy 
company, Envidity, which placed a bid on a company on Kosovo’s mining sector in the process of 
privatizing this sector. As noted by an interviewee, a Kosovo-Albanian legal advisor of DFID, 
when I asked about whether the extended role of the US in law-making was following a ‘logic’ of 
creating political stability:   
 
‘I think ‘political stability’ has become a buzzword. I mean, it means different things 
to different people. For Ambassador Dell, for instance, political stability means that he 
has the same counterparts in the government, that he has exactly the same coalition 
government. And that he doesn’t even have the need to change his phone book, you 
know, the same contacts in order to maintain the same level of influence’252 
 
 The US assistance in rule of law promotion in Kosovo has mainly been carried out 
through its development agency, USAID, and two specific units within the US Department of 
Justice, the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development (OPDAT) and the Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). In addition, US organizations, such as the 
American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) have been 
extensively involved in rule of law reforms in Kosovo since 1999. The ABA established already in 
                                                
251 Interview with EULEX Prosecutor (4), Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office, Pristina 
252 Interview with Deputy Programme Manager, DFID, Pristina 
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1999 an office in Pristina in which US legal advisors would assist the legal drafting within 
UNMIK’s four pillars. Furthermore, several US legal advisors from the USAID and ICITAP 
would work on a permanent basis within UNMIK’s DJA.253  The story goes among international 
actors in Pristina that Kosovo’s current criminal code was drafted by a US lawyer in the US 
Department of Justice. When she presented the code to the relevant local actors in Kosovo’s 
Government on a power point, the provisions in the code that could be changed were marked in 
green, those that could be negotiated were marked in yellow, and the provisions that could 
absolutely not be changed nor discussed were marked in red. The same US advisor was also 
present in the working group in which the new amendments of the criminal code were negotiated. 
During the meetings, she sat next to Kosovo’s Minister of Justice. However, she made sure to 
stress that the criminal code should not be an US code:  
 
‘But again, I wanna emphasize: This isn’t an American code. We do not want to...you 
know… you look at our practices but you need to adopt a code that works for Kosovo, 
based on Kosovo decisions [said in a tone that indicated that this phrase had been 
repeated many times before] The important thing is: your code need to be EU 
compliant, not American compliant. And if the EU doesn’t have a specific standard or a 
specific requirement, it is a Kosovo decision. So, well, American practices may be 
interesting, you should not follow them, you know, you can use them for your 
ratification, but, you know, follow EU directives’254 
 
 Indeed, these practices are not exceptional to Kosovo but were also present during 
the international administration of BiH in the late 1990s. The following quote is by an EULEX 
judge who worked as an international judge within the War Crimes Chamber, a hybrid court, in 
the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina:  
 
‘Often what happens is, on these projects, they send somebody over for six months. 
Often they are not law draftsmen. They are simply academics or they are people who 
have been working in another international mission. And they sort of decide to change 
the law. It happened in Bosnia with a lawyer, an American lawyer, who was from 
                                                
253 Interview with Legal Advisor (3), UNMIK HQs, Pristina 
254 From my participant observation of the negotiations within the working group on amending the 
criminal code (on record) 
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Alaska. And if you compare the Bosnian criminal code and criminal procedural code, 
you will see remarkable similarities with the Alaskan criminal law’255 
 
 In particular, the criminal code and criminal procedure code as well as the Law on 
Border Management have been a prime concern for international donors. For that reason, these 
laws have been drafted with a marginal local involvement. The drafting of the Law on Integrated 
Border/Boundary Management (IBM) (the law is commonly referred to as the law on IBM by 
international actors in order to not endorse the statehood of Kosovo to which the ‘border’ in the 
law’s title aspires) turned into an veritable battle between US legal advisors and EU legal advisors. 
The law was of great importance to international institutions and the control over the lawmaking 
process by international actors was therefore significant. The US Department of Justice, through 
ICITAP, would take the lead on the law drafting together with the EU. The EU had a clear 
mandate to align the Law on IBM with the EU Schengen standards, as Kosovo had become part of 
the EU’s Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP), which is a preparatory framework for EU 
membership. However, the mandate of ICITAP was to ‘develop the government of Kosovo’s 
(GOK) ability to effectively manage and control its borders in accordance with international 
standards and assist with the development of institutions to manage immigration, asylum, and 
citizenship’256. The ‘international standards’, which ICITAP was mandated to implement, were 
effectively US standards for border management. Consequently, the Law on IBM constitutes a 
mix of US (‘international’) and EU standards for regulating border management in substantial 
areas such as personal data protection. Shortly after, the law had to be changed again to comply 
with the criteria for visa liberalization laid out by the European Commission. To this end, both the 
European Commission and EULEX were implementing projects in Kosovo to establish an 
intelligence system within Kosovo’s police. However, even within the institutional bounds of 
EU’s own actors was there lack of any coordination. The project of the European Commission 
supported the establishment of a separate so-called ‘Border and Boundary Police’ intelligent 
system, whereas the EULEX project was establishing single intelligence system within Kosovo’s 
police.    
                                                
255 Interview with EULEX Judge (1), Peja District Court, Kosovo  
256 United States Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistnce 
Program (ICITAP),Program Management Plan for Kosovo (2009), at 5 (emphasis added) 
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 ‘Everything is urgent’, according to international judge with EULEX when he 
describes the general attitude among international donors.257 Referring to a situation where he was 
told to comment on a law the same day, the judge notes: ‘There are laws that are to be in place for 
probably the next decade. And, yet, they were only willing to give me 24 hours to consider them. 
And then of course people seem surprised when things get screwed up’258. The diverging 
mandates of international donors have often resulted in protracted struggles within the working 
groups. According to the same judge, who took part in the working group in charge of drafting the 
new criminal code, the working group turned into ‘a pissing contest between the Americans and 
the Europeans’259: 
 
‘As normally happens in any law that has been introduced by the international 
community is that you end up with a compromise. So, you start up with what might 
actually be quite a good idea. Then it goes through various different working groups, 
different people end up getting involved and stuff. They want to contribute something 
and then, in order to kind of end up with a final product, you invariably have to 
compromise. And so, you often end up with not the best product but something you 
have reached by way of compromise. And that to me is not a good way of making 
law’260 
  
Conclusion:	Contested	Translations	of	the	Rule	of	Law	
 
 Moving from the discursive construction of the rule of law in UN intervention 
discourses to the realm of practice where the practical meaning of the rule of law is made and 
enacted by various vested actors provides another and more gloomy picture of the promises made 
in the name of the rule of law. Indeed, the belief in the rule of law as a yardstick for progress and a 
concept that encompasses principles of legal certainty, transparency in law-making, equality 
before the law, and the supremacy of law, as well as the separation of powers, were all principles 
that were largely discarded once the UN established its rule over the domestic legal in post-
intervention Kosovo. Ironically, the rule of law had been invoked as a fundamental norm to be 
                                                
257 Interview with EULEX Judge (I), Peja, Kosovo 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid. 
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safeguarded and thus fought for in the event of NATO’s humanitarian intervention. However, the 
version – or versions – of the rule of law that saw the day after the intervention would effectively 
contradict seemingly taken-for-granted and shared understandings of what the rule of law is or 
should be.  
 The chapter demonstrated, first, that the storied rule of law vacuum that has 
reverberated through UN and EU intervention discourses was practically created by international 
actors themselves, who would justify their authority in the domestic legal by enacting an unruly 
present that derives from past legal and political practices in a post-conflict state. Indeed, the 
recourse to the discourse of a legal vacuum was performative of enacting and juxtaposing a gap 
between law and politics, where law was assigned to the international administrators and (local) 
politics was to be tamed by law. In bridging this gap, UNMIK actors engaged in an immense 
process of law-making, passing UNMIK regulations that would restructure the legal framework of 
the post-conflict country. Doing so, legal vacuums were created by international actors themselves 
as the applicable law would be marked by inconsistencies as to its sources, conflicting 
interpretations among local and international actors, and no oversight in the legal reform work 
undertaking by the relevant units within UNMIK. Translating the rule of law into a rule through 
international law by juxtaposing law and politics authorized international actors to impose this 
translation through domesticating the meaning of the rule of law to serve the function – the 
mandate – of the UN mission and the extended powers of its executive.  
 Secondly, the chapter demonstrated that the translation of the rule of law into a rule 
through international law also authorized other international actors within the administrative 
bounds created by the mission’s mandate to impose their translation of the rule of law. Kosovo’s 
Ombudsperson, an institution created by the OSCE mission and thus implicitly by UNMIK as the 
OSCE would derive its legal mandate from Resolution 1244, would espouse another version of the 
rule of law, where UNMIK was described as a ‘state’ that could not be immune within its own 
jurisdiction and thus had to obey rule of law principles, such as the separation of powers. Within 
KFOR, the rule of law was a matter of law enforcement and the slow establishment of UNMIK’s 
civilian police force was used as a justification to engage in extra-judicial practices. Finally, the 
SRSG used the rule of international law – the prerogatives assigned to him by international law – 
to continuously reinterpret his mandate as well as human rights law to justify his extra-legal 
practices, too. These different translations of the rule of law within the international administration 
demonstrate how law was both enabling and constraining different translations of how law should 
rule. These translations demonstrate that the condition of the (im)possibility of the rule of law 
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derives from practices of simultaneously enacting and collapsing the boundary between law and 
politics - the meaning of which depends on partial perspectives in contingent contexts and 
therefore on the politics of translating. This demonstrates that the turn to constitutional norms and 
structures within the UN administration resulted in international law’s fragmentation across 
dispersed practices of international administrators. International law’s constitutionalization and its 
fragmentation are therefore not two opposite processes but deeply embedded in one another and 
mutually constitutive. The constitutionalization of IOs, according to Klabbers (2004), might result 
in more fragmentation as ‘competing regimes and organizations will be firmly locked in 
constitutional place and battle with each other’ (24).  
 Finally, in reconstructing early practices of translating the rule of law into a rule 
through international law, the chapter demonstrated the permanence and ‘afterlife’ of this 
translation in turning to how the boundary between international law and constitutional law was 
effectively collapsed at the event of Kosovo’s UDI (to which the situation in the interlude 
testifies). However, one significant change in the rule through international law, which during 
UNMIK had been primarily vested in the SRSG, was the emergence of a veritable rule of 
everyone and no-one within the legal field in Kosovo after 2008. Whereas the political locus had 
moved from the state level to UNMIK in the period from 1999 to 2008, which was reflected in the 
instrumental approach to law-making, it became dispersed across various sites of international 
multi- and bilateral sites of authority within the domestic legal after Kosovo declared its 
independence. In the following chapter, I move to one of these actors described in the last part of 
this chapter, that is, the EU’s rule of law mission in order to reconstruct how three fundamentally 
different translations of the rule of law emerged and were enacted within the mission. This move 
takes off in a cinema in Pristina in April 2013.   
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INTERLUDE:	PRACTICES	
 
Setting:	 Day	 2	 of	 the	 re-trial	 of	 the	 Kosovo	 politician,	 Fatmir	 Limaj,	 and	 nine	 other	 ex-Kosovo	
Liberation	 Army	 (KLA)	 fighters	 for	 alleged	 war	 crimes	 against	 Kosovo-Albanian	 civilians	 and	
Serbian	prisoners	of	war	in	the	town	Klecka	in	Kosovo.		
19	April	2013,	Pristina	District	Court,	ABC	Cinema,	Pristina	
Background	to	the	case:	In	the	first	trial	ten	KLA-fighters,	including	Limaj	(whose	nom	de	guerre	
was	‘Steel’),	had	been	acquitted	by	the	District	Court	of	Pristina.	The	EULEX	prosecutor	assigned	
to	the	case	then	filed	an	appeal	against	the	verdict.	A	mix	panel	presided	by	an	EULEX	judge	in	
Kosovo’s	Supreme	Court	 reviewed	 the	appeal	and	ordered	a	 retrial	against	 Limaj	and	 the	nine	
other	 defendants.	 The	 Klecka	 case	 has	 received	 widespread	 attention	 in	 Kosovo	 because	 of	
Limaj,	a	former	and	very	popular	minister	in	Kosovo	and	the	main	political	rival	of	the	then	Prime	
Minister	 of	 Kosovo,	 Hashim	 Thaci.	 Limaj	 has	 previously	 been	 charged	 and	 acquitted	 for	 war	
crimes	by	 the	 International	Criminal	Tribunal	 for	 the	Former	Yugoslavia	 (ICTY)	 in	2005.	But	 the	
attention	granted	the	Klecka	case	also	follows	from	the	evidence	admitted	in	the	case.	The	core	
witness	in	the	case	–	‘witness	X’	–	committed	suicide	in	Germany	in	October	2011	whilst	he	was	
allegedly	under	the	witness	protection	of	EULEX.	During	the	war,	‘witness	X’	had	been	a	guard	in	
KLA’s	prison	 in	the	village	of	Klecka,	Kosovo,	where	he	had	kept	a	secret	diary,	noting	down	in	
detail	names	and	personal	information	of	the	prisoners,	who	had	been	executed	on	the	orders	of	
Limaj,	the	lead	commander	of	KLA’s	prison	in	Klecka.		
 
[The following text is an excerpt of field notes taken during my observation of the retrial. I have 
inserted an explanatory note in brackets] 
 
 “ABC cinema is full of people today. One of the two cinemas in Kosovo has 
practically been turned into a courtroom of a semi-international court. The purpose is the retrial of 
the defendants in the Klecka case. Limaj is here with nine other defendants. One of the defendants 
is the regional director of the police in Prizren. I sit only a few rows from the defense counsel and 
their defendants. The cinema seats are quite comfortable and the lighting in the room a bit dark. It 
feels indeed as being in the cinema. On stage - in front of the red curtain - is seated the panel of 
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three judges and a secretary, facing ‘the audience’. Two of them are international judges from 
EULEX, one of them is the presiding judge in the case hearing. The hearing is held in both 
English and Albanian. Limaj has two defense lawyers. One of them is the British lawyer, Karim 
Ahmed Khan. I have heard about him a few times before in Pristina [Khan is a specialist in 
international criminal law, has previously worked in the ICTY in The Hague and has served in 
defense councils in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and East Timor. He was the leader of Charles Taylor’s 
defense team]. He is a world-class international defense lawyer. Salustro is EULEX’s prosecutor 
in the case. The presence of one international defense lawyer demonstrates how international 
justice has mainly been a matter of international judges and prosecutors. Why does EULEX only 
deploy prosecutors and judges but no lawyers for the defense councils?  
 The whole set-up is a bit absurd. Limaj is one of the ‘big fishes’ EULEX wants to 
catch and the court hearing today indeed looks like a stage-trial. There is a crowd of journalists, 
photographers and police outside of the cinema. The court proceedings are very slow because of 
the translator. The prosecutor and the presiding judge have to speak very slowly, one sentence at a 
time so it can be properly translated into Albanian. The presiding judge asks the defense counsel: 
‘Do you accept the composition and jurisdiction of the court?’. The defendants are trying to get 
released from house detention. One of the defense lawyers claims that ‘his client’s wife lost 
twelve family members during the war and it is therefore stressful for him to be home with her’ 
and that ‘he would therefore have to bring his wife to her remaining family’. Another defendant 
says that he wants to be released from house detention as the police station is on the way to his 
work and he could therefore report daily when he would go to work. Another defendant says in his 
defense that he is looking after the family and three orphans of another man who had been killed 
during the war. Spring has arrived so he needs to work on his land.  
 According to the defense, another EULEX prosecutor had provided Salustro with 
seventeen reports [new evidence] in the case in March [a month prior to this retrial]. The evidence 
in the case has been disputed after the suicide of ‘witness X’ and the verdict of the District Court 
in Pristina that asserted that the evidence provided by the EULEX prosecutor was not admissible. 
According to Limaj’s defense lawyer, the defense council has not been presented this new 
evidence which demonstrates ‘that the prosecution did not hold the sincere belief that Limaj would 
not interfere in the administration of justice. If the belief had been held they would have told about 
the reports before’. ‘We received this document yesterday evening’, said the defense lawyer of 
Limaj, ‘such an approach in litigation is not consistent with a fair approach to be expected from 
prosecutors – especially not from an EULEX prosecutor, who should be a model for a young 
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country’. ‘There is no separation of prosecution authorities in Kosovo, and only one chief 
prosecutor is responsible for all the prosecutors’.  
 According to Limaj’s defense lawyer: ‘There is a risk that observers could think 
there is an imperative to lock up Fatmir Limaj, come what may’. Limaj’s defense had wanted Troy 
Wilkinson to be part of the defense. [Troy Wilkinson is a former EULEX organized crime 
investigator who gave an interview to the local media in Kosovo in which he stated that the 
investigations EULEX had begun against Limaj did not have any evidence base. According to 
Wilkinson, the Chief Prosecutor of EULEX had put pressure on the investigation team and he had 
therefore voiced in the interview that the investigations of Limaj followed a political agenda]. The 
defense referred to the statements published in local media in August 2011, which were related to 
the French Chief Prosecutor of EULEX, who allegedly had said that she wanted ‘Fatmir’s head’ 
and ‘I want Limaj locked up come what may’. According to Limaj’s defense, the Chief Prosecutor 
and Salustro had under cover of a corruption warrant investigated a war crimes case. Limaj has 
become a ‘whipping horse’ so the international executive can show that they are fighting 
corruption, the defense lawyer says, ‘it is important in a country that is supposed to be 
independent, first under UNMIK and then EULEX, to give guarantee to a foreign court’ and ‘the 
international community holds the undertakings and the guarantees of EULEX in such a low 
regard that one can hope that they pull themselves up to a brighter future’. The presiding judge 
asks Salustro about the issue with the new evidence. Salustro answers that he is ‘tired of Limaj’ 
and ‘all the personal attacks’, ‘let’s talk about the evidence and the substance, and not procedure. 
There are no problems with the procedure. So it’s not technical, it is personal”. 
 
[On September 17, 2013, all ten defendants in the Klecka case were acquitted due to insufficient 
evidence in the case] 
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Chapter	7 
“VILLAGE	JUSTICE”:	TRANSLATING	LAW’S	RULE,	TAMING	ITS	MEANING	
Introduction:	Turning	the	Inside	Out	
 
 Given its ambiguity how is the rule of law translated in and through everyday 
practices within an international mission mandated to promote the rule of law through the 
deployment of judges and prosecutors in a post-conflict country? Since 2000, international judges 
and prosecutors have been deployed in several post-conflict countries to investigate and adjudicate 
in criminal cases. In 2000, the UN established internationalized courts in both Kosovo and East 
Timor during its administration. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) were established by the UN in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively. And in 2003, a War Crimes Chamber (WCC) staffed with international judges and 
prosecutors was established within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to try cases 
transferred from the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). These 
internationalized courts differ from the ICTY and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 
being grafted onto the domestic legal order and thus represent a ‘second generation’ of 
international criminal tribunals (see Shraga 2004), commonly referred to as ‘hybrid courts’.  
 The proliferation of international courts has been praised for their contribution to a 
more just global order in which rule of law principles are shared and observed by a ‘community of 
courts’ (Slaughter 2004, 68). Hybrid courts, in particular, have been recognized for their 
contribution to the exchange of experience and knowledge between international and local actors 
(Dickinson 2003a, 1070; see also Dickinson 2003b). International lawyers within hybrid courts 
might be more sensitive to ‘local approaches to justice’, as opposed to purely international courts, 
and processes of ‘cross-fertilization of international and domestic norms’ are therefore potentially 
more successful within these courts (Dickinson 2003a, 307; see also Higonnet 2005). In the case 
of Kosovo, for instance, Dickinson (2003a) notes that the ‘addition of international judges and 
prosecutors to cases involving serious human rights abuses enhanced the legitimacy of the 
process, both in the eyes of the local population and the international community’ (1069). 
 Turning the inside out of the organizational structures and practices of EU’s rule of 
law mission in Kosovo, this final chapter tells another and indeed less positive story about the 
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functioning of hybrid courts and the international organizational structures in which they are 
embedded. The retrial in the Klecka case provides an insight into the everyday life of a rule of law 
mission and the actors who are authorized to make and enact its practical meaning. However, the 
retrial also demonstrates that international justice might be biased, informed by particular political 
agendas, and that the presence of a rule of law mission is contested from various perspectives. The 
retrial also provides an example of how EULEX’s ambivalent mandate has been operationalized in 
practice. EULEX was deployed in Pristina on February 16, 2008; the day before Kosovo’s 
Assembly adopted the unilaterally declared independence (UDI). Because five EU member states 
did not – and still do not – recognize the independence of Kosovo, the EU and EULEX are 
formally ‘status neutral’ in the question of Kosovo’s statehood261. For that reason, EULEX is 
essentially mandated to establish the rule of law within a state that it does not recognize.  
 The mission derives its legal basis from both the status neutral Resolution 1244 and 
a Joint Action adopted by the European Council. According to its mandate, EULEX is ‘a technical 
mission which mentors, monitors and advises whilst retaining a number of limited executive 
powers’262. The executive powers of EULEX encompass the investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication with majority-international judges panels in ‘cases of war crimes, terrorism, 
organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes and other serious 
crimes [to ‘ensure that’ they] are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced, 
according to the applicable law’263. Paradoxically, the jurisdiction of international judges and 
prosecutors deployed with EULEX is based on a law passed by Kosovo’s Assembly, which 
derives its powers from a constitution the legality of which the EU does not recognize. To decide 
on what law to apply in exercising the mandate of the mission would therefore turn into an 
essential problem, which has never been formally addressed by EULEX nor its member states and 
the relevant institutions in Brussels. Applying laws passed by Kosovo’s Assembly after the UDI 
would indicate that EULEX and the EU member states recognize the legality of Kosovo’s 
independence, which would be in breach with its mandate. However, by only applying UNMIK 
regulations and laws adopted before and during UNMIK’s administrative role in Kosovo, it would 
be practically impossible to carry out the mission’s executive functions within the legal field. 
What is more, whilst EULEX would be ‘neutral’ as to the issue of statehood, it was authorized to 
                                                
261 The five EU member states are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain 
262 European External Action Service (EEAS) webpage on EULEX: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations (emphasis added) 
263 Council Joint Action 2008/124 (CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo, OJ 2008 L 42, Art. 3(d) 
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promote the rule of law ‘in consultation with the relevant international civilian authorities in 
Kosovo, through reversing or annulling operational decisions taken by the competent Kosovo 
authorities’264. The question as to what – and, in particular, when - law should rule would turn into 
protracted struggles within the bureaucratic bounds of the EU’s first rule of law mission, the 
largest mission to date launched by the organization. 
 By following the struggles inside the mission over what law should rule and when, I 
reconstruct how the rule of law adopted three different meanings through the way in which it was 
translated, which would largely contradict each other, that is, the rule of law as a ‘technicality’, the 
rule of law as ‘political stability’ and the rule of law as ‘legality’. The chapter falls in three parts. 
In the first part, I show how the rule of law was translated into a technicality within the EU 
planning team that was mandated to set up the mission and within the Program Office in its 
headquarters in Pristina once the mission was launched. Neither the legal, nor the political aspect 
of the rule of law was addressed. The predominant presence of police experts both in the planning 
team and, in particular, among the supporting institutions in Brussels would impact on the way in 
which the rule of law was approached as a merely technical issue, which could be ‘tracked’ and 
assessed according to ‘performance indicators’. In the second part, I reconstruct how the rule of 
law has been translated into a question of political stability within the senior level of EULEX, 
which has resulted in its interference in the administration of justice and investigations. Law 
should only rule insofar it would not challenge the envisioned political order espoused by senior 
staff and the US embassy, too. In a final and third part, I turn to international judges and 
prosecutors and reconstruct how the rule of law is translated into a matter of legality and the 
construction of law’s relative autonomy. However, in translating the rule of law into legality, 
international judges have largely domesticated its meaning to fit their own background norms and 
ideas about law and justice.  
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The	Planners:	Translating	the	Rule	of	Law	into	a	Technicality	
 
“A	White	Canvas	and	Good	Weather”	
  
 The first time the possibility of deploying an EU rule of law mission was voiced was 
in the context of the March riots in 2004. At that time, there was a certain degree of consensus 
among the EU capitals and Washington that it was time for UNMIK to scale down (Pohl 2014, 
70). To this end, an EU mission should serve as a ‘bridge’ between UNMIK’s withdrawal and 
Kosovo’s full statehood (ibid., 76). Kai Eide, a Norwegian diplomat, had been appointed by the 
UN Secretary-General as his Special Envoy in 2005 to assess the political situation in Kosovo. He 
summarized his findings in a report in which he emphasized that it was ‘premature’ to reduce the 
numbers of international judges and prosecutors in Kosovo, which UNMIK was gradually doing 
to prepare for the transfer of its judicial responsibilities to local institutions and actors.265 
According to Eide, the police and justice sectors should still remain within the remits of an 
international presence even after Kosovo’s status would be solved:   
 
‘[I]n the light of the limitations of the police and judicial system, there will be a need 
for a continued presence of international police with executive powers in sensitive 
areas. A continued presence of international judges and prosecutors will also be 
required to handle cases related to war crimes, organized crime and corruption as well 
as difficult inter-ethnic cases. […] There is little reason to believe that local judges and 
prosecutors will be able to fulfill in the near future the functions now being carried out 
by international personnel’266 
  
 It was widely anticipated that Kosovo and Serbia would derive at an agreement on 
Kosovo’s future status at the time when the EU began planning its mission to assume some of the 
functions carried out by UNMIK. In the context of an agreement, Security Council resolution 
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1244 would be replaced by a new resolution within a short period of time after which UNMIK 
would withdraw entirely. In this context, the EU was aiming for a ‘light footprint’ in its future 
presence in Kosovo. In a joint report entitled ‘The Future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo’ in 
June 2005 by the EU’s High Representative and the European Commission’s Commissioner for 
Enlargement, it was stressed that EULEX would not be a ‘new UNMIK’267. To be sure, the EU 
was not interested in taking up the role of a government as UNMIK had done. The future EU 
mission would, in particular, focus on the rule of law and it was not intended to be – according to 
the joint report - ‘EUMIK’268. 
 An EU Planning Team (EUPT) was launched in April 2006 based on a joint action 
adopted by the European Council. The EUPT was mandated ‘to prepare for a possible future EU 
crisis management operation in the field of the rule of law in Kosovo’269. According to the 
EUPT’s mandate, the EU had the means and the responsibility to replace UNMIK ‘in the police 
and rule of law area’ and the ‘EU will thus have to undertake an important role in Kosovo in a 
complex environment’270. The EUPT was initially composed of twelve members and headed by a 
31-year-old Danish EU ‘fonctionnaire’, who had previously worked three years as a political 
advisor in the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management (DG E IX) within the Directorate 
General of the European Council in Brussels. During the summer 2006, the number of staff within 
the EUPT would grow to 35 and involve five to six officials with legal backgrounds, which would 
later increase to nine (among those, a Belgian federal prosecutor and a Finnish judge).271 The legal 
expertise in the EUPT remained scarce throughout the planning phase as the police aspect of the 
future rule of law mission was of main concern to Brussels. Indeed, this reflects how the rule of 
law had been addressed as a matter of law enforcement in early EU intervention discourses (cf. 
Chapter 5). As noted by an EULEX staff, who had been part of the EUPT, ‘the whole mission still 
suffers from the fact that the focus was on police tasks’272. According to another EULEX staff, 
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‘[the EUPT’s] handling of issues on police and customs was ok. Their handling of judges and 
prosecutors and their planning for that was catastrophic’273. 
 Whilst the EU’s first rule of law mission was being prepared, the institutional 
structures supporting civilian crisis management in Brussels were changing at the same time. As 
noted in Chapter 5, the DG E IX had in 2005 turned into the Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capacity (CPCC) within the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS), which 
only came fully operational in 2007. The institutional structures shaping and supporting the 
mission’s organization were therefore still in its infancy at the time of early planning and later 
deployment of EULEX. Moreover, the experts within the CPCC had primarily experience from 
either the police or the gendarmerie (ie. military police)274. In fact, five years into the mandate of 
EULEX, there is only one lawyer in the CPCC, which has the main operational responsibility for 
the mission, yet he works in the finance and procurement unit under the Mission Support section 
and is therefore not involved in any legal issues concerning the missions.275 Only two EU officials 
in Brussels, who did not have any legal background, were assigned the task of preparing the future 
mission to take over UNMIK’s vast responsibilities within the legal and judicial field in 
Kosovo.276 When the EEAS structures supporting crisis management missions in Brussels finally 
had become operational, the support to the final phase of the EUPT’s work was scarce and 
sometimes ambivalent. In Brussels, the cooperation between the CPCC and the Crisis 
Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), who are both mandated to plan and oversee EU 
civilian missions, was almost non-existent during the planning phase and early deployment of 
EULEX. This was mainly due to their main directors who each thought ‘they were kings of the 
castle’277. The absence of cooperation between the senior level of the CPCC and the CMPD would 
impact on the rest of the organization within these two institutions. For instance, before the 
cooperation improved, staff from the CMPD and the CPCC often conducted field visits 
independently from one another with the result that different and sometimes conflicting messages 
would be given to the same people in EULEX’s administration in Pristina.278  
 As there was no prior experience with how to operationalize a rule of law mission on 
which the EUPT and the fonctionnaires in Brussels could draw they almost ‘had to invent civilian 
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crisis management along the way’ (Dijkstra 2011, 200). In fact, it had been agreed within the 
planning team that they would ‘set up the frame and then they [international judges and 
prosecutors deployed with EULEX] had to fill it out’279. For that reason, the EUPT never 
addressed the legal side of the rule of law, that is, the problem of the applicable law. The planning 
team had little knowledge about the region, according to an EULEX judge who joined EUPT late 
in planning phase, and they did not address the issue about the applicable law at; ‘it was more or 
less a disaster’280. ‘We wanted to build a car’, a member of the EUPT recalls, ‘but we did not want 
to start the engine’281. As noted by a former Deputy Head of the EUPT and later Head of 
Programme Office in EULEX Headquarters in Pristina, the mission was ‘a big machine, like a 
train’ when it started running, ‘but it was a lab’282. 
 A year after the launch of the EUPT, a French Lieutenant General, Yves de 
Kermabon, was appointed by the European Council as the first Head of Mission of EULEX. De 
Kermabon had served as the Commander of NATO’s forces, KFOR, in Kosovo from 2004-2005, 
and was appointed due to his knowledge about the local circumstances.283 During the planning 
phase, Kermabon would be located in Brussels where he was drafting the mission’s operational 
plan (OPLAN). At the same time as the EUPT was preparing the future mission, the issue of 
Kosovo’s unsettled status was rather contentious among the EU member states and Kosovo was 
therefore seldom on the agenda of the Council committees in Brussels consisting of national 
representatives (Dijkstra 2011, 197). When it was, the EU member states representatives were 
often primarily debating over words. Kosovo’s governing institutions should be referred to as 
‘local institutions’, its border to Serbia as ‘boundary’, laws passed by Kosovo’s Assembly should 
be referred to as ‘Assembly laws’, as opposed to national laws, and the Special Prosecution Office 
of the Republic of Kosovo’ would be referred to as ‘Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office 
(SPRK)’.284 Words, indeed, were heavily political in the context of Kosovo’s status. For that 
reason, the member states would prefer not to discuss the content of the future mission at all, 
which was then fully in the hands of the few EU fonctionnaires in Brussels assigned the task of 
preparing the mission, Kermabon, and the EUPT. Indeed, the EUPT was not only planning the 
                                                
279 Interview with former EULEX Legal Advisor, Brussels 
280 Interview with EULEX Judge (1), Kosovo’s Supreme Court, Pristina 
281 Interview with former EULEX Legal Advisor, Brussels  
282 Interview with EULEX Advisor, Programme Office, EULEX HQs, Pristina  
283 Interview with former EULEX Legal Advisor, Brussels 
284 Interview with National Advisor, PermRep to the EU, in charge of EEAS/CSDP, Brussels; 
Interview with EULEX Judge, Kosovo’s Court of Appeals, Pristina 
 223 
mission based on the assumption that Kosovo and Serbia would reach an agreement over the status 
during the international negotiations in 2006 facilitated by the Finnish diplomat, Martti Ahtisaari. 
But, more importantly, the member states did not have a ‘plan B’ in case the status issue would 
not be solved.285 In fact, before the UDI, Kermabon, had been instructed by the EU member states 
to meet with UN representatives in New York to once and for all get the issue regarding the legal 
framework clarified. However, once in New York, Kermabon did not raise the thorny issue of the 
legal order(s), and the issue as to what law should rule in Kosovo was never formally solved.286  
 Furthermore, it was not only the lack of experience with preparing an international 
civilian mission that was a challenge to the preparation and subsequent deployment of the EU’s 
first rule of law mission. But also the institutional structures for decision-making related to the 
EU’s external relations. Following the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, the High 
Representative shares a ‘right of initiative’ and thereby agenda-setting powers with the EU 
member states in matters related to the CSDP, but only EU member states can approve the various 
policy documents of a mission, such as the OPLAN, its budget and other related matters. As noted 
by a staff with EULEX: 
 
‘CSDP is essentially an extension of 27 delegations so it’s very tightly linked to 
political decision-making and strategic decision-making of the 27 member states. It’s 
probably more viewed in terms of political officers, foreign affairs, diplomats’ career 
track service, whereas crisis management is more OCHA, DPKO, WFP oriented […] 
we have to accept that EU is not going to be the UN. EU is going to function as 27 
member states, soon 28, making decisions on what to do, without thinking on how to 
do it. That’s the missing link, that’s the missing link, …’287  
 
  What is more, ‘on the ground’ the relationship between the EUPT and UNMIK was 
rather conflictuous, to say the least, which hampered the effective handover of rule of law 
responsibilities from the UN administration to the future EU mission. In the EUPT’s mandate, it 
had been explicitly emphasized that the planning team should be ‘[f]ollowing closely and 
                                                
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Interview with EULEX Advisor, Best Practices Office, EULEX HQs, Pristina 
 224 
analysing UNMIK planning towards the end of its mandate’288. Now, the EU’s concern with 
distancing itself from UNMIK to demonstrate that it was not a new ‘EUMIK’ would manifest 
itself in its reluctance in drawing on UNMIK’s almost decade-long experience in Kosovo. 
According to an international staff with EULEX: ‘[The EUPT] had a very bad relationship with 
UNMIK. The handover from UNMIK to EULEX was extremely bad. I was [working as an 
international prosecutor] in Iraq and I was reading press reports about that it. That is how bad it 
was’289. Nor was there hardly any cooperation between the EUPT and the liaison office of the 
European Commission in Kosovo, despite the fact that the European Commission had been 
present since the beginning of UNMIK as an integrated component of the UN mission in charge of 
economic reconstruction.290 There seemed to have been an understanding among some of the 
members of the EUPT – and in particular the head of the team – that ‘they could make up their 
own administration from scratch’291.  
 
‘They [EUPT] came with a white canvas and good weather, so they were sitting 
outside drinking coffee. They did not want to draw on what UNMIK had done. The 
UN is very good at setting up these missions. They can go anywhere with nothing and 
set up a mission and they can do it fast. Also, the OSCE is very good with organization 
and administration but the EUPT didn’t draw on their expertise either’292 
 
 One year into EUPT’s mandate, UNMIK completely halted its cooperation with the 
EUPT. In particular, the handover of case files and files related to ongoing investigations from 
UNMIK to the EUPT and the EU ‘was badly done’293. At the moment of EULEX’ deployment 
there were more than 1200 open war crimes cases.294 But UNMIK was hesitating to hand over the 
files as EULEX did not yet have an execute mandate.295 ‘You are not operational yet, do you your 
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homework’, was basically the message from UNMIK.296 According to a former EUPT staff, 
EULEX ‘had to fight to get the files’ from UNMIK297. Indeed, the judicial staff with UNMIK was 
not very supportive either, except for one UNMIK judge who broke into an office during his leave 
to get the documents298. Despite these problems during the planning phase, the final transfer from 
UNMIK to EULEX went swift. A former UNMIK judge describes it as ‘for the judges who stayed 
it was more or less like one day you were a UNMIK judge and the next day you were a EULEX 
judge. But many things got lost in transition’299. Several of now former UNMIK staff did not 
chose to stay or did not get their contracts renewed and many judges chose to leave.300 For this 
reason, many of the cases that were on trial at the moment of transition had to restart with the 
deployment of EULEX.  
 Still, the problem that would resurface throughout the mission’s mandate in Kosovo 
would be the status issue. As mentioned above, at the time of the deployment of the planning team 
there was no hesitation that the status issue of Kosovo would not be solved. In fact, it was 
mentioned in a EU publication on the work of the EUPT that ‘[t]he EU is fully committed to play 
a significant role in post-status settlement Kosovo’301. 2007, it was noted in the publication, ‘will 
be the year of an expected United Nations Security Council decision on status for Kosovo’302. To 
‘supervise’ the independence of Kosovo (cf. Chapter 6), the establishment of an International 
Civilian Office (ICO) was part of the international negotiations. The ICO would be headed by an 
International Civilian Representative (ICR), who would also be the EU Special Representative 
(this double-hatting arrangement had been used in BiH, too). A planning team to prepare for the 
establishment of the ICO had therefore been deployed at the same time as the EUPT. However, 
there was hardly any dialogue between the two planning teams and there were several ‘frictions’ 
between them, not least over how to interpret their widely broad mandates.303 Finally, it had been 
informally agreed that the ICO team would be in charge of the ‘political’ matters (which included 
drafting and implementing the ’41 state-forming laws’ defined in the Ahtisaari Plan), and the 
EUPT with the ‘technical’ matters – that would be the rule of law.304 An EU advisor in Brussels 
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recalls that during the planning phase ‘[w]e considered it a technical job that should be done to 
create capacity for a [local] functioning, lawful administration respecting the rule of law and 
Western traditions’ (quoted in Cross 2011, 207).  
 During the planning phase, the two advisors who were assigned the task of preparing 
the mission in Brussels were mainly working on the calls for contributions, which was quite 
challenging as the mission needed very specific expertise, such as, forensics and staff for the 
future mission’s witness protection unit; expertise that was not readily available in EU member 
states due to lack of experience with war crimes.305 Yet, the most daunting task would be to live 
up to the promise made of deploying a pool of 200 judges, prosecutors and other relevant legal 
staff within 30 days for a civilian crisis management mission, which was practically impossible. 
As noted in Chapter 5, the EU had approached the issue of deploying international prosecutors and 
judges similar to how police officers are deployed in contingents to serve in international civilian 
missions and who would often need only two days to prepare for a deployment.306 However, 
whereas police officers can be easily replaced in their home countries during a leave, this is not 
possible to the same extent for judges and prosecutors.  
 It was in particular difficult to deploy prosecutors as they would often have to finish 
their cases in their respective home country before they could be sent on a mission. For instance, 
the position of the Head of the Kosovo’s Special Prosecution’s Office (SPRK), which is an 
EULEX position and one of the most important positions for the mission’s mandate, was once 
vacant for more than six months. 307 Furthermore, it is difficult to recruit judges as the experience 
from being deployed is often not valued in domestic judicial institutions. In order to advance a 
career in her home country, a judge would need extended experience from her domestic legal 
culture and not from a foreign legal culture. Judges are therefore often reluctant to apply for 
vacant positions with EULEX and, as noted by an EU staff within the human resources unit of the 
CPCC, ‘we have to persuade the member states to not penalize the judges when they go on 
mission’308. Moreover, most of the international staff with EULEX are not contracted by the EU 
but secondees remunerated by EU member states and the number of secondees from each member 
state is predefined and fixed. A report by the EU Court of Auditors four years into EULEX’s 
mandate deplored that the short-termed contracts of secondees, which often would only last for a 
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year, was a ‘handicap for EULEX operations’: ‘In some cases staff can only become fully 
operational after 12 months’309. According to EU recruitment rules, the positions of staff deployed 
with EU missions are not allowed to overlap, even for one day, why the handover of cases, for 
instance, has been problematic within the mission, especially between the prosecutors. Due to the 
secondment rules, it would not always be the right person chosen for a specific position:  
 
‘They [Brussels] have certain posts that are reserved for a Brit, certain posts that are 
only reserved for a German. And this national distribution also works against [the 
functioning of the mission]. How do you know that, at that time, you will have the best 
German to come and occupy the post and with a certain expertise. It is against any logic 
of getting quality people’310 
 
‘I actually rent out my first floor in the house. We had this person from EULEX, who was 
very high up in [EULEX] police. Dutch, who could really speak very very limited 
English. And he could never actually explain to me what was exactly his role but he 
managed to say that it was high in the hierarchy but not exactly what. He didn’t speak 
Albanian. He didn’t speak English. He could only speak Dutch. He worked with Italians 
in French. I think his deputy was Italian and I was really thinking ‘how can this guy 
function?’. And then we had the problems in Mitrovica and he was in charge and I was 
thinking ‘how can he even give command to his fellow police who is not Dutch?’’311  
 
 The rigid division of seconded positions within EULEX among the EU member 
states has also resulted in the problem of finding the most competent legal advisors with 
responsibility for the law-drafting work in which EULEX would come to occupy an important role 
in Kosovo. The following quote from an interview with an EULEX judge from the UK reflects the 
extent to which the role of international lawyers in the legal reform work undertaken by EULEX 
would often be neglected:  
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‘Well a lot of what we do is done in a very amateurish way. It is not just in the EU. It's 
the British Foreign Office as well. They don't necessarily pick for the job the best 
person. They pick for the job the person who is available normally, or somebody who 
they like. And what we should have had here were sort of half a dozen of legal drafts 
people, draftsmen, because a lot of what we do is about changing law, proposing 
changes to law, that sort of thing. And they are asking legal officers, many of whom 
are lawyers with no relative or relevant experience, and judges who have been sitting 
in municipal courts back home. They are asking them to change laws. Now, in our 
own countries we would not be that negligent. In England, we have got senior crown 
council with thirty years law drafting experience in drafting laws. Here, we have got 
trainees drafting laws. And it is hardly surprising that things get fucked up, quite 
frankly. And it is pretty negligent often the way we do stuff. I hope you would not 
send this tape to the head of mission's office [said laughing]’312 
  
 The final composition of the staff of EULEX would reflect the translation of the 
‘rule of law’ into a matter of law enforcement and a technical issue. At the time when EULEX 
reached full deployment, the mission employed 2800 staff (though its authorized staff was 3300) 
divided between three components: Police, Customs and Justice. In fact, despite EULEX being a 
rule of law mission that was mandated, among other things, to assume the responsibilities of 
UNMIK in prosecuting and adjudicating in so-called ‘serious crime’ cases, the positions of judges 
and prosecutors would only constitute 2.3 per cent of the overall authorized staff, which was less 
than the customs positions (Capusella 2015, 115).   
 
Quantifying	the	Rule	of	Law	
 
 The translation of the rule of law into a technical matter within the EUPT would be 
reflected in not only the composition of the mission’s staff but also in its approach to ‘promote’ 
the rule of law. According to the mission statement in EULEX’s mandate, the mission shall assist 
all rule of law institutions in Kosovo – judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies – ‘in 
their progress towards sustainability and accountability […] ensuring that these institutions are 
free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European 
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best practices’313. In the first report published by EULEX after its deployment, the mission 
statement was further described as the very process of ‘moving Kosovo’s police, justice and 
customs from their ‘current’ state to a ‘desired’ state’ where ‘[t]he desired end state envisages rule 
of law institutions that are able to operate “without international intervention and substitution”’314, 
effectively distancing itself from past UNMIK practices. To achieve this aim, the first programme 
report that envisaged EULEX’s approach to rule of law reforms compared the mission’s own work 
with ‘the work of a conductor’, the ‘current state’ with a ‘broad musical theme’ and the mission’s 
desired end state for the rule of law in Kosovo with a ‘coherent symphony’, which together would 
entail a number of tasks:  
 
‘First, developing the detailed musical scores for the various parts of the EULEX 
orchestra (experts in policing, judiciary and customs form Member States and 
Contributing States) 
 
Secondly, ensuring that each part of that orchestra was familiar with its musical score 
and capable of playing its instruments (i.e. each EULEX expert would need to be 
conversant with the law […]) 
 
Thirdly, it would require a rigorous system of communicating information between the 
conductor and the parts of the orchestra’315 
 
 These tasks should be addressed by what the EUPT had termed a ‘programmatic 
approach’, which encompasses measurements and assessments of the rule of law according to 
specific ‘performance’ indicators every six months. During the first six months of this approach, 
the EUPT identified 72 so-called ‘weaknesses’ of Kosovo’s rule of law. Based on these 
weaknesses EULEX’s Programme Office developed 36 Action Fiches, which are detailed needs 
assessments, concrete measures to be taken and their specific envisioned ‘outputs’. The 
performance indicators are used by EULEX staff in police, customs and the judiciary to 
benchmark the performance of their ‘local counterparts’ in order to assess the progress achieved.  
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Source: EULEX Programme Office, EULEX Programme Report 2009 (July) 
 
 To realize the action fiches and the programmatic approach to the rule of law, the 
EUPT identified practices of ‘monitoring, mentoring, and advising’ – in short MMA – as the main 
tool the EULEX staff, such as international judges and prosecutors, should use in promoting the 
rule of law and advancing the expertise of their ‘local counterparts’. The MMA approach 
constitutes a standard grid according to which EULEX staff can monitor and report on local 
practices and progress related to justice and the rule of law. MMA follows the idea of ‘the 
professor and the student’316, according to the Head of EULEX’s Program Office, who developed 
this approach. To this end, an ‘MMA Tracking Mechanism’ has been developed. As stated by its 
initiator within EULEX’s Program Office: ‘For the first time, people will be able to monitor the 
work of EULEX and see to what extent the rule of law institutions of Kosovo are progressing in 
developing the rule of law. Very few other international organisations, anywhere, has ever been so 
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open and accessible to the public’317. In EULEX’s second programmatic report, entitled ‘Building 
Sustainable Change Together’, the purpose of the MMA activities were spelled out: 
 
‘As the MMA Actions are implemented, Kosovo’s rule of law is advancing further 
along. One of the most important requirements for Kosovo to develop its European 
perspective is to improve the rule of law. That is why allowing Kosovo’s people to 
track progress will contribute to bring them closer to the European Union (EU)’318 
  
 ‘Progress’ in the rule of law is assessed and compared on an annual basis according 
to a grading system from A to D in annual ‘progress reports’ prepared by the mission’s 
Programme Office. ‘A’ is graded to a sector, such as ‘judges’, when there is ‘progress’; ‘B’ when 
there is ‘slow progress/need more impetus’, and ‘C’ indicates ‘problematic/very limited or no 
progress’; and a sector is graded ‘D’ when there is a ‘serious concern/regression’:  
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The	Politicians:	Translating	the	Rule	of	Law	into	Political	Stability	
 
A	Rule	of	Law	Mission	Run	by	the	Military	
 
 Whereas the composition of the mission’ staff would reflect the translation of the 
rule of law into a law enforcement, the distribution of power within EULEX would reflect the 
early emphasis on the military dimensions of EU external relations immediately after the Saint 
Malo summit and the fact that the OPLAN had been drafted by a former KFOR Commander. 
EULEX’s senior level has mainly been staffed with ‘former soldiers’319 and thus experts without 
any legal background. The first two Head of Missions (HoM) of EULEX were French generals 
who had served as commanders with KFOR prior to joining EULEX. As noted above, the first 
HoM, Yves de Kermabon, is a French Lieutenant General who was the commander of KFOR from 
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September 2004 to September 2005. One of de Kermabon’s closest special advisors, Frédéric 
Mathieu, had been his political advisor in KFOR, too. The subsequent HoM was also a French 
General, Xavier Bout de Marnhac, who had been KFOR commander from September 2007 to July 
2010. His closest advisor, Romuald Pichard, had also been a senior advisor within KFOR. Indeed, 
as noted by a former staff with EULEX, the French played an important role in the beginning of 
the mission, they knew each other from either the French Foreign League or KFOR, and would 
divide the most important positions of the mission among each other.320 The first Chief Prosecutor 
of EULEX, who had allegedly interfered in the investigations against Limaj in the Klecka case (cf. 
the interlude), was also French and had been directly appointed by Marnhac and part of his inner 
circle321. The last two Deputy HoMs have had long careers as diplomats in the British Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs before joining EULEX. The first Deputy HoM, Roy Reeve, who had served as the 
head of the EUPT after the Danish fonctionnaire and then later as the first acting head of EULEX, 
is a specialist in Soviet studies and his successor, Andy Sparkes, who was the British Ambassador 
to Kosovo before joining EULEX, has a degree in English literature. The organizational structure 
and the composition of the professional expertise in the senior level of EULEX have, in particular, 
been contested from within the mission itself by its judicial staff. According to an EULEX judge, 
‘part of the problem is that many of these seniors on these missions who are in senior positions 
have little or no prior mission experience […] this is not a military mission and therefore there 
should not be a military person running it. It is a civilian mission’322. An international legal 
advisor within the mission expresses the same concerns with the EULEX’s headquarters in 
Brussels: ‘The problem of having the police running a rule of law mission is that they don’t have 
the judicial knowledge’323. 
 The structure of the chain of command within EULEX would reflect an 
understanding of the rule of law as primarily a security issue to be addressed by military staff, 
rather than being a judicial or a legal issue. In the early planning phase of EULEX, the EUPT had 
opted for a decentralized structure of EULEX where the Deputy Head of Mission would be in 
charge of the mission’s organization. However, due to the strong military influence in its planning 
phase with the presence of Kermabon and the prevalent military and police expertise within the 
relevant units in the EEAS, that is, the CMPD and the CPCC, the idea about a more decentralized 
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structure was abandoned. Instead, a top-down chain of command structures the internal 
organizational culture of EULEX. The exchange of knowledge between the three pillars (Police, 
Customs, and Justice) has been largely missing and they work, according to an EULEX staff, as 
‘small empires’, each based on a military chain of command influenced by the Head of Mission.324 
Indeed, this organizational order largely contradicts the purpose of deploying civilian experts in a 
peacebuilding context and it has often made staff below the senior level feeling ‘disenfranchised’ 
and ‘powerless’.325 As a former senior EULEX staff notes, the chain of command has effectively 
hampered the assessments coming from the staff deployed on lower levels within the organization 
of EULEX, which was partly due to what is referred to as a ‘Chinese wall’ around senior 
management326.  
 
‘If you look at the level of experience in this mission, you will actually find out that a 
lot of people who do missions for a living have some six to ten to fifteen years of 
experience working in not senior management but management level positions but 
never go to positions above. So you have all those talented people having ten to fifteen 
years of experience but they are so far below the decision-makers that they have no 
voice. And the decision makers may not have that level of experience and never 
consult below’327 
 
 The top-down structure of the mission would often hamper the exchange of 
knowledge not only within the mission but also between the mission and the relevant institutions 
in Brussels. Staff within EULEX has often deplored that knowledge gained from experiences on 
‘the ground’ from, for instance, the legal staff deployed with EULEX in Kosovo’s district courts, 
seems to be lost when reported back to Brussels as ‘five pages would turn into five lines’328 which 
has had as a result that the EU member states’ decisions in Brussels are often based on 
‘incomplete information’.329 The reports that go to Brussels are – what is referred to as – ‘filtered’ 
by EULEX’s Political Office and called ‘flower reports’ due to the fact often only positive things 
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about the mission would be communicated to Brussels.330 According to an EULEX staff within 
the program office: ‘No one [in Brussels] knows about Kosovo, not even Macedonia and 
Albania’331. In fact, when asked about the issue about the applicable law given that applying laws 
adopted by Kosovo’s Assembly would be in breach with EULEX’s mandate, the head of the 
mission in Brussels responded that ‘I am not sure about whether the issue regarding the applicable 
law is an issue. I don’t know about it’332. 
 The top-down approach to the rule of law effectively discarded local political actors 
in the organization of joint rule of law fora. In order to coordinate the mission’s rule of law 
activities, EULEX established a Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board (JRCB). The Board is co-
chaired by EULEX’s Head of Mission and Kosovo’s Deputy Prime Minister. In fact, when 
EULEX had just been deployed, the Government of Kosovo - the Minister of Justice and the 
Minister of Interior – had agreed to establish a joint forum in which representatives of EULEX 
would sit as members, too, in order to bring together local and EULEX actors involved in rule of 
law reforms.333 The forum would be led by a rotating chair between the Minister of Justice and the 
Minister of Interior. However, once EULEX had been establish and was up and running, the 
project was soon abandoned. As recalled by an advisor with DFID: ‘EULEX wanted to be the 
chair in this structure of eight Kosovars and three EULEX representatives. It therefore changed 
into a structure where there were eight EULEX representatives and two Kosovars. And EULEX 
was in charge and only later on they actually co-headed with the deputy Prime Minister. Initially it 
was chaired by the EULEX Head […] how do you think these people, the Kosovars, felt when 
they were sitting in this EU Rule of Law Coordination Board? They felt humiliated. They didn’t 
feel like giving 100 % to the functioning of this board’334 Now, ‘there is no dialogue. It is 
messaging. You know, you tell them what they [EULEX] want and they will tell you ‘OK, that’s 
it’335.  
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The	“No	Touch	Cases”	
 
 Similar to UNMIK, the organizational structure within EULEX would espouse a 
system in which there was no clear separation of powers and where the executive would ultimately 
have the authority over the judicial staff within the mission. According to EULEX internal rules, 
judges are ‘independent’ whereas prosecutors are ‘autonomous’. Case selection, for that reason, 
has been ‘politicized’336. The independence of its own judges and the autonomy of international 
prosecutors would be challenged by informal pressures from the senior level of the mission and 
the EU member states.337 As stressed by a former staff in EULEX’ Planning Team, EULEX is an 
‘executive mission’ and ‘the ‘technical mission’ is only political jargon. Everyone knows that’338. 
‘They [senior level and EU member states] talk about independence of the judiciary and 
prosecutors, it is absolutely claptrap. So we have a situation where Farmed [EULEX 
Headquarters] is actually running the show, and they are totally arrogant and don't want to talk to 
you’339, according to an EULEX prosecutor. Indeed, the programmatic and technical approach to 
the rule of law among the ‘planners’ had resulted in the development of tracking mechanisms to 
ensure the transparency and openness of the mission’s work. Yet, among the ‘politicians’, 
transparency, openness and legal certainty were effectively discarded in translating the rule of law 
into a question of political stability. 
                                                
336 Interview with former Legal Advisor in EULEX, Pristina 
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 In the beginning of the planning phase, the EUPT had identified the fight against 
corruption and organized crime as the core function of the mission, whilst UNMIK had mainly 
been concerned with war crimes cases. However, according to a former EUPT staff, during the 
planning phase it became increasingly clear that ‘everything is political in Kosovo, even the 
weather is political’340. The organized crime and corruption cases would inevitable involve the 
local political elite and some cases, too, involved relatives of the former and very popular 
resistance leader and ex-President, Rugova, who had deceased in 2006. As noted by an EULEX 
judge, ‘we must in our high management realize that once we start arresting the big politicians, 
suddenly EULEX is going to be persona non grata and we would be out of here pretty quickly’341. 
In addition, as Kosovo is largely a clan-based society investigating organized crimes, it was 
believed within Office of the Head of Mission, could potentially lead to conflicts between 
important clans and destabilize the situation in some of Kosovo’s regions.342 EULEX had 
inherited a large backlog of cases – in particular war crimes cases – from UNMIK, which then 
became the main focus of its judicial work.  
 Gradually, the EU therefore shifted its focus onto these less political sensitive war 
crimes cases.343 However, these cases would be equally politically chartered. UNMIK had 
primarily prosecuted Serbian war criminals. Now, the war crimes cases left for EULEX would 
involve Kosovo-Albanian war criminals, many of whom were extremely popular due to their role 
during the war or had become powerful politicians within the government (for instance, the now 
former Prime Minister of Kosovo was the political leader of KLA and known for having 
committed several war crimes). As noted by an EULEX judge, ‘the war crime cases are very 
difficult as all the war heroes have very high positions’.344 It is the distinction between ‘war 
heroes’ and ‘war criminals’ that matters in terms of who to prosecute.345   
 To be sure, whereas the rule of law had been translated into a technical matter in the 
planning phase and in the Programme Office, high up in senior management the rule of law was 
essentially a political issue. As noted by a former EULEX staff close to the Head of Mission, the 
                                                
340 Ibid. 
341 Interview with EULEX Judge (1), Peja District Court, Kosovo   
342 Interview with former Legal Advisor, Office of the Head of Mission, EULEX Headquarters, 
Pristina 
343 Interview with EULEX Justice Expert, Brussels 
344 Interview with EULEX Judge, Kosovo’s Supreme Court, Pristina 
345 Ibid.  
 238 
senior level within EULEX ‘adheres to the doctrine of stability over the rule of law’346. The 
independence of international judges and prosecutors was further jeopardized in 2010 when the 
head of EULEX issued an instruction that requested prior information on any ‘legal action [eg. 
investigations and judgments] of any significant importance’ (Capusella 2015, 138). 
 In fact, despite potentially exposing themselves to threats and what would be worse, 
several local prosecutors had expressed their will to investigate financial and organized crime 
cases that would inevitably involve local politicians. But they were ‘clearly’ told by the former 
head of Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK), an EULEX prosecutor close to the senior 
leadership within EULEX, that these were ‘no touch cases’347. According to a legal advisor close 
to the senior management of EULEX, especially the Deputy Heads of Mission, who have all been 
former ambassadors in Kosovo, have ‘politicized’ the role of the mission in pushing for political 
solutions to political problems ‘instead of strictly focusing on legal needs and solutions’348: 
 
’The Member States are very involved in the mission. They put their own people there 
and they would bring their own cases. Indeed, it is not a rule of law mission. It is a 
foreign policy instrument. And there is a lot of interference [from EU member states]. 
No doubt. In all the cases’349 
 
‘I mean the big cases, the obvious cases of corruption, involve politicians. And this is 
where EULEX cannot act because of the quint countries, or the embassies, because they 
are the most powerful. They would actually decide on what kind of domino effect [a 
prosecution of a local politician would create]. So that is the determinant factor of 
whether they are having a case against someone or not. And that, you know, this is not 
justice’350 
 
 The reluctance within EULEX’s senior level to address corruption among the local 
politicians was increasingly meeting a widespread criticism among Kosovo’s population, a 
criticism that was voiced in the local media. For that reason, in an interview given to the Kosovar 
newspaper, Koha Ditore, in November 2009, the then EULEX Chief Prosecutor announced that 
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EULEX would now go after the ‘big fish’, meaning the ministers of Kosovo’s government. The 
interview by the EULEX Chief Prosecutor marked a turning point in the public view and even a 
street in Pristina was named after this prosecutor. In April 2010, EULEX conducted its first high-
profile raid in the Ministry of Transport in Pristina. The Minister of Transport, Fatmir Limaj, at 
that time a close associate to the Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, but shortly thereafter his most 
important political opponent, had been under investigation for a while for corruption linked to 
road reconstruction tenders. In fact, Thaci soon denounced the raid which he stressed was a 
‘humiliation’ for Kosovo’s institutions.351 At the same time, EULEX Chief Prosecutor, who was 
in charge of the investigation, announced in an interview to Koha Ditore the following month that 
‘everybody who is involved in organised crime and corruption should start sweating. And if they 
are involved, let them stop from today’352. In the same interview, the Chief Prosecutor also 
announced that six other ministers of Kosovo’s government were under investigation for 
corruption.353  
 However, at the day of the raid, it was reported that Fatmir Limaj had ‘attended 
lengthy meetings’ with EULEX’ Head of Mission, Yves de Kermabon, the US ambassador, 
Christopher Dell and the Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci.354 What is more, the raid that took place 
early in the morning in the offices in the Ministry of Justice was only known among the relevant 
staff within EULEX police and the mission’s senior level. But it was clear that the ministry had 
been tipped and prepared for the raid.355 In fact, the same month of the raid on the Ministry of 
Transport by the EULEX police, the US’ largest construction firm, Bechtel, had just won a 
contract to build the first highway in Kosovo with the project ‘Patriotic Highway’. The US 
ambassador then appeared on national TV next to Fatmir Limaj at the event of the ceremony 
celebrating the signing of the contract. A few weeks later, the US ambassador (who later became 
Bechtel’s regional director in Africa after his term in Kosovo ended) emphasized during a lecture 
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at the University of Pristina that ‘there would be no significant charges brought in the case’356. 
Due to an agreement made between the US and the EU during the planning phase of EULEX, the 
US has advisors within the Office of the Head of Mission of EULEX and within the Justice 
component of EULEX. The doings of the mission’s international judges and prosecutors are 
therefore also a concern to the US embassy, which the following cable from the US embassy in 
Pristina demonstrates: 
 
‘EULEX Justice’s political insensitivity and problems with its prosecutorial structure 
have contributed to other recent questionable outcomes. In the last three months, 
EULEX judges have released from custody a notorious group of six people accused of 
major smuggling and other crimes because they had been held too long without charges. 
They also overturned a 40-year prison sentence handed down by an UNMIK court last 
year against the person convicted of blowing up the “Nis Express” bus in 2005, because 
of insufficient evidence. In both of these cases, EULEX’s leadership has lamented the 
outcome to us and complained that they have no influence over their judges, who 
misguidedly see any guidance as a threat to their independence’357 
  
 Finally, after more than three years of investigation, a EULEX judge ruled in July 
2013 that the evidence in Limaj’s case was valid and his case could be tried in court. The decision 
to try the corruption case against Limaj in court was shortly before the general elections in 
Kosovo, which has resulted in speculations about Thaci’s close relationship to the senior level 
within EULEX and its influence in the administration of justice by its own judges and prosecutors:   
 
‘And for example this trial with Fatmir Limaj. He is the biggest enemy of the prime 
minister. I am not saying that he should not be trialed but the moment when he is being 
trialed is when he could actually cause problems internally in the party just before 
elections so that was actually why…well the Prime Minister eliminated his biggest 
political rival’358 
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 One of the cases in which the different conceptions of law’s rule held by 
international legal and policy practitioners would conflict is the so-called Medicus case. The case 
is related to a report by the Swiss prosecutor, Dick Marty, to the Council of Europe in 2010 in 
which he accuses some of Kosovo’s political leaders for organ theft and trafficking. Indeed, the 
case is politically very sensitive as one of the accused in the report is the now former Prime 
Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, who has been close to the senior level within EULEX. Thaci 
had also been one of the leaders (and thus war hero among many Kosovo Albanians) of Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) during the war. As noted by the EULEX prosecutor in charge of the case:  
 
‘The trouble is that some of these indictments…some of these investigations we are 
working on are very scary and they have huge political consequences. Medicus is one 
of them. And this mission claims that there is independence. But we are in my cases or 
other cases beginning to impact politically upon the country. They [EULEX senior 
level and the EU member states] are very upset about that, all the way up to Brussels. 
But they don't like it. They really don't like. And I have come under significant 
pressure from them at times […] and they are trying to make my life here extremely 
uncomfortable. If you want to talk about people doing what they are not supposed to 
be doing, or corruption, there is corruption within the mission itself. Not corruption in 
the sense of people taking bribes etc., but people not understanding what their duties 
are and where their jobs should stop’359 
 
The	Practitioners:	Translating	the	Rule	of	Law	into	Legality	
 
The	Rule	of	What	Law?	
  
 A third translation of the rule of law is enacted among international judges and 
prosecutors within the mission, which centers on the rule of law as a matter of legality. The 
‘planners’ had translated the rule of law into a technicality, where the relationship between law 
and politics – and notably the issue of the applicable law and thereby legality - was effectively 
discarded in the recourse to templates, performance indicators and practices of monitoring, 
                                                
359 Interview with EULEX Prosecutor (3), Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) 
 242 
mentoring and advising (‘MMA’) ‘local counterparts’ as the core tool of international judges and 
prosecutors to promote the rule of law. ‘MMA’, in particular, has been contested among 
international judges and prosecutors, who term it ‘fluffy’360, ‘patronizing’361, and a ‘miracle 
thing’362 that is not possible to do in practice. It has been criticized for being a policy that is too 
influenced by the police where officers ‘would work in pairs’ and then ‘you could probably have 
this authority/teacher role as a mentor’363. International judges, in particular, have been reluctant 
to monitor and advise their ‘local counterparts’ due to the importance they attach to professional 
norms such as the independence of a judge in rendering a decision.  
 Among the ‘politicians’ in senior management, the relationship between law and 
politics had taken on yet another meaning where law should rule insofar it did not challenge the 
political stability – the political elite – in the country. Among law’s ‘practitioners’ the rule of law 
was understood as a matter of legality and therefore the practice of safeguarding law’s relative 
autonomy – and their own, as stressed by a legal advisor within senior management: ‘The judges 
and prosecutors [within EULEX] are very concerned with securing their independence’364. An 
interviewee recalled a friend, an American EULEX judge, who resigned after having been 
pressured by the US embassy to give a sentence in a case where there was not enough evidence to 
support it: ‘She was pressured by the US ambassador to actually sentence the guy and when she 
said she didn’t want this sense of guilt, they saw that her professional integrity was much more 
important to her and, well, then they kind of put her under pressure and blackmailed her to resign 
because she was not following instructions’365. Among international judges and prosecutors in the 
mission, the doctrine of political stability that reigns within the senior management level follows 
from the ‘politicians’ lack of understanding of the rule of law:  
 
‘It is easier for judges because we can reign above it. But for the prosecutors, it is far 
more difficult. […] Of course, when someone is acquitted, people assume that 
something has gone badly wrong. That’s the perception in headquarters because it is full 
of politicians. So when someone is acquitted it is like ‘what went wrong?’, ‘was is the 
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judge who screwed up? Was it the prosecutor who screwed up?’ And of course, you 
know, we have to explain to them ‘no, that is how justice works’. Sometimes people are 
acquitted because the evidence doesn’t come up to scratch […] there is this kind of 
perception that because we are here in an international mission and because we are 
trying to make a difference therefore the bad guys should be locked up even if the 
evidence perhaps is not as strong as it should be to satisfy the required standard of 
proof’366 
 
 Translating the rule of law into a matter of legality, the question of what would be 
the applicable law was the main concern among international judges and prosecutors once they 
were deployed in Kosovo and its judicial and legal institutions. As noted in the introduction to the 
chapter, the jurisdiction of EULEX judges and prosecutors in Kosovo was based on a law passed 
by Kosovo’s Assembly, which derives its powers from a constitution, the legality of which the 
mission would not recognize. When EULEX had just been deployed, legal advisors within 
UNMIK’s legal unit in Pristina organized a meeting with the Assembly of EULEX Judges to 
derive at an agreement on their jurisdiction and on what laws should be applied in courts. From 
UNMIK’s perspective, the jurisdiction of EULEX judges and prosecutors should be based on the 
UNMIK regulation that had regulated the jurisdiction of UNMIK’s mixed panels, the ’64 panels’. 
However, ‘[the law passed by the Assembly on EULEX’s jurisdiction] was put in place, a clear 
breach of international law and Resolution 1244’367, according to UNMIK lawyers.  
 In fact, due to the politics involved in recognizing the applicable law in Kosovo as a 
consequence of the mission’s ‘status neutrality’, Brussels was completely paralyzed in this matter 
and there was never any formal clarification as to what laws EULEX’s legal staff should apply. 
The constitutional review described in the second interlude shows how some EULEX judges 
would contest the legality of the laws passed by Kosovo’s Assembly and therefore apply UNMIK 
regulations. Finally, there was an internal statement issued by the Head of Mission that 
emphasized that ‘politically EULEX is status neutral’ and international judges and prosecutors 
‘were basically told by Farmed [EULEX’s Headquarters in Pristina] and Brussels ‘to find a 
solution in the field’’368. The following US Embassy Cable entitled ‘Kosovo: EULEX At the Six 
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Month Point’ testifies to the controversy the question as to what law should rule in Kosovo 
triggered within the bureaucratic bounds of EULEX’s administration of justice: 
 
‘With regard to the question of applicable law, there is apparently growing 
controversy on this issue within EULEX Justice. During the week of June 15 [2009], 
Theo Jacobs, the Chief EULEX Prosecutor, informally told EULEX prosecutors to use 
Kosovo law as the legal basis for their work. Isabelle Arnal, EULEX’s Chief 
Prosecutor to the Special Prosecutor’s Office in the Republic of Kosovo (SPRK), we 
subsequently learned, told Jacobs that she disagrees and will continue to pick and 
choose between Yugoslav, Serbian, and UNMIK law as appropriate. Until now, 
EULEX international judges have been given almost carte blanche in their choice of 
applicable law for use in rendering decisions.  The result is a confusing mish-mash of 
legal rulings with little internal consistency’369. 
 
 The question of what law should rule was therefore left with the individual judge. A 
former EULEX judge in the district court in Mitrovica explains how ‘practical solutions in the 
field’ were reached in the court to work themselves around the status neutrality in ensuring that 
some standards of legality were met. The orders of the court would not be stamped with the 
Kosovo stamp, which would have been an expression of the recognition of Kosovo’s statehood, 
and orders that were sent to detention centers were therefore sent without these stamps, ‘which is 
not legal but otherwise we would have no trials’370. In line with this ‘practical solution’, decisions 
sent to the Supreme Court in Pristina would bear the stamp but those that were addressed Kosovo-
Serbs would not in order to avoid any controversies over Kosovo’s statehood. In order not to 
breach international law, too, in referring to the applicable law in the enactment clause in 
decisions, EULEX judges would note that they both applied the provisional criminal procedure 
code that had been passed during UNMIK and the criminal procedure code passed by Kosovo’s 
Assembly after the UDI, effectively enacting both legal realities existing in Kosovo.371 Yet, as 
stated by an EULEX judge, ‘by applying the laws, interpreting them and creating jurisprudence, 
EULEX is not really status neutral by any means’372. 
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371 Ibid. 
372 Interview with EULEX Judge, Courts of Appeals, Kosovo’s Supreme Court, Pristina 
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 As had also been the case during UNMIK, EULEX judges and prosecutors were 
facing the same challenges in navigating in and through the different and sometimes conflicting 
legal sources of Kosovo’s legal framework. As law in Kosovo would still derive from four legal 
sources (Yugoslav laws, Serbian laws, Kosovo laws and international law, e.g. UNMIK 
regulations) to identify the applicable law is a rather complicated task, which has been made even 
more complicated by the inconsistency within particular laws, especially the criminal code that is 
a blend of common law and civil law standards. For instance, the new criminal procedure code, 
which came into force in January 2013, introduced plea agreement, cross-examination and 
opening statements (despite the fact that there is no use of jury trials in Kosovo) which were 
unfamiliar to lawyers from civil law countries. As noted by an EULEX judge: ‘[Law] is not a 
oriented system so if it has a lot of sources, then it conflicts interpretation and we don’t solve the 
problem from the law because the law is itself the mixed thing373. ‘When you have three-judge 
panels with two international judges and one local judge’, according to another EULEX judge, 
‘there are basically three systems present on the panels’374.  
 
Between	European	Standards	and…What	We	Do	at	Home	
 
 An important part of EULEX’s mandate is to promote European best practices and 
European standards of the rule of law within Kosovo’s justice system. However, whilst European 
best practices and standards are at the core of the mission’s approach to promoting the rule of law, 
the meaning of these standards and practices were never explicitly addressed. As said by a 
EULEX judge: ‘we also have a problem with best practices and European standards. They simply 
don’t exist. For instance, there can be diverging understandings of what is a judge’s integrity. It is 
a problem that the Mission always mention best practices etc., but never clarified what it really 
is’ 375 . The overall objectives of fighting corruption, for instance, was never defined and 
clarified.376 As EULEX has an executive mandate to investigate and adjudicate in corruption 
cases, the Assembly of EULEX Judges convened a working group on ‘corruption definition’ to 
once and for all define what ‘corruption’ actually meant. The working group concluded that ‘the 
definition of corruption that may be used as basis of MMA activities on corruption by EULEX 
                                                
373 Ibid. 
374 Interview with EULEX Judge, Special Chamber of Kosovo’s Supreme Court, Pristina, Kosovo 
375 Interview with EULEX Judge (1), Kosovo’s Supreme Court, Pristina 
376 Interview with EULEX Judge (2), Kosovo’s Supreme Court, Pristina 
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Judges should be broad as to take into account the social, cultural and political aspects of this 
phenomenon’377. Yet, as noted by another EULEX judge: ‘the social side is more muddy…the 
problem here is that you have corruption everywhere’378. 
 The recourse to European standards and best practices has resulted in international 
judges largely applying the standards and practices that they are familiar with from their home 
countries and legal cultures, which have then been grafted into the legal culture of Kosovo. As 
noted by a German EULEX judge: ‘if there are gaps in the law, I believe that the German solution 
can be a European standard. But other national practices, for example, British, can also be a 
‘European standard’ […] it depends on the individual impressions’379. ‘There is no uniform 
European best practice. European best practice tends to be interpreted as what we do back home. 
That is pretty much it, you know. Or you might refer to, say, European conventions, or whatever’, 
according to another EULEX judge. Legal cultures and prior experience with missions in post-
conflict countries would in particular divide international judges and prosecutors in their approach 
to what should pertain to being ‘legality’. The use of discretion is, in particular, a bone of 
contention in this regard. As noted by a British EULEX judge:   
 
‘Whereas most civil judges would say 'no, I mean, we cannot do it', there is no 
discretion, that's the end of it. We do. I know Europeans, and I know we are all kind of 
brothers, buddies, etc., but the reality is quite different. The reality is that German 
judges, British judges, Italian judges, […] we may not necessarily approach the 
substantive law in a different way, but most of the time we would approach the 
procedure in a different way so we would take different views on what we can and what 
we can't do’380  
 
 Finally, the conception of what pertains to ‘legality’ and thus the rule of law among 
international judges is also structured around a general consensus that the rule of law does not 
reign in the local context among judges. ‘There is a lot of village justice happening’381 and ‘Kanun 
                                                
377 ’Working Group Definition of Corruption: Outcome of August 2010’, the 12th Assembly of 
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378 Interview with EULEX Judge (2), Kosovo’s Supreme Court, Pristina 
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law [Albanian clan-based customary law] thinking in the rural areas’382, where local judges would 
mediate in their offices between the parties in a case and not use the courtrooms. According to an 
EULEX Judge in the district court in Pristina: ‘Local judges consider themselves as someone who 
wants to mediate. They will serve coffee in their office to the parties and some kind of mediators. 
They will only issue a judgment if nothing else can be done before. If they can manage to avoid 
the trial, they will do everything, they will delay, they will give time, even though it is against the 
law, they don't care, they just postpone everything if it is needed […] I think they still think that is 
their job. But I don't think this is justice’383. ‘Every now and then we have blood revenge issues’, 
according to another EULEX Judge, ‘and the blood revenge issues always start with civil disputes. 
This is why civil law and EULEX civil judges here are important. Brussels and senior 
management here don’t get that. They probably don’t understand the local context’384.  
 
Conclusion:	Turning	to	Insights	From	the	Field	
   
 This chapter began in the cinema in Pristina. The cinema had turned into a semi-
international court for the purpose of the retrial of one of Kosovo’s most famous politicians and 
nine other former members of the KLA. The case hearing set the stage for the different actors 
involved in international criminal justice today: the international judge and prosecutor, local and 
international defense lawyers, and ex-combatants (in this case it was a former minister and a 
regional head of police). But the hearing also demonstrated the extent to which actors working in 
the ‘background’ of an internationalized court play an important role. In the retrial, the sayings of 
an international forensics expert involved in the case, the alleged impartiality of Kosovo’s Chief 
Prosecutor who is an international prosecutor with EULEX as well as the court’s jurisdiction and 
claim to interdependence and impartiality were all referred to and contested due to the 
organizational structures in which the court is embedded.  
 In this last chapter, I turned the inside out of the EU’s rule of law mission’s 
organizational structures and practices and draw on insights ‘from the field’ in following the 
everyday practices of international criminal justice. The purpose of so doing was to reconstruct 
how the meaning of the rule of law was made and fixed in and through different and dispersed 
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practices within a rule of law mission. I reconstructed the practices of three groups of actors within 
the mission: the planning team, the senior level, and the international judges and prosecutors. 
These actors were chosen as their different translations of the rule of law in practice would be 
fundamentally different. Mapping out the practices of these three groups revealed how the rule of 
law adopted three different meanings within the bureaucratic bounds of an international rule of 
law mission, that is, the rule of law as a technicality, the rule of law as a matter of political 
stability and the rule of law as a principle of legality. Each translation would depend on the 
particular context in which it was enacted, the background knowledge and the organizational 
position of the relevant actor, its translator.  
 The different translations of the rule of law evolved around the various meanings 
inscribed into the boundary between law and politics. The rule of law as a technicality resulted 
from the absence within the planning team of any concern with the applicable law and thus the 
question of what law should rule, which was an essentially political question in post-UDI Kosovo. 
The boundary between law and politics, as such, was not a concern as the rule of law was 
effectively a technical matter that could be assessed, measured and thus quantified. However, the 
translation of the rule of law into a technicality also resulted from the recognition among the EU 
member states’ representatives in Brussels that the applicable law was a political issue that they 
were not eager to address and therefore left with the ‘planners’. Indeed, the fighting over words to 
describe the ‘legal’ in Kosovo shows that describing the mission through technical terms 
effectively erased and made invisible the political agency of the EU in the legal field in Kosovo.  
 Among the ‘politicians’ in the mission, the translation of the rule of law into a matter 
of political stability derived from the enactment of a gap between law and politics where law 
should serve the particular political agenda of maintaining a close relationship with local 
politicians to not destabilize the political order in the country. The presence of former KFOR 
commanders and advisors in the senior level and former ambassadors to Kosovo as well as senior 
level’s close relationship to the US embassy and its ambassador was an important factor in taming 
the meaning of the rule of law to suit the ‘doctrine of stability’. As a result, case selection and 
adjudication by its own judges and prosecutors would be exposed to interference and pressures.  
 The rule of law among international judges and prosecutors was essentially a matter 
related to legality, why the question of the applicable law was a concern to these actors. In 
translating the rule of law into legality, international judges and prosecutors largely referred to 
their own background knowledge and thus domesticated the meaning of the rule of law into fitting 
their own values and beliefs in how law should rule. Though all three translations of the rule of 
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law’s practical meaning differed fundamentally from one another, they were also constitutive of 
one another. The translation of the rule of law into legality among international judges and 
prosecutors were done in relation to the criticism voiced against senior level in effectively 
working themselves around the rules of law.  
 Finally, the local context has by international judges often been described as ‘village 
justice’ where local customary norms of informal mediation trump the proper administration of 
justice. However, as this chapter showed, this village justice would equally reign within the 
bureaucratic bounds of the EU’s own rule of law mission where powerful actors would work 
themselves around law’s rule to interfere in the administration of justice by international lawyers. 
As noted by an international judge with EULEX who has experience from Iraq, Afghanistan and 
BiH: ‘There is always tension in any of these missions between justice and the politicians. 
Wherever country we are in politicians don't like judges, because politicians like to be able to do 
whatever they want and they don't like judges spoiling it for them. And it is the same within the 
international community’385. In fact, recently ‘village justice’ has allegedly been exercised among 
the mission’s own legal staff, too. In 2013, an internal investigation within EULEX was launched 
after a whistleblower, an EULEX Prosecutor, had revealed that an EULEX Judge, who was the 
head of all EULEX Judges, had received 300.000 Euros in bribes for turning down cases with the 
alleged implicit consent from EULEX Chief Prosecutor, who is also currently under investigation.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
385 Interview with EULEX Judge (1), Peja District Court 
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Chapter	8	
CONCLUSION:	UNRULY	RULE	OF	LAWS	
 
Among international practitioners and scholars, the rule of law has often been 
praised for its promise in bringing law, order and stability to post-conflict and ‘failed’ states where 
the absence of law’s rule is identified as the very root of political turbulence, lack of progress and 
the usurpation of power by elites unbound by law. This thesis provided another and more gloomy 
picture of the rule of law and promises made in its name by a professional class of international 
experts. Doing so, it uncovered the ‘dark sides’ of rule of law promotion where the identified roots 
of a conflict – the lack of law’s rule and the arbitrary and unaccountable governance by men – 
came to be replicated within the very bureaucratic bounds of international administration over the 
legal in post-conflict Kosovo. In reconstructing how contested concepts, vague wordings and 
political promises combined with international legal expertise, the thesis demonstrated how the 
rule of law has turned into many unruly rule of laws in contemporary global governance.  
In order to provide a concluding answer to the main research question that guided 
this analysis, I will first turn to the question raised in the title of the thesis: has the rule of law 
become a rule by lawyers? On a theoretical level, I addressed this question by developing the 
argument that the meaning of the rule of law cannot be extracted from what it refers to in a ‘world 
out there’ in the sense that it has a once-and-for all stable, universally shared and ‘fixed’ meaning. 
Doing so, has often led practitioners and scholars alike to a neat classical, liberal conception of the 
rule of law where law and politics outbalance each other and legal and political actors are held 
accountable for their deeds and doings (eg. Abbott et al. 2000). The discursive construction of the 
rule of law in UN and EU intervention discourses demonstrated this point. Moreover, among 
several scholars in IR and IL, this had led to the assumption that the rule of law can simply be 
transferred from its domestic constitutional context to transnational fields of global governance 
where it does not only bring stability to ‘shattered societies’ but also holds international actors 
who promote the rule of law accountable for their practices (eg. Slaughter 2004; Zürn et al. 2014). 
As argued by Kumm (2009), ‘[t]here is no deep conceptual difference between national and 
international constitutionalism’ (323). This understanding of the seemingly unproblematic transfer 
of meaning about the rule of law from one context to another reflects conceptions of translation in 
early translation studies, where the transfer of meaning follows norms, such as, symmetry and 
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functional equivalence and the translator merely stands in-between without any influence on the 
meaning that is transferred and thus translated. Yet, as this thesis demonstrated, it is when we 
move to the realm of practice, the doings and sayings of vested actors, that we can reconstruct the 
various partial perspectives on the practical meaning of the rule of law in order to identify its 
unruly, contradictory and contested meanings. Doing so served to redress a rather positive and 
positivist story about the role of law and legal expertise in creating a more just global order.   
However, approaching the rule of law as a transverse line that cuts through a messy 
landscape of the politics of international law and thereby simultaneously transgresses and enacts 
boundaries between law and politics complicates the answer to the question whether the rule of 
law has become a rule by – only – lawyers? Following the rule of law from its uptake in UN and 
EU intervention discourses, through its enactments within an UN administration over the legal in a 
post-conflict country, its spread across a transnationalized field of international donors engaged in 
law-making, and towards its various translations within a rule of law mission, shows that the rule 
of law has become a legitimizing discourse for broadening the scope and power of international 
law to the extent that not only international lawyers but diplomats, military actors and 
‘fonctionnaires’, among others, have become part and parcel of a professional class that governs 
the legal and judicial affairs of a post-conflict country.  
For that reason, critical scholars have often argued that the turn to law in global 
governance has left little room for political contestation (cf. the quote by David Kennedy 
introducing the introductory chapter of the thesis; also Kratochwil 2014). Yet, as this thesis 
demonstrated, the turn to the rule of law and legal expertise in global governance has not resulted 
in less political contestation. But maybe even more. By following the rule of law in and through 
what international experts do and say about the rule of law, the thesis demonstrated that the locus 
of politics in relation to making and administering the legal in the context of rule of law promotion 
in Kosovo gradually shifted from the local state and people to relatively bounded and closed 
administrative fields of international bureaucrats, donors, lawyers, ambassadors, and military 
actors, who struggled with each other to impose their particular translation of the practical 
meaning of the rule of law. Questions as to what law should rule, how law should rule and, in 
particular, when law should rule were contested and politicized among international actors who 
were all authorized to intervene in post-conflict Kosovo to promote the rule of law. These 
questions were not only addressed by international lawyers but by a host of different actors 
drawing on various background norms, knowledge claims and political agendas. In the case of 
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Kosovo, the rule of law became not only a rule by lawyers. But a rule by everyone and ultimately 
no one.   
This leads me to the main research question of the thesis: How is the meaning of the 
rule of law made knowable in practice? The main argument I developed in the thesis was that the 
practical meaning of the rule of law in global governance is constituted through struggles over 
drawing and thereby inscribing meaning into the boundary between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ in the 
quest towards constructing and enacting law’s relative autonomy versus what is narrated and thus 
assessed as being social, political and moral influences. I showed that these struggles played out in 
the often mundane, everyday practices and ordinary languages of international actors who were 
formally identified, authorized and justified to possess the professional knowledge – the particular 
expertise – that was required to solve the ‘problem’ of the rule of law and thus to translate it into 
what it should be in practice. These practices were, for instance, drafting and translating laws 
within the Department of Justice of UNMIK and the subsequent interpretation and enactment of 
laws by international judges and prosecutors, the informal relationship between the US 
ambassador and the senior management of EU’s rule of law mission which resulted in the 
politicization of law’s rule in post-conflict Kosovo, and the interpretation of the applicable law by 
international judges which would often be domesticated to suit their own background knowledge 
on what pertains to being ‘legal’. All these practices were interlinked, mutually constitutive and 
contradicting each other. But, in their aggregate, they constitute the epistemic and normative roots 
of the concept of the rule of law in the case of rule of law promotion in post-intervention Kosovo. 
More specifically, the indeterminate and ambiguous meaning of the concept of the 
rule of law was made knowable through practices of translation evolving around the contested 
boundary between law and politics. To demonstrate this point, I turned to the wordings of laws 
and regulations, different arguments about when, what and how law should rule, and the social 
context in which different actors – translators – were embedded to reconstruct how they made 
sense of their environment and the different languages and idioms available to construct meaning 
and knowledge and thereby translate the rule of law into practice. Identifying not only the 
indeterminacy of translating but also its contingency, I showed how the ambiguous and therefore 
indeterminate meaning of the rule of law was tamed and domesticated by different actors in order 
to through their translations construct a meaning of the rule of law that would suit their own 
norms, knowledge claims and subject positions within a given context and structure of power. The 
international judge, for example, deployed in a hybrid court did not merely stand between two 
legal cultures (as the example of Staunton demonstrated, too) but played an active role and thus 
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exercised her agency in constructing meaning about the context and representations of its culture 
that would fit her norms about legality. It follows therefore that translations are performative – 
both in creating a gap that it purports to bridge but also in spatially ordering different semantic 
fields, social orders and representations of a global world.  
By following the rule of law from its discursive enactments in UN and EU 
discourses throughout the period from 1999 to today within a field of international administrators 
and donors in Kosovo and finally towards its translation within an EU rule of law mission, I 
identified at least seven different translations of the rule of law: the rule of law as a potential for 
peace, the rule of law as law enforcement, the rule of law as a rule through international law, the 
rule of law as a ‘donors’ justice’, the rule of law as a technicality, the rule of law as political 
stability and the rule of law as legality. Following Quine’s problem of Gavagai and the role of 
language games in the construction of meaning, the presence of these different translations 
demonstrates that what is being translated – here the rule of law – cannot be defined and fixed 
once and for all but derives from the connotative relations in which the translator finds herself. 
These translations all resulted from practices of simultaneously separating and connecting law and 
politics, which resulted in the presence of both rule of law and non-rule of law, legalities and 
illegalities, that existed at the same time, vying with each other, and made possible by the same 
condition, that is, the Janus-faced nature of law as both enabling and constraining particular 
practices and actors to intervene in a given context. As such, the thesis showed that by de- and 
then reconstructing supposed singularities – such as the rule of law – directs us towards how 
heterogeneous, dispersed and often contradicting practices interlink and impact on one another in 
creating images and representations of stability, order and – singularity, which – I argued – is a 
result of the politics of translation in global governance.  
In navigating in and through this messy landscape of law and politics in global 
governance, the thesis demonstrated that to conclude that politics is bound by law in the context of 
international law’s constitutionalization and a turn to fundamental, constitutional norms (the rule 
of law) only provides one part of the picture. The promotion of the rule of law in and through 
international practices did not result in more stable international legal orders and interpretative 
practices informed by international law’s seemingly normative unity and semantic clarity. Quite 
the contrary. International law was continuously reinterpreted in the case of UNMIK’s 
administration in Kosovo to extend the powers and the functional scope of international law’s rule 
to create certain desired realities in which international actors could justify their claims to 
authority. However, to conclude that law defers to politics in an increasingly fragmented 
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international legal world populated by a variety of different actors (lawyers, among others) also 
provides only one part – the other part – of the picture. Within the governing structures and 
organizational cultures of UN and EU presence in Kosovo, respectively, the often arbitrary and at 
times illegal practices of non-legal actors in translating the meaning of the rule of law were 
contested by international lawyers, for instance, the Ombudsperson established by the OSCE 
mission or international judges deployed with EULEX. The politics of international law in this 
case played out in the uneasy relationship between law’s constitutionalization and its 
fragmentation. For that reason, a practice-oriented, reconstructive approach to the current changes 
and challenges related to international law’s growing hybridity and expanding scope unveils that 
the two seemingly opposing processes that characterize contemporary international law are deeply 
embedded in one another and even mutually constitutive.  
The findings of the thesis demonstrate that international law is not a bounded, 
confined set of rules that organize inter-state relations. Nor is international law semantically clear 
and precise and thus derives its force from being a stable normative and regulative source for 
shaping social behavior. Quite the contrary: the thesis demonstrated that the role and rule of 
international law and its agents in global governance are constantly constructed, contested and 
changed. Drawing on ethnography and unstructured interviews in following the rule of law 
through dispersed sites and practices offered a venue into unpacking the everyday practices of the 
politics of international law. A multi-sited ethnographic approach combined with retrieving stories 
‘from the field’ also served as a venue into reconstructing the various particular perspectives on 
normative meaning and its exceptions. As the thesis demonstrated, the boundary between a norm 
and its exception is never naturally given but is drawn differently, at a given time and in a given 
place. The rule of law, for example, was at the same time translated into legality and non- or 
illegality within the bureaucratic bounds of the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo. In 
consequence, what normative meaning is inscribed into a given norm, rule or concept depends on 
a particular perspective.  
Finally, the thesis offers two venues for future research, which are related to the 
methodology used and the theoretical framework. First, the findings and insights that result from 
the thesis point to the importance of moving from a logic of subsumption where the meaning of 
concepts are treated as fixed and stable prior to engaging with a field of research and particular 
empirical findings towards reconstructing the meaning of a concept from how it is used in 
practice. The thesis showed that a more mobile and multi-sited ethnographic approach is, in 
particular, suitable for such an inquiry. A reconstructive, practice-oriented and ‘bottom-up’ 
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approach to inquiring into concepts and institutions of global governance can be used to provide 
more pluralistic and critical perspectives on supposed singularities such as the rule of law, 
sovereignty, territoriality, etc. Second, by adopting a translationalist approach to the politics of 
international law resulting from the semantic indeterminacy of international law, how expert 
vocabularies, vernaculars and idioms are constructed, made bounded and juxtaposed can be 
addressed, as opposed to assuming that these vocabularies are already bounded and juxtaposed 
and thus struggle with each other.  
Indeed, it was only by turning to practices of translation and adopting a 
reconstructive approach to the rule of law and the role of legal expertise that the presence of the 
rule of law and non-rule of law, legalities and illegalities, constitutionalism and fragmentation, 
could be foregrounded and assessed. The presence of the rule of law in one context due to a 
particular translation was translated into the presence of the non-rule of law in another context. 
Identifying these practices and translations, the thesis showed how different perspectives, practices 
and problem formulations in their aggregate render the ‘international’ much more pluralistic, 
heterogeneous and, at times, epistemically violent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 256 
REFERENCES	
 
Aalberts, Tanja E. and Erna Rijsdijk (2011) Mobilising Uncertainty and Responsibility in 
International Politics and Law: Guest Editors’ Introduction. Review of International Studies 37 
(5): 2157-2161 
 
Aalberts, Tanja and Ingo Venzke (2015) Moving Beyond Interdisciplinary Truf Wars: Towards an 
Understanding of International Law as Practice. Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper 2015-22: 1-18 
 
Abbott, Andrew (1995) Things of Boundaries. Social Research 62 (4): 857-882 
 
Abbott, Kenneth W. (1989) Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers. Yale Journal of International Law 14 (2): 335-411 
 
Acuto, Michele and Simon Curtis (eds.) (2014) Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage 
Thinking and International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Adler, Emanuel (2005) Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundation of 
International Relations (London: Routledge) 
 
Adler, Emanuel and Vincent Pouliot (2011) International Practices. International Theory 3 (1): 1-
34 
 
Alvesson, Mats and Kaj Sköldberg (2009) Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative 
Research (London: Sage Publications) 
 
Amoore, Louise (2008) Risk before Justice: When the Law Contests Its Own Suspension. Leiden 
Journal of International Law 21 (4): 847-861 
 
Amoore, Louise (2013) The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press)  
 257 
 
Anghie, Antony (2005) Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Aradau, Claudia and Rens van Munster (2007) Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking 
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future. European Journal of International Relations 13 (1): 89-115 
 
Austin, John L. (1962) How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press) 
 
Autesserre, Séverine (2014) Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of 
International Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Baker, Mona (2006) Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account (Oxon: Routledge) 
 
Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations 
in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 
 
Barry, Andrew (2013) The Translation Zone: Between Actor-Network Theory and International 
Relations. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41 (3): 413-429 
 
Barry, Andrew, Georgina Born and Gisa Weszkalnys (2008) Logics of Interdisciplinarity. 
Economy and Society 37 (1): 20-49 
 
Bassnett, Susan (1998) The Translation Turn in Cultural Studies. In Susan Bassnett and André 
Lefevere, Constructing Cultures: Essays on Literary Translation (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters) 
(pp. 123-140) 
 
Bassnett, Susan (2002) Translation Studies (3rd edition) (London and New York: Routledge) 
 
Bassnett, Susan and André Lefevere (1998) Constructing Cultures: Essays on Literary 
Translation (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters) 
 
 258 
Bassnett, Susan and Harish Trivedi (1999) Introduction: Of Colonies Cannibals and Vernaculars. 
In Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi (eds.) Post-Colonial Translation: Theory and Practice 
(London: Routledge) (pp. 1-18) 
 
Beauvais, Joel C. (2000) Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor. 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 33 (4): 1101-1178 
 
Bell, Duncan (2001) International Relations: The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?. British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 3 (1): 115-26 
 
Bell, Duncan (2009) Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond. International Affairs 
85 (1): 3-22 
 
Bellamy Alex J. (2000) Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-99. The International Journal of Human 
Rights 4 (3-4): 105-126 
 
Benjamin, Walter (1968 [1923]) ’The Task of the Translator’ in Walter Benjamin Illusions (transl. 
by Harry Zohn) (New York: Schocken Books) (pp. 69-82) 
 
Benner, Thorsten, Stephan Mergenthaler and Philipp Rotmann (2011) The New World of UN 
Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann (1991 [1966]) The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in The Sociology of Knowledge (London: Penguin Books) 
 
Best, Jacqueline and William Walters (2013) Translating the Sociology of Translation. 
International Political Sociology 7 (3): 345-349 
 
Beurmann, Kurt (2008) Human Rights in Kosovo. Human Rights Review 9 (1): 41-54 
 
Bhabha, Homi (1994) The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge) 
 
Bielsa, Esperanca (2014) Cosmopolitanism as Translation. Cultural Sociology 8 (4): 392-406 
 259 
 
Björkdahl, Annika (2008) Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal 
of European Public Policy 16 (1): 135-154 
 
Bose, Sumantra (2002) Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention 
(New York: Oxford University Press) 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1987) The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field. Hastings 
Law Journal 38: 805-853 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1990) The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press) 
 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992) Beyond Peacekeeping. New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 25: 113-122 
 
Brake, Benjamin and Peter J. Katzenstein (2013) Lost in Translation? Nonstate Actors and the 
Transnational Movement of Procedural Law. International Organization 67 (4): 725-757 
 
Brewer, J. (2000) Ethnography (Buckingham: Open University Press) 
 
Buchan, Russell (2013) International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (Portland: 
Hart Publishing) 
 
Büger, Christian (2015) Making Things Known: Epistemic Practices, the United Nations, and the 
Translation of Piracy. International Political Sociology 9 (1): 1-18 
 
Büger; Christian and Felix Bethke (2014) Actor-Networking the ‘Failed State’ – An Enquiry into 
the Life of Concepts. Journal of International Relations and Development 17 (1): 30-60 
 
Bull, Hedley (2002 [1977]) The Anarchical Society (third ed.) (New York: Columbia University 
Press) 
 
 260 
Cady, Jean-Christian (2012) Establishing the Rule of Law: The U.N. Challenge in Kosovo. Focus 
Stratégique 34: 1-45 
 
Callon, Michel (1980) Struggles and Negotiations to Decide What Is Problematic and What Is 
Not: The Socio-Logics of Translation. In Karin D. Knorr, Roger Krohn and Richard Whitley 
(eds.) The Social Process of Scientific Investigation (Dordrecht: Holland. D. Reidel) 
 
Callon, Michel (1986) Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation and Domestication of the 
Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieux Bay. In John Law (ed.) Power, Action and Belief: A New 
Sociology of Knowledge? (London: Routledge) (pp. 196-229) 
 
Callon, Michel (1995) Four Models for the Dynamics of Science. In Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. 
Markle, James C. Petersen and trevor Pinch (eds.) Handbook of Science and Technology Studies 
(London: Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage) (pp. 29-63) 
 
Callon, Michel and Bruno Latour (1981) Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-
Structure reality and How Sociologists Help Them To Do So’. In Karin Knorr-Cetina and Aaron 
Cicoural (eds.) Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Towards an Integration of Micro 
and Macro-Sociologies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) (pp. 277-303) 
 
Capusella, Andrea (2015) State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the 
Balkans (London and New York: I.B.Tauris) 
 
Carothers, Thomas (1998) The Rule of Law Revival. Foreign Affairs 77 (2): 95-106 
 
Carothers, Thomas (ed.) (2006) Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) 
 
Carr, Edward Hallett (1964 [1939]) The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row) 
 
Catford, John Cunnison (1965) A Linguistic Theory of Translation: An Essay in Applied 
Linguistics (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 261 
 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2000) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
 
Chandler, David (2006) From Dayton to Europe. In David Chandler (ed.) Peace Without 
Politics?: Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia. (New York: Routledge) (pp. 30-43) 
 
Chanock, Martin (1992) The Law Market: the Legal Encounter in British East and Central Africa. 
In E.J. Mommsen and J.A. De Moor (eds.) European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of 
European and Indigenous Law in the 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia  (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press) 
 
Charlesworth, Hilary (1999) Feminist Methods in International Law. The American Journal of 
International Law 93 (2): 379-394 
 
Charlesworth, Hilary and Christine Chinkin (2000) The Boundaries of International Law: A 
Feminist Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
 
Chesterman, Simon (2001) Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Chesterman, Simon (2004) You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, 
and State-Building (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press) 
 
Chesterman, Simon (2005) Imposed Constitutions, Imposed Constitutionalism, and Ownership. 
Connecticut Law Review 37: 947-954 
 
Chimni, B.S. (2012) Legitimating the International Rule of Law. In James Crawford and Martti 
Koskenniemi (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) (290-308) 
 
 262 
Comaroff, John L. And Jean Comaroff (2006) Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An 
Introduction. In John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff (eds.) Law ad Disorder in the Postcolony 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press) (pp. 1-56) 
 
Coplin, William D. (1965) International Law and Assumptions about the State System. World 
Politics 17 (4): 615-634 
 
Cover, Robert (1983) Foreword: Nomos and Narrative. Harvard Law Review 97: 4-68 
 
Craig, Paul (1997) Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law. Public Law 21: 467-
487 
 
Craven, Matt (2007) The Decolonization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Cross, Mai’a (2011) Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-Based Networks Are 
Transforming the European Union (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press) 
 
Czarniawska, Barbara and Guje Sévon (1996) Translating Organizational Change (Berlin and 
New York: de Gruyter) 
 
De Burca, Grainne and Joanne Scott (eds.) (2001) EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional 
Issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing) 
 
De Goede, Marieke (2003) Beyond Economism in International Political Economy. Review of 
International Studies 29 (1): 79-97 
 
De Goede, Marieke (2008a) The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe. 
European Journal of International Relations 14 (1): 161-185 
 
De Goede (2008b) Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination. Security 
Dialogue 39 (2-3): 155-176  
 
 263 
De Goede, Marieke (2011) Blacklisting and the Ban: Contesting Targeted Sanctions in Europe. 
Security Dialogue 42 (6): 499-515 
 
De Goede (2012) Speculative Security: The Politics of Pursuing Terrorist Monies (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press) 
 
De Goede, Marieke and Beatrice de Graaf (2013) Sentencing Risk: Temporality and Precaution in 
Terrorism Trials. International Political Sociology 7 (3): 313-331 
 
De Goede, Marieke and Gavin Sullivan (2013) Betwen Law and the Exception: The UN 1267 
Ombudsperson as a Hybrid Model of Legal Expertise. Leiden Journal of International Law 26 (4): 
833-854 
 
De Goede, Marieke and Gavin Sullivan (2016) The Politics of Security Lists. Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 34 (1): 67-88 
 
Derrida, Jacques (1973) ’Difference’. In Jacques Derrida Speech and Phenomena, and Other 
Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press) 
 
Derrida, Jacques (1985) Des Tours de Babel. In Joseph F. Graham (ed.) Difference in Translation 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press) (pp. 165-207) 
 
Dicey, A. V. (1982) Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund) 
 
Dickinson, Laura A. (2003a) The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: 
The Case of Kosovo. New England Law Review 37 (4): 1059-1072 
 
Dickinson, Laura A. (2003b) The Promise of Hybrid Courts. The American Journal of 
International Law 97 (2): 295-310 
 
Dijkstra, Hylke (2011) The Planning and Implementation of the Rule of Law Mission of the 
European Union in Kosovo. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5 (2): 193-210 
 
 264 
Dijkstra, Hylke (2013) Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Donlon, Fidelma (2011) Hybrid Tribunals. In Schabas and Bernaz (eds.) Routledge Handbook of 
International Criminal Law (New York: Routledge) (pp. 95-106) 
 
Dos Reis, Filipe (2015) International Relations, International Law and the Politics of 
Interdisciplinarity. Paper presented at the 9th Pan-European Conference on International Relations 
(EISA), 23-26 September 2015 (on file with author) 
 
Doty, Roxanne Lynn (1997) Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique 
in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 3(3): 365-392 
 
Dunlap, Charles (2008) Lawfare Today: A Perspective. Yale Journal of International Affairs 
(Winter 2008): 146-154 
 
Dunoff, Jeffrey L. (2009) The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious Case of the 
World Trade Organization. In Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds.) Ruling the World?: 
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) (pp. 178-229) 
 
Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Mark A Pollack (2013) International Law and International Relations: 
Introducing an Interdisciplinary Dialogue. In Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.) 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the 
Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Joel P. Trachtman (2009) (eds.) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989) Building Theories from Case Study Research. The Academy of 
Management Review  14 84): 532-550 
 
 265 
Epstein, Charlotte (2014) The Postcolonial Perspective: An Introduction. International Theory 6 
(2): 294-311 
 
Everly, Rebecca (2007) Reviewing Governmental Acts of the United Nations in Kosovo. German 
Law Journal 8 (1): 21-38 
 
Falk, Richard A. (1970) Status of Law in International Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press) 
 
Fallon, Richard H. (1997) ”The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse.  Columbia 
Law Review 97 (1): 1-56 
 
Falzon, Mark-Anthony (2009) Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in 
Contemporary Research. In Mark-Anthony Falzon (ed.) Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis 
and Locality in Contemporary Research (Surrey: Ashgate) (pp. 1-25) 
 
Fassbender, Bardo (1998) The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community. Columbia Journal of International Law 36 (3): 529-619 
 
Fassbender, Bardo (2009) The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community (The Hague: Brill Academic Publishing) 
 
Feyissa, Hailegabriel G. (2006) The Unique but Forgotten Mixed Courts of Mid-20th Century 
Africa: European Extraterritoriality in Semicolonial Ethiopia. Paper presented at the Harvard Law 
School’s Institute for Global Law and Policy’s (IGLP) African Regional Workshop, 17-23 
January 2016 (on file with author) 
 
Feldman, Gregory (2011) Illuminating the Apparatus: Steps Towards a Nonlocal Ethnography of 
Global Governance. In Cris Shore, Susan Wright, and Davide Péro (eds.) Policy Worlds: 
Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Power (Oxford: Berghahn) (pp. 32-49) 
 
Finnemore, Martha (1996) National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press) 
 266 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change. International Organization 52 (4): 887-917 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Stephen J. Toope (2001) Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of 
Law and Politics. International Organization 55 (3): 743-758 
 
Fischer-Lescano, Andreas and Gunther Teubner (2004) Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law. Michigan Journal of International Law 25 (4): 
999-1046 
 
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006) Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry 
12 (2): 219-245 
 
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2011) Case Study. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.) The Sage Handbook 
of Qualitative Research (4th ed.) (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage) (pp. 301-316) 
 
Foucault, Michel (1995 [1975]) Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison (New York: 
Vintage) 
 
Fougner, Tore (2008) Neoliberal Governance of States: The Role of Competitiveness Indexing 
and Country Benchmarking. Millennium – Journal of International Studies 37 (2): 303-326 
 
Franck, Thomas M. (1990) The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) 
 
Franck, Thomas (1992) The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance. The American Journal of 
International Law 86 (1): 46-91 
 
Franck, Thomas (2009) Preface: International Institutions: Why Constitutionalize? In Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds.) Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law and 
Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (pp. xi-xvi) 
 
 267 
Faundez, Julio (2005) The Rule of Law Enterprise – Towards a Dialogue between Practitioners 
and Academics. University of Warwick, CSGR Working Paper No. 164/05 (May 2005): 1-33 
 
Frankenberg, Gunther (1985) Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law. Harvard 
International Law Journal 26 (2): 451-486 
 
Freeman, Richard (2009) What Is ‘Translation’? Evidence & Policy 5 (4): 429-447 
 
Friedrichs, Jörg and Friedrich Kratochwil (2009) On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can 
Advance International Relations Research and Methodology. International Organization 63 (4): 
701-731  
 
Garth, Bryant G. and Yves Dezalay (2005) Introduction. In Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth 
(eds.) Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal 
Orthodoxy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press) 
 
Gathii, James T. (2003) Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International Law. Albany Law 
Review 67: 335-370 
 
Gazzini, Tarcisio (2005) The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
 
Geertz, Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz. (New 
York: Basic Books Inc.) 
 
Gemkow, Tim and Michael Zürn (2014) Constraining International Authority through the Rule of 
Law: Legitimatory Potential and Political Dynamics. In Zürn, Michael, André Nollkaemper, 
Randy Peerenboom (eds.) Rule of Law Dynamics in an Era of International and Transitional 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (pp. 68-89) 
 
Gerring, John (2004) What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? American Political Science 
Review 98 (2): 341-354 
 
 268 
Glanert, Simon (2011) De la Traductabilité du Droit (Paris: Dalloz) 
 
Glanert, Simon (2014a) Law-In-Translation: An Assemblage in Motion. The Translator 20 (3): 
255-272 
 
Glanert, Simon (ed.) (2014b) Comparative Law – Engaging Translation (London: Routledge) 
 
Glanert, Simon and Pierre LeGrand (2013) Foreign Law in Translation: If Truth Be Told… In M. 
Freeman and F. Smtih (eds.) Current Legal Issues: Law and Language (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
 
Glinavos, Ioannis (2008) Neoliberal Law: Unintended Consequences of Market-Friendly Law 
Reforms. Third World Quarterly 29 (6): 1087-1099 
 
Goertz, Gary (2006) Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press) 
 
Goldstein, Judith L., Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2000) 
Introduction: Legalization and World Politics. International Organization 54 (3): 385–399 
 
Grasten, Maj (2015) Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Mediations on the 
Role and Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Global Affairs 1(3): 349-
350  
 
Grasten, Maj (2016) Whose Legality? Rule of Law Missions and the Case of Kosovo. In Tanja 
Aalberts, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas Rajkovic (eds.) The Power of Legality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)) 
 
Grasten, Maj and Luca J. Uberti (2015) The Politics of Law in a Post-Conflict UN Protectorate: 
Privatisation and Property Rights in Kosovo (1999-2008). Journal of International Relations and 
Development 27 Februart 2015 (online first) 
 
 269 
Grenfell, Laura (2013) Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
 
Guillaume, Xavier (2007) Unveiling the ‘International’: Process, Identity and Alterity. Millennium 
– Journal of International Studies 35 (3): 741-759 
 
Guzzini, Stefano (2000) A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. European 
Journal of International relations 6 (2): 147-182 
 
Guzzini, Stefano (2005) The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis. Millennium – Journal 
of International Studies 33 (3): 495-521 
 
Guzzini, Stefano (2013) The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and 
Modes of Theorizing. European Journal of International Relations 19 (3): 521-541 
 
Haas, Ersnt B. (1964) Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press) 
 
Haas, Peter (1990) Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press) 
 
Haas Peter (1992) Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. 
International Organization 46 (1): 1-35  
 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., David G Victor and Yonatan Lupu (2012) Political Science Research 
on International Law: The State of the Field. The American Journal of International Law 106 (1): 
47-97 
 
Hamati-Ataya, Inanna (2011) The ‘Problem of Values’ and International Relations Scholarship: 
From Applied Reflexivity to Reflexivism. International Studies Review 13 (2): 259-287  
 
Hamati-Ataya, Inanna (2012) Reflectivity, Reflexivity, Reflexivism: IR’s ‘Reflexive Turn’ – And 
Beyond. European Journal of International Relations 19 (4): 669-694  
 
 270 
Hanks, William F. and Carlo Severi (2014) Translating Worlds: The Epistemological Space of 
Translation. Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4 (2): 1-16 
 
Haraway, Donna (1988) Situated Knowledges. The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspectives. Feminist Studies 14 (3): 575-599 
 
Hatzimihail, Nikitas E. (2003) Annelise Riles, The Network Inside Out (Book Review). Leiden 
Journal of International Law 16 (2): 416-421 
 
Hayek, Friedrich A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom (London and New York: Routledge)  
 
Hendry, Jennifer (2014) Legal Comparison and the (Im)Possibility of Legal Translation. In Simon 
Glanert (ed.) Comparative Law – Engaging Translation (London: Routledge) (pp. 87-103) 
 
Herborth, Benjamin (2011) Methodenstreit - Methodenzwang - Methodenfetisch. Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Beziehungen 18 (2): 137-152 
 
Herborth, Benjamin (2012) Theorising Theorising: Critical Realism and the Quest for Certainty. 
Review of International Studies 38 (1): 235-251 
 
Herborth, Benjamin and Oliver Kessler (2014) Theorising Method: World Society and the Practice 
of Inquiry. Paper presented at the Millennium Conference 2014 (on file with author) 
 
Heupel. Monika (2012) Rule of Law Promotion and Security Sector Reform: Common Principles, 
Common Challenge. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 4 (1): 158-175 
 
Higonnet, Ethel (2005) Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal 
Justice Reform. Yale Law School Student Scholarship Series Paper 6: 1-70 
 
Hochschild, Fabrizio (2004) ’It is Better to Leave, We Can’t Protect You’: Flight in the First 
Months of United Nations Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor. Journal of 
Refugee Studies 17 (3): 286-300 
 
 271 
Holbrooke, Richard C. (1998) To End a War (New York: Random House) 
 
Hopf, Ted (1998) The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. International 
Security 23 (1): 171-200 
 
Hopkins, Terrence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein (1977) Patterns of development of the modern 
world-system. Review 1 (2): 111-145 
 
Hui, Wang (1998) ‘Postcolonial Approaches’ in Mona Baker and Gabriela Saldanha (eds.) 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies (London and New York: Routledge) (pp. 200-204) 
 
Humphreys, Stephen (2010) Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention in 
Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)  
 
Humphreys, Stephen (2012) Laboratories of Statehood: Legal Intervention in Colonial Africa and 
Today. The Modern Law Review 75 (4): 475-510 
 
Hurd, Ian (2007) After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
 
Hurwitz, Agnès and Reyko Huang (eds.) (2008) Civil War and the Rule of Law: Security, 
Development, Human Rights (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner) 
 
Ignatieff, Michael (2004) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press) 
 
Ikenberry, John G. and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2006) Forging a World of Liberty under Law: US 
National Security in the 21st Century (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, Princeton University)  
 
Jensen, Erik G. and Thomas C. Heller (2003) Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical 
Approaches to the Rule of Law (Stanford: Stanford University Press) 
 
 272 
Johns, Fleur (2005) Guantánamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception. The European 
Journal of International Law 16 (4): 613-635  
 
Johns, Fleur (2013) Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
 
Jones, William C. (1994) The Great Qing Code (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Kapuściński, Ryszard (2008) Travels with Herodotus. London (London: Penguin Books), 
 
Kasparek, Christopher (1983) The Translator’s Endless Toil. The Polish Review 28 (2): 83-87 
 
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press) 
 
Kendall, Sara (2013) ”Constitutional Technicity”: Displacing Politics through Expert Knowledge. 
Law. Culture and the Humanities 16 August 2013 (published online first): 1-15 
 
Kennedy, David (1987) International Legal Structures (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft) 
 
Kennedy, David (2001) The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the 
Politics of Expertise. European Human Rights 2 (5): 463-598 
 
Kennedy, David (2004) The Dark Sides of Virtue; Reassessing International Humanitarianism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
 
Kennedy, David (2005) Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance. Sydney 
Journal of International Law 27 (1): 5-28  
 
Kennedy, David (2006a) Of War and Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
 
 273 
Kennedy, David (2006b) The ”Rule of Law”, Political Choices, and Development Common 
Sense. In David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds.), The New Law and Economic Development. 
A Critical Apprasial (New York: Cambridge University Press) (pp. 95-173) 
 
Kennedy, David (2007) One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the 
Cosmopolitan Dream’. New York University Review of Law and Social Change 31 (3): 641-660 
 
Kennedy, David (2009) The Mystery of Global Governance. In Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Joel P. 
Trachtman (eds.) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press) (pp. 37-68) 
 
Kennedy, David (2016) A World of Struggle: How Power, Law and Expertise Shape Global 
Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1997) International Relations and International Law: Two Optics. Harvard 
International Law Journal 28: 487-502 
 
Ker-Lindsay, James (2009a) From Autonomy to Independence: The Evolution of International 
Thinking on Kosovo, 1998-2005. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11 (2): 141-156 
 
Ker-Lindsay, James (2009b) Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (New York: 
I.B. Tauris) 
 
Kessler, Oliver (2007) From Agents and Structures to Minds and Bodies: Of Supervenience, 
Quantum, and the Linguistic Turn. Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (3): 
243-271 
 
Kessler, Oliver (2008) Is Risk Changing the Politics of Legal Argumentation?. Leiden Journal of 
International Law 21 (4): 863-884 
 
Kessler, Oliver (2010) Introduction: So Close Yet So Far Away? International Law in 
International Political Sociology. International Political Sociology 4 (3): 303-304  
 
 274 
Kessler, Oliver and Wouter Werner (2008) Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management. Security 
Dialogue 39 (2-3): 289-308 
 
Kessler, Oliver and Wouter Werner (2013) Expertise, Uncertainty, and International Law: A Study 
of the Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare. Leiden Journal of International Law 26 (4): 793-810 
 
King, Iain and Whit Mason (2006) Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press) 
 
Kingsbury, Benedict, Nico Krisch and Richard Stewart (2005) The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law. Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (3): 15-61 
 
Klabbers, Jan (2004) Constitutionalism Lite. International Organizations Law Review 1 (1): 31-58 
 
Klabbers, Jan (2005) The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of 
Interdisciplinarity. Journal of International Law and International Relations (1 (1-2): 35-48  
 
Klabbers, Jan (2009) The Bridge Crack’d: A Critical Look at Interdisciplinary Relations.  
International Relations 23 (1): 119-125 
 
Klabbers, Jan (2015) Friedrich Kratochwil. The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on 
the Role and Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press, 2014 (Book Review). The European 
Journal of International Law 25 (4): 1195-1208 
 
Klabbers, Jan, Peters, Anne and Geir Ulfstein (2009) The Constitutionalization of International 
Law (New York: Oxford University Press) 
 
Kleinfeld-Belton, Rachel (2005) Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for 
Practitioners. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Rule of Law Series, no. 55 
 
Knoll, Bernard (2005) From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and The Problem of an 
International Administration’s Open-Ended Mandate. European Journal of International Law 16 
(4): 637-660 
 275 
 
Knowles, Adam (2011) Conjecturing Rudeness: James Mill’s Utilitarian Philosophy of History 
and the British Civilizing Mission. In Michael Mann and Carey Watt (eds.) From Improvement to 
Development: Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Post-Colonial South Asia (London: Anthem 
Press) (pp. 37-64) 
 
Koselleck, Reinhart (2004) Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: 
Columbia University Press) 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (1989) From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton Kustannus/ Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company) 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (1999a) Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline of a Theory of 
International Law as Practice. In United Nations, Collections of Essays by Legal Advisers of 
States, Legal Advisers of International Organizations and Practitioners in the Field of 
International Law (pp. 495-523) 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (1999b) The Effect of Rights on Political Culture. In Philip Alston (ed.) The 
European Union and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2003) Legitimacy, Rights and Ideology: Notes Towards a Critique of the 
New Moral Internationalism. Associations 7 (2): 349-373 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2004) The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (first published in 2001) 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2005a) From Apology to Utopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2005b) Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of 
Thought. Talk given at a conference at Harvard, 5 March 2005. Available online: 
http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d[1].pdf  
 
 276 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2007a) Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes 
About International Law and Globalization. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8 (1): 9-36 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2007b) The Fate of Public International Law: Between Techniques and 
Politics. Modern Law Review 70 (1): 1-32 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2009a) The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later. European 
Journal of International Law 20 (1): 7-19 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2009b) Miserable Comforters. International Relations as a New Natural 
Law. European Journal of International Relations 15 (3): 395-422 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti (2011) Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in 
Counterdisciplinarity. International Relations 26 (1): 3-34 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti and Päivi Leino (2002) Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties. Leiden Journal of International Law 15 (3): 553–579  
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (1984) The Force of Prescriptions. International Organization 38 (4): 685-
708 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (1989) Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (New York: Cambridge 
University Press) 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2000) How Do Norms Matter?. In Michael Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in 
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (pp. 35-68) 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2006) History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the ‘Second’ Great Debate 
and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory. European Journal of International Relations 12 
(1): 5-29 
 
 277 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2007a) On False Promises and Good Bets: A Plea for a Pragmatic 
Approach to Theory Building (The Tartu Lecture). Journal of International Relations and 
Development 10 (1): 1-15 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2007b) Looking Back From Somewhere: Reflections on What Remains 
’Critical’ in Critical Theory. Review of International Studies 33 (S1): 25-45 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2009a) Legal Theory and International Law. In David Armstrong (ed.) 
Routledge Handbook of International Law (Oxon: Routledge) (pp. 55-67) 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2009b) Has the ‘Rule of Law’ Become a ‘Rule of Lawyers’?. In Gianluigi 
Palombella and Neil Walker (eds.) Relocating the Rule of Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing) (pp. 171-196)  
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2010) International Law and International Sociology. International 
Political Sociology 4 (3): 311-315 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2014a) The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and 
Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (2014b) A Guide for the Perplexed? Critical Reflections on Doing Inter-
Disciplinary Legal Research. Transnational Legal Theory 5 (4): 541-556 
 
Kratochwil, Friedrich and John Gerard Ruggie (1986) International Organization: A State of the 
Art on an Art of the State. International Organization 40 (4): 753-775 
 
Kumm, Mattias (2009) The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’. In Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (eds.) 
Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) (pp. 258-324) 
 
Lapid, Yosef (1989) The Third Debate: On Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist 
Era. International Studies Quarterly 33 (3): 235-254 
 278 
 
Latour, Bruno (1987) Science in Action: How To Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press) 
 
Latour, Bruno (1988) The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 
 
Latour, Bruno (2005) Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Law, John (1997) Traduction/Trahision: Notes on ANT. Paper, Centre for Science Studies, 
Lancaster University. Available at: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/resources/sociology-online-
papers/papers/law-traduction-trahison.pdf     
 
Law, John (2004) After Method: Mess in Social Science Research (Oxon: Routledge)  
 
Law, John and Vicky Singleton (2005) Object Lessons. Organization 12 (3): 331-355 
 
Leander, Anna (2005a) The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of 
Private Military Companies. Millennium – Journal of International Studies 33 (3): 803-825 
 
Leander, Anna (2005b) The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing 
Consequences of Private Military Companies. Journal of Peace Research 42 (5): 605-622 
 
Leander, Anna (2009) Habitus and Field. Department of Intercultural Communication and 
Management Working Paper (9): 1-30  
 
Leander, Anna and Tanja E. Aalberts (2013) Introduction: The Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise 
and International Security. Leiden Journal of International Law 26 (4): 783-792 
 
Leander, Anna and Rens van Munster (2007) Private Security Contractors in the Debate About 
Darfur: Reflecting and Reinforcing Neo-Liberal Governmentality. International Relations 21 (2): 
201-216  
 
 279 
Lefevere, André (1977) Translating Literature: The German Tradition from Luther to Rosenweig 
(Assen: Van Gorcum) 
 
LeGrand, Pierre (1996) European Legal Systems Are Not Converging. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 45 (1): 52-81 
 
LeGrand, Pierre (2005) Issues in the Translatability of Law. In S. Bermann and M. Wood (eds.) 
Nation, Language, and the Ethics of Trannslation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) (pp. 
30-50) 
 
LeGrand, Pierre (2014) Withholding Translation. In Simon Glanert (ed.) Comparative Law – 
Engagning Translation (London: Routledge) 
 
Lemay-Hebert, Nicolas (2009) State-Building From the Outside-In: UNMIK and Its Paradox.  
Journal of Public and International Affairs 20 (1): 65-86 
 
Lemay-Hebert, Nicolas (2011) The ”Empty-Shell” Approach: The Setup, Process of International 
Administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Concesquences and Lessons. International 
Studies Perspectives 12 (2): 190-211 
 
Lemay-Hebert, Nicolas (2014) The Semantics of Contemporary Statebuilding: Kosovo, Timor-
Leste, and the ’Empty-Shell’ Approach. In Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Nicholas Onuf, Vojin Rakic 
and Petar Bojanic (eds.), Semantics of Statebuilding: Language, Meanings and Sovereignty 
(Oxon: Routledge) (pp. 135-149) 
 
Lie, Jon and Harald Sande (2013) Challenging Anthropology: Anthropological Reflections on the 
Ethnographic Turn in International Relations. Millennium – Journal of International Studies 41 
(2): 201-220  
 
Lindahl, Hans (2013) Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
 280 
Liste, Philip (2008) Articulating the Nexus of Politics and Law: War in Iraq and the Practice 
within Two Legal Systems. International Political Sociology 2 (1): 38-55 
 
Luhmann, Niklas (2004) Law as a Social System (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
MacDonald, Barry and Rob Walker (1975) Case Study and the Social Philosophy of Educational 
Research. Cambridge Journal of Education 5 (1): 2-12 
 
Magen, Amichai (2004) EU Democracy and Rule of Law Promotion: The Enlargment Strategy 
and Its Progeny. Center on Democracy Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute for 
International Studies, Working Paper no 27 
 
Malmkjær, Kirsten (2005) Linguistics and the Language of Translation (Edinburgh: Edinbirgh 
University Press) 
 
Marcus, George E. (1995) Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited 
Ethnography. Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 95-117  
 
Marshall, David and Shelley Inglis (2003) The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice 
in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (Spring): 95-146 
 
McArthur, Tom (2013) Concise Companion to the English Language (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) (current online version: 2013) 
 
Marvasti, Amir B. (2004) Qualitative Research in Sociology (London: SAGE Publications) 
 
Marzouk, Lawrence ‘Pristina Street ‘Renamed’ After EULEX Prosecutor’, Balkan Insight 10 May 
2010; available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/pristina-street-renamed-after-eulex-
prosecutor 
 
Mehta, Uday Singh (1999) Liberalism and Empire: India in British Liberal Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) 
 
 281 
Merkel, Wolfgang (2014) Measuring the Quality of Rule of Law: Virtues, Perils, Results. In Zürn, 
Michael, André Nollkaemper, Randy Peerenboom (eds.) Rule of Law Dynamics in an Era of 
International and Transitional Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (pp. 21-47) 
 
Merriam, Sharan B. (1998) Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass) 
 
Merry, Sally Engle (2006) Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law 
into Local Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 
 
Merryman, John H. (1977) Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins Style, Decline & 
Revival of the Law and Development Movement. American Journal of Comparative Law 25: 457-
489 
 
Mezzadra, Sandro and Naoki Sakai (2014) Introduction. Translation 4 (online journal); available 
online at: http://translation.fusp.it/issues/issue-4  
 
Mill, James (2010 [1817]), The History of British India vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press) 
 
Mol, Annemarie (1999) Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions. In John Law and John 
Urry (eds.) Actor Network Theory and After (Oxford: Blackwell) (pp. 74-89) 
 
Mol, Annemarie (2002) Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham: Duke University 
Press) 
 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1940) Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law. The American 
Journal of International Law 34 (2): 260-284 
 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1985) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (6th 
edition) (New York: McGraw-Hill) 
 
 282 
Morlino, Leonardo and Gianluigi Palombella (eds.) (2010) Rule of Law and Democracy: Inquiries 
Into International and External Issues (Leiden and Boston: Brill) 
 
Møller, Jørgen and Svend-Erik Skaaning (2014) The Rule of Law: Definitions, Measures, Patterns 
and Causes (London: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Nader, Laura (1972) Up the Anthropologist – Perspectives Gained from Studying Up. In D. 
Hymes (ed.) Reinventing Anthropology (New York: Pantheon) (pp. 284-311)  
 
Neumann, Iver B. (2002) Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy. 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31 (3): 627-651 
 
Neumann, Iver B. (2005) To Be a Diplomat. International Studies Perspectives 6 (1): 72-93  
 
Nexon, Daniel H. and Vincent Pouliot (2013) ’Things of Networks’: Situating ANT in 
International Relations. International Political Sociology 7 (3): 342-345 
 
Niranjana, Tejaswini (1992) Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial 
Context (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press)  
 
Nouwen, Sarah M. H. (2006) ‘Hybrid Courts’ The Hybrid Category of a New Type of 
International Criminal Courts. Utrecht Law Review 2 (2): 190-214 
 
O’Neill, William (2008) UN Peacekeeping Operations and Rule of Law Programs. In Agnès 
Hurwitz and Reyko Huang (eds.) Civil War and the Rule of Law: Security, Development, Human 
Rights (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner) (pp. 91-113) 
 
Onuf, Nicholas G. (1989) World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations (Columbia, SC: Greenwood Press) 
 
Onuf, Nicholas G. (2014) Rule and Rules in International Relations. Speech given at the Erik 
Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki, 24 April 2014. 
 283 
Available online at: 
http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Events/Nicholas%20Onuf_Rule%20and%20Rules%20%204-2-14.pdf  
 
Orford, Anne (1998) Embodying Internationalism: The Making of International Lawyers. 
Australian Yearbook of International Law 19: 1-34 
 
Orford, Anne (1997) Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the 
Cold War. Harvard International Law Journal 38 (2): 443-485  
 
Orford, Anne (1999) Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New 
Interventionism. European Journal of International Law 10 (4): 679-711 
 
Orford, Anne (2003) Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Orford, Anne (2006) (ed.) International Law and Its Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 
 
Orford, Anne (2011) International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 
 
Orford, Anne (2012) In Praise of Description. Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (3): 609-
625 
 
Orford, Anne (2013) On International Legal Method. London Review of International Law 1 (1): 
166-197 
 
Österdahl, Inger (2008) Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 
39 of the UN Charter (Uppsala: Och Justus Forlag) 
 
Pakenham, Thomas (1991) The Scramble for Africa (London: Abacus) 
 
 284 
Palombella, Gianluigi and Neil Walker (2009) Relocating the Rule of Law (Oxford and Portland: 
Hart Publishing) 
 
Paris, Roland (2002) International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice. Review of 
International Studies 28 (4): 637-656 
 
Park, Susan and Antje Vetterlein (2010) (eds.) Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in 
the IMF and the World Bank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Peerenboom, Randall (2002) Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: 
Debating Rule of Law in China. Michigan Journal of International Law 23 (2): 471-544 
 
Peerenboom, Randall (2009) The Future of the Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the 
Field. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1 (1): 5-14 
 
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1965) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol, 1, Principles of 
Philosophy; Vol. 2, Elements of Logic; Vol. 5, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism; Vol. 7, Science 
and Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 
 
Peters, Anne (2006) Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures. Leiden Journal of International Law 19 (3): 579-610 
 
Peters, Anne (2009) Conclusions. In Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (pp. 342-352) 
 
Pohl, Benjamin (2014) EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: Power, Purpose 
and Domestic Politics (London and New York: Routledge) 
 
Pouliot, Vincent (2007) Sobjectivism: Towards a Constructivist Methodology. International 
Studies Quarterly 51 (2): 359-384 
 
Pouliot, Vincent (2008) The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities. 
International Organization 62 (2): 257-288 
 285 
 
Power, Samantha (2008) Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the 
World (New York: The Penguin Press) 
 
Pym, Anthony (2010) Explaining Translation Theories (London: Routledge) 
 
Quine, Willard Van Orman (1960) Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 
 
Rabinow, Paul (1986) Representations are Social Facts: Modernity and Post-Modernity in 
Anthropology. In James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.) Writing Cukture: The Poetics and 
Politics of Ethnography (Berkely: University of California Press) (pp. 234-261) 
 
Rajkovic, Nikolas M. (2010) ‘Global Law’ and Governmentality: Reconceptualizing the ‘Rule of 
Law’ as Rule ‘Through’ Law. European Journal of International Relations 18 (1): 29-52 
 
Rancatore, Jason P. (2010) It Is Strange: A Reply to Vrasti. Millennium – Journal of International 
Studies 39 (1): 65-77 
 
Rausch, Colette (2002) The Assumption of Authority in Kosovo and East Timor: Legal and 
Practical Implications. In Renata Dwan (ed.) Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace 
Operations. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Research Report no. 16. (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press) (pp. 11-32) 
 
Reed, Marcia and Paola Demattè (2011) (eds.) China on Paper: European and Chinese Works 
from the Late Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century (Los Angelens: Getty Publications 
 
Reisman, W. Michael, Siegfried Wiessner and Andrew R. Willard (2007) The New Haven School: 
A Brief Introduction. Yale Journal of International Law 94 (April): 31-40 
 
Reus-Smit Christian (2004) (ed.) The Politics of International Law. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 
 
Ricæur, Paul (2006) On Translation (translated by Eileen Brennan) (London: Routledge) 
 286 
 
Riegner, Michael (2010) The Two Faces of the Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant: 
Independence and Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Kosovo. The Goettingen 
Journal of International Law 2 (3): 1035-1062 
 
Riles, Annelise (1999) Models and Documents: Artefacts of International Legal Knowledge. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48 (4): 805-825 
 
Riles, Annelise (2000) The Network Inside Out (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press) 
 
Riles, Annelise (2011) Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) 
 
Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) The Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction. In Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn 
Sikkink (eds.) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (pp. 1-38) 
 
Robinson, Douglas (1997) Translation and Empire: Postcolonial Theories Explained 
(Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing)  
 
Rubel, Paula G. and Abraham Rosman (eds.) (2003) Translating Cultures: Perspectives on 
Translation and Anthropology (Oxford: Berg) 
 
Rubin, James P. ’Countdown to a Very Personal War’, Financial Times, 30 September 2000 
 
Ruggie, John (1975) International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends. International 
Organization 29 (3): 557-583 
 
Said, Edward W. (1978) Orientalism (New York: Random House) 
 
Sakai, Naoki (1997) Translation and Subjectivity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 
 
 287 
Sakai, Naoki (2008) Language as a Countable and the Regime of Translation. In Shinji Sato and 
Neriko Musha Doerr (eds.) Rethinking Language and Culture in Japanese Education: Beyond the 
Standard (Bristol: Multilingual Matters) (pp. 35-59) 
 
Sakai, Naoki (2009) How Do We Count Language? Translation and Discontinuity. Translation 
Studies 2 (1): 71-88 
 
Sakai, Naoki (2014) The Figure of Translation: Translation as Filter? In Joyce C.H. Liu and Nick 
Vaughan-Williams (eds.) European-East Asian Borders in Translation (London and New York: 
Routledge) (pp. 12-37) 
 
St André, James (2004) “But Do They Have a Notion of Justice?”. The Translator 10 (1): 1-31 
 
Schuppert, Gunnar Folke (2014) New Modes of Governance and the Rule of Law: The Case of 
Transnational Rule Making. In Zürn, Michael, André Nollkaemper, Randy Peerenboom (eds.) 
Rule of Law Dynamics in an Era of International and Transitional Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) (p. 90-110) 
 
Searle, John R. (1969) Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Serres, Michel (1982) Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, ed. J.V. Harari and D.F. Bell 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
Shklar, Judith (1998) Political Thought and Political Thinkers (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press) 
 
Shore, Cris (2011) Espionage, Policy and the Art of Government: The British Secret Services and 
the War on Iraq. In Cris Shore, Susan Wright, and Davide Péro (eds.) Policy Worlds: 
Anthropology and the Analysis of Contemporary Power (Oxford: Berghahn) (pp. 169-186) 
 
Shraga, Daphna (2004) The Second Generation UN-Based Tribunals: A Diversity of Mixed 
Jurisdictions. In Cesare P. R. Romano, André Nollkaemper and Jann K. Kleffner (eds.) 
 288 
Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) (pp. 16-40) 
 
Sikkink, Kathryn (2011) The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing 
World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company) 
 
Simma, Bruno and Andreas L. Paulus (1999) The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View. American Journal of International Law 93 (2): 
302-316 
 
Simpson, Alfred William Brian (2001) Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the 
Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Slaughter Burley, Anne-Marie (1993) International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Dual Agenda. The American Journal of International Law 87 (2): 205-239 
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1995) International Law in a World of Liberal States. European Journal 
of International Law 6 (1): 503-538 
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2003) A Global Community of Courts. Harvard International Law 
Journal 44 (1): 191-219 
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2004) A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2007) The Idea that Is America: Keeping Faith with Our Values in a 
Dangerous World (New York: Basic Books) 
 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie and William Burke-White (2002) An International Constitutional Moment. 
Harvard International Law Journal 43 (1): 1-21 
 
Snell-Horny, Mary (1988) Translation Studies: An Integrated Approach (Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: Benjamins) 
 
 289 
Snell-Hornby, Mary (2000) Communicating in the Global Village: On Language, Translation and 
Cultural Identity. In Christina Schäffner (ed.) Translation in the Global Village (Clevedon: 
Multilingual Matters) (pp. 16-28) 
 
Snell-Hornby, Mary (2006) The Turns of Translation Studies: New Paradigms or Shifting 
Viewpoints?  (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company) 
 
Solomon, Jon (2014) The Transnational Study of Culture and the Indeterminacy of People(s) and 
Language(s). In Doris Backmann-Medick (ed.) The Trans/National Study of Culture: A 
Translational Perspective (Göttingen: De Gruyter) (pp. 69-92) 
 
Sörensen, Jens S. (2009) State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery: Political Economy, 
Ethnicity and Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo (Oxford: Berghahn Books) 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (2007) Translation as Culture. In Paul St-Pierre and Prafulla C. Kar 
(eds.) In Translation – Reflections, Refractions, Transformations (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company) (pp. 263-276) 
 
Sripati, Vijayashri (2012) UN Constitutional Assistance Projects in Comprehensive Peace 
Missions: An Inventory 1989-2011. International Peacekeeping 19 (1): 93-113 
 
Sriram, Chandra Lekha, Olga Martin-Ortega and Johanna Herman (2011) Promoting the Rule of 
Law: From Liberal to Institutional Peacebuilding. In Sriram, Chandra Lekha, Olga Martin-Ortega 
and Johanna Herman (eds.) Peacebuilding and the Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace? (London 
and New York: Routledge) (pp. 1-20) 
 
Stahn, Carsten (2010) The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: 
Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Stake, Robert E. (1995) The Art of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage) 
 
Stake, Robert E. (2005) Qualitative Case Studies. In Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln 
(eds) Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications) (pp. 443-466) 
 290 
 
St André, James (2004) “But Do They Have a Notion of Justice?”. The Translator 10(1): 1-31 
 
Staricco, Juan Ignacio (2015) Towards a Fair Global Economic Regulation? A Critical 
Assessment of Fair Trade through the Examination of the Argentinean Wine Industry. Doctoral 
School in Organisation and Management Studies, Copenhagen Business School, PhD Series 
38.2015 
 
Staunton, George Thomas (1810/2012) Ta Tsing Leu Lee; Being the Fundamental Laws, and a 
Selection from the Supplementary Statutes, of the Penal Code of China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press) 
 
Stepputat, Finn (2012) Knowledge Production in the Security-Development Nexus: An 
Ethnographic Reflection. Security Dialogue 43 (5): 439-455 
 
Stepputat, Finn and Jessica Larsen (2015) Global Political Ethnography: A Methodological 
Approach to Studying Global Policy Regimes (DIIS Working Paper 2015:01): 1-30 
 
Stone Sweet, Alec (2009) Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes. Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 16 (2): 621-645 
 
Stritzel, Holger (2011) Security, the Translation. Security Dialogue 42 (4-5): 343-355 
 
Strohmeyer, Hansjoerg (2001) Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United 
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor. American Journal of International Law 95 (1): 46-
63  
 
Stromseth, Jane, Wippman, David and Rosa Brooks (eds.) (2006) Can Might Make Rights? 
Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)  
 
Sullivan, Gavin (2014) Transnational Legal Assemblages and Global Security Law: Topologies 
and Temporalities of the List. Transnational Legal Theory 5 (1): 81-127 
 
 291 
Sullivan, Gavin and Marieke de Goede (2013) Between Law and the Exception: The UN 1257 
Ombudsperson as a Hybrid Model of Legal Expertise. Leiden Journal of International Law 26 (4): 
833-854 
 
Tamanaha, Brian Z. (2004) On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Teitel, Ruti (2000) Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press) 
 
Teitel, Ruti (2011) Humanity’s Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press) 
 
Teubner, Gunther (2012) Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Toury, Gideon (1980) In Search of a Theory of Translation (Tel Aviv: Porter Institute for Poetics 
and Semiotics) 
 
Trubek, David M. (1972) Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism. Faculty Scholarship 
Series Paper 4001. Available online: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4001  
 
Trubek, David M. (2006) The ”Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and 
Future. In David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds.) The New Law and Economic Development 
– A Critical Appraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press) (pp. 74-94)  
 
Trubek, David M. and Marc Galanter (1974) Scholar in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on 
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States. Wisconsin Law Review: 1062-
1102 
 
Trubek, David M. and Alvaro Santos (2006) Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and 
Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice. In David M. Trubek and 
Alvaro Santos (eds.) The New Law and Economic Development – A Critical Appraisal (New 
York: Cambridge University Press) (pp. 1-18)  
 
 292 
Tunheim, Judge John R. (2009) Rule of Law and the Kosovo Constitution. Minnesota Journal of 
International Law 18 (2): 371-379 
 
Tymoczko, Maria (2009) Translation, Ethics and Ideology in a Violent Globalizing World. In 
Esperanza Bielsa and Christopher W. Hughes (eds.) Globalization, Political Violence and 
Translation (London: Palgrave) (pp. 171-194) 
 
Tymoczko, Maria (2010)  Enlarging Translation, Empowering Translators (2nd ed.) (London and 
New York: Routledge) 
 
Van der Ree, Gerard (2013) The Politics of Scientific Representation in International Relations. 
Millennium – Journal of International Studies 42 (1): 24-44 
 
Venuti, Lawrence (1995) The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation (London: 
Routledge) 
 
Venzke, Ingo (2012) How Interpretation Makes International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) 
 
Vrasti, Wanda (2008) ’The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’. 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37 (2): 279-301 
 
Walker, Neil (2002) ’The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’. Florence: EUI Working Paper (1): 1-
52 
 
Weber, Cynthia (1994) Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Weber, Maz (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (ed. by Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich) (Berkely: University of California Press) 
 
Weick, Karl E. (1988) Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations. Journal of Management Studies 
25 (4): 305-317 
 293 
 
Weller, Marc (2008) ’Negotiating the final status of Kosovo’ in Chaillot Paper, no. 114 
(December) 1-100 
 
Weller, Marc (2009) Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
 
Wendt, Alexander (1987) The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory 
International Organization 41 (3): 335-370  
 
Wendt, Alexander (2002) Anarchy is What States Make of It. International Organization 26 (2): 
391-425 
 
Werner, Wouter G. (2001) Securitization and Judicial Review: A Semiotic Perspective on the 
Relation Between the Security Council and International Judicial Bodies. International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law 14 (4): 345-366 
 
Werner, Wouter (2010) The Use of Law in International Political Sociology. International 
Political Sociology 4 (3): 304-307 
 
Werner, Wouter G. (2014) The Politics of Expertise: Applying Paradoxes of Scientific Expertise 
to International Law. In Monika Ambrus, Karin Arts, Ellen Hey and Helena Raulus (eds.) (2014) 
The Role of ’Experts’ in International and European Decision-Making Processes: Advisors, 
Decision Makers or Irrelevant Actors? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (pp. 44-62) 
 
De Wet, Erika (2006) The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a 
Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order. Leiden Journal of International 
Law 19 (3): 11-32 
 
White, James Boyd (1994) Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism 
(paperback edition) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) 
 
 294 
Wiener, Antje (2008) The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International 
Encounters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Wilde, Ralph (2008) International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing 
Mission Never Went Away (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Wilson, Peter (1998) The Myth of the ’First Great Debate’. Review of International Studies 24 (5): 
1-15 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2009) Philosophical Investigations, revised 4th edition, translated by 
G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell) 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2014) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Toronto: Dover Publications) 
 
Woelk, Jens (2012) Bosnia-Herzegovina: Trying to Build a Federal State on Paradoxes. In 
Michael Burgess and Alan Tarr (eds.) Constitutional Dynamics in Federal States (Kingston and 
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press) 
 
Yanow, Dvora (2004) Translating Local Knowledge at Organizational Peripheries. British Journal 
of Management 15 (1): 9-25 
 
Yanow, Dvora (2015) Making Sense of Policy Practices: Interpretation and Meaning. In Frank 
Fischer, Douglas Torgerson, Michael Orsini and Anna Durnová (eds.) Handbook of Critical 
Policy Studies (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) (pp. 401-421) 
 
Ybema, Sierk, Dvora Yanow, Harry Wels and Frans Kamsteeg (2009) Studying Everyday 
Organizational Life. In Sierk Ybema, Dvora Yanow, Harry Wels and Frans Kamsteeg (eds.) 
Organizational Ethnography: Studying the Complexity of Everyday Life (London: SAGE 
Publications) (pp. 1-20) 
 
Yin, Robert K. (2009) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage) 
 
Yin, Robert K. (2012) Applications of Case Study Research (3rd ed.) (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage) 
 295 
 
Young, Robert J. C. (2003) Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
 
Zaum, Dominik (2007) The Sovereignty Paradox: Norms and Politics of International 
Statebuilding (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Zogiani, Avni, ‘Are the EU and US More Interested in Making Money than Cleaning Up Kosovo 
Corruption? EU Observer 1 July 2010; available at: http://euobserver.com/opinion/30404 
 
Zürn, Michael, André Nollkaemper, Randy Peerenboom (2014) Rule of Law Dynamics in an Era 
of International and Transitional Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Zweigert Konrad, and Hein Kötz (1998) An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edition) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
 
UN	Reports	and	Resolutions	
 
UN Secretary-General, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and 
Peacekeeping’ (1992) UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 
 
UN Secretary-General, ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’ (1995) UN Doc. 
A/50/60-S/1995/1 
 
UN Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo’ (12 July 1999) S/1999/779  
 
UN Secretary-General ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ (2000) (‘Brahimi 
Report’), UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809 
 
 296 
UN Secretary-General’s Remarks on the Ministerial Meeting of the Security Council on Justice 
and the Rule of Law: The United Nations Role (24 September 2003); available at: 
http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=518) 
 
UN Secretary-General, Report on ’the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies’ (2004) S/2004/616 
 
UN Secretary-General, High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility’ (2004); available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf  
 
UN Secretary-General, Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
president of the Security Council, Addendum, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement, Doc S/2007/168/Add 
 
UN Secretary-General Special Envoy, Kai Eide, ’A Special Review of the Situation in Kosovo’, 
annexed to the Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the United Nations Secretary-General to the 
United Nations Security Council (2005) S/2005/635 
 
UN Secretary-General, Report on ’Uniting Our Strengths: Enhancing United Nations Support for 
the Rule of Law’ (2006) A/61/636-S/2006/980 
 
UN Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, ’United Nations Assistance to 
Constitution-Making Processes’ (April 2009); available at: 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/guidance-note-of-the-secretary-general-united-
nations-assistance-to-constitution-making-processes/) 
 
United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 10 November 2005 from the President of the 
Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, Doc S/2005/709 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on United Nations Interim Mission in 
Kosovo 
 
 297 
United Nations General Assembly, ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations’, Resolution 2625 adopted during the 25th session of the General Assembly, 24 October 
1970  
 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1 adopted during the 60th session of the General 
Assembly (’World Summit Outcome’), 25 October 2005 
 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 456 adopted during the 61th session of the General 
Assembly, 18 December 2006 
 
United Nations General Assembly, ‘Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General 
Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’, Resolution 67 adopted by 
the General Assembly during the 67th session, 30 November 2012  
 
United Nations Development Programme, ’UNDP Guidance Note on Constitution-Making 
Support’ (2014); available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Parliamentary%20De
velopment/Constitution-Making-Support-Guidance-Note.pdf)  
 
United Nations Development Programme, Executive Board of the United Nations Development 
Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, ‘Role of the UNDP in Crisis and Post-
Crisis Situations’ (2001) DP/2001/4 
 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993; available 
at:  (http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/vienna.pdf)  
 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ’Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict 
States’, Truth Commissions, (2006); available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawTruthCommissionsen.pdf)  
 
 298 
United Nations Rule of Law Indicators Implementation Guide and Project Tools (2011); available 
at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf 
 
UNMIK	Regulations	
 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 ‘On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/2 ’On the Prevention of Access by Individuals and Their Removal to 
Secure Public Peace and Order’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 ’On the Law Applicable in Kosovo’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 2000/34 ‘On the Appointment and Removal From Office of International 
Judges and International Prosecutors’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 2000/64 ‘On Assignment of International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change 
of Venue’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 2001/2 ‘Amending UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/6, as Amended, on the 
Appointment and Removal from Office of International Judges and International Prosecutors’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 2001/7 ’On the Authorization of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 2001/18 ‘On the Establishment of a Detention Review Commission for Extra-
Judicial Detentions Based on Executive Orders’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 ‘On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in 
Kosovo’ 
 
UNMIK Regulation 2001/10 ’On the Prohibition of Unauthorized Border/Boundary Crossings’ 
 
 299 
EU	Reports	and	Decisions	
 
Council Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP of 10 April 2006 on the establishment of an EU Planning 
Team (EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of 
law and possible other areas in Kosovo 
 
Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo 
 
Council of the European Union, The Secretary General/High Representative, Statement, Brussels, 
14 December 2005; available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/87644.pdf  
 
European Court of Justice, Case 294/83 Les Verts vs Parliament (1986) ECR 1339 
 
European Union, ’Preparing for a Future International and EU Presence in Kosovo’ (2007); 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/kosovo/eu_preparations_may_2007_en.pdf 
 
EULEX Programme Office, EULEX Programme Report (July 2009); available at: 
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/Accountability/EULEX-PROGRAMME-REPORT-July-2009-
new.pdf 
 
EULEX Programme Office, EULEX Programme Report, ‘Building Sustainable Change Together’ 
(2010); available at: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/EPR_2010_2.pdf  
 
EULEX Programme Office, EULEX Programme Report, ‘Bolstering the Rule of Law in Kosovo: 
A Stock Take’ (2011); available at: 
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/EPR_2011_2.pdf  
 
EULEX Kosovo, ‘Fact Sheet’ (December 2009); available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/091214%20FACTSH
EET%20EULEX%20Kosovo%20-%20version%209_EN.pdf 
 300 
 
EULEX News, ’Tracking Kosovo’s Progress in the Rule of Law’ (5 May 2010); available at: 
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/news/000223.php 
 
EULEX Kosovo, ’Mission Implementation Plan (on file with author) 
 
EU High Representative for the CFSP and EU Commissioner for Enlargement, ‘Summary note on 
the joint report on the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo’ (14 June 2005) Doc. S217/05; 
available 
at:http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/85228.pdf) 
 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council (19-20 June 
2000) 
 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council (7-9 December 2000) 
 
European Council Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and 
Defence Policy (15-16 June 2001); available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/09526-r1.en1.html 
 
European Court of Auditors, ’European Union Assistance to Kosovo Related to the Rule of Law’, 
Special Report No 18 (2012) 
 
Other	Reports	and	Documents	
 
Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01 
 
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), ’Status of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, MNF – Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq’, CPA/ORD/27 June 2004/17 
 
 301 
Coalition Provisional Autority, ‘Public Services Announcement’ by L. Paul Bremer on the 
Transitional Administrative Law and the Rule of Law;  available online: 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/democracy/PSAs/Rule_Law.html 
 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’), 2 February 2007 
 
Constitutional Review of the Decision of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, 
ASC-09-089, dated 4 February 2010 
 
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
 
Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense (1998); available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-
British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf 
 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK), The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
 
International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 
 
International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 
 
International Crisis Group (1999) Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo (Pristina: 
International Crisis Group, ICG Balkans Reports No 76) (18 October 1999) 
 
International Crisis Group (2008) ’Kosovo’s Fragile Transition’ (Europe Report No 196) (25 
September 2008) 
 
International Crisis Group (2011) North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in Practice (International 
Crisis Group Europe Report No 211) (14 March 2011) 
 302 
 
International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) 
 
International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL) Rule of Law Lessons Learned from 
the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Report (2009) 
 
Interview with Professor Louis Aucoin (2008), ’Views from the Field: On Constitution Writing: 
The Case of Kosovo’. In The Fletcher Journal of Human Security 23: 123-128; available at:  
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Praxis/Archives/~/media/EFB50A4BC05A482994D6E3D246D57309.pdf  
 
Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008; available at: http://www.assembly-
kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635 
 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, ’A Fragile Peace: Laying the Foundation for Justice in 
Kosovo’ (October, 1999);  available at 
http://secure.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/kosovofull1099.htm 
 
NATO Press Release, ’Statement on Kosovo (Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.) (24 April 1999) 
Doc. S-1(99)62 
 
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report no. 1 (published 18 August 2000) 
 
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report no. 3 on ’The Conformity of Deprivations of 
Liberty under ’Executive Orders’ with Regonised International Standards’ addressed to Mr. Hans 
Haekkerup, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations 
 
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Fourth Annual Report (2003-2004) (published 12 July 12 
2004) 
 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the 1990 Copenhagen 
Meeting  
 303 
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE/OSCE; available at:  
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304?download=true  
 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Legal System Monitoring Section, ’Review 
of the Criminal Justice System in Kosovo (September 2000-February 2001) 
 
United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Judge John R. Tunheim, ‘Biographical 
Material’; available online at: www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2871 
 
United States Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistnce 
Program (ICITAP), Program Management Plan for Kosovo (2009) (on file with author) 
 
USAID Kosovo, ’Legislative Drafting Manual: A Practitioner’s Guide to Drafting Laws in 
Kosovo’ (2006) 
 
World Bank, Legal Vice Presidency, ’Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions’ (January 
2003); available at: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/24/000160016_200310240929
48/Rendered/PDF/269160Legal0101e0also0250780SCODE09.pdf) 
 
Webpages	
 
European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘EULEX’, webpage: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations  
 
European Union, External Action Service, ‘About CSDP – Civilian Headline Goals’, webpage 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/civilian_headline_goals/index_en.htm) 
 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, ’Rule of Law’, webpage 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/policy-highlights/rule-of-law/index_en.htm)    
 
National Democratic Institute (NDI): https://www.ndi.org/about_ndi?page=0,0 
 304 
 
’NATO’s Role in Kosovo’; available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm 
(accessed on August 1, 2015)    
 
Rule of Law and United Nations Peacekeeping, webpage: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ruleoflaw.shtml 
 
Wikileaks, http://download.cabledrum.net/wikileaks_archive/file/un-kosovo-rol-2009.pdf  
 
List	of	Interviews	
 
EULEX	Headquarters,	Pristina,	Kosovo	
 
EULEX Advisor Training Office, EULEX HQs   Pristina 24 January 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Political Office, EULEX HQs  Pristina 1 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Assembly of EULEX Judges, Supreme Court Pristina 2 February 2012 
 
EULEX Analyst  Situation Center, EULEX HQs  Pristina  2 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Reporting Office, EULEX HQs   Pristina 3 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Political Office, EULEX HQs  Pristina 3 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (1) Office of the Chief of Staff, EULEX HQs Pristina 7 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (2) Office of the Chief of Staff, EULEX HQs Pristina 7 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Best Practices Office, EULEX HQs Pristina 8 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Program Office, EULEX HQs  Pristina 12 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor (1) Legislation Unit, Kosovo’s Ministry of Justice Pristina 15 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor (2) Legislation Unit, Kosovo’s Ministry of Justice Pristina 15 February 2012 
 305 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (1) Kosovo Judicial Council  Pristina 17 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (2) Kosovo Judicial Council  Pristina 17 February 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (1) Mitrovica District Court  Mitrovica 22 February 2012 
 
EULEX Advisor Human Resources Unit, EULEX HQs Pristina 6 May 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Property Expert, EULEX HQs  Pristina 8 May 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Anti-Corruption Expert, EULEX HQs Pristina 8 May 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Office of the Minister of Justice, MOJ Pristina 10 May 2012 
 
EULEX Head of Justice Justice Unit, EULEX HQs  Pristina 14 May 2012 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor Office of the Head of Justice, EULEX HQs Pristina 15 May 2012 
 
EULEX Press Officer (1) Public Information Office, EULEX HQs Pristina 18 April 2013 
 
EULEX Press Officer (2) Public Information Office, EULEX HQs Pristina 15 May 2013 
 
EULEX Legal Advisor (2) Mitrovica District Court  Pristina 29 July 2013 
	
EULEX	Judges	and	Prosecutors,	Kosovo	
 
EULEX Judge  Assembly of EULEX Judges, Supreme Court Pristina 27 January 2012 
 
EULEX Judge  Special Chamber of Kosovo’s Supreme Court Pristina 23 April 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (1) Kosovo’s Supreme Court  Pristina 24 April 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (2) Kosovo’s Supreme Court  Pristina 10 May 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (3) Kosovo’s Supreme Court  Pristina 8 May 2013 
 
EULEX Judge  Kosovo’s Court of Appeals  Pristina 6 August 2013 
 306 
 
EULEX Judge (1) Pristina District Court  Pristina 31 January 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (2) Pristina District Court  Pristina 31 January 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (3) Pristina District Court  Pristina 9 May 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (1) Prizren District Court  Prizren 6 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (2) Prizren District Court  Prizren 6 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (3) Prizren District Court  Prizren 6 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (1) Peja District Court  Peja 13 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (2) Peja District Court  Peja 13 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (3) Peja District Court  Peja 13 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (4) Peja District Court  Peja 13 February 2012 
 
EULEX Judge (5) Peja District Court  Peja 24 July 2013  
 
EULEX Judge  Mitrovica District Court  Mitrovica 29 July 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (1) EULEX Police Headquarters  Pristina 18 April 2013 
 
EULEX Judge (2) EULEX Police Headquarters  Pristina 9 May 2013 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (1) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 20 January 2012 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (2) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 22 January 2012 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (3) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 10 February 2012 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (4) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 10 February 2012 
 
Chief EULEX Prosecutor EULEX Police Headquarters  Pristina 7 May 2013 
 
 307 
EULEX Prosecutor (1) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 7 May 2013 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (2) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 8 May 2013 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (3) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 9 May 2013 
 
EULEX Prosecutor (4) Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) Pristina 24 July 2013  
 
UN	Institutions,	Pristina,	Kosovo	
 
UNDP Legal Advisor Office of the President, Assembly of Kosovo Pristina 13 December 2011 
 
Former SRSG of UNMIK Phone Interview   21 December 2012 
 
UNMIK Legal Advisor (1) UNMIK HQs   Pristina 15 April 2013 
 
UNMIK Legal Advisor (2) UNMIK HQS   Pristina 15 April 2013 
 
UN Legal Advisor UNDP Office   Pristina 25 July 2013 
 
UNMIK Legal Advisor (3) UNMIK HQs   Pristina 31 July 2013 
 
Political Advisor UN Development Coordinator’s Office Pristina 31 July 2013 
 
Kosovar	NGOs	and	Other	Institutions,	Pristina,	Kosovo	
 
Legal Advisor  Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Pristina 5 November 2011 
 
Legal Advisor  Effective ROL Program, Checchi Consulting Pristina 23 November 2011 
 
Researcher   FOL Lëvizja   Pristina 29 November 2011 
 
Journalist  Zëri Gazeta   Pristina 29 November 2011 
 
Director  Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI) Pristina 30 November 2011 
 
Director  COHU for Anti-Corruption  Pristina  30 November 2011 
 
 308 
Researcher (1)  Think Tank Legal Political Studies Pristina 2 December 2011 
 
Researcher (2)  Think Tank Legal Political Studies Pristina 2 December 2011 
 
Kosovo-Albanian Lawyer East West Management Institute Inc Pristina 2 December 2011 
 
President  The Union of Independent Trade Unions Pristina 29 April 2013 
 
Professor of Law University of Pristina  Pristina 23 July 2013 
 
Senior Researcher  Kosovo Center for Security Studies Pristina 29 July 2013 
 
International	NGOs	Pristina,	Kosovo	
 
Director  European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI) Pristina 5 December 2011 
 
Program Assistant National Democratic Institute (NDI) Pristina 5 December 2011 
 
Program Director National Center for State Courts (NCSC) Pristina 29 July 2013 
 
Kosovo	Judicial	Institutions,	Pristina	
 
Director  Kosovo Judicial Council Secretariat Pristina 22 November 2011 
 
Secretary-General  Kosovo’s Constitutional Court  Pristina 24 January 2012 
 
Kosovo-Albanian Prosecutor  Office of the Chief Prosecutor, Corruption Unit Pristina 10 February 2012 
 
International Legal Advisor Kosovo’s Constitutional Court  Pristina 16 February 2012 
 
Kosovo-Albanian Judge Kosovo’s Constitutional Court  Pristina 17 February 2012 
 
President of Supreme Court Kosovo’s Supreme Court  Pristina  22 February 2012 
 
Members	of	Parliament,	Pristina,	Kosovo	
 
Member of Parliament (1) Assembly of Kosovo  Pristina 5 December 2011 
 
 309 
Member of Parliament (2) Assembly of Kosovo  Pristina 15 December 2011 
 
Former Minister of Justice Assembly of Kosovo  Pristina 2 August 2013 
 
European	Commission	Liaison	Office,	Pristina,	Kosovo	
 
EC Rule of Law Advisor EC Liaison Office  Pristina 21 February 2012 
 
EC Political Advisor EC Liaison Office, Rule of Law Unit Pristina 12 July 2012 
 
EC Rule of Law Advisor EC Liaison Office  Pristina 26 April 2013 
 
EC Legal Advisor EC Liaison Office, Rule of Law Unit Pristina 29 April 2013 
 
EC Political Advisor EC Liaison Office, Rule of Law Unit Pristina 2 May 2013 
 
Legal Advisor  Office of the EU Special Representative Pristina 2 May 2013 
 
OSCE	Mission,	Pristina,	Kosovo	
 
Legal Advisor   OSCE Mission, Legal System Monitoring Unit Pristina 30 July 2013 
 
Political Advisor OSCE Mission, Program Office  Pristina  3 August 2013 
 
US	Institutions,	Pristina,	Kosovo	
 
Program Director USAID    Pristina 17 February 2012 
 
Police Advisor  ICITAP US Embassy  Pristina 30 July 2013 
 
Program Manager  ICITAP US Embassy  Pristina 31 July 2013 
 
Legal Advisor   ICITAP US Embassy  Pristina 31 July 2013 
 
European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS),	Brussels	
 
Advisor (1)  Western Balkans Unit, EEAS  Brussels 11 June 2012 
 310 
 
Advisor (2)  Western Balkans Unit, EEAS  Brussels 11 June 2012 
 
EULEX Justice Expert EU External Action Service (EEAS) Brussels 21 June 2012 
 
EEAS Advisor  Crisis Management and Planning Directorate Brussels 12 June 2012 
 
Press Officer  European External Action Service Brussels  12 June 2012 
 
National Advisor PermRep to the EU, in charge of EEAS/CSDP Brussels 12 March 2014 
 
Advisor (1)  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity Brussels 13 March 2014  
 
Advisor (2)  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity Brussels 17 March 2014 
 
Advisor (3)  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity Brussels 18 March 2014 
 
Advisor (4)  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity Brussels 2 May 2014 
 
European	Commission,	DG	Enlargement,	Brussels	
 
Deputy Head (1) Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement   Brussels 13 June 2012 
 
Advisor (1)  ROL Desk, Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement Brussels 13 June 2012 
 
Advisor (2)  ROL Desk, Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement Brussels 13 June 2012 
 
Deputy Head (2) Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement   Brussels 13 March 2014 
 
Advisor (3)  ROL Desk, Kosovo Unit, DG Enlargement Brussels 17 March 2014 
 
Former EULEX Legal Advisor European Commission  Brussels 27 March 2014 
 
National Advisor Kosovo’s Embassy, EC liaison  Brussels 12 March 2014 
 
 
 
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2004
1. Martin Grieger
 Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
 and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
 LIKENESS
 A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
 Beslutningens vaklen
 En systemteoretisk analyse of mo-
derniseringen af et amtskommunalt 
sundhedsvæsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
 Organizing Consumer Innovation
 A product development strategy that 
is based on online communities and 
allows some ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a 
distributed process of innovation by 
consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
 SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION 
AND TRANSLATION MEMORY 
 SYSTEMS
 An empirical investigation of cognitive
 segmentation and effects of integra-
ting a TM system into the translation 
process
6. Jeanet Hardis
 Sociale partnerskaber
 Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie 
 af partnerskabsaktørers virkeligheds-
opfattelse mellem identitet og 
 legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
 System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
 Strategisk Økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
 Knowledge Management as Internal 
 Corporate Venturing
 – a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
  Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
 De profesjonelle i endring
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
 Environmental Practices and Greening 
 Strategies in Small Manufacturing 
 Enterprises in South Africa
 – A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
 Industriel forskningsledelse
 – på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde 
i danske forskningsintensive virksom-
heder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
 The Governance of GN Great Nordic
 – in an age of strategic and structural
  transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
 The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV 
 Advertising 
 A study of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years with 
 special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
 Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
 The Social and Economic Dynamics 
 of Networks 
 – a Weberian Analysis of Three 
 Formalised Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
 Engaging Personas and Narrative 
 Scenarios – a study on how a user-
 centered approach inﬂuenced the 
 perception of the design process in 
the e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
 Organisationsidentitet
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
 Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk 
in Energy Markets
20.  Sabine Madsen
 Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
  Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
 The Impact of Foreign Direct Inve-
stment on Efﬁciency, Productivity 
Growth and Trade: An Empirical Inve-
stigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
 Making Events Work Or, 
 How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
 Brand Ethos
 Om troværdige brand- og 
 virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og 
diskursteoretisk perspektiv 
24. Sidsel Fabech
 Von welchem Österreich ist hier die 
Rede?
 Diskursive forhandlinger og magt-
kampe mellem rivaliserende nationale 
identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske 
pressediskurser 
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
 Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
  ﬂersprogede forbundsstater
 Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og 
 Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
 Human Resource Practices and 
 Knowledge Transfer in Multinational 
 Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
 Markedets politiske fornuft
 Et studie af velfærdens organisering i 
 perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
 A.s erfaring
 Om mellemværendets praktik i en 
transformation af mennesket og 
 subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
 The Constitution of Meaning
 – A Meaningful Constitution? 
 Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion 
in the debate on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
 Managing product innovation through 
 rules – The role of formal and structu-
red methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
 Mellem konﬂikt og konsensus
 – Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
 Customer Value Driven Product Inno-
vation – A Study of Market Learning in 
New Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
 Making space
 An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
 Differences that Matter
 An analysis of practices of gender and 
 organizing in contemporary work-
places
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
 Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
 Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
 Benchmarking as a Means to 
 Managing Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
 From an idea to a standard
 The UN and the global governance of 
 accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d. 
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
 An Experimental Field Study on the 
 Effectiveness of Grocer Media 
 Advertising 
 Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, 
 Purchase Intentions and Short-Term 
Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
 Essays on the Pricing of Corporate 
Bonds and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
 Figure che fanno conoscere
 Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo 
e espressivo della metafora e di altri 
tropi da Aristotele e da Vico ﬁno al 
cognitivismo contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
 Strategic Planning and Corporate 
 Performance
 An integrative research review and a 
 meta-analysis of the strategic planning 
 and corporate performance literature 
 from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
 The TDF – PMI Case
 Making Sense of the Dynamics of 
 Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
 Corporate Social Responsibility in 
 Global Supply Chains
 Understanding the uniqueness of ﬁrm 
 behaviour
16.  Eva Boxenbaum
 Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
 Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
 Capacity Development, Environmental 
 Justice NGOs, and Governance: The 
Case of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
 Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
 Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening 
 Comprehension in English as a Foreign 
 Language
 An empirical study employing data 
 elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
 Essays on Business Reporting
 Production and consumption of  
strategic information in the market for 
information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
 Egos and Ethics of Management 
 Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
 Performance management i Proces-
 innovation 
 – belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
 perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
 GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
 Om organisering af den kreative gøren 
i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
 Revenue Management
 Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige & 
 organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
 Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
 The Danish Case of Accounting and 
 Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
 The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’ 
 Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
 Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes 
 fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
 Remerger
 – skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og 
 opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
 A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF 
 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
 Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot, 
 pædagog eller politiker?
 Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstil-
skrivninger i forbindelse med vellykket 
gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede 
forandringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
 Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynami-
ske 
 læringsnettverk i toppidretten
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
 Linking Healthcare
 An inquiry into the changing perfor-
 mances of web-based technology for 
 asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
 Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
 Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie 
i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering 
kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle lærings-
miljøer
34. Anika Liversage
 Finding a Path
 Labour Market Life Stories of 
 Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
 Studier i samspillet mellem stat og   
 erhvervsliv i Danmark under 
 1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
 A DIFFERENT STORY
 Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
 Strategic Management of the Radical 
 Innovation Process
 Leveraging Social Capital for Market 
 Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
 Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
 Essays in Computational Finance
3. Tina Brandt Husman
 Organisational Capabilities, 
 Competitive Advantage & Project-
Based Organisations
 The Case of Advertising and Creative 
 Good Production
4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
 Practice at the top
 – how top managers mobilise and use
 non-ﬁnancial performance measures
5. Eva Parum
 Corporate governance som strategisk
 kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj
6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
 Culture’s Inﬂuence on Performance 
 Management: The Case of a Danish 
 Company in China
7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
 The Discursive Constitution of Organi-
zational Governance – Between unity 
and differentiation
 The Case of the governance of 
 environmental risks by World Bank 
environmental staff
8. Cynthia Selin
 Volatile Visions: Transactons in 
 Anticipatory Knowledge
9. Jesper Banghøj
 Financial Accounting Information and  
 Compensation in Danish Companies
10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
 Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-
Tech Markets: What’s the Difference 
and does it Matter?
11. Tine Aage
 External Information Acquisition of 
 Industrial Districts and the Impact of 
 Different Knowledge Creation Dimen-
sions
 
 A case study of the Fashion and  
Design Branch of the Industrial District 
of Montebelluna, NE Italy
12. Mikkel Flyverbom
 Making the Global Information Society 
 Governable
 On the Governmentality of Multi- 
Stakeholder Networks
13. Anette Grønning
 Personen bag
 Tilstedevær i e-mail som inter-
aktionsform mellem kunde og med-
arbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst
14. Jørn Helder
 One Company – One Language?
 The NN-case
15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
 Differing perceptions of customer 
value
 Development and application of a tool 
for mapping perceptions of customer 
value at both ends of customer-suppli-
er dyads in industrial markets
16. Lise Granerud
 Exploring Learning
 Technological learning within small 
 manufacturers in South Africa
17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
 Between Hopes and Realities: 
 Reﬂections on the Promises and 
 Practices of Corporate Social 
 Responsibility (CSR)
18. Ramona Samson
 The Cultural Integration Model and 
 European Transformation.
 The Case of Romania
2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
 Discipline in The Global Economy
 Panopticism and the Post-Washington 
 Consensus
2. Heidi Lund Hansen
 Spaces for learning and working
 A qualitative study of change of work, 
 management, vehicles of power and 
 social practices in open ofﬁces
3. Sudhanshu Rai
 Exploring the internal dynamics of 
software development teams during 
user analysis
 A tension enabled Institutionalization 
 Model; ”Where process becomes the 
 objective”
4. Norsk ph.d. 
 Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur
5. Serden Ozcan
 EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN 
 ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND 
 OUTCOMES
 A Behavioural Perspective
6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
 Inter-organizational Performance 
 Measurement and Management in 
Action
 – An Ethnography on the Construction 
of Management, Identity and 
 Relationships
7. Tobias Lindeberg
 Evaluative Technologies
 Quality and the Multiplicity of 
 Performance
8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
 Den globale soldat
 Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse 
i multinationale militære organisatio-
ner
9. Lars Frederiksen
 Open Innovation Business Models
 Innovation in ﬁrm-hosted online user 
 communities and inter-ﬁrm project 
 ventures in the music industry 
 – A collection of essays
10. Jonas Gabrielsen
 Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’ 
til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
 Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld  
evaluering.
 Anvendelsen af studentertilfredsheds-
 målinger på de korte og mellemlange  
 videregående uddannelser set fra et 
 psykodynamisk systemperspektiv
12. Ping Gao
 Extending the application of 
 actor-network theory
 Cases of innovation in the tele-
 communications industry
13. Peter Mejlby
 Frihed og fængsel, en del af den 
samme drøm? 
 Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af 
 frigørelsens og kontrollens sam-
eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse! 
 
14. Kristina Birch
 Statistical Modelling in Marketing
15. Signe Poulsen
 Sense and sensibility: 
 The language of emotional appeals in 
insurance marketing
16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
 Essays on derivatives pricing and dyna-
mic asset allocation
17. Peter Feldhütter
 Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit 
Markets
18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
 Default and Recovery Risk Modeling 
and Estimation
19. Maria Theresa Larsen
 Academic Enterprise: A New Mission 
for Universities or a Contradiction in 
Terms?
 Four papers on the long-term impli-
cations of increasing industry involve-
ment and commercialization in acade-
mia
20.  Morten Wellendorf
 Postimplementering af teknologi i den  
 offentlige forvaltning
 Analyser af en organisations konti-
nuerlige arbejde med informations-
teknologi
21.  Ekaterina Mhaanna
 Concept Relations for Terminological 
Process Analysis
22.  Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
 Forsvaret i forandring
 Et studie i ofﬁcerers kapabiliteter un-
der påvirkning af omverdenens foran-
dringspres mod øget styring og læring
23.  Christa Breum Amhøj
 Det selvskabte medlemskab om ma-
nagementstaten, dens styringstekno-
logier og indbyggere
24.  Karoline Bromose
 Between Technological Turbulence and 
Operational Stability
 – An empirical case study of corporate 
venturing in TDC
25.  Susanne Justesen
 Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity 
in Innovation Practice
 – A Longitudinal study of six very 
 different innovation processes – in 
practice
26.  Luise Noring Henler
 Conceptualising successful supply 
chain partnerships
 – Viewing supply chain partnerships 
from an organisational culture per-
spective
27.  Mark Mau
 Kampen om telefonen
 Det danske telefonvæsen under den 
tyske besættelse 1940-45
28.  Jakob Halskov
 The semiautomatic expansion of 
existing terminological ontologies 
using knowledge patterns discovered 
on the WWW – an implementation 
and evaluation
29.  Gergana Koleva
 European Policy Instruments Beyond 
Networks and Structure: The Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative
30.  Christian Geisler Asmussen
 Global Strategy and International 
 Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?
31.  Christina Holm-Petersen
 Stolthed og fordom
 Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved ska-
belsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem 
fusion
32.  Hans Peter Olsen
 Hybrid Governance of Standardized 
States
 Causes and Contours of the Global 
Regulation of Government Auditing
33.  Lars Bøge Sørensen
 Risk Management in the Supply Chain
34.  Peter Aagaard
 Det unikkes dynamikker
 De institutionelle mulighedsbetingel-
ser bag den individuelle udforskning i 
professionelt og frivilligt arbejde
35.  Yun Mi Antorini
 Brand Community Innovation
 An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult 
Fans of LEGO Community
36.  Joachim Lynggaard Boll
 Labor Related Corporate Social Perfor-
mance in Denmark
 Organizational and Institutional Per-
spectives
2008
1. Frederik Christian Vinten
 Essays on Private Equity
2.  Jesper Clement
 Visual Inﬂuence of Packaging Design 
on In-Store Buying Decisions
3.  Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
 Tid til kvalitetsmåling?
 – Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i 
forbindelse med introduktionen af 
kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i speciallæ-
gepraksissektoren
4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
 Management Consulting in Action
 Value creation and ambiguity in 
 client-consultant relations
5.  Anders Rom
 Management accounting and inte-
grated information systems
 How to exploit the potential for ma-
nagement accounting of information 
technology
6.  Marina Candi
 Aesthetic Design as an Element of 
 Service Innovation in New Technology-
based Firms
7.  Morten Schnack
 Teknologi og tværfaglighed
 – en analyse af diskussionen omkring 
 indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafde-
ling
8. Helene Balslev Clausen
 Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio 
sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en 
un pueblo mexicano
9. Lise Justesen
 Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter.
 En beretning om forvaltningsrevisio-
nens beretninger
10. Michael E. Hansen
 The politics of corporate responsibility:
 CSR and the governance of child labor 
and core labor rights in the 1990s
11. Anne Roepstorff
 Holdning for handling – en etnologisk 
undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale 
Ansvar/CSR
12. Claus Bajlum
 Essays on Credit Risk and 
 Credit Derivatives
13. Anders Bojesen
 The Performative Power of Competen-
ce  – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and 
Social Technologies at Work
14. Satu Reijonen
 Green and Fragile
 A Study on Markets and the Natural  
Environment
15. Ilduara Busta
 Corporate Governance in Banking
 A European Study
16. Kristian Anders Hvass
 A Boolean Analysis Predicting Industry 
Change: Innovation, Imitation & Busi-
ness Models
 The Winning Hybrid: A case study of 
isomorphism in the airline industry
17. Trine Paludan
 De uvidende og de udviklingsparate
 Identitet som mulighed og restriktion 
blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftaylo-
riserede fabriksgulv
18. Kristian Jakobsen
 Foreign market entry in transition eco-
nomies: Entry timing and mode choice
19. Jakob Elming
 Syntactic reordering in statistical ma-
chine translation
20. Lars Brømsøe Termansen
 Regional Computable General Equili-
brium Models for Denmark
 Three papers laying the foundation for 
regional CGE models with agglomera-
tion characteristics
 
21. Mia Reinholt
 The Motivational Foundations of 
Knowledge Sharing
22.  Frederikke Krogh-Meibom
 The Co-Evolution of Institutions and 
Technology
 – A Neo-Institutional Understanding of 
Change Processes within the Business 
Press – the Case Study of Financial 
Times
23. Peter D. Ørberg Jensen
 OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND 
HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES: 
ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS 
AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS
24. Pham Thi Song Hanh
 Functional Upgrading, Relational 
 Capability and Export Performance of 
Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers
25. Mads Vangkilde
 Why wait?
 An Exploration of ﬁrst-mover advanta-
ges among Danish e-grocers through a 
resource perspective
26.  Hubert Buch-Hansen
 Rethinking the History of European 
Level Merger Control
 A Critical Political Economy Perspective
2009
1. Vivian Lindhardsen
 From Independent Ratings to Commu-
nal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’ 
Decision-Making Behaviours
2. Guðrið Weihe
 Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning 
and Practice
3. Chris Nøkkentved
 Enabling Supply Networks with Colla-
borative Information Infrastructures
 An Empirical Investigation of Business 
Model Innovation in Supplier Relation-
ship Management
4.  Sara Louise Muhr
 Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulner-
ability of Diversity Management
5. Christine Sestoft
 Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livs-
formsteoretisk perspektiv
6. Michael Pedersen
 Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On 
the production of the stress-ﬁt self-
managing employee
7.  Salla Lutz
 Position and Reposition in Networks 
 – Exempliﬁed by the Transformation of 
the Danish Pine Furniture Manu-
 facturers
8. Jens Forssbæck
 Essays on market discipline in 
 commercial and central banking
9. Tine Murphy
 Sense from Silence – A Basis for Orga-
nised Action 
 How do Sensemaking Processes with 
Minimal Sharing Relate to the Repro-
duction of Organised Action?
10. Sara Malou Strandvad
 Inspirations for a new sociology of art: 
A sociomaterial study of development 
processes in the Danish ﬁlm industry
11. Nicolaas Mouton
 On the evolution of social scientiﬁc 
metaphors: 
 A cognitive-historical enquiry into the 
divergent trajectories of the idea that 
collective entities – states and societies, 
cities and corporations – are biological 
organisms.
12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
 Mobile Data Services:
 Shaping of user engagements
13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korﬁatis
 Information Exchange and Behavior
 A Multi-method Inquiry on Online 
Communities
14.  Jens Albæk
 Forestillinger om kvalitet og tværfaglig-
hed på sygehuse
 – skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og 
plejegrupperne angående relevans af 
nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gen-
nem tolkningsprocesser
15.  Maja Lotz
 The Business of Co-Creation – and the 
Co-Creation of Business
16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
 Narrative Construction of Leader Iden-
tity in a Leader Development Program 
Context
17. Dorte Hermansen
 ”Living the brand” som en brandorien-
teret dialogisk praxis:
 Om udvikling af medarbejdernes 
brandorienterede dømmekraft
18. Aseem Kinra
 Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental 
Complexity
19. Michael Nørager
 How to manage SMEs through the 
transformation from non innovative to 
innovative? 
20.  Kristin Wallevik
 Corporate Governance in Family Firms
 The Norwegian Maritime Sector
21. Bo Hansen Hansen
 Beyond the Process
 Enriching Software Process Improve-
ment with Knowledge Management
22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
 Franske adjektivisk aﬂedte adverbier, 
der tager præpositionssyntagmer ind-
ledt med præpositionen à som argu-
menter
 En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse
23. Line Gry Knudsen
 Collaborative R&D Capabilities
 In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer
 Employers meet employees
 Essays on sorting and globalization
25. Rasmus Johnsen
 The Great Health of Melancholy
 A Study of the Pathologies of Perfor-
mativity
26. Ha Thi Van Pham
 Internationalization, Competitiveness 
Enhancement and Export Performance 
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 Evidence from Vietnam
27. Henriette Balieu
 Kontrolbegrebets betydning for kausa-
tivalternationen i spansk
 En kognitiv-typologisk analyse
2010
1.  Yen Tran
 Organizing Innovationin Turbulent 
Fashion Market
 Four papers on how fashion ﬁrms crea-
te and appropriate innovation value
2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen
 Metaphysical Labour
 Flexibility, Performance and Commit-
ment in Work-Life Management
3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir
 Dependently independent
 Co-existence of institutional logics in 
the recorded music industry
4.  Ásta Dis Óladóttir
 Internationalization from a small do-
mestic base:
 An empirical analysis of Economics and 
Management
5.  Christine Secher
 E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og 
forvaltningens medkonstruktion og 
konsekvenserne heraf
6. Marianne Stang Våland
 What we talk about when we talk 
about space:
 
 End User Participation between Proces-
ses of Organizational and Architectural 
Design
7.  Rex Degnegaard
 Strategic Change Management
 Change Management Challenges in 
the Danish Police Reform
8. Ulrik Schultz Brix
 Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslut-
ning
 En pragmatisk analyse af perception 
og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutte-
rings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet
9. Jan Ole Similä
 Kontraktsledelse
 Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse 
og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via ﬁre 
norske virksomheter
10. Susanne Boch Waldorff
 Emerging Organizations: In between 
local translation, institutional logics 
and discourse
11. Brian Kane
 Performance Talk
 Next Generation Management of  
Organizational Performance
12. Lars Ohnemus
 Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and 
Shareholder Value
 An Empirical Reconciliation of two 
Critical Concepts
13.  Jesper Schlamovitz
 Håndtering af usikkerhed i ﬁlm- og 
byggeprojekter
14.  Tommy Moesby-Jensen
 Det faktiske livs forbindtlighed
 Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk 
τηθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger
15. Christian Fich
 Two Nations Divided by Common 
 Values
 French National Habitus and the 
 Rejection of American Power
16. Peter Beyer
 Processer, sammenhængskraft  
og ﬂeksibilitet
 Et empirisk casestudie af omstillings-
forløb i ﬁre virksomheder
17. Adam Buchhorn
 Markets of Good Intentions
 Constructing and Organizing 
 Biogas Markets Amid Fragility  
and Controversy
18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen
 Social læring og fælles praksis
 Et mixed method studie, der belyser 
læringskonsekvenser af et lederkursus 
for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige 
mellemledere
19. Heidi Boye
 Fødevarer og sundhed i sen- 
modernismen
 – En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og  
de relaterede fødevarepraksisser
20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen
 Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige 
mobiliseringer
 Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde 
Festival
21. Oliver Jacob Weber
 Causes of Intercompany Harmony in 
Business Markets – An Empirical Inve-
stigation from a Dyad Perspective
22. Susanne Ekman
 Authority and Autonomy
 Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge 
Work
23. Anette Frey Larsen
 Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler
 – Ledelsernes indﬂydelse på introduk-
tion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstra-
tegier i det danske sundhedsvæsen
24.  Toyoko Sato
 Performativity and Discourse: Japanese 
Advertisements on the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Desire
25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen
 Identifying the Last Planner System 
 Lean management in the construction 
industry
26.  Javier Busquets
 Orchestrating Network Behavior  
for Innovation
27. Luke Patey
 The Power of Resistance: India’s Na-
tional Oil Company and International 
Activism in Sudan
28. Mette Vedel
 Value Creation in Triadic Business Rela-
tionships. Interaction, Interconnection 
and Position
29.  Kristian Tørning
 Knowledge Management Systems in 
Practice – A Work Place Study
30. Qingxin Shi
 An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud 
Usability Testing from a Cultural 
Perspective
31.  Tanja Juul Christiansen
 Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes 
kommunikative handlekraft
32.  Malgorzata Ciesielska
 Hybrid Organisations.
 A study of the Open Source – business 
setting
33. Jens Dick-Nielsen
 Three Essays on Corporate Bond  
Market Liquidity
34. Sabrina Speiermann
 Modstandens Politik
 Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten. 
 En diskussion af traﬁkkampagners sty-
ringspotentiale
35. Julie Uldam
 Fickle Commitment. Fostering political 
engagement in 'the ﬂighty world of 
online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen
 Traveling technologies and 
transformations in health care
37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte
 Organising Development
 Power and Organisational Reform in 
the United Nations Development 
 Programme
38. Louise Rygaard Jonas
 Branding på butiksgulvet
 Et case-studie af kultur- og identitets-
arbejdet i Kvickly
2011
1. Stefan Fraenkel
 Key Success Factors for Sales Force 
Readiness during New Product Launch
 A Study of Product Launches in the 
Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry
2. Christian Plesner Rossing
 International Transfer Pricing in Theory 
and Practice
3.  Tobias Dam Hede
 Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin
 – en analyse af coachingsdiskursens 
genealogi og governmentality
4. Kim Pettersson
 Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choi-
ce, and Equity Valuation
5. Henrik Merkelsen
 The expert-lay controversy in risk 
research and management. Effects of 
institutional distances. Studies of risk 
deﬁnitions, perceptions, management 
and communication
6. Simon S. Torp
 Employee Stock Ownership: 
 Effect on Strategic Management and 
Performance
7. Mie Harder
 Internal Antecedents of Management 
Innovation
8. Ole Helby Petersen
 Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and 
Regulation – With Comparative and 
Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark 
and Ireland
9. Morten Krogh Petersen
 ’Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multipli-
city in Government Communication
10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund
 Allocation of cognitive resources in 
translation - an eye-tracking and key-
logging study
11. Moshe Yonatany
 The Internationalization Process of 
Digital Service Providers
12. Anne Vestergaard
 Distance and Suffering
 Humanitarian Discourse in the age of 
Mediatization
13. Thorsten Mikkelsen
 Personligsheds indﬂydelse på forret-
ningsrelationer
14. Jane Thostrup Jagd
 Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbølgen ud-
over ”the tipping point”?
 – en empirisk analyse af information 
og kognitioner om fusioner
15. Gregory Gimpel
 Value-driven Adoption and Consump-
tion of Technology: Understanding 
Technology Decision Making
16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov
 Den nye mulighed
 Social innovation i en forretningsmæs-
sig kontekst
17.  Jeppe Christoffersen
 Donor supported strategic alliances in 
developing countries
18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard
 Dominant Ideological Modes of  
Rationality: Cross functional 
 integration in the process of product
 innovation
19.  Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
 Governance Failure and Icelands’s
 Financial Collapse
20.  Allan Sall Tang Andersen
 Essays on the modeling of risks in
 interest-rate and inﬂ ation markets
21.  Heidi Tscherning
 Mobile Devices in Social Contexts
22.  Birgitte Gorm Hansen
 Adapting in the Knowledge Economy
  Lateral Strategies for Scientists and 
Those Who Study Them
23.  Kristina Vaarst Andersen
 Optimal Levels of Embeddedness
  The Contingent Value of Networked 
Collaboration
24.  Justine Grønbæk Pors
 Noisy Management
  A History of Danish School Governing 
from 1970-2010
25.  Stefan Linder
  Micro-foundations of Strategic 
Entrepreneurship
  Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action
26.  Xin Li
  Toward an Integrative Framework of 
National Competitiveness
 An application to China
27.  Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
 Værdifuld arkitektur
  Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers 
rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse
28.  Monica Viken
  Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i 
varemerke- og markedsføringsrett
29.  Christian Wymann
  Tattooing 
  The Economic and Artistic Constitution 
of a Social Phenomenon
30.  Sanne Frandsen
 Productive Incoherence 
  A Case Study of Branding and 
Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige 
Organization
31.  Mads Stenbo Nielsen
 Essays on Correlation Modelling
32.  Ivan Häuser
 Følelse og sprog
  Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori, 
eksempliﬁ ceret på russisk
33.  Sebastian Schwenen
 Security of Supply in Electricity Markets
2012
1.  Peter Holm Andreasen
  The Dynamics of Procurement 
Management
 - A Complexity Approach
2.  Martin Haulrich
  Data-Driven Bitext Dependency 
 Parsing and Alignment
3.  Line Kirkegaard
  Konsulenten i den anden nat 
  En undersøgelse af det intense 
arbejdsliv
4.  Tonny Stenheim
  Decision usefulness of goodwill 
under IFRS
5.  Morten Lind Larsen
  Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd
  Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens 
Danmark 1945 - 1958
6.  Petter Berg
  Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries 
7.  Lynn Kahle
 Experiential Discourse in Marketing
  A methodical inquiry into practice 
and theory
8.  Anne Roelsgaard Obling
  Management of Emotions 
in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9.  Thomas Frandsen
  Managing Modularity of 
Service Processes Architecture
10.  Carina Christine Skovmøller
  CSR som noget særligt
  Et casestudie om styring og menings-
skabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en 
intern optik
11.  Michael Tell
  Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers 
ﬁ nansieringsudgifter
  En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11, 
11B og 11C
12.  Morten Holm
  Customer Proﬁ tability Measurement 
Models
  Their Merits and Sophistication 
across Contexts
13.  Katja Joo Dyppel
  Beskatning af derivater 
 En analyse af dansk skatteret
14.  Esben Anton Schultz
  Essays in Labor Economics 
 Evidence from Danish Micro Data
15.  Carina Risvig Hansen
  ”Contracts not covered, or not fully 
covered, by the Public Sector Directive”
16.  Anja Svejgaard Pors
 Iværksættelse af kommunikation
  - patientﬁ gurer i hospitalets strategiske 
kommunikation
17.  Frans Bévort
  Making sense of management with 
logics
  An ethnographic study of accountants 
who become managers
18.  René Kallestrup
  The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign 
Credit Risk
19.  Brett Crawford
  Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests 
in Organizational Institutionalism
  The Case of U.S. Chambers of 
Commerce
20.  Mario Daniele Amore
  Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance
21.  Arne Stjernholm Madsen
  The evolution of innovation strategy 
  Studied in the context of medical 
device activities at the pharmaceutical 
company Novo Nordisk A/S in the 
period 1980-2008
22.  Jacob Holm Hansen
  Is Social Integration Necessary for 
Corporate Branding?
  A study of corporate branding 
strategies at Novo Nordisk
23.  Stuart Webber
  Corporate Proﬁ t Shifting and the 
Multinational Enterprise
24.  Helene Ratner
  Promises of Reﬂ exivity
  Managing and Researching 
Inclusive Schools
25.  Therese Strand
  The Owners and the Power: Insights 
from Annual General Meetings
26.  Robert Gavin Strand
  In Praise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Bureaucracy
27.  Nina Sormunen
 Auditor’s going-concern reporting
  Reporting decision and content of the 
report
28.  John Bang Mathiasen
  Learning within a product development 
working practice:
  - an understanding anchored 
in pragmatism
29.  Philip Holst Riis
  Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise 
Systems: From Vendors to Customers
30.  Marie Lisa Dacanay
 Social Enterprises and the Poor 
  Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and 
Stakeholder Theory
31.  Fumiko Kano Glückstad
  Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual 
concept mapping based on the 
information receiver’s prior-knowledge
32.  Henrik Barslund Fosse
  Empirical Essays in International Trade
33.  Peter Alexander Albrecht
  Foundational hybridity and its 
reproduction 
 Security sector reform in Sierra Leone
34.  Maja Rosenstock
 CSR  - hvor svært kan det være? 
  Kulturanalytisk casestudie om 
udfordringer og dilemmaer med at 
forankre Coops CSR-strategi
35.  Jeanette Rasmussen
 Tweens, medier og forbrug
  Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns 
brug af internettet, opfattelse og for-
ståelse af markedsføring og forbrug
36.  Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen
  ‘This page is not intended for a 
US Audience’
  A ﬁ ve-act spectacle on online 
communication, collaboration 
& organization.
37.  Kasper Aalling Teilmann
  Interactive Approaches to 
Rural Development
38.  Mette Mogensen
  The Organization(s) of Well-being 
and Productivity
  (Re)assembling work in the Danish Post
39.  Søren Friis Møller
  From Disinterestedness to Engagement 
  Towards Relational Leadership In the 
Cultural Sector
40.  Nico Peter Berhausen
  Management Control, Innovation and 
Strategic Objectives – Interactions and 
Convergence in Product Development 
Networks
41.  Balder Onarheim
 Creativity under Constraints
  Creativity as Balancing 
‘Constrainedness’
42.  Haoyong Zhou
 Essays on Family Firms
43.  Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen
 Making sense of organisational conﬂ ict
  An empirical study of enacted sense-
making in everyday conﬂ ict at work
2013
1.  Jacob Lyngsie
  Entrepreneurship in an Organizational 
Context
2.  Signe Groth-Brodersen
 Fra ledelse til selvet
  En socialpsykologisk analyse af 
forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse 
og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv
3.  Nis Høyrup Christensen
  Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional 
Analysis of the Emerging 
Organizational Field of Renewable 
Energy in China
4.  Christian Edelvold Berg
 As a matter of size 
  THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL 
MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS 
5.  Christine D. Isakson
  Coworker Inﬂ uence and Labor Mobility 
Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship 
and Location Choice in the Danish 
Maritime Industry
6.  Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon
  Accounting Qualities in Practice 
Rhizomatic stories of representational 
faithfulness, decision making and 
control
7.  Shannon O’Donnell
 Making Ensemble Possible
  How special groups organize for 
collaborative creativity in conditions 
of spatial variability and distance
8.  Robert W. D. Veitch
  Access Decisions in a 
Partly-Digital World
Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal 
Modes for Film and Music
9.  Marie Mathiesen
 Making Strategy Work 
 An Organizational Ethnography
10.  Arisa Shollo
 The role of business intelligence in   
 organizational decision-making 
11.  Mia Kaspersen
  The construction of social and 
environmental reporting
12. Marcus Møller Larsen
 The organizational design of offshoring
13. Mette Ohm Rørdam
 EU Law on Food Naming
 The prohibition against misleading   
 names in an internal market context
14. Hans Peter Rasmussen 
 GIV EN GED!
 Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte 
 til velgørenhed og understøtte 
 relationsopbygning?
15. Ruben Schachtenhaufen 
 Fonetisk reduktion i dansk
16. Peter Koerver Schmidt
 Dansk CFC-beskatning
  I et internationalt og komparativt 
perspektiv
17. Morten Froholdt
 Strategi i den offentlige sektor 
 En kortlægning af styringsmæssig   
 kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt 
 anvendte redskaber og teknologier for  
 udvalgte danske statslige styrelser
18. Annette Camilla Sjørup
 Cognitive effort in metaphor translation
 An eye-tracking and key-logging study
19. Tamara Stucchi
  The Internationalization 
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 A Context-Speciﬁ c Study
20. Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth
 “Let’s Go Outside”:
 The Value of Co-Creation
21. Ana Alačovska
 Genre and Autonomy in Cultural 
 Production
 The case of travel guidebook 
 production
22. Marius Gudmand-Høyer
  Stemningssindssygdommenes historie 
i det 19. århundrede
  Omtydningen af melankolien og 
manien som bipolære stemningslidelser 
i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til 
dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs 
relative autonomi. 
  En problematiserings- og erfarings-
analytisk undersøgelse
23. Lichen Alex Yu
 Fabricating an S&OP Process
  Circulating References and Matters 
of Concern
24. Esben Alfort
 The Expression of a Need
 Understanding search
25. Trine Pallesen
 Assembling Markets for Wind Power  
 An Inquiry into the Making of 
 Market Devices
26. Anders Koed Madsen
 Web-Visions
 Repurposing digital traces to organize  
 social attention
27. Lærke Højgaard Christiansen
 BREWING ORGANIZATIONAL 
 RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
28. Tommy Kjær Lassen
 EGENTLIG SELVLEDELSE
  En ledelsesﬁ losoﬁ sk afhandling om 
selvledelsens paradoksale dynamik og 
eksistentielle engagement
29. Morten Rossing
 Local Adaption and Meaning Creation  
 in Performance Appraisal
30. Søren Obed Madsen
 Lederen som oversætter
 Et oversættelsesteoretisk perspektiv 
 på strategisk arbejde
31. Thomas Høgenhaven
 Open Government Communities
 Does Design Affect Participation?
32. Kirstine Zinck Pedersen 
 Failsafe Organizing? 
 A Pragmatic Stance on Patient Safety
33. Anne Petersen
 Hverdagslogikker i psykiatrisk arbejde
 En institutionsetnograﬁ sk undersøgelse  
 af hverdagen i psykiatriske 
 organisationer
34. Didde Maria Humle
 Fortællinger om arbejde
35. Mark Holst-Mikkelsen
 Strategieksekvering i praksis 
 – barrierer og muligheder! 
36. Malek Maalouf
 Sustaining lean
 Strategies for dealing with
 organizational paradoxes
37. Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche
 Systemic Innovation In The Making
 The Social Productivity of 
 Cartographic Crisis and Transitions 
 in the Case of SEEIT
38. Morten Gylling
 The Structure of Discourse
 A Corpus-Based Cross-Linguistic Study
39. Binzhang YANG
 Urban Green Spaces for Quality Life
  - Case Study: the landscape 
architecture for people in Copenhagen
40. Michael Friis Pedersen
 Finance and Organization:  
 The Implications for Whole Farm 
 Risk Management
41. Even Fallan
 Issues on supply and demand for 
 environmental accounting information
42. Ather Nawaz
 Website user experience
 A cross-cultural study of the relation  
 between users´ cognitive style, context  
 of use, and information architecture 
 of local websites
43. Karin Beukel
 The Determinants for Creating 
 Valuable Inventions
44. Arjan Markus
 External Knowledge Sourcing 
 and Firm Innovation 
 Essays on the Micro-Foundations 
 of Firms’ Search for Innovation
2014
1.  Solon Moreira
  Four Essays on Technology Licensing 
and Firm Innovation
2.  Karin Strzeletz Ivertsen
 Partnership Drift in Innovation 
 Processes
 A study of the Think City electric 
 car development
3.  Kathrine Hoffmann Pii
 Responsibility Flows in Patient-centred  
 Prevention
4.  Jane Bjørn Vedel
 Managing Strategic Research
 An empirical analysis of 
 science-industry collaboration in a   
 pharmaceutical company
5.  Martin Gylling
 Processuel strategi i organisationer   
 Monograﬁ  om dobbeltheden i 
 tænkning af strategi, dels som 
 vidensfelt i organisationsteori, dels 
 som kunstnerisk tilgang til at skabe 
 i erhvervsmæssig innovation
6.  Linne Marie Lauesen
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 in the Water Sector: 
 How Material Practices and their 
 Symbolic and Physical Meanings Form 
 a Colonising Logic
7.  Maggie Qiuzhu Mei
 LEARNING TO INNOVATE: 
 The role of ambidexterity, standard,  
 and decision process
8.  Inger Høedt-Rasmussen
 Developing Identity for Lawyers
 Towards Sustainable Lawyering
9.  Sebastian Fux
 Essays on Return Predictability and   
 Term Structure Modelling
10.  Thorbjørn N. M. Lund-Poulsen
 Essays on Value Based Management
11.  Oana Brindusa Albu
 Transparency in Organizing: 
 A Performative Approach
12.  Lena Olaison
 Entrepreneurship at the limits
13.  Hanne Sørum
 DRESSED FOR WEB SUCCESS?
  An Empirical Study of Website Quality 
in the Public Sector
14.  Lasse Folke Henriksen
 Knowing networks
 How experts shape transnational 
 governance
15.  Maria Halbinger
 Entrepreneurial Individuals
 Empirical Investigations into 
 Entrepreneurial Activities of 
 Hackers and Makers
16.  Robert Spliid
 Kapitalfondenes metoder 
 og kompetencer
17.  Christiane Stelling
 Public-private partnerships & the need,  
 development and management 
 of trusting 
 A processual and embedded 
 exploration
18.  Marta Gasparin
 Management of design as a translation  
 process
19.  Kåre Moberg
 Assessing the Impact of 
 Entrepreneurship Education
 From ABC to PhD
20.  Alexander Cole
 Distant neighbors
 Collective learning beyond the cluster
21.  Martin Møller Boje Rasmussen
 Is Competitiveness a Question of 
 Being Alike?
 How the United Kingdom, Germany  
 and Denmark Came to Compete   
 through their Knowledge Regimes 
 from 1993 to 2007
22.  Anders Ravn Sørensen
 Studies in central bank legitimacy, 
 currency and national identity
 Four cases from Danish monetary 
 history
23.  Nina Bellak
  Can Language be Managed in 
International Business?
 Insights into Language Choice from a 
 Case Study of Danish and Austrian 
 Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
24.  Rikke Kristine Nielsen
 Global Mindset as Managerial 
 Meta-competence and Organizational  
 Capability: Boundary-crossing 
 Leadership Cooperation in the MNC
  The Case of ‘Group Mindset’ in 
 Solar A/S.
25.  Rasmus Koss Hartmann
 User Innovation inside government  
 Towards a critically performative 
 foundation for inquiry
26.  Kristian Gylling Olesen
  Flertydig og emergerende ledelse i 
folkeskolen 
  Et aktør-netværksteoretisk ledelses-
studie af politiske evalueringsreformers 
betydning for ledelse i den danske 
folkeskole
27.  Troels Riis Larsen
  Kampen om Danmarks omdømme 
1945-2010
 Omdømmearbejde og omdømmepolitik
28.  Klaus Majgaard
  Jagten på autenticitet i offentlig styring
29.  Ming Hua Li
 Institutional Transition and
 Organizational Diversity:
 Differentiated internationalization
 strategies of emerging market 
 state-owned enterprises
30.  Soﬁ e Blinkenberg Federspiel
 IT, organisation og digitalisering: 
 Institutionelt arbejde i den kommunale 
 digitaliseringsproces
31.  Elvi Weinreich
 Hvilke offentlige ledere er der brug for 
 når velfærdstænkningen ﬂ ytter sig
 – er Diplomuddannelsens lederproﬁ l 
 svaret?
32.  Ellen Mølgaard Korsager 
 Self-conception and image of context 
 in the growth of the ﬁ rm
 – A Penrosian History of Fiberline 
 Composites
33.  Else Skjold
  The Daily Selection
34.  Marie Louise Conradsen
  The Cancer Centre That Never Was
 The Organisation of Danish Cancer  
 Research 1949-1992
35.  Virgilio Failla
  Three Essays on the Dynamics of 
Entrepreneurs in the Labor Market
36.  Nicky Nedergaard
 Brand-Based Innovation
  Relational Perspectives on Brand Logics 
and Design Innovation Strategies and 
Implementation
37.  Mads Gjedsted Nielsen
 Essays in Real Estate Finance
38.  Kristin Martina Brandl
  Process Perspectives on 
Service Offshoring
39.  Mia Rosa Koss Hartmann
 In the gray zone
 With police in making space 
 for creativity
40.  Karen Ingerslev
  Healthcare Innovation under 
The Microscope
  Framing Boundaries of Wicked 
Problems
41.  Tim Neerup Themsen
  Risk Management in large Danish 
public capital investment programmes
2015
1.  Jakob Ion Wille 
 Film som design 
  Design af levende billeder i 
ﬁ lm og tv-serier
2.  Christiane Mossin 
 Interzones of Law and Metaphysics 
  Hierarchies, Logics and Foundations 
of Social Order seen through the Prism 
of EU Social Rights
3.  Thomas Tøth
  TRUSTWORTHINESS: ENABLING 
GLOBAL COLLABORATION
  An Ethnographic Study of Trust, 
Distance, Control, Culture and 
Boundary Spanning within Offshore 
Outsourcing of IT Services
4.  Steven Højlund 
 Evaluation Use in Evaluation Systems –  
 The Case of the European Commission
5.  Julia Kirch Kirkegaard
 AMBIGUOUS WINDS OF CHANGE – OR  
 FIGHTING AGAINST WINDMILLS IN  
 CHINESE WIND POWER
 A CONSTRUCTIVIST INQUIRY INTO   
 CHINA’S PRAGMATICS OF GREEN   
 MARKETISATION MAPPING 
 CONTROVERSIES OVER A POTENTIAL  
 TURN TO QUALITY IN CHINESE WIND  
 POWER
6.  Michelle Carol Antero
  A Multi-case Analysis of the 
Development of Enterprise Resource 
Planning Systems (ERP) Business 
Practices
  Morten Friis-Olivarius
 The Associative Nature of Creativity
7.  Mathew Abraham
 New Cooperativism:
  A study of emerging producer 
organisations in India
8.  Stine Hedegaard
 Sustainability-Focused Identity: Identity  
 work performed to manage, negotiate  
 and resolve barriers and tensions that  
 arise in the process of constructing or 
 ganizational identity in a sustainability  
 context 
9.  Cecilie Glerup
 Organizing Science in Society – the  
 conduct and justiﬁ cation of resposible  
 research
10.  Allan Salling Pedersen
 Implementering af ITIL®  IT-governance
 - når best practice konﬂ ikter med   
 kulturen Løsning af implementerings- 
 problemer gennem anvendelse af   
 kendte CSF i et aktionsforskningsforløb.
11.  Nihat Misir
 A Real Options Approach to 
 Determining Power Prices
12.  Mamdouh Medhat
 MEASURING AND PRICING THE RISK  
 OF CORPORATE FAILURES
13.  Rina Hansen
 Toward a Digital Strategy for 
 Omnichannel Retailing
14.  Eva Pallesen
 In the rhythm of welfare creation
  A relational processual investigation 
moving beyond the conceptual horizon 
of welfare management
15. Gouya Harirchi
 In Search of Opportunities: Three   
 Essays on Global Linkages for Innovation
16. Lotte Holck
 Embedded Diversity: A critical 
 ethnographic study of the structural  
 tensions of organizing diversity
17. Jose Daniel Balarezo
 Learning through Scenario Planning
18. Louise Pram Nielsen
  Knowledge dissemination based on 
terminological ontologies. Using eye 
tracking to further user interface 
design.
19. Soﬁ e Dam
  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY 
TRANSFORMATION
  An embedded, comparative case study 
of municipal waste management in 
England and Denmark
20. Ulrik Hartmyer Christiansen 
  Follwoing the Content of Reported Risk 
Across the Organization 
21. Guro Refsum Sanden 
  Language strategies in multinational 
corporations. A cross-sector study 
of ﬁ nancial service companies and 
manufacturing companies.  
22. Linn Gevoll 
  Designing performance management 
for operational level
  - A closer look on the role of design 
choices in framing coordination and 
motivation
23.  Frederik Larsen
  Objects and Social Actions
 – on Second-hand Valuation Practices
24.  Thorhildur Hansdottir Jetzek
  The Sustainable Value of Open 
Government Data
  Uncovering the Generative Mechanisms 
of Open Data through a Mixed 
Methods Approach
25.  Gustav Toppenberg
  Innovation-based M&A 
  – Technological-Integration 
Challenges – The Case of 
Digital-Technology Companies
26.  Mie Plotnikof
  Challenges of Collaborative 
Governance
  An Organizational Discourse Study 
of Public Managers’ Struggles 
with Collaboration across the
 Daycare Area
27.  Christian Garmann Johnsen
  Who Are the Post-Bureaucrats?
  A Philosophical Examination of the 
Creative Manager, the Authentic Leader 
and the Entrepreneur
28.  Jacob Brogaard-Kay
  Constituting Performance Management
  A ﬁ eld study of a pharmaceutical 
company
29.  Rasmus Ploug Jenle
  Engineering Markets for Control: 
Integrating Wind Power into the Danish 
Electricity System
30.  Morten Lindholst
  Complex Business Negotiation: 
Understanding Preparation and 
Planning
31. Morten Grynings
 TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY FROM AN  
 ALIGNMENT PERSPECTIVE
32.  Peter Andreas Norn
  Byregimer og styringsevne: Politisk 
lederskab af store byudviklingsprojekter
33.  Milan Miric
  Essays on Competition, Innovation and 
Firm Strategy in Digital Markets
34.  Sanne K. Hjordrup
 The Value of Talent Management 
  Rethinking practice, problems and 
possibilities
35.  Johanna Sax
 Strategic Risk Management 
  – Analyzing Antecedents and 
Contingencies for Value Creation
36.  Pernille Rydén
 Strategic Cognition of Social Media
37.  Mimmi Sjöklint
 The Measurable Me 
 - The Inﬂ uence of Self-tracking on the  
 User Experience
38.  Juan Ignacio Staricco
 Towards a Fair Global Economic   
 Regime? A critical assessment of Fair 
 Trade through the examination of the  
 Argentinean wine industry
39.  Marie Henriette Madsen
 Emerging and temporary connections  
 in Quality work
40.  Yangfeng CAO
 Toward a Process Framework of 
 Business Model Innovation in the   
 Global Context
 Entrepreneurship-Enabled Dynamic  
 Capability of Medium-Sized  
 Multinational Enterprises
41.  Carsten Scheibye
  Enactment of the Organizational Cost
 Structure in Value Chain Conﬁ guration
 A Contribution to Strategic Cost
 Management
2016
1.  Signe Soﬁ e Dyrby
 Enterprise Social Media at Work
2.  Dorte Boesby Dahl
  The making of the public parking 
attendant
  Dirt, aesthetics and inclusion in public 
service work
3.  Verena Girschik
  Realizing Corporate Responsibility 
Positioning and Framing in Nascent 
Institutional Change
4.  Anders Ørding Olsen
  IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
  Inertia, Knowledge Sources and Diver-
sity in Collaborative Problem-solving
5.  Pernille Steen Pedersen
  Udkast til et nyt copingbegreb
  En kvaliﬁ kation af ledelsesmuligheder 
for at forebygge sygefravær ved 
psykiske problemer.
6.  Kerli Kant Hvass
  Weaving a Path from Waste to Value: 
Exploring fashion industry business 
models and the circular economy
7.  Kasper Lindskow
  Exploring Digital News Publishing 
Business Models – a production 
network approach
8.  Mikkel Mouritz Marfelt
  The chameleon workforce:
 Assembling and negotiating the   
 content of a workforce 
9.  Marianne Bertelsen
 Aesthetic encounters
  Rethinking autonomy, space & time 
in today’s world of art
10.  Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen
 EU PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL  
 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
11.  Abid Hussain
  On the Design, Development and 
Use of the Social Data Analytics Tool 
(SODATO):  Design Propositions, 
Patterns, and Principles for Big 
Social Data Analytics
12.  Mark Bruun
  Essays on Earnings Predictability
13.  Tor Bøe-Lillegraven
 BUSINESS PARADOXES, BLACK BOXES,  
 AND BIG DATA: BEYOND 
 ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY
14.  Hadis Khonsary-Atighi
  ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF 
DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN AN OIL-
BASED ECONOMY: THE CASE OF IRAN 
(1965-2010)
15.  Maj Lervad Grasten
  Rule of Law or Rule by Lawyers? 
On the Politics of Translation in Global 
Governance
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1.  Niels Kornum
  Servicesamkørsel – organisation, øko-
nomi og planlægningsmetode
1995
2.  Verner Worm
 Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
 Kulturspeciﬁ kke interaktionsrelationer
 ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i
 Kina
1999
3.  Mogens Bjerre
 Key Account Management of Complex
 Strategic Relationships
 An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
 Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4.  Lotte Darsø
 Innovation in the Making
  Interaction Research with heteroge-
neous Groups of Knowledge Workers
 creating new Knowledge and new
 Leads
2001
5.  Peter Hobolt Jensen
 Managing Strategic Design Identities
  The case of the Lego Developer Net-
work
2002
6.  Peter Lohmann
 The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
 Change – Moving Perspectives of the
 Human
7.  Anne Marie Jess Hansen
 To lead from a distance: The dynamic
  interplay between strategy and strate-
gizing – A case study of the strategic
 management process
2003
8.  Lotte Henriksen
 Videndeling
  – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæs-
sige udfordringer ved videndeling i
 praksis
9.  Niels Christian Nickelsen
  Arrangements of Knowing: Coordi-
nating Procedures Tools and Bodies in
 Industrial Production – a case study of
 the collective making of new products
2005
10.  Carsten Ørts Hansen
  Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
 effektivitet
TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN
2007
1.  Peter Kastrup-Misir
 Endeavoring to Understand Market
 Orientation – and the concomitant
 co-mutation of the researched, the
 re searcher, the research itself and the
 truth
2009
1.  Torkild Leo Thellefsen
  Fundamental Signs and Signiﬁ cance 
effects
 A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental
 Signs, Signiﬁ cance-effects, Knowledge
 Proﬁ ling and their use in Knowledge
 Organization and Branding
2.  Daniel Ronzani
 When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make
 Them Trip. Technological Innovation
 and the Role of Regulation by Law
 in Information Systems Research: the
 Case of Radio Frequency Identiﬁ cation
 (RFID)
2010
1.  Alexander Carnera
 Magten over livet og livet som magt
 Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens
